

HISTORY OF GREECE.

(CONNOPIE THE LWAII D D)

Connope / The Lwa

L I N A Y M

8 C I VII

2638
2.A.2



It should be

London

1817 Don't know

London

PRINTED BY H. N. BROWN & SONS, 15, N. B. ST. MARK'S PLACE, LONDON

TABLE,

ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL

TO THE SEVENTH VOLUME OF

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER LIII

ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS IN INDIA TO HIS RETREAT FROM THE HYPHASIS.

B. C.		Page
	India as known to the Greeks before Alexander	2
	Taxiles " " " "	3
	Alexander's Forces " " " "	4
327	March to Cabul " " " "	5
	Operations in the Mountains north of the Cophen	7
	Siege of Aornus " " "	10
	The Indian Nyssæ " " "	12
326	Alexander's Arrival at Taxila	13
	Indian Anchorites " " "	15
	Encampment on the Hydaspes " " "	16
	Attempts to deceive Porus " " "	17
	Passage of the Hydaspes " " "	19
	Battle of the Hydaspes " " "	22
	Treatment of Porus " " "	23
	Abisares " " "	24
	March to the Hydraotes " " "	25
	Sangala taken " " "	26
	Arrival at the Hyphasis " " "	27
	The Army bent on Retreat " " "	9
	Alexander yields " " "	30
	Returns to the Hydaspes " " "	31

vi ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

CHAP. LIV.

ALEXANDER'S PASSAGE DOWN THE INDUS AND RETURN TO SUSA.

B C		Page
	Preparations for the Navigation of the Indus	- 33
	Confluence of the Hydaspes and Acesines	- 35
	The Malli and Sudracæ	- 37
	Brahmins among the Malli	- 39
	Alexander's perilous Position	- 41
	He is dangerously wounded	- 43
	Returns to the Camp	- 45
	Submission of the Malli and Sudracæ	- 46
325.	Descent of the Indus	- 47
	Musicanus	- 48
	Arrival at Pattala	- 50
	Voyage to the Sea	- 51
	Survey of the Delta of the Indus	- 53
	Nearchus takes the Command of the Fleet	- 54
	Alexander quits India	- 55
	The Oritæ	- 56
	Gedrosia	- 57
	Sufferings of the Army	- 59
	Alexander's Self-denial	- 60
	Pura	- 61
	Arrival in Carmania	- 62
	Punishment of Macedonian Officers	- 63
	Arrival of Nearchus	- 65
	Rejoicings	- 67
	Alexander's Arrival in Persis	- 68
324.	Return to Susa	- 69

CHAP. LV.

FROM ALEXANDER'S RETURN TO SUSA TO HIS DEATH

Alexander's Projects	- 71
Discontent of his Subjects	- 72
Harpalus	- 73
Disbandment of the Greek Mercenaries	- 75
Nuptials at Susa	- 76
The Marriage Feast	- 77
Death of Calanus	- 79
Alexander pays the Debts of his Soldiers	- 80
New Organisation of the Army	- 82
Mutiny at Opis	- 83
Alexander's Speech	- 85
The Reconciliation	- 87

ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. vii

B C		Page
	Departure of Craterus with the Veterans	88
	Antipater	89
	Alexander's new Measures with the Greeks	90
	March to Ecbatana	91
	Festival at Ecbatana	92
	Performance of the Agen	93
	Death of Hephæstion	94
	Honours paid to him	95
	The Coesians	96
	Sinister Omens	97
	The Chaldeans	98
323	Embassies at Babylon	99
	Hephæstion's Funeral	101
	Alexander's Voyage on the Euphrates	102
	Omens	103
	Cassander	105
	Alexander's last Illness	107
	His Death	109
	Review of his Life	115

CHAP. LVI.

FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER TO THE END OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

	Mourning for Alexander's Death	116
	Council of the Officers	117
	Proposals as to the Succession	118
	Discontent among the Infantry	119
	Election of Arridaeus Philip	121
	Meleager and Perdicas	122
	Eumenes	123
	The Compromise	124
	The Lustration	126
	The Partition	127
	Alexander's Projects	129
	Murder of Statira	130
	State of Greece	131
	Demosthenes and the Macedonian Party at Athens	133
330	Prosecution of Ctesiphon	135
	Defeat of Æschines	138
	Remarks on the Case	139
	Trial of Leocrates	140
	Character and Administration of Lycurgus	141
	Alexander's Demand of Divine Honours	149
324.	His Decree for the Restoration of the Greek Exiles	151
	Harpalus in Athens	153
	Conduct of Demosthenes	155
	Escape of Harpalus	159

viii ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

B C		Page
	Condemnation of Demosthenes explained - -	- 160
	His Policy considered - - -	- 161
	Leosthenes - - -	- 163
323.	Preparations for War with Antipater -	- 165
	Confederacy of the Greeks - -	- 166
	Phocion and Hyperides - -	- 167
	Situation of Antipater - - -	- 169
	Victory of Leosthenes in Bœotia - -	- 171
	Antipater blocked up in Lamia - -	- 172
	Exertions of Demosthenes - - -	- 175
	His Return to Athens - - -	- 176
	Death of Leosthenes - - -	- 177
	Appointment of Antiphilus - - -	- 178
	Leonnatus - - -	- 179
	Diminution of the Greek Forces - -	- 181
322	Defeat and Death of Leonnatus - -	- 182
	Naval War - - -	- 183
	Arrival of Craterus in Thessaly - -	- 185
	Battle of Crannon - - -	- 186
	Dissolution of the Confederacy - -	- 187
	Embassies of the Athenians to Antipater -	- 189
	Xenocrates and Antipater - - -	- 190
	Macedonian Garrison in Munychia - -	- 191
	New Athenian Constitution - - -	- 192
	Emigration from Athens - - -	- 193
	Persecution of the Orators - - -	- 195
	Archias - - -	- 196
	Death of Demosthenes - - -	- 198
	Invasion of Ætolia - - -	- 199
	End of the Lamian War - - -	- 200

CHAP. LVII.

FROM THE END OF THE LAMIAN WAR TO CASSANDER'S OCCUPATION OF ATHENS.

323	Insurrection among the Greek Colonists in Asia -	- 203
	Treacherous Massacre - - -	- 204
322.	Campaign of Perdiccas against Ariarathes -	- 205
	Destruction of Laranda and Isaura - -	- 206
	Ptolemy's Power - - -	- 207
	Conquest of Cyrene - - -	- 208
	Alexander's Remains carried to Egypt -	- 209
	Intrigues of Perdiccas - - -	- 210
	Death of Cynane - - -	- 211
321.	Flight of Antigonus - - -	- 212
	Eumenes in Command in Asia Minor -	- 213
	Treachery and Defeat of Neoptolemus -	- 214

ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

IX

B. C.		Page
	Defeat and Death of Craterus and Neoptolemus	- 216
	Perdiccas invades Egypt	- 217
	Fruitless Attempts to cross the Nile	- 219
	Death of Perdiccas	- 221
	War in Greece	- 223
	Mutiny at Triparadissus	- 224
	Partition of Triparadissus	- 225
	Situation of Eumenes	- 226
	Danger of Cleopatra	- 228
	Antipater's Arrangement with Antigonus	- 229
21	Eumenes defeated, takes Refuge in Nora	- 231
	His Conference with Antigonus	- 232
	Defeat of Alcetas and Attalus	- 233
	Death of Alcetas	- 234
	State of Athens	- 235
	Intrigues of Demades	- 236
	His Embassy to Antipater	- 237
	And Death	- 238
1	Antipater's last Will, and Cassander's Intrigues	- 239
	Eumenes at Nora	- 240
	His Escape	- 241
	Operations of Antigonus on the Coast of Asia Minor	- 242
	Polysperchon and Olympias in Correspondence with Eumenes	- 243
	He espouses their Cause	- 244
	Prospects of Greece	- 245
	Polysperchon's Policy	- 246
	Edict of Arridæus Philip	- 247
18	Phocion and Nicanor	- 248
	Arrival of Alexander, Son of Polysperchon	- 249
	Phocion in the Macedonian Camp	- 250
	Is sent back to Athens	- 251
	Sacrificed by Polysperchon	- 252
	His Trial	- 254
	And Death	- 255
	Reflections on his political Career	- 256
	Megalopolis resists Polysperchon	- 258
	Siege of Megalopolis	- 259
	Polysperchon repulsed	- 260
	Victory and Death of Cleitus	- 261
	Capitulation of Athens with Cassander	- 262
	Prospects for Greece	- 263

X ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

CHAP LVIII.

**FROM CASSANDER'S OCCUPATION OF ATHENS TO THE TREATY
BETWEEN ANTIGONUS AND PTOLEMY, CASSANDER AND LY-
SIMACHUS, IN 311 B. C.**

B. C.		Page
	Difficult Position of Eumenes - - -	265
	His Contrivance of the Royal Tent - - -	266
	The Argyraspids - - -	267
317	Eumenes in the East - - -	268
	Is pursued by Antigonus - - -	269
	Confederacy of the Eastern Satraps - - -	270
	Antigonus at Susa - - -	271
	Stratagems of Eumenes - - -	272
	His Illness - - -	273
	Battle between Antigonus and Eumenes - - -	274
	Stratagem of Antigonus baffled by Eumenes - - -	275
	Treachery of the Satraps - - -	276
316	Last Battle between Antigonus and Eumenes - - -	277
	Treachery of the Argyraspids - - -	279
	Death of Eumenes - - -	280
	Pithon's Intrigues and Death - - -	281
	Return of Antigonus toward the West - - -	282
	Flight of Seleucus - - -	283
	Eurydice and Olympias - - -	284
317	Death of Arridaeus Philip and Eurydice - - -	285
	Cassander besieges Olympias in Pydna - - -	287
	Surrender of Olympias - - -	289
316	Death of Olympias - - -	291
	Marriage of Cassander and Thessalonice - - -	292
	Restoration of Thebes - - -	293
	Negotiation between Antigonus and his Rivals - - -	296
315	Preparations of Antigonus - - -	297
	Assembly at Tyre - - -	299
	Antigonus assumes the Regency - - -	300
	State of Grece - - -	301
314	Successes of Cassander - - -	303
	War in Cyprus - - -	304
	Naval Power of Antigonus - - -	305
	Antigonus in Phrygia - - -	307
313	Siege of Callistia - - -	308
	Negotiations - - -	309
	Hostile Fleets in the Eurpus - - -	310
312	Ptolemy invades Syria - - -	311
	Battle of Gaza - - -	312
	Seleucus recovers Babylon - - -	313
	Antigonus Master of Syria - - -	314
311	Expedition of Demetrius to Babylon - - -	315
	General Peace - - -	317

CHAP. LIX.

FROM THE PEACE OF 311 TO THE BATTLE OF IPSUS.

B. C.		Page
	Murder of Roxana and Alexander Ægus	- 319
310.	Revolt of Ptolemæus and Renewal of Hostilities	- 320
	Hercules Pretender to the Throne	- 321
309	Treacherously murdered by Polyperchon	- 322
308	Ptolemy's Expedition to Greece	- 323
	Murder of Cleopatra	- 324
	Demetrius the Phalerian	- 325
	Expelled from Athens	- 326
307.	Demetrius Master of Athens	- 331
	Extravagant Lattery	- 332
306.	Recal of Demetrius	- 333
	Siege of Salamis in Cyprus	- 334
	Sea-fight off Salamis	- 335
	The new Kings	- 337
	Expedition of Antigonus against Egypt	- 338
	He is compelled to retreat	- 339
	His War with the Rhodians	- 341
305.	Rhodes besieged by Demetrius	- 342
	Demetrius repulsed by Sea	- 343
304	And by Land	- 347
	Makes Peace with the Rhodians	- 348
	Returns to Athens	- 349
	His Excesses	- 350
303	His Expedition to Peloponnesus	- 351
	He reduces Sicyon and Corinth	- 352
	Congress at Corinth	- 353
	Expedition of Demetrius to the West	- 354
302	Demetrius initiated	- 355
	Lysimachus crosses over to Asia	- 356
	Demetrius and Cassander in Thessaly	- 357
	Movements of Antigonus and Lysimachus	- 358
	Negotiation between Demetrius and Cassander	- 359
	Demetrius in Asia	- 360
	Ptolemy's Operations in Syria	- 361
301.	Return of Seleucus from the East	- 362
	Battle of Ipsus	- 363
	Death of Antigonus	- 364
	Flight of Demetrius	- 365
	Conduct of the Athenians toward Demetrius	- 366
	Partition	- 367
	Results of the Battle of Ipsus	- 369

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER LIII.

ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS IN INDIA TO HIS RETREAT FROM THE HYPHASIS.

AFTER the conquest of the Bactrian satrapy, there remained only one province of the Persian empire into which Alexander had not yet carried his arms: it was that which tempted his curiosity, as well as his ambition, perhaps more than any other. Already, indeed, before he crossed the Paropamisus, he had made himself master of a great part of the country which the Persians called India, and perhaps had very nearly reached the utmost limits within which the authority of the Great King was acknowledged in the latter years of the monarchy. But the power of the first Darius had certainly been extended much further eastward. It seems probable that a part of his Indian tribute was collected in the Pendjab, and there is some reason to believe that it was on the Hydaspes Scylax began his voyage of discovery.¹ After the death of Darius, the attention of the Persian kings was so much turned toward the west, or distracted by wars with their revolted subjects,

¹ So Ritter, *Asien*, iv. 1. p. 445 v. Bohlen (*Indien*, i. p. 64), who likewise considers Caspatyrus as Cashmire, takes the river mentioned by Herodotus *iv.* 44. for the Cabul river. But in the same page he expresses a doubt whether the voyage described by Herodotus was ever made.

that they would scarcely have had leisure for fresh conquests in India, even if the spirit of Cyrus had lived in his successors: and it is very uncertain, whether their territories reached so far as the Indus. The greater part of the peninsula was, as we see from the accounts of Herodotus and Ctesias, utterly unknown to the Persians. The India of Herodotus is bounded on the east by a sandy desert, which, it seems, he believed to be terminated by the ocean which girded his earth, and was inhabited chiefly by pastoral and savage, even it was said cannibal tribes.¹ Nor had Ctesias, during his long residence at the Persian court, heard of the Ganges, or of the countries on its banks. He had indeed collected many marvellous reports, which must for the most part have seemed incredible to all intelligent Greeks, about the productions of India; but he betrays a total ignorance of the peculiar features of Indian society. Both he however and Herodotus represent the country, so far as it was known to them, as exceedingly rich and populous. The Indians, Herodotus observes, are by far the most numerous race of men we know: and the tribute of the Indian satrapy amounted to a third of the whole that Darius received: all, according to him, arising from the gold found in the northern mountains. But many other costly and useful productions of India, as cotton, spices, ivory, and precious stones, were very early known in the west, chiefly, it appears, through the commercial activity of the Phœnicians. At the battle of Arbela the Greeks for the first time saw elephants, which they heard had been brought from the banks of the Indus. To Alexander and his companions India appeared from a distance as a new world, of indefinite extent, and abounding in wonders and riches. Even without any other inducement, he must eagerly have desired to explore and subdue it.

During the campaigns of the last two years, he had met with opportunities of gaining better information

¹ These are generally supposed to be the aboriginal negro population from which the *Paria*s are believed to descend.

about India, than was to be found in Herodotus or Ctesias. Among the followers of Bessus was an Indian chief, or leader of mercenaries, named Sisycottus, who, when Bessus fell into Alexander's hands,¹ submitted to the conqueror, and became firmly attached to him. The accounts which he gave of the countries beyond the Indus, might afterwards have been confirmed by an embassy which Alexander received in Sogdiana, from a prince whose name is written by the Greeks Omphis, or Mophis, and who reigned over the rich tract which intervenes between the Upper Indus and the Hydaspes (Behut or Jhelum), the westernmost of the five great tributaries from which the whole eastern basin of the Indus, down to their confluence with it, takes the name of the Pendjab. His capital Taxila, from which he is more commonly entitled Taxiles, stood at some distance from either stream, and appears to have been a large and splendid city, though its site has perhaps not yet been discovered.¹ The king of Taxila had offered his alliance to Alexander, and sought aid from him against a powerful neighbour; and thus Alexander ascertained that the state of things in this part of India was highly favourable to his projected invasion. The distribution of power in the Pendjab appears to have fluctuated as much in the earliest times to which we can ascend in its history, as it has in those nearest to our own days. Ctesias spoke of the king of the Indians², as if all India, so far as it was known to him, was comprised under a single monarchy. This king was an ally of Artaxerxes, to whom he sent presents³, but not, it appears, as tokens of inferiority. Hence we may collect, that, when Ctesias wrote, a great part of the country on the Persian frontier was united under one powerful ruler. But in its ordinary condition it seems to have been subdivided into a number of small states, which were not under kingly government, and its inhabitants were on this

¹ The claims of the Tope of Maniklaula (Elphinstone, p. 79) to such antiquity are very doubtful.

² Ind. 22. 27. 28.

³ Ind. 98.

account branded, by the eastern Indians, whose kings reigned by divine right, as a lawless race.¹ Through some revolutions, no record of which has been preserved, a great part of it had in Alexander's time fallen under the dominion of three princes, the Taxiles already mentioned, and two who were kinsmen, and bore the name of Porus. The most powerful of these was the immediate neighbour of Taxiles; his territories lay to the east of the Hydaspes. It was against him that the king of Taxila sought to strengthen himself by an alliance with the Macedonian conqueror.

The accounts which Alexander received of the population and resources of the country he was about to enter, together with the consideration of the great length of time that would be requisite for reinforcements to reach him there, convinced him of the necessity of extraordinary preparations for his Indian expedition. But the European force which he had at his disposal for this purpose, can hardly have amounted to a greater number than he at first brought over into Asia. For beside the manifold losses this part of his army had suffered in the last two years, and the garrisons and colonies which had been drawn from it, he thought it necessary to leave a corps of 10,000 infantry, and 3,500 horse, in Bactria, under the command of the satrap Amyntas. Yet he marched into India at the head of 120,000 foot and 15,000 horse.² Of these we must suppose that at least 70,000 were Asiatic troops. A considerable part of these auxiliaries were drawn from Bactria and Sogdiana, and from the neighbouring Scythian hordes: and they answered the double purpose of strengthening his army, and of securing the tranquillity of the conquered lands from which they were withdrawn. With the same object a large proportion of

¹ Ritter, *Asien*, iv. p. 459. Lassen, *de Pentapotamia Indica*, p. 22. 'Απέ-
πιος (Arrian, *Periplus*, p. 27 ed. Hude.), Aráshtras, or Arattas, kingless.
The nickname seems to have been applied to the whole population of the
Pendjab, though it happened that in Alexander's time the part west of
the Acesines was under kingly government. Lassen, *u. s.*, speaks of this
as if it had been a permanent distinction.

² Plut. *Al.* 66., Arrian, *Ind.* 19. who does not mention the cavalry.

the boys, who were taken from their homes to receive Greek training, were undoubtedly collected in the north-east provinces. According to Curtius, it was just before he set out for India, that Alexander ordered a levy of 30,000 youths, to serve at once as hostages and soldiers.

The summer of 327 had scarcely begun, when he crossed the mountains, by a shorter route than he had taken in the winter of 329¹, which brought him in ten days to Alexandria. Here he found reason to remove the governor whom he had left there, and, having appointed Nicanor in his room, descended the valley of the Cabul river to Nicæa. This, according to the most probable conjecture, was the new name which he gave to the city otherwise called Ortospana, or Cabura, the site of the modern Cabul, where he made a sacrifice to Athene, perhaps to place it under her protection. He then advanced to the banks of the Cophen, the river formed by the confluence of the Cabul river with the Pendjshir, a larger stream, which meets it from the north-west. Here, in conformity to his summons, he was met by Taxiles, and by several chiefs from the country west of the Indus, bringing presents, such as were accounted the most honourable; and, as he expressed a wish for elephants, they promised all they possessed, which however amounted to no more than five-and-twenty. The satrapy of the Paropamisadæ, west of the Cophen, or Pendjshir, was committed to Tyriaspes. Alexander now divided his forces. He sent Hephæstion and Perdikkas, with a strong division, accompanied by the Indian chiefs, down the vale of the Cophen to the Indus, to prepare a bridge for the passage of the army, while he himself directed his march into the mountains north of the Cophen, and included between it and the Indus.² Here lay the territories

¹ Strabo, xv p. 267 Tauchn.

² An opinion of such a man as Schlosser must always deserve notice, and therefore the reader ought to be informed, that Schlosser (l. 3. p. 133.) takes an entirely different view of Alexander's march from Bactria to the Cophen. He says: "Alexander must probably have found the nearest road to

of three warlike tribes, the Aspasians or Hippasians, Guræans, and Assacenians. The operations of this campaign, which occupied the rest of the year, do not require to be related here with all the military details which belonged to Arrian's subject. It seems that Alexander was induced to take the upper road, not so much because he desired to reduce the mountaineers, as because he had learnt that it led through a country which was both better supplied with provisions, and on the whole presented fewer obstacles (since the streams would be more easily crossed near their sources, while the climate was more temperate) than he was likely to meet with, if he kept closer to the left bank of the Cophen.¹

He first ascended the rugged vale of the Choes, which seems also to have been called Choaspes, and Evaspla, by the Greeks; a tributary of the Cophen, apparently the modern Kamah, or Kashgar, which falls into it at the eastern foot of the great mountain pile called the Khoond, in which the Caucasus projects southward, toward the Khyber range. This vale led into the territory of the Aspasians, where, having taken two of the smaller towns, leaving Craterus to subdue the rest of the southern district, he himself marched

Cabul by Bamian too difficult, for he took the other, which leads from the southern part of the province of Balkh (from Ghoraut) to Kandahar, and accomplished this march in ten days. Thence he marched up the river Urgundab by Ghizni, which his Greek^s called Nysa, to Cabul, or Arigeum, and then down the river Cabul, which the ancients named Kophen, to its confluence with the Indus at Attock, the ancient Taxila." But Strabo (xv. p. 287 Tauchn.) on the contrary says expressly, that Alexander on his return crossed the Paropamisus by a *shorter route* than he had taken on his road to Bactria, and then directed his march straight toward India. This seems clearly to prove that he did not pass through Candahar, or Ghizni. As he had before crossed the mountains in the winter, the shortest route was probably then impracticable. Schlosser assigns no reason for fixing Nysa at or near Ghizni. Nysa lay (Arr. v. 1) in the country between the Cophen and the Indus, the same highlands in which lay the towns which Schlosser himself (p. 137) describes as situate in the mountains of the Hindukuh.

¹ Strabo, xv. p. 288. Tauchn. It seems necessary to interpret the passage thus, on account of the concluding sentence, which assigns the reason why Alexander crossed the Cophen, and subdued the mountain region eastward. Otherwise it would seem that the description of the drought and the heat was meant for the south of India, and not for the valley of Cabul.

northward against the capital, Gorydala, which stood on the eastern bank of the Choes. On his approach, the natives set fire to their city, and fled into the heart of their mountains: but they were overtaken by the invader, and their chief fell by the hand of Ptolemy. He then crossed over to the city of Arigæum, on the eastern side of the Aspasian territory. This he also found reduced to ashes, and deserted by its inhabitants: and as it commanded an important pass between the vale of the Choes, and that of the Guræus, another tributary of the Cophen (probably the Penjkore), he ordered Craterus, who had here rejoined the great army, to rebuild it, while he himself advanced into the interior in pursuit of the fugitives. He defeated their collected forces, and gathered a vast booty, including 40,000 captives, and between three and four hundred thousand head of cattle, from which he selected some of the finest to be sent into Macedonia. He then, with some difficulty, effected the passage of the deep and rapid Guræus, and entered the territory of the Assacenians. They did not venture to keep the field, but trusted to the strength of their towns. In Massaga, their capital, their chief had prepared to defend himself with the aid of 7000 mercenaries from the Pendjab. But when, after a short siege, he was killed by a dart from an engine, the garrison capitulated, and Alexander accepted the surrender of the place, on the condition that the mercenaries should join his army. But they discovered a degree of patriotism which he had not looked for. They were so averse from the thought of turning their arms against their countrymen, that, having marched out, and encamped on a hill by themselves, they meditated making their escape in the night. Alexander was apprized of their design, and, though they had not begun to execute it—with less generosity than might have been expected from him, even if mercy was out of the question—surrounded the hill with his troops, and cut them all to pieces. Then, holding the capitulation to

have been broken, he stormed the defenceless city, where the chief's mother and daughter fell into his hands.

Two strongholds, named *Ora* and *Bazira*, remained to be reduced in the district between the *Guræus* and the *Indus* : and the inhabitants of *Ora*, which probably lay farthest eastward, had received promises of support from a neighbouring prince named *Abisares*, who, according to this and the other indications afforded by his proceedings, must have reigned over *Cashmire*, a part of which is said to bear a name of very similar sound. Alexander however anticipated the arrival of these succours, by the capture of *Ora*, where he found some elephants : and the inhabitants of *Bazira*, now despairing of their own safety, fled to another place of refuge, which was deemed impregnable, and soon became crowded with fugitives from all parts of the country. This was a hill fort on the right bank of the *Indus*, not far above its junction with the *Cophen*. Its Indian name seems to have been slightly distorted by the Greeks, according to their usual practice, into that of *Aornus*, which answered to its extraordinary height, as above the flight of a bird. It was precipitous on all sides, and accessible only by a single path cut in the rock, though in one direction it was connected with a range of hills. But its summit was an extensive plain of fruitful soil, partly clothed with wood, and containing copious springs. The traditions of the country concerning its insurmountable strength seem to have given occasion to the fable, which spread through the Macedonian camp, that *Hercules* himself had assailed it without success. Alexander did not need this inducement to excite him to the undertaking. The opinion of the natives, which had led so many to take shelter there, was a sufficient motive. It had been a principle, to which he owed most of his conquests, to show that he was not to be deterred by any natural difficulties : and he resolved to make the *Aornus* his own. On his road southward, along the right bank of the *Indus*, he passed through the district of *Peucelaotis*, so called after its chief city *Peucela*,

which lay west of the Indus, though it has given its name to the modern Puckhelee on the opposite side of the river.¹ Its ruler, Astes, whose territory stretched southward beyond the Cophen, had maintained his independence against Hephæstion and Perdiccas, in a city which they besieged for thirty days on their march eastward. But he had fallen in the siege, and the place having been stormed, was committed to the care of Sangeus, one of his subjects who had revolted from him. Peucela surrendered to Alexander on his passage, and he occupied it with a Macedonian garrison. He then advanced to a city called Ecbolima, which lay very near to the foot of Aornus, and here he left Craterus, with orders to lay in a great stock of provisions: for the reports he had heard of Aornus, though they did not shake his resolution, made him doubt whether he might not be forced to turn the siege into a blockade.

The sight of the place itself, when he encamped before it, probably suggested no better hopes. But he had not long arrived at it, before he received information of a rugged and difficult track that led up to the top of a hill, separated by a hollow of no great depth, though of considerable width, from the rock. By this path he sent Ptolemy, with a body of light troops, who reached the summit before he was noticed by the garrison, and immediately, as he had been ordered, threw up an intrenchment, and by a fire-signal announced his success to the camp below. The Indians attempted in vain to dislodge him from his position: and the next day Alexander, by a hard struggle, notwithstanding their vigorous resistance, joined him there with the rest of the army. He now availed himself of his superior numbers, and began to carry a mound across the hollow. He took part in the work with his own hands, and the whole army, animated by his example and exhortations, prosecuted it with restless assiduity. It advanced at the rate of a furlong a day; and on the fourth day, a

¹ Rennell, *Memoir of a Map of Hindostan*. p. 147.

small detachment of Macedonians took possession of a little peak, which was on a level with the rock, where it seems they were protected by the missiles with which the besieged were now continually assailed: and the army redoubled its efforts to connect the mound with this point. But the Indians, astonished at the intrepidity with which a handful of men had seized this vantage-ground, and alarmed by the progress of the work, began to despair of resistance, and to meditate flight. They sent envoys to treat of terms of capitulation; but their intention was only to amuse Alexander until nightfall, and then to make their escape. He however was apprized of their design, and permitted them partly to execute it. But while they were stealing out of the place, he scaled the deserted wall with a part of his guard, entered the fortress, and chased the fugitives with great slaughter into the plains below. The capture of the rock which had baffled the assaults of Hercules, was celebrated with solemn sacrifices, and supplied a fresh theme for the eloquence of Agis and Anaxarchus.

The government of this important fortress was committed to Sisycottus: and the satrapy of the newly conquered districts between the Cophen and the Indus to Nicanor.¹ But the spirit of the mountaineers was not yet subdued. Alexander had scarcely left the Assacenic territory, before it was roused to revolt by a brother of the chief who had fallen at Massaga; and as soon as he had taken Aornus, the conqueror retraced his steps into the mountains, to suppress this insurrection.² He was the more anxious to reduce the rebel, because he was in possession of a number of elephants. But when he arrived at the town of Dyrtā in the insur-

¹ So perhaps Arrian's statement, iv 28., in which Droysen, p 376., suspects an error, may be reconciled with that which follows, v. 8. The satrapy of Philippos may have begun south of the Cophen.

² It is amusingly characteristic to find Droysen, p. 380, talking of Alexander's *just anger* against the insurgents: as if a robber had a *right* to be angry, when a man whom he has knocked down gets up again, and tries to recover his property.

gent district, he found it deserted by its inhabitants, and could not even obtain any information as to the movements of the fugitives. He therefore despatched Nearchus and Antiochus to scour the country toward the north-west, while he himself opened a road which no army had ever before trodden to the banks of the Indus. On his way he took some of the natives, who informed him, that the main body of their countrymen had fled into the dominions of Abisares, but that they had left their elephants in the thickets, on the west bank of the river.¹ With the aid of native hunters, Alexander captured the beasts, and then built a fleet, in which he dropped down the stream to the bridge which had been prepared for him by Hephæstion and Perdicas: where he arrived, it appears, toward the end of the year 327.

It was in the course of the campaign in the highlands between the Cophen and the Indus, and, it seems, in the territory of the Guræans, that the Macedonians were struck with some appearances in the productions of the soil, and the manners of the natives, and probably also by the sound of some names, which reminded them of the legends of Dionysus, whose fabulous conquests were now so often mentioned by Alexander's flatterers, for the purpose of exalting the living hero, whom they proposed to deify, above the god. Euripides, a bold innovator in many things, had, in one of his finest tragedies, described the expedition of Dionysus to the remote east, and had carried him as far as Bactria, a greater distance, it seems, than he had been made to reach by any preceding poet. But as there was no reason why the victorious and beneficent career of the wine-giving son of Zeus should have stopped there, it could not be surprising if traces of his presence were

¹ Arrian's narrative can hardly be reconciled with that of Curtius (viii. 12.), if his Eryx, the Aphricas of Diodorus (xviii. 86.) is the same person with the Assacenian chief. For, according to Curtius and Diodorus, his head was brought to Alexander by his own soldiers. The scene of the elephant chase is supposed to have lain near Mullai, about the confluence of the Indus and the Abbasseen.

discovered farther eastward. And so we read, that Alexander came to a city called Nysa, which boasted of Dionysus as its founder, and, as evidence of the fact, showed the ivy and laurel which he had planted¹; a sight new to the Macedonians, since they had left their native land. And near the city was the mountain which he had named Meros, or Meru, in memory of his marvellous birth. The Macedonians, it is said, made a pilgrimage to the mountain, wove themselves chaplets of the ivy that grew in the thickets on its sides, and joyfully hymned the heart-cheering Power. Alexander sacrificed to his divine predecessor, and permitted his colony, which is described as an aristocratical republic, under a chief named Acuphis, to retain its liberty and laws.

We have too many instances of the readiness with which the natives of India have humoured the fancy of Europeans about their mythology, to be much surprised that the Guræans should have adopted the fable of Dionysus, which they may have learnt from the questions of the invaders, and have dexterously turned to their own profit.² Alexander, Arrian ob-

¹ The name of Nysa, which was so celebrated in the legends of Dionysus, that it accompanied him in all his wanderings, was probably invented for this story, by the writers who put it into the form in which it is related by Arrian. But if, as v. Bohlen conjectures (*Indien*, i. p. 143.), the range of Paropamisus was properly *Paropanisas* (*above Nisa*), Alexander's soldiers must have heard some name in this district of similar sound. It is however remarkable, that in the Indian mythology (v. Bohlen, p. 141) the sun has the name of *Suradevas*, the wine-god, and is born of *Nis*, night. Ritter, who a few years ago (*Asien*, iv. i. p. 449) seemed inclined to adopt v. Bohlen's derivation *paraupa Nisa*, in his late essay on the Topes, p. 37., decides in favour of another, *Paro Vami*—the mountain city: taking Bamiyan for the place which thus gave its name to the whole range. The country of the Guræans, it has been conjectured, answers to that of the remarkable people, called by the Mahometans of India *Cafirs* (Unbelievers), of whom an interesting account is given in the Appendix (C) of Elphinstone's *Caulbul*. Their valleys, it is said (p. 618) produce large quantities of grapes, wild and cultivated. It is rather surprising, that Arrian does not mention the vines of Nysa. They are however included in the description given by Curtius of Mount Meros, viii. 10 12. The *Cafirs* (Elphinstone, p. 626.) of both sexes drink wine to great excess. Persons of both sexes, and of all ages, dance with great vehemence, using many gesticulations, and beating the ground with great force, to a music which is generally quick, but varied and wild. Such usages would certainly have struck the Macedonians as Bacchanalian.

² Acuphis, we are told by Arrian (v. 1.) came at the head of an embassy, to implore the conqueror's clemency for the colony of Dionysus. They

serves, was gratified by their story, and wished it to be believed, that he was then treading in the steps of Dionysus; for he hoped that the Macedonians, roused by emulation, would be the more willing to bear the fatigues of the expedition in which he purposed to pass the utmost distance that had been reached by the divine conqueror. If we may depend on this observation, it would prove that he had not yet thought of any limit to his own progress, within the farthest bounds of the eastern world.

Aristobulus related, that the spring (326) had only just begun when Alexander ended his campaign in the mountains; and according to Arrian's chronology, — which, however, as will be seen, there is some reason to question — it cannot have been later than March when he crossed the Indus, probably a little above its junction with the Cophen. He celebrated his arrival on the eastern bank by a solemn sacrifice, and soon after met Taxiles, who had come out, with his army and his elephants, to greet him, and conduct him to his capital, with professions of the most entire submission and devotion. It is possible, and indeed it must be supposed, if we follow Aristobulus, that he made a stay of considerable length at Taxila¹, for here, according to this author, he experienced the beginning of the summer rains², which are not known to fall in the Pendjab before June or July.³ It is certain that he there received an embassy from Abisares, which was brought by the prince's own brother, and by some of his principal nobles, as well as from another Indian chief,

find him sitting in his tent, still covered with dust from the day's march, and in full armour, leaning on his spear. They prostrate themselves before him for a time in silent awe. Acuphis then makes a speech, such as might have been put into his mouth by Anaxarchus.

¹ As might perhaps be inferred from Diodorus, xvii. 87., *ἐν τῇ Ταξιλαῖ ἡ χώρα προσαναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν*.

² Strabo, xv. p. 259. Tauchn.

³ "The south-west monsoon commences in the south of India about the beginning of June, but it gets later as we advance towards the north." (Elphinstone, p. 126.) About Delhi it does not begin till the end of June, p. 130. It may, however, deserve to be noticed, that Baber (Memoirs, p. 257.) mentions a great flood caused by a fall of rain in the Duab of the Indus, and the Jhelum, on the 25th of February.

named Doxares. It appears also, notwithstanding Arrian's silence on the subject, that he sent an envoy to Porus to demand tribute, and to say that he expected to be met by him on his western frontier. The answer of Porus breathed defiance ; he would meet the invader at the entrance of his kingdom, but in arms. But about the same time he received an embassy of a different tenor from the other prince of that name. This Porus, who was jealous of his kinsman's power, and hoped to profit by his fall, sent offers of submission to the stranger. He was perhaps attracted by the example and the good fortune of Taxiles, whose hospitality Alexander requited with munificent presents, and an enlargement of his territory, to which he probably annexed some of the newly-conquered districts west of the Indus. But Taxiles purchased this advantage at the price of his independence ; for Philippos was appointed satrap of this part of India, and a Macedonian garrison was stationed in his capital.

It seems to have been during his stay at Taxila, that Alexander was first enabled to gratify his curiosity concerning the doctrines and practices of the Indian ascetics. He had already witnessed something similar at Corinth, where he found Diogenes living in habits of simplicity not unworthy of the Eastern gymnosophists, as the Greeks called the sages who exposed themselves almost naked to the inclemency of the Indian sky. He is reported to have said that, had he not been Alexander he would have been Diogenes. The independence of a man who had nothing to ask of his royal visitor but that he would not stand between him and the sun, struck him as only less desirable than the conquest of the world ; and he conceived a like admiration for the Indian quietists, who manifested a kindred spirit. Yet their principles were widely different from those of the Greek philosopher. Diogenes thought he had attained the summit of happiness, when he had contracted his animal enjoyments within the narrowest compass, so that fortune might have the smallest possible hold on

him. The Indian anchorites appear to have viewed their mortal existence as a period of training for a final release from the body, which was the highest object of their desires, and to have believed that the waste and abuse of life was the best preparation for death. Alexander, to whom such spectacles were new, did not perhaps sufficiently reflect, that to throw away life — whether in frivolous amusements, or useless austerities, or indolent rumination — requires much less vigour of mind and energy of character than to spend it in enterprises even less arduous and noble than his own. He was desirous of carrying away with him some of the Indian sophists as companions of Anaxarchus.¹ Fifteen of them were pursuing their contemplative exercises in a grove near Taxila, and Onesicritus was sent to them with the king's invitation.² It was rejected with disdain by Dandamis, the eldest and head of the cœnobites: but one of them — by the Greeks nicknamed Calanus³ — was induced, it is said, by the persuasions of Taxiles to accept it, and accompanied Alexander to the end of his expedition; a sacrifice of his independence, by which he incurred the contempt of his fellow-recluses.

After solemn sacrifices and games, Alexander resumed his march. He was informed that Porus had collected his forces on the left bank of the Hydaspes, to defend the passage; and he therefore sent Crœnus back to the

¹ Perhaps, too, as Arrian suggests (Ind. c. 15.) for the benefit of their medical skill.

² Strabo, xv p 296. Tauchn. It has been disputed whether Calanus and his companions were Brahmins, or Buddhists. The language of the Greeks, Alexander's contemporaries, who scarcely suspected the difference between the two religions, is of little weight on this question. But it seems most probable that they were Brahmins. This supposition appears to agree best with the attachment they discover to the soil of India, and with the boast attributed to Dandamis, that he, no less than Alexander, was a son of the supreme God. (Arrian, vii. 2.) On the other hand, there is no trace of any Buddhist peculiarity among them. The distinction between the Brahmins, the Samanai, or Buddhists, and the Sarmanai, or Brahmin anchorites, has been clearly and convincingly explained by Lassen, *De hominibus quibus a veteribus appellantur Indorum philosophi* Welcker's *Rhen. Mus.*, vol. 1., where he observes, p. 175., that the title of Gymnosophists, which was applied indiscriminately to ascetics of both religions, does not occur in any Greek author before Plutarch.

³ His proper name was Sphines, Plut. Al. 65. Calanus was, it seems, a corruption of the Indian salutation *Calyana*; which is said to be equivalent to *dear friend*.

Indus, with orders to have the vessels in which the army had crossed sawed each into two or three pieces, and transported to the Hydaspes. He left all his invalids at Taxila, and strengthened his army with 5000 Indians, who were commanded by Taxiles in person. On his march he found a defile, through which his road lay, occupied by a nephew of Porus, named Spittacus, or Spitaces, with a body of troops.¹ These he soon dispersed, and having arrived without further opposition on the right bank of the Hydaspes, beheld the whole army of Porus, with between 200 and 300 elephants, drawn up on the other side, separated from him by a deep and rapid stream, which, at the time he reached it, was perhaps little less than a mile broad.²

¹ Polyænus, iv. 3 21., who gives indeed no hint as to the scene of the action. But as there can be little doubt that his Pittacus is the Spitaces mentioned by Arrian, v. 18, I have not hesitated to place it here, with Droysen. Whether the government of Spittacus, who is described by Arrian as *νομάρχης τῶν τὰν Ἰνδῶν*, extended west of the Hydaspes, is another question.

² The exact points at which Alexander encamped on the Hydaspes, and crossed it, seem to be not clearly ascertained. The prevailing opinion seems to be, that the encampment was either near Jhelum and Rotas, or near Jhelalpoore, about sixteen miles lower down. Mr. Elphinstone and his suite, who crossed at the latter place (Cabul, p. 80), were struck by the *precise correspondence between this part of the Hydaspes, and Curtius's description of the scene of Porus's battle*; chiefly, it appears, on account of the islands, which are there formed by the stream. On the other hand, Burnes, li. p. 49 (who also confounds the place, either of the encampment or the passage, with the field of battle, as well as the 150 stades of Alexander's march along the river with the distance of the Macedonian camp from its bank) observes, that the sunken rocks mentioned by Curtius (in the description of the *encampment*, viii. 13. 9.) seem to point higher up the river near Jhelum, where is the more frequented ford, and the ordinary road from the Indus (see Rennell's Memoir, p. 122, but comparing Vincent, i. p. 110), and where the river also forms several islands. About fifteen miles lower down, near Daralpoore, he saw extensive ruins (Oudeenugur, Huria Badshapoor) which he takes for those of Nicæa and Bucephalia (describing them as nearly opposite to each other). He seems not to have observed, that, according to Curtius, Alexander marched up the river to the place where he crossed. Ritter (Asien, iv. i. p. 452.), though he mentions these conjectures of Burnes with approbation, fixes on Daralpoore as the place of crossing, and supposes the camp to have been more than twelve miles lower down, therefore below Jhelalpoore, where, he says, the road from Taxila crosses the river. Mr. Williams (Alex. p. 267.) observes, "We may be almost certain that the advance of the army was along the main road leading from Attock to Jellick-pore" (perhaps a misprint for Mullick-pore or Jilla-pore, two names which are close together in Arrowsmith's map). Vincent would place the encampment much lower down; for he thinks it evident that the woody island, where Alexander crossed, is no other than that of Jamad, which was defended by Chehabeddin against Timour (Cheref, iii. c. 10.) about twenty-eight miles, according to him, below Rotas; and he meets the objection which might be drawn from the modern direction of the high road from the Indus, by the conjecture, that the road has been diverted to Rotas, only because the island afforded a strong

Porus had stationed posts at various points up and down the river to watch the enemy's motions, and Alexander spent some time reconnoitring the country on the right bank. To distract the attention of Porus, he divided his army into several columns, with which he made frequent excursions in various directions, as 1. uncertain where he should attempt a passage. He then gave out that he had resolved to wait for the more favourable season, when the streams should have shrunk within their ordinary beds, and ordered magazines of provisions to be formed, as for a long sojourn. It seems indeed surprising, that he did not defer his expedition until the end of the monsoon, the nature and duration of which he must now have learnt from the natives. He may, it is true, have suspected their accounts of exaggeration; but perhaps also he was encouraged by the persuasion, that his own troops were able to sustain the inclemency of the weather better than any others, and by the thought, that the greater the difficulty of keeping the field the more likely that he might gain a passage by surprise. He had very soon satisfied himself that it would be utterly impracticable to cross in the face of the enemy, because the very sight of the elephants would have thrown his cavalry into confusion. It only remained therefore to steal a passage at some other point. His movements were probably hastened by the intelligence, that Abisares, notwithstanding the recent embassy, was on his way with his army to join Porus.

At the distance of a day's march above the camp, at

*post, which in India is always a source of exaction. And he thinks that, from the resistance of Chahubeddin it may be presumed, that the island has the advantage of high ground, and woods, as described by Arrian. Droysen, adopting Vincent's hypothesis, and building upon the last-mentioned conjecture, does not hesitate to describe Jamad as a high and woody island. (p. 389.) But the coincidence, though certainly specious, is uncertain (Plutarch, from Alexander's letters, calls the island *ἡ μυστλή*, Al. 60.); and, according to Vincent's reasoning, Alexander should have encamped nearer to the island. Droysen thinks that we recognise the line of Alexander's march in Baber's description of his own. But to do so, we must first ascertain the position of the pass of Hambātu, and that of Bherah on the Hydaspes (Baber, p. 255.) Six years later (1525), we find Baber (p. 255.) passing the river Behas below Jilem by the ford.*

a bend of the river toward the west, where the projecting right bank was covered with wood, an island, also thickly wooded, parted the stream. This was the spot which Alexander fixed upon for his attempt. He ordered the vessels brought in pieces from the Indus to be carried to it: the shelter of the wood enabled the workmen to put them together again unobserved. Skins also were provided to be stuffed with straw. In the meanwhile he endeavoured to lull the enemy's vigilance by a series of false alarms. Night after night he sallied forth with his cavalry, as noisily as possible, and pushed up or down the river, as if to attempt a passage. Porus at first drew out his elephants, and moved towards the quarter from which the clamour proceeded. But when the feint had been often repeated, he ceased to attend to it, and did not stir his elephants for any noise that he might hear on the other side. Still farther to cover his plan, Alexander lined the right bank, down to the destined point of embarkation, with a series of posts, within hearing of each other, who were ordered to keep up an incessant shouting. He then left Craterus, with a strong division, in the camp, with orders to remain there as long as he saw the elephants on the opposite bank, but whenever they should be withdrawn, to attempt the passage without loss of time. Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias, were posted with the mercenaries, horse and foot, lower down the river, and were ordered to cross over as soon as they should see the Indians engaged with the king. Alexander himself set out with the flower of his Macedonian cavalry, and the Bactrian, Sogdian, and Scythian auxiliaries, in all about 5000, and a select division of heavy and light infantry, which included the hypaspists and the brigades of Cleitus and Cœnus. He directed his march at a sufficient distance from the river to be concealed from the enemy's view, and about sunset arrived over against the island. During the night a violent fall of rain, accompanied by a terrible thunder-storm, a little impeded the labours of the men; but the noise also served to drown the clatter

of the axes and hammers, and all the din of preparation, which might otherwise have reached the post on the opposite bank.

With the return of light the rain had ceased, and the storm was hushed: and the troops were immediately embarked. The king himself, with Ptolemy¹, Perdikkas, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, the founder of the Syrian dynasty, went on board a small galley, with a part of the hypaspists. The woody island concealed their movements, until, having passed it, they were within a short distance of the left bank. Then first they were perceived by the Indians stationed there; who immediately rode off at full speed to carry the tidings to their camp. In the mean while Alexander proceeded to form the cavalry, which was first landed, and, putting himself at their head, began to advance from the bank. But he soon discovered that he had not yet reached the main land: that he was on another island, separated from it by a channel of no great width but which the rain just fallen had swollen into a formidable stream. A ford, however, barely passable, was at length discovered: and the whole division was finally drawn up in order of battle. Arrian seems to say, that the infantry amounted to no more than 6000 men: but perhaps he meant to speak only of the two brigades of the phalanx²: the whole of the foot, including the hypaspists and the light troops, may have been nearer 20,000. Alexander pushed forward with his cavalry and a corps of bowmen: confident that by his superi-

¹ So Arrian. And even Curtius mentions Ptolemy as present at the battle (viii. 14, 15), though before (viii. 13, 27) he had mentioned him as if he had been left on the right bank opposite to Porus, probably confounding him with Craterus. Droysen, however, seemingly on no other ground, states that Ptolemy was left in command of the three divisions, Melager, Attalus, and Gorgias. We require some better evidence to prove that Ptolemy was not an eye-witness of the battle, which Arrian has described on his authority.

² Droysen, on the contrary, imagines that they were left behind on the right bank to cover the road from Cashmere. One should have thought that Alexander could have found a better use for them against Porus; and it is not at all clear that he believed Abisares to be so near at hand. Arrian is silent as to the report mentioned by Diodorus (xvii. 87), that Abisares was on his march to join Porus, and was only 400 stades off. He merely speaks of an intention (*ἔμελλεν*, v. 20) which it appears had not been so far indicated by any overt act, as to render an apology necessary.

ority in this arm he should be enabled either to rout the whole host of Porus, or at least to keep it engaged until the infantry came up to support him: and it seems he was not without hope that the tidings of his unexpected passage might strike the enemy with such consternation that they would not wait for his coming, and that he should have nothing to do but to overtake and destroy the fugitives.

This hope, however, was not fulfilled. Porus was not of a spirit to be so easily overpowered. His first thought, when he received the intelligence, was that there might still be time to come up with the enemy, before they had completed their landing: and he immediately sent one of his sons¹, with 2000 cavalry, and 120 chariots, toward the place. Alexander, when he first saw this body, believed that Porus was approaching with his whole army, and sent the horse-bowmen forward to reconnoitre. But as soon as he had ascertained the real state of the case he charged with all his cavalry. The Indians scarcely waited for the shock of this greatly superior force. Four hundred of them were slain, and among them the prince himself. The chariots, which made their way with great difficulty over ground which the rain had turned into a swamp, all fell into the hands of the conquerors.

Even this disaster did not bow the courage of Porus: but he was perplexed by the necessity of at once meeting Alexander's attack, and defending the passage of the river against Craterus. He did not however hesitate long; but, leaving a part of his elephants to check Craterus, advanced to the decisive conflict, with 200 of them, the whole of his cavalry (about 4000), 300 chariots, and the bulk of his infantry, which amounted to about 30,000 men. Beyond the swampy ground near the river, he found a tract of sandy soil, which now presented a firm footing: and here he drew up his forces to await Alexander's approach. He relied chiefly on his elephants, which he placed in front of his line,

¹ According to Curtius, his brother, named Hages

at intervals of a hundred feet, which were filled up with infantry: one half of the cavalry was posted at each flank, and the chariots in front of them.

Alexander, when he came in sight of the enemy, made his cavalry halt, to allow time for the infantry to come up, and recover breath, after their long and quick march, while he himself, observing the disposition of the hostile army, decided on his plan of attack. It was his object to make such use of his cavalry, in which his own strength lay, as to deprive Porus of all the advantage he expected from his elephants, and from the superior numbers of his foot. He posted himself, as usual, in the right wing, with the main body of the cavalry; but stationed Cœnus, with two squadrons, on the left. With his wonted sagacity he anticipated that an attack on the enemy's left wing would draw out the cavalry on the right to protect it: and he ordered Cœnus in this case to fall on their rear. His own phalanx was not to be brought up, until the enemy's line should have been thrown into confusion by the charge of the cavalry. The event answered his expectations in every point. The horse-bowmen were first ordered to advance, and threw the enemy into some disorder by a shower of arrows. Alexander then led up the rest of his cavalry to the charge. The Indian cavalry of the right wing was brought up to the relief of their left, and was at the same time taken in the rear by Cœnus, and charged by Alexander in front. The whole body, in disorder, sought shelter in the line of the elephants, and the Macedonian phalanx then advanced to take advantage of the confusion, and to support their cavalry. Yet the shock of the huge animals, as long as they were under controul, made havock even in the ranks of the phalanx, and afforded time for the Indian cavalry to rally. But when they were driven in by a second charge of the Macedonian horse, and the engagement was crowded within a narrower space, the elephants, pressed on all sides, began to grow unmanageable; many lost their drivers, and, maddened by wounds, turned their fury

indiscriminately against friend and foe. The phalanx then opened a large space for them and eluded their onset, while the light troops plied them with their missiles, or mutilated their trunks, and drove them back upon their own ranks, where, as long as their strength lasted, they spread havoc and confusion. At length, when many of them were killed, and the rest, spent with wounds and toil, ceased to be formidable, Alexander ordered another general charge of horse and foot; and the Indians, routed at all points, betook themselves to flight. By this time Craterus, and the divisions on the right bank, had effected their passage; and engaging in the pursuit with all the vigour of fresh troops, made dreadful slaughter among the fugitives.

The number of the slain on the side of the Indians amounted, according to the more moderate account in Diodorus, to about 12,000. Among them were two other sons of Porus, and the greater part of his principal officers. Nine thousand prisoners were taken, and eighty elephants. The chariots had been all destroyed, though Arrian does not mention the part which they took in the battle. The loss of the Macedonians is estimated, as usual, at only a few hundreds.¹

Porus himself, mounted on an elephant, had both directed the movements of his forces, and gallantly taken part in the action. He had received a wound in his shoulder — his body was protected by a corselet of curious workmanship, which was proof against all missiles — yet, unlike Darius, as long as any of his troops kept their ground, he would not retire from the field. When, however, he saw all dispersed, he too turned his elephant for flight. He was a conspicuous object, and

¹ This battle, according to Arrian, was fought in the month Munychion of the Archon Hegemon (April and May, 326.) Mr. Clinton adopts an emendation, by which the date would be changed to August, 327. The oversight by which he has omitted to notice, that no time would thus be left for the campaign in the mountains between the Cophen and the Indus, is clearly pointed out by Droysen. But it is at least equally strange, that Droysen himself should adopt Arrian's date, as if it were free from all difficulty; though, unless the nature of India has changed since the time of Alexander, it is impossible that the rainy season, which had set in before the battle, could have begun in Munychion.

easily overtaken; and Alexander, who had observed and admired the courage he had shown in the battle, desirous of saving his life, sent Taxiles to summon him to surrender. But the sight of his old enemy only roused his indignation; Taxiles could not gain a hearing for his message, and narrowly escaped a wound. Alexander nevertheless continued to send messengers after him; and at length, hopeless of escape, and worn with fatigue and thirst, he yielded to the persuasions of Meroes, an Indian, one of his favourites, alighted from his elephant, and after having slaked his thirst, permitted himself to be led into the conqueror's presence.¹ All he would ask of Alexander, was to be treated as a king: and when Alexander observed, that this was no more than a king must do for his own sake, and bade him make some request for himself, his reply was still, that all was included in this.

His expectations could scarcely have equalled the conqueror's munificence. He was not only reinstated in his royal dignity, but received a large addition of territory. Yet it was certainly not pure magnanimity, or admiration for his character, that determined Alexander to this proceeding. He was conscious that his forces were not sufficient to enable him to displace the native princes east of the Indus, and to annex their territories, in the form of a satrapy, to his empire. Hence the generosity he had shown to Taxiles. But Taxiles himself might have become formidable without a rival; and the only way to secure the Macedonian ascendancy in the Pendjab, was to trim the balance of power.²

Alexander, after he had buried his slain, and solemn-

¹ Diodorus and Curtius tell a different story. According to them, Porus, holding out to the last, sank senseless from loss of blood, and in this state was carried into Alexander's presence.

² Droysen, p. 401., conceives, that Alexander could not have *wished* to make a people so highly civilised as the Indians subjects of his empire, but only to open a way for the influence of *Hellenistic* forms of society, by which, in process of time, they might be united (under one government ?) with the rest of Asia. But a conjecture so arbitrary does not belong to history, especially where it is not needed for the explanation of any facts.

ised his victory with his usual magnificence, allowed the main body of his army a month's rest, perhaps in the capital of Porus. The continuance of the rains was probably the chief motive for this delay. But before he quitted the scene of his triumph, he founded two cities near the Hydaspes, one, which he named Nicæa, near the field of battle, the other near the place where he had crossed the river; this he named Bucephala, after his gallant steed, which had sunk either under fatigue or wounds in the hour of victory. Craterus was left to superintend the building of these cities; while Alexander himself, with a select division of horse and foot, invaded the territory of the Glausæ, or Glau-sanicæ, who occupied the rich valleys on the north of the dominions of Porus. It was a highly flourishing and populous region, but offered little resistance to Alexander, who is said to have taken thirty-seven cities, none containing less than 5000 inhabitants. All this country he annexed to the kingdom of Porus. He at the same time reconciled him, in appearance at least, with Taxiles, who was then permitted to return to his own capital. On his return from his expedition against the Glausæ, Alexander received another embassy from Abisares, which was again brought by his brother, in which he renewed his offers of submission, and, as a pledge of his sincerity, among other presents, sent forty elephants. But Alexander, who was aware of his crooked and time-serving policy, replied only by a threatening message, requiring him, if he wished to avoid an invasion, to present himself in person at the Macedonian camp. Envoys came likewise from the younger Porus, who up to this time had believed that he was deeply interested in Alexander's success, and from the independent states east of the Hydraotes. Here too he received a reinforcement brought by Phrattaphernes, of the Thracians who had been left with him. On the other hand, he was informed by a dispatch from Sisycottus that a fresh revolt had broken out among the Assacenians, who had killed the governor

set over them. Philippus and Tyriaspes were sent with a division to reduce them to obedience.

Before he resumed his march eastward, Alexander ordered a great quantity of ship timber to be felled in the forests on the upper course of the Hydaspes, which abound in fir and cedar, and floated down the stream to his new cities, and a fleet to be built for the navigation of the Indus. He then advanced to the next great river of the Pendjab, the Chenab, which, it seems, he named Acesines, to avoid the sinister omen contained in its Indian name¹, which might attract attention from the injury which was done to the boats by its rocky bed. He now dismissed Porus to collect Indian troops and elephants for his service, and leaving Cœnus with his brigade on the right bank to guard the passage for the convoys which he expected, set forward with his lightest troops to overtake the younger Porus, who, hastily concluding that the favour shown to his kinsman portended his own ruin, did not venture to trust himself in the hands of the conqueror, and had fled beyond the Hydraotes (or Araotes, the Ravee), which separated his territories from those of the independent tribes. Alexander sent Hephæstion with a strong division to take possession of the fugitive's vacant dominions, as well as of any independent territory that he might find west of the Hydraotes; and ordered that they should be subjected to the rule of Porus. On the right bank of the Hydraotes he found himself not far from the confines of one of the most warlike of the independent tribes, who, according to the Greek form of their Indian name, were called Cathæans.² Their chief city, Sangala, seems to have occupied nearly the same site as the modern capital of the Seik monarchy, Lahore, on a branch of the Ravee, near the edge of a small lake.³

¹ Chandrabâgha—the moon's gift—would have been pronounced by the Greeks so as to sound like Sandrophagus (q. d. Ἀνδροφάγος or Ἀλιεὺς ἀνδροφάγος). Ritter, *Asien*, iv. 1 p. 456.

² The name is considered by Sanskrit scholars as a corruption of Kahatra, or Xatres, which is said to signify a mixed race, sprung from females of the warrior tribe and men of an inferior caste.

³ Burnes, i. 156.

Alexander, on his march up the river, received or extorted the submission of some other smaller tribes. As he approached Sangala, he found the Cathæans strongly intrenched on an insulated hill near the city, behind a triple barrier of waggons. Such an obstacle could not long detain the Macedonians. After Alexander, dismounting from his horse, had put himself at the head of the phalanx, the three lines were soon forced, and the barbarians took refuge within their walls. He then invested the city on three sides, and, expecting that the enemy would attempt to escape in the night across the lake, lined its margin with his cavalry. The attempt was made, but through this precaution without effect, and he then proceeded to open a trench between the city and the lake. The barbarians still made another attempt to escape in the night, before the trench was completed; but their design was betrayed, and they were again driven back within their ramparts. Engines had now been constructed for an assault; but before they were brought up, the walls, which were made of brick, were partly undermined, and the place was carried by storm. A bloody carnage ensued; for the besieged had made a vigorous resistance, and more than 1200 of the besiegers, including several general officers, and the somatophylax Lysimachus, were wounded. In revenge 17,000 of the barbarians were massacred; 70,000 were made prisoners. Alexander then sent his secretary, Eumenes of Cardia, to announce his conquest to two neighbouring cities which had been in alliance with the Cathæans, and to invite them to earn his clemency by a timely submission. But the fate of Sangala had struck them with such consternation, that the whole population took to flight. Alexander tried to overtake them, and came up with a few of the hindmost, who were cut to pieces; but he was at length obliged to give up the pursuit. On his return to Sangala, he razed it to the ground, and distributed its territory among the tribes which had submitted without resistance. Porus, who had arrived during the siege

with about 5000 Indians, was sent to place garrisons in their towns. He himself continued his march towards the south-east, and received the submission of two chiefs, who are named by the Greeks Sopeithes and Phegeus, and then arrived on the banks of the Hyphasis, or rather of the stream formed by the junction of the Hyphasis (Beiah) with the Hesudrus (Setledge).

That he came upon it considerably below the confluence seems clear, from the mention of the desert which lay between it and the Ganges. And here he had at length reached the fated term of his progress toward the east. The causes which arrested his career on the western bank of the Hyphasis, are too uniformly stated by the ancient historians, notwithstanding the rhetorical exaggerations for which the event furnished such an ample theme, to permit us to believe that they have been totally misrepresented. Alexander had, no doubt, long been undeceived as to the narrow limits which, according to the geography of his day, he had at first assigned to India, and to the eastern side of the earth. The ocean, which he had once imagined to be separated by no very vast tract from the banks of the Indus, had receded, as he advanced, to an immeasurable distance. He had discovered that, beyond the Hyphasis, a desert more extensive than any he had yet crossed parted the plains of the Five Streams from the region watered by the tributaries of the Ganges, a river mightier than the Indus: that the country east of the Ganges was the seat of a great monarchy, far more powerful than that of Porus, the land of the Gangarides and Prasians, whose king could bring into the field 200,000 foot, 20,000 horse, and several thousands of elephants. That this information rather served to inflame Alexander's curiosity and ambition than to deter him, could scarcely be doubted by any one who has fully entered into his character, even if it had not been expressly stated by the ancients. The only plausible reason that has been alleged for questioning whether he himself

wished and designed to prosecute his expedition in the same direction, is, that by the orders he had given for the building of a fleet on the Hydaspes, he had already manifested his intention of sailing down the Indus. That he had indeed resolved to explore the course of this river to its mouth, and to make it, if possible, a channel of communication between India and his western dominions, seems sufficiently clear. But he might still have left the time when he should execute this part of his plan to depend upon circumstances. As to the probable result of the expedition, if he had advanced towards the Ganges, it seems a little hardy to speak with confidence. It is by no means certain that he would have encountered any much greater obstacles than he had already overcome. The king of the eastern tribes is represented as an upstart and usurper¹, and Alexander might have been aided, as he had been in the conquest of the Pendjab, by divisions among the natives.

But the accounts which kindled his ardour, plunged the Macedonians into sullen dejection, which at length broke out into open murmurs. It is possible that, if they had seen any distinct and certain goal before them, they would not have shrunk from the dangers and difficulties of a last enterprise, however arduous. But to set out from a region which had once appeared to them as the verge of the habitable world on a new series of conquests, to which they could foresee no termination, was enough to appal the most adventurous spirits. Their thoughts began to revert with uncontrollable force to their homes in the distant west, as they had reason to fear that they were on the point of being torn from them for ever. For even of those who might escape the manifold dangers of a fresh campaign, how many might be doomed to sit down as colonists, and to spend the rest of their lives in that strange land! India was a still more hopeless place of exile than Bactria and Sogdiana, where the Greeks, who had been planted by

¹ Curtius, ix. 2. Diodorus, xvii. 93.

violence, were only detained by terror. These seem to have been the motives which weighed most with the army. But their force was undoubtedly much aggravated by the extraordinary hardships it had suffered, since it had crossed the Indus, during the rainy season. It appears that a great many horses had perished, and it may be concluded that much sickness had been caused among the men by their continual encampments on damp if not flooded ground : though, after the battle of the Hydaspes, a part at least may have found shelter for some weeks within the walls of a town. It does not seem that they had experienced any scarcity of provisions ; but their clothes and armour had been in general almost worn out, and many had been obliged to exchange the Greek dress for such articles of clothing as they could find in the country. The wish to return became universal, and was soon transformed into a firm resolution not to proceed.

It is difficult to guess how far the arguments by which Alexander endeavoured to overcome the repugnance of his troops, and to animate them with his own spirit, resembled any of those which are attributed to him by Arrian and Curtius. But it is hardly probable that he tried to persuade them that the ocean lay but a short distance beyond the Ganges, and that he declared his intention to circumnavigate first India and then Africa ; or that he expected them to believe that his recent conquests would be insecure, unless he enlarged his empire with the countries which lay to the east. The threat which Curtius puts into his mouth, that, if the Macedonians would not follow him, he would throw himself on his Bactrian and Scythian auxiliaries and make the expedition with them alone, most likely misrepresents the tone which he assumed. But it may easily be supposed that he expressed his wishes, and urged the army to compliance, with passionate eloquence. Not only, however, the feelings of the troops, but the judgment of his officers was adverse to the proposed enterprise ; and Cœnus, in a speech which has either been

better written or more faithfully reported than the king's, exhorted him to abandon his design. Alexander retired to his tent in displeasure. The next day he again assembled the army, and made another attempt to overpower their reluctance. As a last experiment, he declared that he would force no Macedonian to accompany him ; he was sure that there would be volunteers enough among them for his purpose ; the rest might return home and say, that they had left their king in the midst of his enemies. But even this appeal produced no effect. For three days he kept within his tent, where not even his chief officers were admitted to his presence, waiting for a change in the disposition of the men. But the stillness which prevailed in the camp convinced him, more strongly than words could have done, that their determination was fixed. He then felt that it was time to yield ; not perhaps without some pride in the reflection, that there was not a man in the army who was capable of his own contempt for difficulties and dangers. He had however gone too far, it seems, to recede without some other pretext. The sacrifices easily supplied one. When they were found unpropitious to the passage of the river, he called his council and declared his resolution to retreat.

It was received with tears of joy and grateful shouts by the army. Before he quitted the Hyphasis, he ordered twelve colossal altars to be built on its banks, and dedicated to the gods who had led him thus far victorious ; then, after a solemn sacrifice and games, he began to retrace his steps. The country not yet disposed of, as far as the Hyphasis, was committed to Porus. On the Acesines he found the city, which Hephæstion had been ordered to build, ready to receive a colony ; and there he left the disabled mercenaries, and as many natives of the neighbouring districts, as were willing to settle there. While he was engaged in preparation for his voyage to the sea, he received another embassy from Abisares, pleading illness as an excuse for his absence, which was confirmed by the Macedonians who had been

sent to his court. The embassy was accompanied by thirty elephants and costly presents. Arsaces, a chief whose territories lay on the confines of Abisares, came at the same time to offer his submission, and was placed under the authority of his more powerful neighbour, whom Alexander, though he had reason to distrust his professions, thought it prudent to conciliate.

The fleet on the Hydaspes was now nearly ready, but the two new cities had suffered so much from the rains, that the army was for some time employed in restoring them. In the meanwhile, Alexander made his final arrangement of the affairs of the northern Pendjab, by which Porus gained a fresh addition of territory, so that his dominions included, it is said, seven nations and above 2000 cities, with, it seems, a title which established his superiority over all the chiefs east of the Indus.¹ During the preparations for the voyage Cœnus died; more regretted probably by the army, whose cause he had pleaded, than by the king. Alexander however honoured him with a magnificent funeral, but, it is said, could not forbear to remark, that it was to little purpose Cœnus had made that long speech, and shown so much anxiety to return to Macedonia.²

¹ Arrian, vi. 2.

² Curtius, ix. 3. Propter paucos dies longam orationem eum exorsum, tamquam solus Macedoniam visurus esset. The last part of the remark may not have been correctly reported, but altogether, the sneer was a natural expression of Alexander's vexation. Whether it was, as it has been called, *brutal*, cannot be determined by its present appearance on paper.

CHAP. LIV.

ALEXANDER'S PASSAGE DOWN THE INDUS AND RETURN
TO SUSA.

HOWEVER reluctantly Alexander may have abandoned the immediate prospect of further conquests and discoveries in the East, there was still enough to fill his mind, and to gratify his passion for heroic adventures, in the enterprise which he was next to begin. So vague had been, almost down to this time, his notions as to the geography of the regions which he was to traverse on his return to Persia, that when he found crocodiles in the Indus, he conceived a fancy that this river was a branch of the Nile; and this conjecture seemed to him strongly confirmed, when he met with the lotus, such as he had seen in Egypt, on the banks of the Acesines. He even mentioned, in a letter to his mother, that he believed he had discovered the land which contained the springs of the Nile; he thought that, in its course from India to Ethiopia, it might flow through some vast desert, in which it lost its original name. A little inquiry among the natives must have sufficed to correct this error—which seems to prove that he was not well read in Herodotus, and that the expedition of Scylax had excited but little attention in Greece—and that he remained so long ignorant of the truth, shows how singly his views were at first bent towards the East.

The fleet, which was probably for the most part collected from the natives, numbered, according to Ptolemy, nearly 2000 vessels of various kinds, including eighty galleys of war. Arrian gives a list of thirty-three, which were nominally under the command of the prin-

cipal officers of the army, most of whom nevertheless continued to serve on shore.¹ As we learn from another author, that Alexander's finances were at one time, before he left India, in so low a state, that he was obliged to solicit contributions from his friends, it seems very probable that these officers fitted out the vessels at their own charge.² The crews of the larger vessels — the natives no doubt manned their own small craft — were composed partly of Phœnicians and Egyptians, and partly of Greeks, from the islands and coast of the Ægean. The command of the whole fleet was entrusted to Nearchus. Alexander divided his forces into four corps. The main body, with about 200 elephants, was to advance along the eastern bank under the com-

¹ Mr. Williams (Life of Al p 298) has thought proper to transcribe this list for sundry weighty reasons; first, as useful to show who the *master-spirits* were who worked the great revolution in the eastern world. His readers might otherwise have imagined that there was but one *master-spirit*, Alexander, seconded by several able and active officers, whom he and his father had formed. Another purpose is, to show that the list does not contain the name of a single citizen of any of the southern republics; and particularly no Athenian. So we are led to an important consequence. "The republicans of Greece had no part or portion in the glory of the war. Hence arose that jealousy of the Macedonian fame, that bitter hostility to Alexander, who had so dimmed and obscured their exploits by the splendour of his renown, and, as the literature of Greece was in their hands, that systematic attempt to depress his fame and blacken his character." This last remark will probably appear not the least notable to those readers who are aware, that perhaps no history was ever so much disfigured by gross exaggeration and extravagant flattery, as Alexander's, who remember Strabo's complaints about the constant tendency of his historians to magnify their hero's exploits (xv 252 *συνμυνοῦσι* — 253 *πλεοναυματοῦ τῶν νελευμένων Ἀλεξάνδρον* — 269 *παντὶς οἱ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρον τοῦ βασιλέως ἐντὶ τῶν λόγων, ἀπιδίχοντο μάλλιν*) and Plutarch's treatise. The truth is, that the Greeks were proud of Alexander, as they well might be and had a right to be for he belonged to them, both by blood, and by education: in this last respect more particularly to Athens. His conquests were one of their sources of consolation under the Roman yoke. Greece indeed produced few men comparable to him; but the same thing may be said of all the rest of the world, including even China, with its *admirable constitution*. But as to the other *master-spirits*, from Hephæstion down to the eunuch Bagoas, there was certainly no Greek state, however inconsiderable, that had any reason to be jealous of their glory. We know what the most illustrious among them were, and did. Notwithstanding the conspicuous theatre on which fortune placed them, they permit us to assert, that, out of the royal Greek family, Macedonia never gave birth to a great man. But such an effusion of purblind and impotent ill-will toward the people which has conferred greater benefits than any other on the world, would scarcely have deserved notice, except as a specimen of that systematic attempt to which I have adverted elsewhere. — Vol. lii. p 67 n. 5.

² Plutarch, Eum. 2. *Ναυαρχοὶ ἱκτιμῶσι μετὰ νῆας ἐπὶ τῇ Ἰνδοῦ θάλασσᾳ, ἧτις χεῖματα τοῖς φίλοις οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῷ βασιλείᾳ.* A passage not noticed by Schmiæder, who first proposed the opinion adopted in the text in his note on Arrian, Ind. 18.

mand of Hephæstion. Craterus was to lead a smaller division of infantry and cavalry on the opposite side of the river. Philippus, with the troops of his satrapy, was ordered to take a circuitous route toward the point where the two other generals were to wait for the fleet, in which the king himself was to embark with the hypaspists, the bowmen, and a division of his horseguard, in all 8000 men. On the morning of the embarkation, Alexander himself, under the direction of his sooth-sayers, offered the libations and prayers which were deemed fittest to propitiate the powers of the Indian streams, Hydaspes and the impetuous Acesines, which was soon to join it, and the mighty Indus, which was afterwards to receive their united waters. Among the gods of the west, Hercules and Ammon were invoked with especial devotion ; then, at the sound of the trumpet, the fleet began to drop down the river. The most judicious arrangements had been made to prevent confusion, and to keep its main divisions, the galleys of war, the horse-transports, and the vessels loaded with the baggage, at a convenient and invariable distance from each other. It was a spectacle such as the bosom of the Hydaspes had never before witnessed, nor has it since. Its high banks were crowded with the natives, who flocked from all quarters with eager curiosity to gaze, and accompanied the armament in its progress to some distance before they could be satiated with the sight of the stately galleys, the horses, the men, the mighty mass of vessels gliding down in unbroken order ; and as the adjacent woods rang with the signals of the boatswains, the measured shouts of the rowers, and the plash of numberless oars, keeping time with perfect exactness, the Indians too testified their delight in strains of their national music.

On the third day Alexander found Hephæstion and Craterus encamped at the place appointed, and, having waited there two days, was joined by Philippus. He immediately sent Philippus across to the Acesines, with orders to pursue his march along its banks, while He-

phæstion and Craterus moved forward in advance of the fleet on opposite sides of the Hydaspes. He himself, as he proceeded, landed his troops wherever he found a display of force necessary to extort submission from the neighbouring tribes, though it was with reluctance that he spent any time in these incursions; he was anxious, as soon as possible, to reach the frontiers of the Malli, a warlike race, from whom he expected a vigorous resistance, and whom he therefore wished to surprise before they had completed their preparations, and had been joined by their allies, particularly their southern neighbours the Oxydracæ or Sudracæ. In five days he arrived at the second place of rendezvous, the confluence of the Hydaspes and the Acesines. His Indian pilots had warned him of the danger which the fleet would have to encounter at this point: yet it did not escape. The united rivers were at that time pent into a narrow space, where their conflicting waters roared and chafed in eddies and waves, which, seventeen centuries later, still presented the appearance of an agitated sea.¹ The principal obstructions appear now to have been worn away, and the passage is no longer formidable. But Alexander's sailors were so much alarmed or astonished at the sounds which they heard, even before they reached the confluence, that, by an involuntary impulse, they at once rested on their oars: and when they had entered it, the novelty of the spectacle seems to have deprived them of their self-command, and to have prevented them from executing the orders they received with the precision necessary to carry them through in safety. The broad vessels, however, which were probably built after the Indian fashion, suffered no damage though they were whirled round by the eddies. But several of the long galleys lost a great part of their oars, and were much shattered: two were dashed against each other, and entirely wrecked, and many of the crews perished. According to some accounts, Alexander himself at one time thought his own

¹ Cherefeddin, iv. c. 10.

galley so much in danger, that he was on the point of jumping overboard. As the stream widened, and spent its violence, a headland on the right bank afforded shelter to the fleet.

While it was undergoing the necessary repairs, Alexander made an expedition inland against the Sibas, or Sivaïtes, so called undoubtedly from the Indian deity, who was the chief object of their worship. As they were armed with clubs, and marked their cattle with this symbol of their god, the fancy of the Macedonians transformed them into descendants of the followers of Hercules.¹ They themselves of course did not on this account submit the more readily to the invader, as Diodorus represents²: but they appear to have been easily overawed, or disabled from sending any succour to their countrymen on the other side of the river; and this was the purpose for which Alexander entered their territory. On his return to the fleet, he was rejoined by his three generals, and immediately made his dispositions for the subjugation of the Malli.³

There can be little doubt that the name of this people has been preserved in that of the modern city of Multan, though it lies far below the junction of the Chenab and the Ravee, while the territory of the Malli seems to have been situate almost wholly to the north of that point, and most of it to have been included between the two rivers. Hence the greatest geographer of our day conjectures, that they formerly met a great way to the south of their present confluence.⁴ The united forces of the Malli and the Sudracæ are estimated in the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius, on the most moderate calculation, at 80,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and 700 chariots: and from the manner in which they are coupled together, we are led to presume, that

¹ Strabo, xv. p. 253. Tauchn. Comp. Vol. V p. 149 n. 1. ² xvii. 96.

³ Arrian (vi. 5.) has made his narrative rather obscure and perplexed, by a premature mention of the orders given to Nearchus, which he afterwards repeats, as if they relate to two distinct epochs: though it is clear from the context, that Nearchus did not move, before Alexander had returned from his expedition against the Sivaïtes.

⁴ Ritter, Asien, iv. l. p. 468.

in this respect there was no great inequality between them. But the two races were composed of widely different elements ; for the name of one appears to have been derived from that of the Sudra caste ; and it is certain that the Brahmins were predominant in the other. We can easily understand why they did not intermarry, and were seldom at peace with each other, and that their mutual hostility was only suspended by the common danger which now threatened their independence. Yet it appears that even this was not sufficient to overcome the jealousy that prevailed between them, and that their forces were not combined, because they could not agree in the choice of a leader. But the Malli themselves seem to have relied chiefly on the strength of their fortified towns, and on the natural barriers of their peninsula, which was protected toward the north by a desert of considerable extent : they delayed at least to collect their forces, before it was too late.

As it was on the side of the desert that they might be expected to feel most secure, Alexander resolved to strike across it himself with one division of his army, into the heart of their country, while two other corps traversed it in other directions, to intercept the retreat of those whom he might drive before him. One of these was entrusted to the command of Hephæstion, who was sent forward five days before the king was to begin his march ; the other to Ptolemy, who was ordered to wait three days after the king's departure, that he might meet the fugitives who should attempt to escape towards the north, on the side of the Acesines. To prevent the enemy from receiving any succours from the west, and from seeking refuge in that quarter, Philippus and his troops, together with Polysperchon's brigade, the horse-bowmen, and the elephants, were transferred to the right bank of the Hydaspes, and placed under the command of Craterus, who was ordered to march down towards the confluence, and meet Nearchus, who was sent forward three days before with the fleet.

The division which Alexander retained under his

own orders, was composed of the light troops best adapted to the rapid movements which he meditated. With this, having marched day and night with a very short intermission, he appeared, early on the second morning, before one of the strongholds, in which, as likely to be last attacked, many of the natives had taken refuge. A great number of them were surprised by the Macedonian cavalry outside the walls, and unarmed : many were put to the sword ; the rest fled into the town, which Alexander immediately surrounded with his horse, while he waited for the arrival of the infantry. When it came up, he dispatched Perdicas, at the head of his own squadron, and that of Cleitus, with the Agrianians, to invest another of the nearest towns, with orders to abstain from assault, but to take care that none of the inhabitants escaped, to spread the news of Alexander's approach. He himself proceeded to reduce the first. The besieged — whose number can never have been great — found themselves so much weakened by the slaughter made in the fields, that they soon abandoned the walls, and retired into the citadel : but, notwithstanding their gallant defence, this too was speedily stormed, and they were all put to the sword. As the number of those who were slain here was but 2000, the vanquished seem to have earned quite as much glory, in a better cause, as the conquerors. Perdicas soon returned to the camp. He had found the town which he was to blockade entirely deserted ; but hearing that the inhabitants had not quitted it long, he pursued them at full speed, and overtook and cut down many ; the rest sought shelter in a morass, where he did not venture to follow them.

Alexander allowed his men a short rest, and then, by a forced night-march, reached the Hydrates at day-break. Here he learnt, that many of the natives had already crossed the ford, but he came up in time to make considerable slaughter among the hindmost, and instantly plunging into the stream, pursued the fugitives on the other side. The greater part sought refuge

in an adjacent fortress, which however soon yielded to Peithon, who was sent to attack it, while Alexander marched against another town, which the Greeks describe as if it was inhabited by Brahmins only : and these are mentioned as a different race from the Malli who fled to them for shelter. We cannot rely on the accuracy of these statements ; but it is certain that in this western border-land of India the distinction of castes has never been rigidly observed, and it is possible that, here and elsewhere, a whole community of Brahmins may have preserved the purity of their blood, while they engaged in all the necessary occupations which in theory properly belonged to the lower castes. Yet the name may only designate a mixed colony of purer Indian blood than the great body of the Malli, and their neighbours, the Sudracæ, among whom it is probable there was also some disparity of birth. These Brahmins were stout warriors, and offered the most determined resistance, that Alexander had hitherto encountered in this campaign. When they could no longer defend their walls against the superior skill of the besiegers, they retreated to the citadel ; and when this too was stormed, set fire to the houses, and almost all, to the number of 5000, died, either fighting, or in the flames.

After a day's repose, he advanced into the interior, but found the towns abandoned, and learnt that their inhabitants had fled to the desert. So, after another day's pause, he sent Peithon with his brigade, accompanied by a squadron of horse under Demetrius, and some light troops, back to the Hydraotes, with orders to march along the river-side, and intercept the fugitives, who might have betaken themselves to the woods that lined its banks, while he himself proceeded to the capital of the Malli, which, we thus perceive, lay east of the Hydraotes. The reports he had heard led him to expect that he should find it crowded with those who had escaped from the other cities, and perhaps that he might here nearly finish the campaign at one blow : but

it also was deserted by the Indians on the tidings of his approach, and he ascertained that they had crossed the Hydraotes, and were collecting their forces on the right bank. Instantly he pushed forward toward their position with his cavalry, leaving the foot to follow. The banks of the river, where he saw the hostile army, it is said 50,000 strong, drawn up to receive him, were indeed high and steep, so that the Malli had thought them a stronger defence than their walls. But Alexander scorned such obstacles: he waited not for the infantry, but at once dashed into the stream with his horse: and before he had reached the other side, the enemy, who however were not fully aware of his weakness, began to retreat. When he had overtaken them, and they perceived the smallness of the force by which they were pursued, they made a stand: nor did Alexander attempt more than to detain them by slight charges, until the infantry should have come up. So long only their courage held out: at the appearance of the phalanx, the whole mass took to flight, mostly toward the strongest town in the neighbourhood. Thither Alexander pursued them, cutting down many of the fugitives, and immediately encircled the place with his cavalry, but, as the day was far spent, deferred the assault to the morrow, to give his wearied troops and jaded horses a short interval of refreshment.

The next morning he began the attack of the town on two sides, having given the command of the second division of his army to Perdicas. It was probably a mere embellishment of the story, suggested by the event, that he was warned by a soothsayer of danger to his life, and urged to postpone the assault, but rejected the advice with a sneer at auspices and superstition. It is certain that, even if he believed in such things less than he appears to have done, he was too prudent to disclose his incredulity, and so throw away an instrument which a Greek general might so often find useful. The besieged did not attempt to defend the town, but retreated within the walls of the citadel, which must have been

capable of containing a great multitude. The king and his troops entered first through a postern, which they opened with the hatchet. Perdiccas was later, though his men were only delayed by the difficulty of climbing over the town-wall: but as it was supposed that all resistance was over, the scaling-ladders were mostly left behind. Alexander, at the foot of the citadel, eagerly called for them. Two or three were brought: and, seizing the first, he himself fixed it against the wall, and mounted foremost, covered by his shield. At the top, he soon killed or thrust away the Indians who opposed him, and took his stand on the wall, which, it seems, was narrow, and without battlements. He was followed by Peucestes, bearing the shield taken from the temple at Ilion, and by Leonnatus, who both made good their ascent: as did, on another ladder, Abreas, a veteran of the class called *dimoirites*, from the double pay with which their services were rewarded, and which thus became also a title of honour. But in the mean while Alexander stood as a mark for the enemy's missiles, both from the nearest towers, and from the adjacent parts of the citadel: and the Macedonians, especially those of his guard, alarmed for his safety, crowded to the ladders. Before a fifth man had reached the top, both the ladders were broken by the weight, and Alexander was thus cut off from all prospect of immediate aid, while the enemy, animated by the hope of an easy victory worth more than the destruction of an army, redoubled their efforts.

He felt that he could not remain long where he was, and that he was exposing his life, with little honour, and to no useful purpose. There were two ways of changing his position, between which he had to choose. He might throw himself down with comparative safety among his friends, or he might descend into the midst of the enemy, where he would at least, if not instantly overpowered, have an opportunity of using his arms. With little hesitation he decided on the last alternative, and, by a dexterously balanced leap, alighted unhurt on

his feet, so that he could immediately put himself into a posture of defence.

No action of his life seems to have contributed so much as this adventure to lower the general estimation of his prudence and good sense, and to subject him, even in the opinion of his warmest admirers, to the charge of blind, ungovernable, almost frantic, rashness. Yet to himself it may have seemed so natural and fit, as to be in a manner necessary; and it may have been as little the effect of a sudden, thoughtless impulse, as the unreflecting self-devotion of a martyr, who feels that, to shrink from the last trial, would be to undo all his past labours and sufferings. Alexander's principle, to which he owed his conquests, had been, never to recede before any thing less than an insurmountable obstacle — as to which he was used to judge differently from other men — least of all before personal danger. He now but acted on the same principle, in a new and very hazardous attempt, without any particular necessity indeed, except that of preserving his own character. But for Alexander could there be any more pressing! It may serve perhaps, according to the reader's point of view, somewhat to extenuate either his imprudence or his heroism, to notice that a similar exploit is related of a princely German warrior of the fifteenth century.¹

The Indians rushed on, a host against a man, as having nothing to do but to despatch the prey that had fallen into their hands. But Alexander, who was now partly sheltered by the wall, and also, it seems, by the trunk and spreading boughs of an old tree that grew near it, kept his assailants at bay with his wonted vigour. Their chief, and another, who ventured within reach of his sword, paid for their rashness with their lives. Two more, before they came quite so near, he disabled, after the manner of a Homeric combat, with stones. The rest, deterred by these examples, kept at a safe distance, and only plied him with missiles, which,

¹ Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, I. p. 70.

if we believe Curtius, were mostly intercepted by the branches under which he stood, leaning either against the trunk or the wall. By this time however he was joined by Peucestes, Leonnatus, and Abreas, who, it may be supposed, had not been left unmolested before they leaped down to defend him. Abreas very soon received a mortal wound from an arrow in the face: and he had scarcely fallen, when another arrow pierced Alexander's corslet, and lodged itself deep in the right breast. Yet he did not immediately cease to defend himself, but, after a short struggle, fainting through loss of blood, sank upon his shield. Peucestes and Leonnatus now stood over him, and intercepted the blows aimed at him by the enemy. Both were wounded, but not so as to prevent them from keeping their post. So unequal a contest however could not probably have lasted much longer. It was the most critical moment of Alexander's life.

But in the meanwhile the Macedonians outside the wall, not less anxious because they could not witness his danger, had not remained inactive. Though ladders were not at hand, their ingenuity, sharpened by the emergency, soon found substitutes. Some drove pegs into the wall, which was of clay, and so climbed to the top. Others were raised on the shoulders of their comrades. All, as fast as they effected their ascent, leaped down, and rushed, with cries of grief and rage, toward the place where they saw their king stretched, seemingly lifeless, on the ground. The combat soon ceased to be merely defensive on the part of the Macedonians. A gate was forced open by some who had entered, and numbers poured in, sufficient to overwhelm all resistance. The only work now remaining for them was that of revenge; and this they executed so diligently, by a general massacre of the besieged, that not even a woman or a child was spared.

Alexander, as soon as he was rescued, had been conveyed to his tent; and the arrow was at length extracted, whether by the physician Critodemus, or, as

some accounts went, by Perdiccas, who, it was said, by the king's command, widened the wound with his sword to make a passage for the barbed steel. But the extraction was followed by so great a loss of blood, that the patient again fainted: and when he recovered his senses, it was for some time doubtful whether he could survive. The first tidings of the disaster carried to the camp near the confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines, represented him as already dead: and the grief and alarm they excited in every breast, were a tribute of affection and confidence, which might well soothe the resentful feelings that had been awakened in him by the abrupt termination of his campaign on the Hyphasis. The grief of the Macedonians indeed, which broke out in a wailing that spread with the news through the camp, was probably in great part selfish, but, even so, highly honoured its object; for it attested, what they were not slow to declare in words, that, in their judgment, he was the only man in the army capable of leading them back safely through the countries which he had traversed as a conqueror. It was their despondency about their own seemingly forlorn condition, that rendered them backward to believe the more favourable reports which followed, that the king was still living, and that there was ground to hope for his recovery. Even when a letter from himself announced that he should soon be among them, there were many who suspected that it was a mere artifice of the generals to lull their fears.

When he had regained sufficient strength to bear the gentlest motion, he embarked on the Hydraotes, and dropped down towards the confluence, not more perhaps to quiet the apprehensions of his troops, than, as Curtius suggests, to crush the hopes which might have been conceived from the same cause by the enemy. As he approached the camp, he ordered the awning, under which he lay at the stern of the galley, to be removed, and, when close to the bank, stretched out his hand toward the crowd who were there waiting for him, still half

doubting what they so eagerly wished. This sign of life was answered by a general shout of joy, and every hand was raised, not without tears, in gratitude to heaven, or in greeting to the king. A litter was brought for him to the landing-place: but he called for his horse; when he mounted it, the banks and adjacent woods rang with a fresh peal of applause. At a short distance from his tent, he alighted, that he might be seen to walk: and all pressed round him, to touch, if they could, his hands, or knees, or clothes: or at least, if less fortunate, to see and salute him, and to strew his path with fillets and flowers. The congratulations of his officers in the tent were mingled with remonstrances, as severe as might be ventured, on his imprudence. To these he listened but impatiently: as Arrian thought, because he knew that they were just: perhaps rather because he felt that they were misapplied, and that he was misunderstood. He was better pleased with an old Bœotian, who cheered him with the remark, that men must be proved by their deeds; adding a line of Æschylus, rather strangely distorted from its original meaning¹, to the effect, that whoever would do, must expect to suffer.

While he waited here to complete his recovery, he received an embassy from the Malli, who still remained in arms, and the Sudracæ. The envoys, a hundred or more of their chief men, persons of stately form and mien, all riding in chariots, and clad in linen robes embroidered with purple and gold, came with magnificent presents, to offer their entire submission to the conqueror. They spoke of their past resistance not without dignity, adding some mention of Dionysus, the only invader who had ever before subdued them, which they knew would be acceptable to his successor. They declared themselves ready to give hostages, pay tribute,

¹ *Δεδορμένους γὰρ τοῖς καὶ πάλιν ἀπιδόναις*, quoted among other poetical apophthegms on Divine retribution, by Stobæus, *Ecl. Ph.* 1. 4. 24. It is the *εργάτων μίσθος* of the *Choeph.* 302., which Klausen suspects may have been the passage Stobæus had before him: the more probably, as *τεταπεινώμενος* occurs there also a few lines before.

and receive a satrap at Alexander's pleasure. He annexed their countries to the satrapy of Philippos, and, according to Curtius, imposed a tribute on them of the same amount as they had paid to the Arachosians: a statement hardly consistent either with their boasts of independence, or with their recorded actions. For security he demanded a thousand of their best warriors, either as hostages, or, if they were willing, to serve in his army. Curtius also describes a magnificent banquet at which they were entertained, and which gave rise to a single combat — not without its significance, if it really occurred — between Dioxippus, an Athenian, and a Macedonian named Corragus, in which the Athenian, who was practised in the games of Greece, armed only with a club, overcame his antagonist in the panoply of the phalanx, to the great displeasure of the Macedonians, and of Alexander himself. The ambassadors soon returned with a band of a thousand men, the flower of their nation: they also brought as a free gift 500 chariots, with some of the produce of their industry, and among other rarities several tamed lions and tigers. Alexander, convinced it seems of their sincerity, accepted the chariots, and dismissed the hostages.

During this detention, he had ordered more vessels to be built for the transport of his troops, and when he felt himself strong enough to prosecute his expedition, embarked with a larger force of horse and foot, and sailed down to the confluence of the Acesines with the Indus, the southern extremity of the Pendjab. At this important point he waited some days for Perdikkas, who, with a part of the land force, had been engaged in the subjugation of an independent tribe, the Abas-tani, or Avasthanas. In the interval he received the voluntary submission of another free commonwealth, the Ossadians, and fresh additions to his fleet from the banks of the Acesines. This point of the Pendjab he assigned as the southern limit of the satrapy of Philippos, whom he ordered to build a new city there. It

was to be well provided with arsenals ; and he expected, from the peculiar advantages of the site, that it would become a flourishing seat of commerce. The small town of Mittun may perhaps stand nearly in its place, but no vestige remains of Alexander's foundation. During his stay here, he was overtaken by his father-in-law Oxyartes, who probably came to inform him of a revolt which had broken out among the Greek colonists in Bactria¹, and to complain of the misconduct of Tyriaspes, the satrap of Paropamisus. Tyriaspes was deprived of his government, and Oxyartes received it in addition to his own. We must therefore suspect an error in Arrian's statement, or text, where it is related, that Oxyartes was appointed with Peithon satrap of the territories to be conquered in the lower course of the Indus to the sea. A body of troops, including all the Thracians, was left with Philippus. Craterus, with the bulk of the army, and the elephants, was landed on the left bank of the Indus, where the country opposed the fewest obstructions to his march ; and yet his presence was needed to overawe the natives. Alexander himself sailed down to the chief city of a people whose name is variously written : Arrian calls them Sogdians. He transformed their capital into a Greek colony, which he named Alexandria, and probably designed for the residence of his satrap. Here too he built an arsenal, in which he refitted a part of his fleet.

Not very far to the south, lay the territories of a powerful prince, whom the Greek writers name Musicanus, from whom, as he had hitherto made no overtures, Alexander had reason to expect active resistance. He therefore urged the progress of his fleet, and reached the frontier, before Musicanus was aware that he had

¹ Arrian (vi. 15.) does not mention this revolt, the details of which are given by Curtius (ix. 7), and assigns no motive for the coming of Oxyartes. Curtius places the arrival of Oxyartes later, which indeed would be absolutely necessary, if Diodorus is to be believed when he states (xvii. 99.) that the revolt was occasioned by the report of Alexander's death.

quitted the Sogdian capital. Dismayed by the suddenness of his appearance, he went forth to meet the invader, with royal presents, all his elephants, and submissive acknowledgements of his fault, which were still more graciously received, and placed himself and his people at the conqueror's disposal. Alexander was struck with admiration by the fertility and opulence of the country—which probably far surpassed all the regions he had been traversing from the north in the luxuriance of its vegetation—and by the capital, traces of which may perhaps still be visible near Bukkur.¹ He permitted Musicanus to retain his kingdom, but ordered a fortress to be built in the city, under the superintendence of Craterus, and to be occupied by a Macedonian garrison, as a post peculiarly well fitted to command the surrounding country.

Westward of the territory of Musicanus, lay that of a chief similarly named Oxycanus, or Porticanus², who likewise had kept suspiciously aloof. Alexander, with only a body of light troops and cavalry, marched against him with his usual rapidity, and stormed two of his cities, in one of which Oxycanus himself was taken, or slain. After this, all the other towns submitted without resistance. In the adjacent highlands, a chief named Sambus, who, it seems, had courted the conqueror's favour through jealousy of Musicanus, as Taxiles through fear of Porus, and had been invested with the title of satrap, when he heard that his enemy was par-

¹ As Burnes thinks (I. 66) in the ruins of Alore, four miles distant, "said to have been once the capital of a mighty kingdom," ruled by a Brahmin, who was defeated and slain by the Moslems in the seventh century.

² These names are an etymological puzzle, tempting from the seeming readiness of solution. Mr Williams (p 313) thinks that they "point to the names of the territories governed by these princes: because the word *khawn* is constantly found, even to this day, on the lower Indus: so that Musicanus might be properly described as the rajah of Moosh, and Oxycanus as the rajah of Ouche." I am surprised to find that Ritter, at least some years ago, entertained a similar opinion (*Asien*, xi. 2. p. 1095) Do we not require some better evidence that the Turkish title *khan* (*Mirchond* in Wilken, *Chrestomathia Persica*, p. 120, observes *Gordachestanenses principem suum Schar appellant, quemadmodum Turcæ Chan, et Indi Ras dicunt*) was in use before the time of Alexander on the lower Indus? The names of the district Sehwan, and the city Larkhanu, have suggested other not much more satisfactory conjectures. According to Curtius, the people of the northern chief were called Muscani.

done, and re-established in his dominions, had become alarmed for his own safety, and had withdrawn from his capital, Sindomana. Alexander therefore advanced against it, but was received, according to Arrian, with every token of subjection by the friends of the absent chief, who explained the motive of his flight, and surrendered his elephants and his treasure. Other authors had spoken of a laborious siege, and immense slaughter of the barbarians, Arrian only mentions the capture of a town which had revolted through the instigation of the Brahmins, and that they were put to death.

The influence of the Brahmins was also very powerful in the kingdom of Musicanus, and at his court. It seems to have been always directed against the invader, who had touched the hallowed soil with impure feet, with all the energy of patriotism inflamed by religious zeal. During Alexander's absence, Musicanus was induced by his priestly counsellors to revolt, in an evil hour for him and them, and for the ill-fated land. Alexander sent Peithon, the satrap, with a sufficient force against the king, who had probably no time to collect an army, while he himself overran the country, and made himself master of the towns, which he either razed to the ground, or curbed with citadels and garrisons. Peithon brought Musicanus a prisoner, with his principal Brahmins; and Alexander, calculating, as we are apt to think, rather too coolly on the effect of the spectacle, ordered them to be crucified in the most conspicuous manner.¹ We are here unpleasantly reminded of Cortes and Pizarro.

The conquest of the Indus was now nearly complete; for the chief of Pattala, named or entitled Mœris², whose rule extended over the Delta of the Indus, came in person to surrender himself and his dominions to the conqueror. He was directed immediately to return to his capital, and make preparations for the reception of

¹ Mr Williams however informs his readers (p. 314.), that *probably the insurrection had been characterised by atrocious deeds. Vae victis!*

² V Böhlen (Ind. i p 91) seems to suspect that it is a corruption of the Indian title Maha-rajah.

the armament. As no further resistance was to be apprehended down to the river's mouth, Alexander here divided his forces, and ordered Craterus, with three brigades of the heavy infantry, some light troops, and the elephants, accompanied by the disabled Macedonians who had received permission to return to their native land, to take the road to Carmania, through Arachosia and Drangiana, no doubt by the pass of Bolan. He thus gained the advantage of confirming his authority in a part of the empire hitherto but imperfectly subdued, while he lessened the difficulties of his own march through an inhospitable region, and spared the veterans who might have sunk under its hardships. The rest of the land force, in two divisions, he placed under the command of Hephæstion and Peithon, who were ordered to march down to Pattala on the opposite side of the river; and Peithon was charged with the task of settling colonies in the fortified towns, and pacifying the country, on the way. He himself proceeded with the fleet; but before he had reached the city of Pattala, which stood like Tatta, if not precisely on the same site, at the northern point of the Delta, he was informed that the chief, in a fit of distrust, had taken to flight with the greater part of the inhabitants. In fact, Alexander, on his arrival, found the city and its neighbourhood almost utterly deserted. He instantly sent a detachment of his lightest troops in pursuit of the fugitives, and when some were brought in prisoners, bade them return to their countrymen, and invite them, with every assurance of safety, to come back to their fields and dwellings. After a while the greater part of the population resumed their peaceful labours.

Alexander's first care was to fortify a citadel in the town, to form a harbour, and build docks sufficient for a large fleet. The superintendence of these works was committed to Hephæstion, who had already arrived. Parties were sent into the neighbouring districts, where there was a great scarcity of water, to dig wells, and otherwise make provision for the passage of troops or

travellers.¹ They were attacked by the natives, and it was found necessary to send a stronger force to protect them. Nor, it seems, could Alexander procure a pilot at Pattala for the voyage which he now meditated to the sea down the western branch of the river.² He however embarked, as soon as the works had made some progress, in a squadron of his fastest-sailing galleys, while Leonnatus, with a corps of 8000 foot, and 1000 horse, began his march along the same side of the Delta. On the second day, his voyage was interrupted by a gale, which, meeting the rapid current of the Indus, caused a swell, in which the galleys became unmanageable. Most of them were severely damaged, many went to pieces, either afloat, or after they had been run aground. While the shipwrights were repairing this disaster, Alexander sent a few light troops up the country, in search of natives who might serve as pilots. A few were taken, well acquainted with the navigation of the river; and under their guidance he continued his

¹ Arrian indeed (vi. 18.) says something more than this; but on the other hand very much less than has been inferred from his words, particularly by Droysen, p. 457. Arrian says, that Alexander sent men into the waterless part of the adjacent country (*την ἀνυδροὺς τῆς πλησίον γῆς*) to sink wells, and to make the land habitable (*οἰκίσαιμον*). The numbers sent, as appears from the narrative, was not large. Droysen however describes Alexander's object to have been nothing less than "to facilitate the communication between Pattala and the east of India, and to open it for caravans from the countries on the Ganges, and from the Deccan." But it seems very difficult to believe, either that Alexander had acquired sufficient information as to the geography of India, to form such a plan, or that he had the means of executing it. The operation described by Arrian could have been manifestly but a very slight and ineffectual beginning of such an undertaking. But as little can I believe, that Alexander's main object was to promote the cultivation of the country round Pattala. His views seem to have been confined, for the time at least, to two points—the survey of the mouths of the Indus and of the Delta, and the establishment of a commercial intercourse with the West. I therefore suspect that Arrian's arid tract must be referred to the Delta, or to the adjacent shores, and that the wells were designed, in the first instance, for the service of the expedition.

² A strange fact, not clearly explained by Arrian, or by those who comment on him. The only reason Arrian assigns is, that the natives had fled. But it seems very improbable, that Alexander set out before most of them had returned to their homes, and even less likely, that in the whole population no pilot could be found "because the people of Pattala, and the Indians in general, did not practise navigation." This remark, which is Droysen's, at least cannot be applicable to the rivers. The Indus surely was at all times actively navigated by the natives down to its mouth. How else are we to account for the canal mentioned by Arrian shortly after? Perhaps too little attention has been paid to Curtius, who says, that the pilots whom Alexander took with him from Pattala made their escape.

voyage to the sea. Near the mouth, it still blew so hard from the sea, that he was fain to take shelter in a canal pointed out by the Indians. And here the Macedonians were first astonished by the ebb of the tide, when they saw their vessels suddenly stranded. They were still more amazed and terrified by the fury of the reflux — the peculiar terror of the Indian coasts at the mouths of the great rivers, but so familiar to the natives, that it seems they gave the strangers no warning of it — which shattered the galleys which were not firmly imbedded in the mud. After it had been refitted, the fleet was moored at an island lower down, named Cilluta, where water was found, while Alexander, with the best sailers, proceeded to explore the mouth, and soon came in sight of another island, which lay beyond in the ocean; the term, in this direction, of his conquests and discoveries. That day he returned to Cilluta, and made solemn sacrifice, as he gave out, according to directions which he had received from Ammon.¹ On the morrow he touched at the distant island, where he celebrated fresh sacrifices, with different rites, to other deities. Finally he put out to the open sea, that he might satisfy himself no land lay within view to the south. Here he again sacrificed to the sea-god, whose proper realm he had now entered, as well in thankfulness for the prosperous termination of one expedition, as to propitiate his favour for that which was to be next undertaken. The victims, and the golden vessels with which he made the libations, were thrown into the sea. He then returned up the same arm of the Indus to Pattala, where he found the fortifications of the citadel completed, and Peithon arrived with a very satisfactory report of his operations.

The works connected with the harbour were not yet finished, and while they proceeded, under the care of Hephæstion, he again embarked to explore the eastern

¹ A proof, in Mr. Williams's judgment (p. 317) that as early as his Egyptian voyage, he had contemplated his visit to the shores of the eastern ocean. One would think the fact might be more simply explained.

side of the Delta. He found that the river, before it reached the sea, expanded into a broad gulph. Here he left the greater part of the troops, and all the smaller vessels, with Leonnatus, and then, again entering the ocean, which on this side opposed fewer obstacles to his passage, landed on the south coast of the Delta with a body of horse, and surveyed it to the distance of three days' march westward, sinking wells at convenient intervals. He then returned to his ships, and sailed up to Pattala, while a detachment, which was ordered likewise to dig for water at every halting-place, marched round in the same direction. The gulph he had seen appeared to him so important as a naval station, that he once more visited it, ordered docks to be built there, and magazines, where he laid in four months' provisions for the army, and left a garrison to protect them.

The immediate object of all these preparations and precautions was to provide, as far as was practicable, for the successful commencement of the voyage of discovery on which he had resolved to send a squadron from the Indus to the Persian gulph. That there was an open sea between the two coasts, he could now scarcely doubt, though the passage might be difficult and dangerous ; and this was the first step toward the communication which he wished to establish between India and his western dominions. If however we believe an account which Arrian gives, on the authority of Nearchus himself, it would seem, that when Alexander first appointed Nearchus admiral of the fleet, he had either not yet matured his plan, or did not think fit to disclose it. Afterwards, we are informed, he consulted Nearchus on the choice of an officer to conduct the voyage of discovery. Nearchus, as, we should think, must have been expected, offered to undertake the command himself ; and it appears that there was no other man in the army whom the king would willingly have entrusted with it. We cannot therefore but suspect the sincerity of the reluctance, which he is said to have expressed, to permit so valued a friend to embark on so

perilous an adventure. But he desired that the offer should be freely made by Nearchus, for the sake of the confidence with which it would inspire those who were to be placed under his orders.

He himself was about to undertake a march along the same coast, little less dangerous: one on which, according to tradition, the armies of Semiramis and Cyrus had perished almost to a man; and Nearchus believed that he was partly stimulated to the enterprise by the hope of outdoing these celebrated conquerors.¹ We must however doubt, whether he could have heard of these legends in India; even if they are genuine, and did not rather spring out of his own expedition. It seems clear, that he had no distinct conception of the difficulties he was about to encounter; and particularly that he had not foreseen the length of time he was to spend on the road, which was far greater than a calculation founded on the most exact measurement of the distance would have led him to expect. But at least he was not impelled by any childish emulation. He had two important objects in view — to provide, as far as possible, for the safety of the fleet, and to explore and subdue a side of the empire, which was hitherto, at most, but nominally subject to him.

The navigation of the rivers had employed about seven months, and nearly four appear to have been spent in and near Pattala. It was toward the end of August, 325, when the preparations were completed for the departure of both armaments. We are unable to estimate the force of either, otherwise than by an uncertain approximation. If, however, Alexander invaded India with 120,000 men, since he received some reinforcements there, we can hardly believe, after every allowance for the numbers lost, or left behind in garrisons and colo-

¹ Arr vi 24. Schlosser (l. 3 p 146) has strangely mistaken Arrian's meaning, and attributes the opinion, that Alexander was not aware of the difficulties of the enterprise, to Nearchus, whereas it is clear, both from Arrian and Strabo (xv. p 250 Tauchn.) that it was Nearchus alone, who ascribed to him the motive of emulation with Semiramis and Cyrus, adding indeed, oddly enough, that of his rational anxiety for the safety of the fleet.

nies, and for the division under Craterus, that he retained fewer than 50,000 under his own command. As to the armament under Nearchus, we have no other guide than the list of the galleys equipped on the Hydaspes. But probably it did not include so many of that class.¹ It is not likely that any larger force would be employed on this service, than might appear necessary to overpower resistance on the coast: for it was not undertaken without reluctance by the men, though their spirits were raised by the appointment of Nearchus, by the careful and even splendid equipment of the vessels, and still more perhaps by the excursions which the king himself had made into the ocean. But Alexander was now aware of a natural obstacle, the prevalence of the south-west monsoon, which rendered it necessary to postpone the departure of Nearchus. Some weeks were still to come before the trade-winds would set in from the north-east, when they would be perfectly favourable for the voyage. It was not however necessary that the army should wait so long, but perhaps rather more expedient that it should precede the fleet. Nearchus therefore was left at Pattala, while Alexander set out on his return to the West.

The chain of mountains which descends, west of the Indus, from the Paropamisus to the sea, was first to be crossed: he then entered the province of Lus, which is surrounded on three sides by lofty ranges. He found it divided between two independent tribes, the Arabites and the Orites, who were separated from each other by a river called the Arabius (the Poorallee, or river of Son-meany); names which probably preserve a trace of an early settlement, formed on this coast by Arabians or Phœnicians. At the approach of the invader, the Arabites, incapable of resistance, yet disdaining submission, fled to the adjacent desert: and Alexander did not pursue

¹ Droysen (p. 469.) has totally mistaken Vincent, who gives the number, not of the vessels, but of the men in the thirty-three galleys, amount to 9000, exclusive, as he says (Nearch. i. p. 215.), of those on board the transport. And this seems nearer the truth than Droysen's conjecture, which he himself believes to be more moderate, of 100 vessels and 5000 men.

them, for he wished to surprise their western neighbours, the Orites, who seem to have been the more powerful race. On the Arabius, in which he found but little water, he left the bulk of his army under the command of Hephæstion, and pushed forward, with a select body of troops, towards the coast, where he designed to sink wells for the use of the fleet. The coast of the Oritis was described by Nearchus as a barren tract, inhabited by a race of hairy half-naked savages. But in the interior, after a forced night-march across a desert, Alexander found a more civilised people, and a well cultivated region, which he overran with his cavalry, not however without a formidable resistance : for the natives fought with poisoned arrows, and Ptolemy received a wound which had nearly proved mortal ; but an antidote — revealed, it was said, to the king in a dream — was discovered in time. It is not certain whether there was a capital of the country, named Ora, or the people lived wholly in villages. But the largest of these, called Rambacia, appeared to Alexander so happily situated, that he resolved to plant a colony there, and Hephæstion was appointed to superintend the progress of the new Alexandria. In the meanwhile the king himself, with a small body of cavalry, and the lighter troops, rapidly advanced toward a difficult pass in the western mountains, which he learnt was held by an army of Orites and Gedrosians. But the mere tidings of his approach threw the enemy into such consternation, that the chiefs of the Orites came to the camp, and submitted. They were directed to exert their influence, to restore tranquillity, and recal the fugitives to their dwellings. He did not however think it safe to rely on their professions. He placed Apollophanes over them as satrap, and left Leonnatus, with a body of troops, to wait for the arrival of Nearchus, and in the interval to protect the rising city, and secure the obedience of the natives.

It was perhaps the beginning of October, when he penetrated through the pass from which he had driven the enemy, into Gedrosia, the southern Mekran. This

wild, fearful region has been since but little explored by European travellers: but a few of its general features appear to be well ascertained. It is intersected with ranges of mountains, some very lofty, running parallel to the coast, but commonly not approaching it within ten or twelve miles. The ridges themselves are rocky and bare; the intervening plains, for the most part, barren wastes, here and there furrowed by deep water-courses, which, except in the rainy season, are almost dry. Still the interior is in general less arid and desolate than the low ground on the coast.¹ Alexander, when he entered Gedrosia, sent Thoas, with a party of horse, to the sea-side, and received an alarming report from him of the maritime district which he visited. He had found there only a few wretched fishermen, living in stifling cabins, built of sea-shells and the bones of whales, or other large fishes, which served for rafters and door-posts. Fish, with a small mixture of meal, was their common food; and even the few sheep they possessed, had no other. Water they could only procure in small quantities, and brackish, as they dug for it under the beach. Hence the whole coast of Mekran, as far as Cape Jask, is called by the Greeks the land of the Ichthyophages, or Fish-eaters. It must not however be supposed, that the foregoing description is applicable to the whole tract, which contains some cultivated districts, as it did no doubt in Alexander's time.

¹ The report of Captain Grant, who traversed the western part of Mekran in various directions (Kinneir's Memoir, p. 203., foll. and 447) does not convey any such idea of desolation as the ancients appear to have associated with the name of Gedrosia. "It appears that the middle parts are entirely mountainous, diversified with valleys and plains, some of which are exceedingly fertile, and others arid." Again: "The level plain between the sea and the hills produces abundance of pasturage." "Captain Grant seldom, even in the most unfrequented route of Mekran, made a march, without meeting one or two flocks of goats and sheep, amounting to from one to two hundred each. In the low country he frequently encountered droves of two or three hundred camels, and saw individuals possessed of a thousand head." "Between Kej, the capital, and the port of Chobar, the country is hilly, and comparatively speaking well inhabited." It seems however that farther eastward the coast is more generally barren. So in the report of General Malcolm's native agent, who travelled along the coast from Sonmeany to Chobar (Kinneir, p. 209. and 442.) we hear more of arid, sandy tracts, and from Kej to Urboo, a small seaport, distant about seven days' journey, in an E. & E. direction, the country is said to be destitute of vegetation and good water.

Still the information he received induced him to abandon his original intention which was to follow the windings of the coast, and he took a more inland route. Yet it seems that his line of march was seldom more than two or three days' journey from the sea, and oftener within sight of it.

The heats in this country prevail from March to November: when Alexander traversed it, they were still excessive, though beginning to subside. To avoid this evil, the army generally moved during the night; but it frequently happened, that at day-break it was still far from the next watering-place, and was compelled to prolong its march under the burning sun, tormented by increasing thirst. The sandy wastes indeed were not always utterly cheerless. Their sterility was often relieved, especially it seems on the eastern side of Gedrosia, by a profusion of aromatic plants¹ — myrrh-trees, from which the Phœnician followers of the camp loaded their beasts with the precious gum, and spike-nard, which, when trodden under foot, filled the air with its fragrance. The wild vigour of nature was also indicated by venomous reptiles, poisonous plants, and thorns of uncommon strength, from which the hares could not extricate themselves, and which were found annoying even by the cavalry. But far greater hardships were to be endured, when the army came to wide plains, where the sand was fine, and soft, as freshly fallen snow, in the day-time so hot as to blister the feet, and driven by the wind into long ridges.² On the top of these downs grew a kind of grass, which was a favourite lurking-place for serpents, from which they darted forth on the unwary passenger. Here numbers of the beasts sank under the continued toil of wading through the

¹ Nothing of this kind is noticed in the reports of modern travellers, though the plains are said to be frequently overgrown with jungle.

² Arrian's description of the sand-hills (vi. 24.) answers so well to that which Pottinger gives of the high waves of soft fine sand which he had to cross for a distance of about seventy miles (see his *Travels*, or *Kinneir's Memoir*) as to be strongly confirmed by it. Yet it is strange that no obstacle of this kind is mentioned as occurring in Mettrac, south of the Great Sandy Desert.

sandy waves. The carriages were for the most part broken up, as they could not be dragged through; so that, at last, no means were left of conveying the sick, or those whose strength could not support them to the halting-place. Wretched and hopeless was the condition of those, who, overcome with fatigue, lay down to sleep, and, when they woke, found themselves far in the rear. And the men, occupied each with his own misery and danger, grew careless of one another's sufferings and wants.

The descriptions of Arrian and Strabo might lead one to imagine, that a great part of the march was made over such ground. Nevertheless it seems certain, that Alexander never crossed any part of the great Sandy Desert, which is bounded by the mountains of southern Mekran, unless possibly for a short distance near the confines of Gedrosia and Carmania (Kerman). There may however have been some tracts nearer to the coast, answering to this description, though hardly of any considerable extent, so as not to be avoided by a moderate circuit. But one or two scenes of this kind would leave so deep an impression, that they could not fail to become the prominent feature in every narrative.

The scarcity of water was the great and constantly recurring cause of distress. Numbers, both of men and beasts, perished through thirst: and at the outset many disasters arose from the impatience with which, when they came in sight of water, the foremost crowded to it, several ceasing not to drink till they expired. A still greater calamity was occasioned by the rising of a small stream, on which the army encamped for a night, which was suddenly swollen by a fall of rain in the distant mountains, into a mighty flood¹, and, it is said, drowned most of the women and children, and all the remaining beasts of burden, and carried away the whole of the royal baggage, and the arms of many of the soldiers. After this occurrence the camp was always pitched at a

¹ It still remains to be explained, how this could have happened so late in the year.

distance from the watering-place. But food was at times equally scarce. The country yields but little grain: sheep, it seems, are not rare; but the flocks would often be driven out of reach. It is however interspersed with groves of date-trees, which abound particularly in the beds of the rivers, and, according to Strabo's strong expression, their fruit were the salvation of the army. Still the men were sometimes forced by hunger to slaughter the beasts of burden, pretending that they had perished of thirst on the road: and Alexander was obliged to wink at this license, which indeed, in the confusion of the night-marches, could seldom be detected.

It may easily be supposed, that he bore his full share in the labours and hardships of the expedition. He accompanied his men during their longest marches on foot; and it was perhaps on one of these occasions that he gave an example of self-command, which served to animate their courage, while it raised him in their esteem. After an unusually long and hot march, some of the light troops, who had been sent in search of water, having discovered a little remaining in the bed of a torrent, brought some in a helmet, as the most precious of all presents, to the king. Alexander, who knew how many longing eyes were fixed on him, though he was himself parched and faint with thirst, poured the delicious draught on the ground.¹ Another time, when all the marks of the road had been covered by the sand-drifts, the sea was no longer in sight, and the guides owned that they had lost their way, he set out, with a few horsemen, to seek the coast. Five only remained with him when he reached it. But having discovered that there was here plenty of fresh water to be found in the beach, he led the army to the place, and for seven days after marched close to the shore.

¹ Arrian expresses a doubt whether the occurrence belonged to the march through Gedrosia, or to the occasion mentioned vol. vi. p. 279. It seems possible, that it may have happened, under different circumstances, more than once. Plutarch (*Al.* 42.) refers it to the pursuit of Darius.

The barrenness of the coast inspired him with no less anxiety about the safety of the fleet, than he felt for the troops under his own command, and his exertions to provide for its wants were no less unremitting. From the first district in Gedrosia, where he found provisions unusually abundant, he ordered all that could be spared to be transported to the sea-side, in packages sealed with his own signet. But the escort entrusted with this convoy were themselves so pressed by hunger on the way, that they were compelled to break the royal seal, and to consume the whole stock. Another supply was afterwards transmitted under the care of Cretheus: and again Telephus was sent with a small quantity of meal. Parties were also detached up the country for the same purpose; and the natives were directed to bring down all that could be procured of corn, dates, and sheep.

Two months were spent in the march from Ora to Pura, the capital of Gedrosia.¹ The time seems great, compared with the direct distance, especially as the army was often forced to make very long marches from one station to another, and we hear of none but the ordinary halts. It is probable however that, though the road was only once lost, it was generally very winding, since both the difficulty of the ground, and the scarcity of provisions, often rendered a circuit necessary. Even at Pura, the position of which is unknown, Alexander seems to have allowed his troops but a short repose, before he advanced into Carmania. He had several motives to urge his progress—to meet Craterus, to gain tidings of Nearchus, and perhaps also to prevent the disturbances, which were likely to arise from reports of his own danger, and to ascertain the state of affairs in the provinces from which he had been so long absent.

¹ It has been commonly assumed, that this is Pureg—"now a miserable village" Kinnelr, p. 207. But the name does not seem sufficient evidence. Bumpore, situate in a district which "produces grain in such abundance as to supply the neighbouring country," might seem to have a better claim; and a small town, named Pahura, lies sixteen miles from it to the N. E. Kinnelr. p. 218.

For he had already reason to suspect that some of his officers in distant governments had abused his confidence: as at Pura he was induced to remove Apollophanes for neglect of duty¹; though it seems that before the satrap learnt his disgrace, he had atoned for his fault by death on a field of battle. On the road to Carmania, Alexander received despatches from Taxiles and Porus, announcing the death of Abisares, and of Philippus, who had been murdered by some of his own mercenaries. His Macedonian guards however had remained faithful, and punished the assassins. Alexander directed Taxiles, and Eudemus, the commander of the Thracians left with Philippus, to take charge of the province, until a new satrap should have been appointed. The son of Abisares was permitted to succeed his father.

In Carmania the army found a delightful change in the face of nature, and a striking contrast to the Gedrosian wilderness: a country which the ancients describe as uncommonly fertile, abounding in fruit, especially grapes of extraordinary size², and watered by copious streams. This description is still applicable to some districts of Kerman, though they are separated from each other by many desert tracts. Craterus arrived soon after, safe and victorious, having quelled an insurrection in Arachosia, and brought two of the chiefs of the rebels Ordanes and Zariaspes, with him in chains. It is a little surprising and suspicious, that we hear nothing of the hardships and dangers that beset his march: though as his road, unless he made an enormous circuit,

¹ The conjecture, that this Apollophanes was a different person from the satrap, who had been left in Oritia, may be allowed to sink into oblivion, with the hundreds of others, as confidently and groundlessly thrown out, in the work where it occurs. On the other hand, we are not informed, what the points were as to which Apollophanes had neglected his duty. The instructions mentioned by Arrian (vi. 2.) relate only to the fleet, and to the administration of Oritia: nor is it easy to understand how it was in the power of Apollophanes to provide for the subsistence of the army during its march through Gedrosia. It does not appear, how any convoy he might have sent could have overtaken Alexander.

² Strabo's description (xv. p. 315) reminds us of the grapes of Cansan. The clusters, he says, were three feet long. A convivial usage of the Carmanians is mentioned by Posidonius (Athen. ii. 24.).

lay across a part of the Great Sandy Desert, it might have been supposed that with the elephants and the heavy baggage, he must have had more to encounter than Alexander. The plenty that now prevailed in the camp was increased by the arrival of a large convoy, brought by Stasanor, satrap of Ariana, and Pharismanes, son of the Parthian satrap Phrataphernes, who, either in compliance with the king's orders, or of their own accord, hearing of the dangerous route he had taken¹, came to meet him with a long train of camels, and other beasts, laden with provisions. Alexander distributed all among his troops. Their losses were thus partly repaired, their wants abundantly supplied; their sufferings might be considered as at an end. We cannot wonder that, in the enjoyment of pleasures from which they had been so long debarred, they abandoned themselves to some excesses, perhaps only following the example of their chiefs and of Alexander himself: and this was probably the main ground of fact for the exaggeration of later writers, who described his march through Carmania, as a continued revel, in which he imitated the festive procession with which his divine predecessor had returned from his Indian conquests. He was now also joined by three generals, Cleander, Sitalces, and Heraco², who commanded the forces left in Media with Parmenio, and had brought with them the greater part of their troops. They too perhaps wished to make a display of loyal zeal, but they were called upon to answer charges of gross misconduct; and Cleander and Sitalces were immediately convicted, and put to death. It appeared that they had plundered temples, ransacked ancient tombs, and sacrificed the honour of noble families to their lust. If we may

¹ Arrian represents their coming as a spontaneous movement. But, according to Curtius (ix 10. 17) and Diodorus (xvii. 105¹) they were only obeying orders which Alexander had sent, when he began to be distressed by the scarcity of provisions in Gedrosia. This would confirm the opinion, that he was before ignorant of the nature of the country. But he may have sent the orders sooner.

² Curtius adds Agathos to the number: but we do not hear what became of him.

believe Curtius, Alexander also put to death no less than 600 of the soldiers, who had been their instruments in these acts of violence. Heraco was afterwards condemned on another similar charge.

There can be no doubt that in these cases the punishment was deserved. But another execution is said by Curtius to have taken place in Carmania, for which he charges Alexander with cruelty. Aspastes, the satrap of the province, though he came to meet the king on his arrival, and was at first graciously received, was put to death, on a suspicion of treasonable designs, formed in Alexander's absence.¹ This, according to the view entertained by Curtius, and by several other writers, both ancient and modern, would be the first indication of an unhappy change which was beginning to show itself in Alexander's character: an effect, either of his uninterrupted prosperity, or, as others have conceived, of the partial failure and disappointment which he had experienced in India. We need not stop to inquire which of these causes is the more probable, since the alledged effect seems to be extremely doubtful. We shall indeed meet with other instances, in which there is ground to suspect, that he was not exempt from passion, which hurried him into hasty decisions, in the administration of justice. But we cannot infer that any change had taken place in his character. He appears to have been always quick in resentment, and rather generous than either merciful or scrupulously just. He was now no doubt highly provoked by the audacity with which his officers had violated their duty in his absence, as if certain that he would never return, and was hence inclined to lend a favouring ear to such accusations: and his indignation was probably heightened by the conviction, which must

¹ The fact might seem doubtful, if it rested on no authority better than Curtius. But Arrian, though he does not mention it in his history, seems clearly to allude to it in his *Indica*, 36, where he says, that the satrap of Carmania *παραβήσας πάλιν πρέσβειν Ἀλεξανδρῶν*. Schmiæder indeed interprets this expression to mean, *had gone out of office*, and refers it to the removal of Siburtius; but he supports his opinion only by most irrelevant quotations.

have been forced on him by these occurrences, that, from the moment of his death, had it happened, his vast empire would at once have fallen in pieces. Still cruelty, in the most odious sense of the word, wanton injustice, was always foreign to his nature: nor have we any proof, that his temper had become in other respects harsher, or less even, than before his Indian expedition.¹

In the mean while he was in painful uncertainty, and was giving way more and more to gloomy thoughts, as to the fate of Nearchus and the fleet. They were at length dispelled by tidings, that Nearchus had landed on the coast of Carmania, within a few days' march of the camp. The bearer of the news was the governor of the maritime district in which the event had occurred. Some of the men belonging to the fleet, in an excursion up the country, had fallen in with one of Alexander's soldiers, and learnt from him, that the king was encamped only five days' march from the sea: by him Nearchus was brought to the governor, who hastened to the camp with the joyful tidings. Alexander sent party after party with means of conveyance for Nearchus. Some of his messengers proceeded but a short distance, and returned without intelligence. Others went farther, but lost the road. He began to suspect that he had been deceived, and ordered the governor to be arrested. Meanwhile Nearchus had hauled up his vessels on shore, and had fortified a naval camp, where he left the greater part of his men, and set out, with Archias, his second in command, and five or six companions, to seek the king. On their way they met one of the parties which had been sent with horses and carriages in search of them. But so great was the change made in their appearance by the hardships of the voyage, that, even when they inquired the road to the camp, they were not recognised by their country-

¹ Droysen's picture (p. 486.) of the state of Alexander's mind: "the period of effort and struggle had gone by, the enthusiasm of youth and hope was cooled, &c." seems to be drawn purely from imagination, and to be inconsistent with the vast enterprises in which we find him engaged to the end of his life.

men, until, on the suggestion of Archias, they made themselves known. Some now hastened to inform Alexander of their approach. When he heard of the smallness of their number, he concluded that the fleet was lost, and that they were the only survivors. But their arrival cleared up all mistakes, and diffused universal joy.

The details of the voyage would be foreign to our purpose. Nearchus had been forced to begin it, before the winds had become favourable, by the hostility of the Indians at Pattala; and though he waited four and twenty days on the Arabite coast, he afterwards lost three of his vessels in the adverse monsoon. On the coast of Oritis he met Leonnatus, who, after Alexander's departure, had been obliged to defend himself against the combined forces of the natives and their allies. He had gained a great victory with the loss of few men: the satrap Apollophanes was among the slain. From Leonnatus, according to the king's orders, Nearchus received a supply of corn sufficient for ten days, and exchanged some of his least active sailors for better men from the camp: but it does not appear that he lighted upon any of the magazines destined by Alexander for his use. After manifold hardships and perils, from the monsters of the deep, the barrenness of the coast, the hostility of the barbarians, and from the timidity and despondency of his own crews, he at length, with the aid of a Gedrosian pilot, reached the mouth of the Persian Gulph. When they came in sight of Arabia, Onesicritus — with what view is not perfectly clear — urged the admiral to strike across, and steer to the south. Nearchus however prudently refused to deviate from the king's instructions, and finally landed near the mouth of the river Anamis (Ibrahim), not far to the east of the isle of Ormuz.

Alexander now celebrated these happy events with a solemn festival, which, as usual, was enlivened by gymnastic and musical contests: and perhaps the poets

who vied with one another on this occasion, as well as the spectacle itself, may have contributed to the origin of the fables about his Bacchanalian pomp. In the triumphal procession Nearchus was the foremost object of congratulation and applause. The king then consulted with him as to the remainder of the voyage. Alexander may now have been in earnest, when he begged him not to expose himself to further danger and hardship with the fleet, which some other officer might conduct to the mouth of the Tigris: but he gladly and thankfully complied with the admiral's request, that he might be allowed to complete the glorious undertaking, which he had already brought to a point where it became comparatively safe and easy. He was accordingly dismissed with a small escort. The state of the country was still so unsettled, that he was attacked on his way to the sea by the Carmanians, who were in open revolt, and had seized all the strongholds. According to Arrian, this insurrection was excited by the changes that had been made in the government of the province. For Siburtius, who succeeded Aspastes, had just been removed to the satrapy of Gedrosia, and Tlepolemus appointed in his room. In his history Arrian does not mention this rebellion, and perhaps Alexander did not think it important enough to require that he should suppress it in person.¹ He now divided his forces. The main body he committed to Hephæstion, who, as it was winter, was ordered to move along the shore of the Persian Gulph, where the climate at this season was mild, and provisions plentiful, and to join him at Susa. He himself, with a small division of light troops and cavalry, took the upper road through Pasargadæ and Persepolis.

In Persis too he found that affairs had gone but ill

¹ In the speech which Arrian puts into his mouth at the mutiny, he says of himself *Καταμάρτυς γεγονυμένων*, which, but for the reason given in a preceding note, might seem to imply that it had never before been subject to him. But the expression may relate to the rebellion, whether it was quelled by Alexander himself, or by Tlepolemus.

in his absence. The satrap Phrassartēs was dead, and a noble Persian, named Orxines, according to Curtius a descendant of Cyrus, and a man of large hereditary possessions, had ventured to assume the government, professing however none but loyal intentions, perhaps being the only person to whom the province would quietly have submitted: and he came to meet the king with a magnificent display of costly presents. Alexander seems to have betrayed no displeasure at his usurpation, but was exceedingly incensed by the discovery, that the sepulchre of Cyrus at Pasargadæ had been defaced and pillaged. The offender was not immediately named. The Magians who had the care of the sacred inclosure, were examined, and put to the torture, but revealed nothing. It was not until the army reached Persepolis, that Orxines was charged with this and other acts of sacrilege, and with arbitrary executions, and being convicted, according to Arrian, on clear evidence, was condemned to death. Curtius however asserts, that he was innocent, and fell a victim to calumny and court intrigues: and it must be owned, that if we believe what is said of his birth and his wealth, the charge of sacrilege seems scarcely credible: especially as the tomb of Cyrus at least appears to have been rifled by a Macedonian, named Polymachus. Alexander had before resolved to confer the satrapy of Persis on Peucestes, whom he had already, in Carmania, raised to the dignity of somatophylax, as a reward for his great service in India. Peucestes had also distinguished himself in another way, not quite so honourable to him: by the readiness with which he adopted the barbarian usages; and when he was appointed satrap, he assumed the Median dress, began to study the Persian language, and in all points formed his court on the native model. By these proceedings he both won the hearts of the people, and rose in favour with his master. A more jealous prince might perhaps have suspected him of ambitious projects. But Alexander was too well

pleased with his obsequiousness, or dexterity, and hoped that his example might be followed by others among his Macedonian nobles.

From Persepolis, where he could not now view the ruins of the palace without regret and self reproach — a sign that his better feelings had not lost their strength — he proceeded, without further delay, to meet Hephæstion and Nearchus, at Susa, which he designed for the scene of several important transactions.

CHAP. LV.

FROM ALEXANDER'S RETURN TO SUSA TO HIS DEATH.

ALEXANDER might now be said to have returned into the heart of his dominions; since the Indus, the Iaxartes, and the Nile, had become Macedonian rivers. It was a question at that time of great importance to the whole civilised world, what were the plans now floating in the imagination of the youthful conqueror, if not yet reduced to a settled purpose. His character and past achievements naturally excited an expectation of enterprises still more extraordinary. None, perhaps, not absolutely impracticable, could be thought too great for his ambition, or too arduous for his adventurous spirit. Some of those attributed to him however could only have been deemed probable by persons who were incapable of duly estimating the sagacity and prudence which guided even his boldest undertakings. It was believed by many, that he designed to circumnavigate Arabia to the head of the Red Sea, and afterwards Africa; then, entering the Mediterranean by the Pillars of Hercules, to spread the terror of his arms along its western shores, and finally to explore the northern extremity of the lake Mæotis, and, if possible, discover a passage into the Caspian Sea. These reports were not altogether without a visible foundation. They seem to have arisen out of the simple fact, that Alexander, on his return from India, prepared to equip a fleet on the Euphrates, and sent orders to Phœnicia for vessels to be built there and transported to Thapsacus; thence to fall down the river to Babylon, where a harbour was to be formed, capable of containing 1000 galleys of war. That a great armament therefore was to be collected, for some operations which

were to begin in the Persian Gulph, was sufficiently certain: and Alexander also gave proofs that his views were directed toward Arabia, for he sent three expeditions to survey its coasts: first, a vessel under the command of Archias, the companion of Nearchus, who however did not even venture to cross over to the Arabian side of the Persian Gulph, but stopped short at one of the islands: Androsthenes, who was afterwards sent out with another vessel, did a little more—he sailed for a short distance along the coast. The boldest of the adventurers was a Cilician, named Hiero, who advanced much further in the same direction: but his courage and perseverance were at length overcome by the vast range of the coast, which exceeded all his expectations: and on his return he reported that Arabia was nearly as large as India. Yet it would seem, from Arrian's account, that even he had not doubled the Cape seen by Nearchus.

It can hardly be supposed that Alexander had resolved to attempt the conquest of Arabia, while he was conscious that he knew so little about the nature and extent of the country, especially as the information which he might obtain as to the interior cannot have been encouraging. But it is not the less probable that discovery and conquest in this quarter were the objects which, henceforth to his death, chiefly occupied his thoughts: for the spirit of discovery was here stimulated by a clear prospect of great advantages to be derived from a maritime communication between Egypt and India. To ascertain whether it was possible to open one, and to secure it, if not by conquests, at least by colonies planted on the Arabian coast, was a design certainly suited to Alexander's genius, and worthy of his ambition; and this appears to have been the first destination of the new armament. That another expedition to India had presented itself to his mind, is implied in this supposition, but that it was the immediate object of his preparations we find no reason to believe. On any other projects which he may have entertained, it would be still more idle to speculate.

For some time after his return, his attention was engrossed by different cares. From every side he continued to receive fresh complaints of the excesses committed by his satraps and other officers, during his absence, and fresh proofs that many of them aimed at establishing an independent authority. The indignation of the people was especially provoked by the spoliation of the sacred buildings. It is probable, that in almost every case such outrages on the national feelings proceeded from the reckless cupidity of the Macedonians, though the native governors may have abused their powers as grossly in other matters. Not unfrequently perhaps they had connived at the misconduct of the Macedonian officers under their command, as we may suspect to have been the case with Orxines and the above-mentioned Polymachus, who is described as a man of high rank. So Abulites, the satrap of Susa, and his son Oxathres, were put to death, it is said, for neglect of duty: it would seem too hastily, for Alexander ran Oxathres through the body with his own sarissa: but it was the Macedonian Heraco who had plundered the temple at Susa. Such proceedings may have been the main cause of an insurrection which had broken out in Media, but was suppressed by the satrap Atropates, who brought its author, a Median named Baryaxes, and several of his partizans, to Pasargadæ, where they suffered death. Baryaxes had assumed the erect cidaris, and the title of king of the Medes and Persians, a step to which he was probably encouraged by the popular discontent which had been excited by the extortion and insolence of the strangers. Alexander was still more deeply wounded by another example of disloyalty, which was aggravated by foul ingratitude and led to important consequences.

We have seen, that before he came to the throne, some of his friends had been banished from Macedonia, because they had taken his side in his quarrel with his father.¹ Among them was Harpalus. All were after-

¹ Vol vi. p. 82. Where the name of Laomedon should have been added from Artian, iii. 6.

wards rewarded with high promotion: Harpalus, whose frame was not sufficiently robust for military service, was entrusted with the office of treasurer. Yet, a little before the battle of Issus, he had fled to Greece, having no doubt been guilty of embezzlement. But even this offence did not deprive him of the king's favour. Alexander not only induced him to return by a promise of pardon, but afterwards restored him to the trust which he had so flagrantly abused, and, on the death of Mazæus, raised him to one of the most important posts in the empire, the Babylonian satrapy. The man probably, beside the doubtful merit of his early services, possessed some pleasing talents which won his master's partiality; and Alexander committed no greater mistake in this choice, than in the appointment of the Egyptian satrap, Cleomenes. Harpalus was not more greedy than lavish of money; and, as the king's return from the far East grew more and more hopeless, he threw off all restraints, treated the revenues of his rich province and all he could exact from it as his own, and squandered them in a luxury which seems to have rivalled that of the Persian kings. We read of fish brought from the Persian Gulph for his table¹, and of his struggles with nature to fill his gardens at Babylon with exotic plants.² These however were his most innocent pleasures. The Babylonians were forced to surrender their wives and children to his boundless lust, which he moreover indulged with a peculiar kind of capricious ostentation. He sent for Pythionice, the most celebrated of the Athenian courtezans, and caused her to be received at Babylon with royal honours, and after her death erected two monuments to her memory, one at Babylon, the other in Attica, at a cost of 200 talents³—the Babylonian monument in the form of a temple, where he ordered her to be honoured,

¹ Diodor. xvii. 108.

² Plut. Al 35.

³ Theopompus in Athen. xiii 67. Plutarch however (Phoc. 32.) says that the one in Attica cost but thirty talents, and that it did not look as if so much had been laid out on it.

under the title of her patron goddess, with sacred rites. Her successor, Glycera, a native of Athens, he treated with no less extravagant homage, lodged her in the royal palace at Tarsus, dedicated a bronze statue to her in Syria, by the side of his own, and in a place where he was about to erect one of Alexander himself, and forced the people to salute her as a queen. For her sake, and probably likewise with an eye to the need he might have of Athenian protection in a reverse of fortune, he sent a large present of corn to the Athenians, who requited it with their franchise. An account of these proceedings was sent to Alexander by the historian Theopompus, in a letter of which some fragments have been preserved¹: but Alexander had probably received earlier information of them from other quarters. When Harpalus heard of the king's safe return, and of the severity with which he had punished similar offences, he despaired of forgiveness, seized all the treasure he could collect, which amounted to 5000 talents, took 6000 mercenaries into his pay, and, flying to the western coast, sailed over to Athens. He was forced indeed, after a time, as we shall see, to quit the city; but he staid there long enough, and was sufficiently well received, to excite bitter resentment in Alexander's mind against the Athenians. The king's confidence in Harpalus was so strong to the last, that he imprisoned Ephialtes and Cissus, who brought the news of his flight, as guilty of calumny.²

It was necessary not only to soothe the people by the punishment of such offences, but, if possible, to prevent their recurrence. It seems to have been for this end that Alexander sent orders to all his Asiatic satraps, to dismiss the Greek mercenaries whom they had taken into their service, in whom they probably found their most willing instruments for every act of violence, as well as encouragement to hope for impunity. That

¹ Athen. xiii. 67. 'Εν τῇ πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπιστολῇ. In what relation this letter stood to a work of Theopompus quoted by Athenæus, xiii. 50. under the title 'Εν τοῖς πρὸς τοῖς Χίαις ἐπιστολαῖς, it is difficult to conjecture.

² Plut. Al. 41.

Alexander really issued this order, cannot be doubted ; as we shall have occasion hereafter to observe some effects which resulted from it. It cannot however have been his intention to allow these adventurers to roam at large over Asia, where they might be expected not only to commit numberless disorders, but likewise to lend their aid to every attempt that might be made against his government, and to hold out a constant temptation to the disaffected. We have therefore in the case itself confirmation of a statement, otherwise not resting on very high authority, that he designed to plant colonies in Persia with these disbanded troops.¹ The plan indeed, if it was formed, seems to have failed, at least as to the greater number. The Greek soldiers, so long as they could find employment, were perhaps seldom inclined to exchange their military habits for peaceful occupations, and at least were generally averse from the thought of a settlement so far from their native land : as had been already proved by the example of those who had been left in Bactria, who not long after rose against the satrap, seized the citadel of Bactria, drew a part of the natives into their revolt, and set out in a body for Europe. This however only shows that there was a difficulty to be overcome. The project attributed by Pausanias to Alexander, is not the less in perfect harmony with his general policy, and appears, in fact, as we shall see, to have been partly carried into effect.

But such precautions as these were barely sufficient to maintain tranquillity for the present : much more was needed for the future. All that he had observed since his return appears to have strengthened his previous conviction, that his empire, to be permanent, must be established on a new basis. And at Susa he began a series of measures, tending, in their remote consequences, to unite the conquerors with the conquered, so as to form a new people out of both, and, in their immediate effects, to raise a new force, independent

¹ PAUS. l. 25. 5. 'Ανακίσσαι σφᾶς ἐς τὴν Περσίαν διαθήσαντες Ἀλιζάνδρου.

alike of Macedonian and of Persian prejudices, and entirely subservient to his ends. The first of these measures was a great festival, in which he at the same time celebrated his own nuptials with Statira, the eldest daughter of Darius (who now, it seems, took the name of Arsinoë¹) and those of his principal officers with Persian and Median ladies of the noblest families. We find an intimation, that some address was needed, before the preliminaries could be arranged²; and this, from the known temper and views of the Macedonian generals we can easily believe. The king's example had no doubt the greatest weight in overcoming the aversion which they must have felt to such an alliance. The liberality with which he portioned their brides out of his treasure, also had its effect: and their pride was flattered by the condescension with which he placed them on a level with himself in the ceremony. Hephæstion received the hand of Drypetis, Statira's sister: it was Alexander's express wish that his friend's children should be related to his own. Craterus was wedded to Amastris, a niece of Darius; Perdiccas to a daughter of the satrap Atropates; Ptolemy and Eumenes, to two daughters of Artabazus. For Nearchus Alexander chose the daughter of Mentor by Barsine, a mark of distinguished favour, since he himself had admitted the mother to his bed, and already had a son by her, on whom he had bestowed the name of Hercules, and who afterwards became a competitor for the throne. To Seleucus he gave a daughter of the Bactrian chief Spitamenes. These are the only names recorded by Arrian, but the whole number of the officers who followed the king's example amounted to nearly a hundred. It was not less important for his object that above 10,000 of the private Macedonians had either

which seems happily to explain the variations in the name, which we find in Arrian vii. 4. (compared with Photius, p. 686, 687) and other authors. Aristobolus related, that Alexander also married Parysatis, daughter of Ochus. There was probably some foundation for this statement: but we hear nothing more of Parysatis, and Alexander certainly never placed her on a level with Statira.

¹ Diodorus, xvii. 107. *Ἰσμεν*. Compare Arrian, vii. 6.

already formed a connection, or were now induced to enter into one, with Asiatic women. To render it solemn and binding, a list was taken of their names, and a marriage portion was granted to each.

The wealth of Asia and the arts of Greece were combined to adorn the spectacle with a splendour and beauty worthy of the occasion. A gorgeous pavilion was erected, probably on a plain near the city, capable of containing not only the bridal party, but the guests whom the king had invited to the banquet.¹ It was supported by pillars sixty feet high, glittering with gold, silver, and precious stones, and was hung and spread with the richest tissues. Ninety-two chambers, magnificently furnished, were annexed to the building: and an outer court appears to have been inclosed by a partition, likewise hung with costly tapestry, for the reception of the 10,000 newly-married soldiers, each of whom received a golden vessel for his libation, and of the strangers who had been drawn by business or curiosity to the court. In the fore-ground without, tables were spread for the rest of the immense multitude. The nuptials were solemnised according to Persian usage. A separate seat was assigned to each pair: all were ranged in a semicircle, to the right and left of the royal throne. When the last libation had been announced by a flourish of trumpets to the multitude without, the brides entered the banquet-hall, and took their places. The king first gave his hand to Statira, and saluted her as his consort; and his example was followed by the rest. This, it

¹ That the tent described by Chares (Athenæus, xii 54 *Ælian*, V H viii 7) as erected for the marriage-feast, is the same with that described as the king's ordinary tent for solemn audiences by Phylarchus (Athen xii 55 *Ælian*, V H ix 3) may be considered as nearly certain. Droysen (p 496) concludes, that the royal tent was fitted up for the wedding feast. It seems more probable, that one was built for that occasion. Chares distinguishes the *δῶμα*, or inner tent, in which the tables were laid for the bridegrooms and the king's guests, from the *σάλα*, in which, according to him, the whole army, with the crowd of strangers, was entertained. But that an inclosure was made to contain so vast a multitude, seems highly improbable. The *σάλα* appears to have been destined for the Macedonian bridegrooms of lower rank. Droysen takes no notice of the outer court, but supposes that tables were laid in the tent for 8000 persons, all of distinguished rank.

seems, completed the nuptial ceremony. The festivities lasted five days, which were filled up with a variety of entertainments; among the rest, musical and dramatic performances of Greek artists, and feats of Indian jugglers.¹ Alexander's subjects from all parts of the empire vied with each other in the magnificence of their offerings to the king: and the value of the crowns which he received on this occasion is said to have amounted to 15,000 talents.

We may here mention another spectacle which was exhibited at Susa, probably soon after the king's arrival, not less to the astonishment of the natives than of the Greeks. The Indian philosopher Calanus had accompanied the army thus far.² He had become a favourite with Alexander, and with several of his officers: was frequently a guest at the royal table, and sometimes even offered political advice to the king.³ On the road to Susa, he was visited for the first time, at the age of seventy-three, with symptoms of disease. He disdained, as perhaps Plato would have done, to submit to the use of medicine and change of diet for the sake of a few more years of sickly life; and resolved, while his mind was still clear and his spirit unbroken, to drop his mortal load, and ascend to a higher sphere. He wished to solemnise this his last act according to the custom of his country, and requested the king to direct a funeral pile to be prepared for him. Alexander endeavoured in vain to divert him from his purpose, and at last ordered Ptolemy to make the necessary arrangements.

¹ *Θαυματοποιία*, Athen xii 54.

² Strabo (xv 300 Tauchn.) says that he fell ill at Pasargadae, and put an end to his life which seems to imply that this was the scene of his death. and Arrian (vii 3) appears likewise to fix it in Persia. But, as Droysen observes, his mention of Nearchus and the elephants as present at the funeral, clearly proves that it cannot have taken place before the reunion of the forces at Susa. And so we find Diodorus, in this instance, apparently rather more accurate than Strabo or Arrian, for, according to him, it was about the time that Alexander reached the frontiers of Susa, that Calanus burnt himself, xvii 107.

³ To illustrate the danger of Alexander's expeditions into remote regions, Calanus, it is said, laid a dry hide on the ground, and showed, that when any corner was pressed the other parts were raised, but when the pressure was applied to the centre, the whole was kept at rest. Plut. Al 65.

When all was ready, a military procession, accompanied by the elephants, led the way. Vessels of gold and silver, royal vestments, and precious spices — Alexander's presents to his departing friend — were carried before him to be laid on the pile, which was itself constructed of all manner of odoriferous woods.¹ A horse of the Nysæan breed had also been brought for him; but, according to some accounts, he was unable to mount it, and was borne in a litter, crowned with a chaplet, and singing his Indian hymns. When he reached the place, he distributed the king's presents among the persons to whom he had been most attached, giving the horse to Lysimachus, who had been used to take pleasure in his conversation, took leave of his friends, and requested them to devote the rest of the day to convivial mirth. He then mounted the pile, and gravely laid himself down in the sight of the whole army, which was drawn up in a circle round it. Alexander alone would not be tempted by curiosity to witness such an end of one whom he loved. As soon as the torches were applied to the pile, the trumpets sounded, the men raised the battle yell, and the elephants were made to join their sharp screech. Every eye was fixed on Calanus; but he was never seen to stir again. The funeral was followed, according to ancient Greek usage, by a horse-race, and by gymnastic and musical contests. But his last request was fulfilled in a manner which he could scarcely have wished, and which does not convey a favourable idea of Alexander's court. At the banquet which closed the day, the king proposed a prize for the stoutest drinker. It need not be supposed that he himself engaged in the contest: but it proved almost immediately fatal to no less than forty-one of the competitors, and Promachus, the conqueror, did not survive his triumph more than three days. It must be confessed, that such a tribute to the memory of Calanus

¹ *ÆL. V. H. v. 6.*

was not more humane than a combat of gladiators : and, after this well-attested fact, the Macedonians could not justly complain that any wrong was done to their character by the legend of their drunken march through Carmania.¹

The nuptial festival was a concession gained from the Macedonians in favour of the ancient masters of Asia. It had not been yielded without reluctance ; and notwithstanding the king's liberality and condescension, murmurs were excited, both in the mass of the army, and among some of the newly-married officers, by the preference which had been given to the Persian ceremonial. Alexander, who meditated innovations which were likely to give still greater offence to the Macedonians, now endeavoured to conciliate them by another act of royal munificence, and by the distribution of rewards to those who had distinguished themselves in the late expeditions. He declared his intention to pay the debts of every Macedonian in the army ; and directed that all who wished to share his bounty should give in their names to be registered. The offer was at first very coldly received, and awakened a suspicion, which indicated an unsound state of feeling, though it arose in part from a reproving conscience, and might also be considered as occasioned by the incredible amount of the proffered donative. It was generally believed, that the king's object was chiefly to gain information as to the state of their private affairs, and, from the debts which they had contracted, to form a judgment which could not fail to be often unfavourable on the habits and character of each. Few therefore presented themselves to enter their names. Alexander, as soon as he discovered the cause of this general backwardness, reproved them for their unworthy distrust, with the

¹ Ælian's authority (V. H. II. 41.) does not seem sufficient to prove that such drinking matches were customary in India, and that Alexander proposed this to gratify the Indians who were then at his court. There is no reason to suppose that so great a change has taken place in Indian manners as this would imply. Ælian may have inferred the custom from the request of Calanus and the manner in which it was fulfilled.

remark, that it was no more fit that subjects should suspect their king of falsehood, than that he should practise it: and immediately ordered tables to be set in the camp, with heaps of gold, where each might receive the amount of his debts without registering his name. This generous confidence removed all doubts: men of all ranks flocked in with their claims: and the secrecy was felt as a greater favour than the relief. We hear but of one case in which the temptation held out by it to fraud was abused. A veteran, named Antigènes, who had lost an eye at the siege of Perinthus, came to one of the counters with a man whom he had induced to act the part of a creditor. The pretended debt was paid: but the collusion was soon after detected; and Alexander indignantly banished Antigènes from court, and deprived him of his command. The shame was more than the offender could bear; and it became evident that he would not long survive it. To prevent a fatal issue, which would have damped the joy of the army, Alexander restored the old officer to his rank, and permitted him to keep all he had received.

The sum expended on this largess is said to have been no less than 20,000 talents. Alexander, at the same time, bestowed crowns of gold on several of his principal officers, among whom are mentioned Peucestes, Leonnatus, Nearchus, Onesicritus, and Hephæstion. Other rewards were conferred on a great number of persons in proportion to their rank and services. But the popularity which the king gained by these measures, was soon to be subjected to a hard trial. For it was not long after, that the satraps who had the charge of the Asiatic youth selected some years before, to be taught the Greek language, and to be trained to war according to the Macedonian system, came to Susa, with a body of 30,000 young soldiers formed in these schools, equipped and armed in the Macedonian fashion. Alexander himself was delighted with their fine persons and martial bearing, and with

the manner in which they executed their manœuvres, and immediately proceeded to incorporate them with his army. The infantry, it seems, was for the present kept distinct from the Macedonian troops: but the cavalry, which was drawn from Bactria and Sogdiana, and other eastern provinces, was admitted into the same ranks with the flower of the Macedonian nobility. A fifth division of horse was formed to receive them: and, at the same time, several of the young Asiatic nobles were enrolled in the Escort, a body hitherto selected from the first families of Macedonia. These changes roused the jealousy and resentment of the old troops, in a much higher degree than any of the king's previous acts. His adoption of the dress and usages of the conquered people had displeased them, because it indicated a purpose which they disliked: the late alliances created perhaps still greater discontent, because they still more clearly and directly tended to the same point. But the new organisation of the army was more than a tendency; it was not a mere indication, but the first step in the execution of the purpose which had alarmed them; it was a beginning of destruction to all the privileges they most valued. Alexander, it was plain, wished to be considered only as their sovereign, no longer as their countryman.

The murmurs of the camp probably did not escape his notice, and may have induced him to set out the earlier from Susa, on a march which, by the new occupation it afforded, would perhaps make the army forget its supposed grievances. He therefore ordered Hephestion to lead the main body down to the coast, while he himself, with the hypaspists, and a few squadrons of horse, embarked on board the fleet which Nearchus had brought up the Eulæus to Susa. Having fallen down the river as far as the cut by which it is connected in the upper part of its course with the Tigris, he left the vessels which had suffered most from the sea, to enter the Tigris by this canal, while with the rest he

sailed down to the mouth, and surveyed the coast of the Delta. Then, again entering the Tigris by another arm, he sailed up toward the place of rendezvous, which he had concerted with Hephæstion, and, when the whole armament was once more united, proceeded by slow marches to Opis. His attention on the way was entirely devoted to the state of the stream, and the adjacent districts; and he employed his troops to remove the dykes, or bunds, by which the ancient kings of Persia or Assyria had obstructed the navigation; whether, as he wished to be believed, for the security of their dominions against inroads from the sea, or, as seems more probable, for other purposes, which appeared to him no longer to require them.

On his arrival at Opis, he assembled the Macedonians, and addressing them from a lofty stand, where he was surrounded by his principal officers, informed them that he had determined to release from service those who, by age or wounds, had become unfit for the field, and that they were at liberty to return to their homes: that it should be his care to make such a provision for their old age, as should render their condition happy and honoured, and should induce others of their countrymen to encounter like hardships and dangers for the sake of like rewards. The offer may have been made in a spirit of real kindness and generosity: but it was interpreted by the Macedonians according to the impression which had been left on them by the recent innovations. They viewed it as a pretext, by which the king sought to rid himself of veterans, whom, toilworn as they were, he would have been glad to retain in his service, if he had not wished to fill their places with barbarian recruits. This thought was as a torch applied to their pile of grievances, and kindled their long smouldering resentment into a blaze. A cry spread through the ranks, and was raised by several who stood immediately before the king, "That he might dismiss them all, and go to war with the aid of the god, his father." It was

evident that, though the outbreak was sudden, the movement had been long prepared : that the disposition of the multitude was ripe for violence, and that this tumult, unless immediately suppressed, might in a few moments burst every barrier, and cause irreparable calamities. Alexander met this danger with as much presence of mind as all others to which he was ever exposed. He was probably a little stung by their taunts, and perhaps his indignation was roused by what he may have considered an ungrateful return for his kindness. Arrian thinks, that, before he became accustomed to the servility of the barbarians, he would have treated his Macedonians in such a case more leniently. Of this we can hardly judge, as the occasion would not have arisen : but, in his actual situation, the course which he took was probably the only one by which he could have averted the danger, without the sacrifice of his will, and the loss of his authority. He instantly leaped down from the tribune, followed by his officers, and pointing to the men whom he had observed most active in the disturbance, ordered his guards to seize them. Thirteen were arrested, and led away at his command to immediate execution.

At once the uproar sank into deep silence ; the spirit of the multitude quailed before a stronger resolution : the mutiny was already crushed. It only remained to follow up the blow and secure the victory. Alexander resumed his station, and again addressed the awe-struck crowd. The speech which Arrian has put into his mouth for this occasion may not improbably represent the substance of that which he really delivered. It has been much admired, and certainly its merit, as a piece of rhetoric, is not the less because it confines itself to topics on which he could dwell with a clear advantage, avoids all notice of the point which was the sole ground of complaint, and gives a turn to the language of the mutineers quite foreign to their well-known sentiments. He reminded them of the benefits

which his father and himself had conferred on Macedonia, and the terms in which he describes the state from which Philip raised it, involve a complete vindication of the policy of the Athenian party which resisted the growth of his power, and of the contempt with which they regarded his people. He then spoke of his own conquests, of the scanty means with which he began his expedition, and of the immense change it had made in the fortunes of his followers; for all he had won was theirs: he had conquered, not to enrich himself, but them: for himself he reserved nothing but the purple and the diadem. So the speech dexterously, and not less boldly, asserts: as if they had been expected to believe that his treasury had been drained by his munificence. He could more truly claim the merit of greater personal risks and sufferings than any of them were able to allege, which, if they, and not he, had been the gainers by his victories, would doubtless have been an argument of some weight. He however reminded them more particularly of the splendid rewards they had received for their services, and finally he bade them go and make it known at home that, after a series of triumphs such as no conqueror had before achieved, they had abandoned their king, and had consigned him to the guard of the barbarians whom he had subdued. "This conduct," he concludes with emphatic irony, "may perhaps be honourable in the judgment of men, and pious in the eyes of the gods. Away!" So saying, he hastily quitted the stand, attended by his great officers and his guard, and shut himself up in the palace¹, where he neglected his ordinary refreshments, and for two days refused to admit even his most intimate friends to his presence.

¹ Mr. Williams (*Geography of Ancient Asia*, p. 32) asserts, that "at Opis there could have been no royal palace;" but neglects to offer any proof of his assertion. Whether there was a treasury there, is a question perfectly immaterial. On this very bold, but no less unfortunate attempt, to extort testimony from Arrian in favour of the opinion, that the mutiny took place, not at Opis, where Arrian expressly lays the scene, but at Susa, see vol. vi. p. 338.

The Macedonians might perhaps have found an answer to the speech, though so much of it was indisputably true. They might have pointed out that it did not at all affect the justice of their complaints, which rested on the change that had been made in their relation to the conquered races: and that, far from wishing to leave their king in the hands of the barbarians, they only felt themselves aggrieved because he had honoured and trusted the barbarians too much. But, for whatever might have been said in their behalf, they had neither spokesman nor hearer: and, what rendered their condition still more desperate, they had no leader. They remained for some time where the king had left them, in silent consternation and deep perplexity. They were a body without a head, unable either to act or to deliberate. The spirit of resistance had, it appears, been entirely broken: they were ready to submit, and only waited to learn Alexander's intentions. He had resolved to try their obedience and to vindicate his own majesty to the utmost. On the third day he sent for the principal Persian officers, and declared to them his purpose, to be hereafter served by Asiatic troops in the room of the Macedonians: he assigned to them their commands in the army, which was to be organised on the Macedonian model and with Macedonian names. Even the royal escorts of infantry and cavalry were to be composed wholly of Persians, and he selected some Persian nobles to receive the title of his kinsmen and the privilege of kissing him.¹ When these orders were published, they carried the feelings which already prevailed in the Macedonian camp, to the last extremity of anguish and dismay. It seemed as if the king was in earnest, and would take them at their word: their own rashness had brought down upon them the evil which they dreaded. No

¹ Droysen (p. 515) infers from Polyænus (iv. 3. 7) that Alexander sent a challenge to the Macedonians, to choose a leader, and give him battle. This is not more probable than the scene which Polyænus describes — perhaps with no other groundwork than a distorted account of Alexander's language on this occasion.

hope was left but in the royal clemency. There needed no consultation, and scarcely a voice to express the universal sentiment. With one consent they rushed to the palace, and threw down their arms as ensigns of supplication before the gates, intreating for admission, offering to surrender their evil counsellors and those who had first uttered the seditious cries, for punishment, and declaring that they would not quit the threshold, day or night, until Alexander took compassion on them.

He had now brought them to the degree of submission which he desired, and it became safe and reasonable to relent. We may be sure that nothing was farther from his thoughts, than to lose such a body of troops, and to endanger the peace of Macedonia by an appearance of complete alienation: and perhaps the experiment would have been imprudent, if it had exposed him to such hazard. But he might easily foresee the result; and indeed the success of his first step showed that it rested with himself to receive them again into his service, whenever he would, upon his own terms. His prudence was no less conspicuous in the manner of the reconciliation, than his firmness had been throughout the struggle. It appears that he did not let them remain long in the attitude of suppliants, but came out to them, as eager to forgive, when he could no longer doubt the sincerity of their repentance. Their downcast looks, and pitiful lamentations, drew tears — which a Greek easily shed — from his own eyes. He prepared to speak; but the sound of wailing and intreaty did not cease. At length a veteran officer of the cavalry, named Callines, ventured to remark, that the thing which most hurt the Macedonians was, that the king had honoured Persians with the title of kinsmen, and the privilege of the kiss, which no Macedonian had ever enjoyed. Alexander, as if affected by their loyal jealousy, declared that he should henceforth look upon all of them as his kinsmen, and grant them the privilege they so much coveted. Accordingly Cal-

lines, and several others, were permitted to kiss him ; and the whole body, taking up their arms, returned with shouts of joy and pæans to the camp. To seal the reconciliation, Alexander celebrated a thanksgiving-sacrifice, which was followed by a banquet, at which he entertained 9000 of his troops, selected for their personal rank and merits from the rival nations. The Macedonians took the precedence, and were placed immediately round the king : the Persians were seated next ; and then it seems, without distinction, the representatives of the other races. The religious rites were directed by Greek soothsayers and Magians : the king, and those around him, drew their libations from one bowl ; and he accompanied them with a prayer for concord, and community of empire, between the Macedonians and the Persians.

The discharged veterans, 10,000 in number, were then dismissed with every token of respect and affection. Each received a talent over and above his pay, calculated to the time of his arrival in Macedonia. The children born to them of Asiatic women¹, Alexander took under his own charge — to prevent, as he said, discord in their families — promising to train them for soldiers, and, when they had grown up, to lead them to Macedonia himself. And he bade them consider it as the strongest proof he could give of his regard for them, that he appointed Craterus, the friend who was dear to him as his own life, to conduct them home. With Craterus he had joined Polysperchon as second in command, that no embarrassment might arise if Craterus, who was in ill-health, should be detained on the road. It was not however simply for the sake of the veterans, that Craterus was entrusted with this commission. He had received other instructions of at least equal importance. He was to supersede Antipater in the government of Macedonia ; and Antipater was to conduct the fresh levies to the king. Though Arrian

¹ The Epigoni, properly so called : for the name was sometimes incorrectly applied to the young barbarian recruits.

cautions his readers not to rely on writers who affect to disclose the most secret counsels of princes, it can hardly be doubted that by this time Alexander's confidence in Antipater had begun to give way to his mother's continued accusations, and to the complaints which he received from other persons, against the regent. If we may judge from the scanty accounts remaining of Antipater's private habits and sentiments, there was reason to think, that he disapproved of many of the king's proceedings. He is reported to have remarked, when he heard of Parmenio's death: "If Parmenio conspired against Alexander, who is to be trusted? If not, what is to be done?"¹ And he might be supposed to be no better satisfied with the execution of his own son-in-law, Alexander the Lyncestian. He retained the old Macedonian simplicity in his dress and manner of living, to a degree which attracted notice, by its contrast with the habits of the age, and which must have appeared still more singular, when compared with the splendour of Alexander's court.² The looms of Ionia were kept in constant activity to supply purple robes for the courtiers³; while Antipater still wore a garment adorned only with a plain white border. And Alexander is said to have observed, when this was mentioned to him, that though Antipater's outside was so homely, he was all purple within.⁴ That there was a real foundation for the prevailing opinion, that the regent had sunk in the king's favour, seems clear from the fact, that he sent his son Cassander to court to defend his conduct: and it appears that he had also entered into a secret treaty with the Ætolians.⁵

Alexander's attention had also been drawn of late towards the state of Greece, and particularly towards Athens. Nothing had occurred there that could fairly be interpreted as a sign of defiance or hostility: but it

¹ Plut. R. et I. Ap. Antip. 1.

² Athen. xii. 71.

³ Athen. xii. p. 539 F.

⁴ Plut. R. et I. Ap. Alex. 17 "Ἐξωδὸν λευκονόμος, τὰ δὲ ἔσω πορφύρεος.

⁵ Plut. Al. 49.

seems that this resentment, kindled by the flight of Harpalus, turned itself against the people among whom the fugitive had sought shelter, and that he meditated a signal revenge. It may easily be conceived, that he was still more impatient of every appearance of opposition from the Greeks, than from his Macedonians, and he had adopted two measures, which left no doubt as to the footing on which the Greeks were henceforth to consider themselves as standing with respect to him, and were calculated to put an end to all resistance to his authority. It will be more convenient to reserve an account of the reception which these measures met with in Greece, for a subsequent chapter: but they must be mentioned here, as they throw light on Alexander's character and views. One was a decree, published at the Olympic games (B.C. 324), by which he enjoined, that all the exiles who had been forced to quit their homes for any other offence than sacrilege and murder, should be permitted to return. *This measure was manifestly designed for the benefit of that numerous class of persons who had been defeated in the struggles of the Greek parties, and banished by their adversaries. Their return would have established the predominance of the Macedonian interest in every Greek city, almost as effectually as a Macedonian garrison. It was a stroke of policy; the policy of an enemy, who wished to divide, that he might rule. But the other measure looks more like the act of a despot, who would degrade a conquered people, that he might trample upon them. It was a requisition, sent round to the principal states of Greece, demanding divine honours for Alexander. It is true that such things were no longer looked at by the Greeks so seriously as they had once been: there had also been instances in which honours of this kind had been paid to persons much inferior to Alexander in dignity and power: as to Lysander: it was indeed no more than Harpalus had exacted, though not from Greeks, for his deceased mistress. Possibly too Alexander's envoys may have ventured to alledge the example of the Mace-

donians: and very probably he expected, that the reluctance of the Macedonians might be softened by the acquiescence of the Greeks. This last supposition, though it could not alter the character of the measure in the eyes of those to whom it was dictated, would certainly present it in a less odious light to us.¹

After the departure of Craterus, Alexander set out for Ecbatana. The state of the treasure, and the country, which had been so long in such hands as those of Cleander and Sitalces, demanded his attention. It was also a point where he might collect information, and concert measures, with regard to the regions which bounded his dominions on the north along the coasts of the Caspian Sea, concerning which his knowledge was hitherto very imperfect. But no doubt one of his main objects was to gratify the Medians by a residence of some months in their splendid capital, one of the proudest cities of the ancient world, where his Persian predecessors had been used to hold their court during a part of the year. Their sojourn had been a burdensome honour to their subjects: for the host which they brought with them was to be supported at the expense of the country.² Alexander's presence was everywhere felt as a blessing. In his progress through Media he viewed the pastures celebrated—it seems, under the name of the Nysæan plain—for the number and excellence of the horses bred in them. The number had amounted to 150,000;

¹ Droysen (Al. p. 524) elaborately vindicates the policy of the measure, which, according to him, was absolutely necessary for the stability of Alexander's throne, adding the very questionable assertion, that all monarchical governments rest on the belief, that the sovereign is a being of a higher nature. But his argument with regard to Alexander, depends on the no less precarious assumption, that the effect of the order on the Greeks was likely to be that of awakening their veneration for his majesty. It appears that the feelings which it really excited, partook much more of either indignation or contempt.

² A tolerably correct notion of the weight of the burden may be formed from the list, given by Polyænus (iv. 3. 32.), of the provisions daily consumed by the Great King's household. The list professes to have been copied from a brazen column, which Alexander found in a royal palace. As a specimen, we may notice, that it included 400 sheep, 300 lambs, 100 oxen, 30 horses, 30 deer, 400 fat geese, 300 pigeons, 600 small birds of various kinds. Alexander ordered the column to be taken down. He limited the daily expense of his own table to 10,000 drachmas; which possibly was as much as the Persian kings spent for the same purpose.

but, through a series of depredations, which mark the disordered state of the province, it had been reduced by nearly two-thirds. Here he was met by Atropates, the satrap of the north-west part of Media, who, it seems, entertained him with a masquerade of a hundred women, mounted, and equipped with hatchets and short bucklers, according to the popular notion of the Amazons. Such is Arrian's conjecture. The fact, whatever it may have been, gave rise to a story, that Alexander here received an embassy from the queen of the Amazons, and promised to pay her a visit. There were several other objects on this road to attract his attention in a leisurely march: a Bœotian colony planted by Xerxes, which still retained a partial use of the Greek language, and the garden and monuments of Baghistane, which tradition ascribed to Semiramis.

At Ecbatana, after he had dispatched the most important business which awaited him there, he solemnised the autumnal festival of Dionysus with extraordinary magnificence. The city was crowded with strangers, who came to witness the spectacle; and 3000 artists are said to have been assembled from Greece, to bear a part in it. The satrap Atropates feasted the whole army; and the Macedonian officers seem to have vied with each other in courtly arts. They put proclamations into the mouths of the heralds, breathing, it is said, a strain of flattery, such as had scarcely been heard by the Persian kings.¹ One of these, which was preserved as a specimen of insolent servility², but is more remarkable as an indication of Alexander's sentiments, was made by Gorgus, the master of the armoury, who presented him with a crown worth 3000 gold pieces, and undertook to furnish 10,000 complete suits of armour, and as many missiles of every sort proper for the attack of a town, whenever he should lay siege to Athens.

Among the theatrical exhibitions there was one which,

¹ Κερύματα υπερόψια καὶ τῆς Περσικῆς υπερόψιας αὐθιγόνεσσιν. Athen. xi. 53.

² Ὑπερταπεινὸν πᾶσαν πολυανίαν.

through the singularity of the subject, has been in part preserved from the oblivion, in which the rest, with numberless better things, have been lost. It was a little drama of the satirical class, entitled *Agen*, the work, as was generally believed, of one Python, possibly the Byzantian, Philip's secretary¹; but there was also a singular report, that it was written by Alexander himself. If he did not even suggest the subject, or any of the scenes, the passages which have been preserved were certainly designed to gratify his feelings.² They allude to the flight of Harpalus, who is mentioned both by his own name, and by a nickname significant of his most notorious vice³: to the monument which he had erected at Babylon in honour of Pythionice, and to the largess of corn by which he had obtained the Athenian franchise. The wretched state of Athens, as if it needed such benefactions, is described in a tone of bitter sarcasm, which passes into that of earnest hostility, when one of the speakers observes, that the corn was Glycera's, but might perhaps prove a fatal pledge of friendship to those who had received it.⁴ There can be no doubt that in these words the poet meant to speak Alexander's mind. But the festival was interrupted by an event, which Alexander felt as the greatest calamity of his life. Hephæstion had been attacked some days before by a fever, which at first did not show any alarming symptoms. Trusting to his

¹ Athenæus calls him first (xiii. 50) ὁ Καραναῖος, and afterwards (c. 68) ὁ Κ ή ὁ Βυζαντινός. One might be inclined to suspect some confusion between Καραναῖος and Δίνιος.

² According to Athenæus (xii. 68.), the *Agen* was exhibited during the Dionysia celebrated on the banks of the Hydaspes. But as it is certain, that the flight of Harpalus did not take place before Alexander's return from India, there must be some error in the name Hydaspes. Droysen would read Χαέρου for 'Υδάου, and supposes the *Agen* to have been performed at Susa. Specious as this conjecture is, two reasons induce me to reject it. The Dionysia celebrated by Alexander at Ecbatana were very famous (Athen. xii. p. 538 A.), but we do not hear of any at Susa. This indeed of itself would be a slight objection. But another which seems decisive is, that at Susa Alexander could not have heard of the fugitive's reception at Athens and there was therefore no provocation for the threat. To suppose that Alexander encouraged such language on a bare surmise — as Droysen seems to intimate (Al. p. 632) — would both be violently improbable, and reflect little honour on his temper, or his judgment.

³ Παλλίδης.

⁴ Ἐννίς δ' ἵεναι Διόνυσον διλίσθην, πούχ' ἰταίρας ἀρρεβάνει.

youth, and his strong constitution, he had it appears neglected the directions of his physician, and by his imprudence so inflamed the disease, that it carried him suddenly off. It was a day which was to have been devoted to the gymnastic exercises of the boys. Alexander was witnessing a footrace, when a message was brought to him that Hephæstion was worse. He instantly hurried to his friend's bedside, but before he arrived Hephæstion had expired. Alexander's grief, though not embittered by self-reproach, was passionate and violent, as that which he showed at the death of Clitus. There is no evidence that Hephæstion possessed any qualities that deserved the preference with which Alexander distinguished him: and indeed there are intimations that, even in Alexander's judgment, his chief merit was the devotion and obsequiousness with which he requited his master's partiality.¹ Perhaps if the attachment had been more considerably formed, the loss would have been less keenly felt. After the first transports of anguish had subsided, Alexander sought consolation in the extravagant honours which he paid to his departed favourite, and in the vain semblance of grief, which he forced all persons and things around him to put on. We may refuse, with Arrian, to believe that he was so barbarous and frantic, as to put the innocent physician to death, and to pull down the temple of Esculapius, if there was one, at Ecbatana. But there is no reason why we should question Plutarch's statement, that he ordered the horses and mules to be shorn, and the town-walls to be dismantled of their battlements.²

¹ Plut. Al 47 Hephæstion's merits are summed up in the epithet φίλαλιξάνδρῃς (Friend to Alexander): it seems that Alexander himself could not help respecting Craterus more. When the favourite quarrelled with Craterus in India, Alexander sharply rebuked Hephæstion, saying, he must be mad if he is not aware that without Alexander he would be nothing.

² Droysen rejects these reports with the utmost contempt: perhaps forgetting what Herodotus (ix 24) relates of the mourning for Masiatis, in which the Persians *shaved themselves, and the horses, and the beasts of burden*: a precedent, which at least proves, that there is nothing absurd, or incredible, in Plutarch's account: if it does not render it certain, that the same marks of grief were a necessary part of the general mourning ordered by Alexander.

These were probably among the customary signs of a general mourning on the death of the Persian kings : and it is certain that he directed one to be observed throughout his Asiatic dominions. He also commanded that, as was usual on the same occasions, the sacred fire should be quenched in all the Persian sanctuaries until the funeral was over. For this preparations were made on a scale of more than royal magnificence. He ordered Perdicas to convey the corpse to Babylon, where a pile was to be built at the expence of 10,000 talents, and funeral games, gymnastic and musical, were to be celebrated with a splendour never before witnessed : for which purpose all the artists assembled at Ecbatana were to repair to the capital. The courtiers, especially those who might be suspected to entertain very different feelings, endeavoured to prove their sympathy with the king by extraordinary tokens of veneration for the departed favourite. Eumenes, who had lately had a violent quarrel with him, which was only composed by the royal authority, dexterously set the example, and dedicated himself and his arms to the deceased : perhaps anticipating Alexander's wish, that Hephæstion should receive sacred honours. He was anxious that this should be done under the sanction of religious authority, and therefore sent to consult the oracle of Ammon on the question, whether Hephæstion should be worshipped as a hero or a god. In the mean while, it is said, he ordered the sound of music to cease in the camp. The division of the cavalry which had been commanded by Hephæstion, was to retain his name, and the officer to whom it was committed was to be regarded only as his lieutenant.¹

These fantastic cares, however, served but to cherish his melancholy, and his officers endeavoured to divert him by some fitter occupation, which might draw him from Ecbatana, where he was constantly reminded of his bereavement. He at length began to rouse himself, and complied with their wishes. An object opportunely pre-

¹ Arrian, vii. 14.

sented itself, which called him again into action, and in the manner most suited to the present temper of his soul. The Cossæans, who inhabited the highlands on the confines of Media and Persia, were still unsubdued ; and, relying on their mountain strongholds, continued from time to time to make predatory inroads on their neighbours. Though it was now the depth of winter, Alexander set out to punish and quell them. He divided his forces into two columns, and gave the command of one to Ptolemy. The obstacles opposed by the country and the season were such as he was used to overcome : the barbarians could do little to bar his progress. They were hunted like wild beasts into their lairs, and every man taken capable of bearing arms was put to the sword. It was a sacrifice to the shade of Hephæstion, in which Alexander might see another resemblance to Achilles. He then crossed the mountains, and, coming down upon the Tigris, took the direct road to Babylon.

At the distance of some days' march from the city, he was met by presages of impending calamity. A deputation of the Chaldæan priests came to the camp, and requested a private audience, in which they informed him, that their god Belus had revealed to them that some danger threatened him, if he should at that time enter Babylon. Alexander is said to have replied with a verse of Euripides, expressing disbelief in divination. But it is certain that the warning sank deep into his mind. The state of his feelings was apt for gloomy forebodings : and there was a strange harmony between the words of the Chaldæans, and an intimation which he had lately received from a Greek soothsayer, named Peithagoras. Peithagoras had been requested by his brother Apollodorus,—who had commanded the troops left at Babylon with Mazæus, and though he had accompanied the king to Ecbatana, did not feel secure of his favour,—to discover, if he could, through his art, whether the general had any thing to fear either from Alexander or Hephæstion. An answer came from Babylon that, as to Hephæstion, he was

safe: the victims showed that the favourite would soon be out of their way: and the next day Hephæstion died. Shortly after a like prediction came with regard to Alexander himself: and Apollodorus was loyal or prudent enough to disclose it to the king, who commended him for his openness. A still more marvellous story afterwards found credit: that Calanus, just before his death, had declined to take leave of Alexander, saying, that he should soon meet him at Babylon. Still the priests found that they could not induce the king to give up his intention of visiting the capital of his empire, where many important affairs were to be transacted, and embassies from remote parts of the world were awaiting his arrival. They then urged him at least not to enter the city in the direction in which he was then marching, by the eastern gate, so as to have his face turned toward the dark west: but to make a circuit, and enter from the opposite quarter. This mysterious advice struck Alexander's fancy; he wished to comply with it, and for that purpose altered the course of his march, and proceeded some distance along the bank of the Euphrates. But he then found that the lakes and morasses formed by the inundations of the river to the west of Babylon, would prove an insurmountable obstacle. He was still reluctant to neglect the warning of the Chaldeans, but yet not now indisposed to listen to Anaxarchus, and the other philosophical Greeks about him, who treated the occult science, and especially its Babylonian professors, with contempt. There was however another motive for distrust, which weighed still more with him. He had begun to conceive a suspicion, that his priestly counsellors were less concerned about his safety, than their own. It appeared, that they and their order had reason to dread the account to which they would probably be called on his arrival. Alexander, before he left Babylon, had ordered the great temple, which Xerxes had demolished, to be rebuilt: the work was placed under the superintendence of the priests, who might have been expected

to show the greatest zeal for its accomplishment. That Alexander had complained of the remissness with which it was carried on, and he had since discovered the cause. The revenues which had been assigned by the Assyrian kings, for the maintenance of the temple-worship, were also managed by the priests, and, while the temple lay in ruins, had been applied by them to their own use. They knew that Alexander's presence would soon put an end to such abuses; and he might therefore well doubt that the oracle, with which they attempted to delay his coming, had been given by the god. We do not hear that he suspected any collusion between them and other persons at Babylon: yet the example of Apollodorus seems to show, that such a suspicion would not have been unreasonable.

Thus then he at length entered Babylon, not without a secret misgiving, by the ominous quarter.¹ The Great City had probably never before witnessed so stirring a scene as was exhibited by the crowds now assembled for various purposes within its walls. Nearchus had brought in the fleet from Opis: the vessels transported over land from Phœnicia had come down from Thapsacus: the harbour was in progress, and other ships were on the stocks in the arsenals of Babylon itself, for which Alexander had ordered the cypress trees, the only ship-timber its territory yielded, to be felled. Another crowd of workmen and artists were busied with

¹ That Alexander's return to Babylon took place early in 323, may now be considered as sufficiently certain. Vincent's remark "I cannot discover in any of the historians two winters after Alexander's return to Susa," so clearly expresses the inference which any unprejudiced reader must draw from the narratives remaining to us, that Mr. Clinton would certainly never have disputed it (F. H. p. 231), if, through his oversight in the previous chronology — having brought Alexander to Taxila a year too soon — he had not found a year on his hands, which he could only dispose of at Babylon. He has thus been induced to admit as a *sufficient answer* to Vincent's objection, a series of fictions and fallacies, resting chiefly on the groundless supposition, that the works mentioned were all begun after Alexander's arrival. The contrary is plainly implied in Arrian's statement from Aristobulus, vii. 19: and the conjecture, that Alexander made two voyages from Babylon, is utterly inconsistent with Arrian's narrative. It is not the only instance in which the writer whose opinion Mr. Clinton adopts, has misled his readers, not merely through ignorance, but by an unreasonable display of the kind of knowledge which he really possessed.

Hephæstion's funeral pile, and with the preparations for his obsequies. And never before had Alexander's imperial greatness been so conspicuously displayed as in the embassies from foreign states, which were now in attendance at his court. It seems indeed that there was a disposition among some of his historians to exaggerate the number and variety of those embassies. We must perhaps pass over as doubtful those which are said to have come—surprising the Macedonians and the Greeks by the novelty and strangeness of their names and garb—from the European Scythians, from Celtic and Iberian tribes, from Ethiopia, and from Carthage: though reasons may be assigned, why the Carthaginians at least should have thought it expedient to propitiate the master of Asia and of Egypt. Yet it seems to have been better ascertained, that among the envoys there were some from Libya—probably the part between Egypt and Cyrene—who came to present him with crowns, and to congratulate him on the conquest of Asia, and from at least three of the Italian nations, the Bruttians, Lucanians, and Tyrrhenians. The object of the Italian embassies is not mentioned: those of the Bruttians and Lucanians may be easily accounted for, since, only six or seven years before, the conqueror's kinsman and namesake, Alexander of Epirus, had perished in war with them. If this was their motive, and indeed whatever may have been the interests for the sake of which they undertook so long a journey, we might have expected that their most powerful neighbour would not have been unconcerned about the issue of their negotiations: and hence we are prepared to accept the testimony of the authors who related, that they were met at Babylon by envoys from Rome, though it was not confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus, and though the scene may appear to us so memorable, as to have afforded temptation for fiction: for the fact was recorded before the greatness of the Roman name could have suggested the thought. Strabo mentions an occasion which might have

led to this embassy.¹ Alexander—we know not precisely when—had sent remonstrances to the Romans on account of injuries which his subjects had suffered from the pirates of Antium, which was subject to Rome: and the same fact, as Niebuhr observes, throws light on the embassy of the Tyrrhenians—the maritime inhabitants of Etruria. Most readers perhaps will be inclined to adopt the opinion of that great historian on another question, which has been variously viewed from Livy's days down to our own. He thinks, that Alexander would probably have been satisfied with such a supremacy in Italy, as he had acquired in Greece: that no general confederacy would have been formed against him by the Italian states: and that Rome, single-handed, could not long have withstood such an army as he could have brought against her, backed by the forces, and treasure, of Greece, Asia, and Africa.

Among the embassies were several from Greek cities, sent, some to offer presents, some to seek the king's aid or intervention in public and private affairs, and some to remonstrate against the decree for the restoration of the exiles. To those who came on this last business he gave audience after the rest: probably to mark his displeasure at the application, for he cannot have listened to it favourably, though he strove to send all away satisfied. To the others he gave precedence according to the dignity of their temples. So Elis took the lead, and was followed by Delphi and Corinth: but the shrine of Ammon was recognised as second to Olympia. The Epidaurians received an offering for their god, though Alexander added the remark, that Esculapius might have treated him better, than to suffer him to lose his dearest friend.

The honours designed for Hephæstion continued to

¹ V. p. 232. (376. Tauchn.) It is remarkable, that both Droysen (Al. p. 564), and it seems Niebuhr himself (iii. p. 195.), have contounded what Strabo says of Alexander, with what he adds of Demetrius: that he sent back the pirates whom he took. Of Alexander he only relates, that he made complaints in a letter (*ἱκετικὴ ἐπιστολή*). The fact of the embassy was recorded by Clitarchus, who wrote not long after Alexander's death. Plin. N. H. lib. 9.

share his earnest attention with graver business. The funeral pile was at length completed, and was a marvel of splendour, such as the gorgeous East had never beheld. A part of the wall of Babylon, to the length of about a mile, was thrown down to furnish materials for the basement, and the shell of the building. It was a square tower, and each side, at least at the foot, measured a stade in breadth: the height was about 200 feet, divided into thirty stories, roofed with the trunks of palm trees. The whole of the outside was covered with groups of colossal figures, and other ornaments, all of gold, ivory, and other precious materials, and it was surmounted by statues of sirens, so contrived as to emit a plaintive melody. All who courted the king's favour contributed their offerings to the work, or to the obsequies. As to the magnificence of the concluding ceremony, of the funeral games and banquet, nothing more need be said, than that it corresponded to the richness of this astonishing work of art, which was raised at an expence about ten times exceeding that of the Parthenon¹, merely to be devoured by the flames.

Alexander was not of a character to continue long brooding over melancholy thoughts.² He appears now to have resumed his great plans with his wonted energy. It was about this time, that he sent out the three expeditions already mentioned to explore the coast of Arabia. He was also intent on discoveries in another quarter. He was impressed with the belief, that the Caspian Sea was connected by some outlet at its northern extremity with the ocean which girded the earth. and perhaps hoped that a passage might be found through this channel to the coast of India. With this view he sent Heraclides, with a party of shipwrights, to the shores of the Caspian, to build a fleet, which

¹ See Leake, Athens, p. 419. The alteration in the value of money is to be taken into account.

² Here again Droysen's picture of Alexander's dejection (p. 567.): "With Hephæstion his youth had sunk into the grave: and, though scarcely beyond the threshold of manhood, he began fast to grow old," seems violently overcharged.

might survey its coasts, and ascertain its limits. In the mean while, he undertook an excursion from Babylon on the Euphrates, to inspect the canal called the Pallacopas, which branched from it to the south-west, both for the purpose of effecting any improvement which might appear practicable in the distribution of its waters for the benefit of the surrounding country, and to ascertain the nature of the obstacles which barred the communication with Arabia on this side.¹ The Pallacopas had been formed to discharge the superfluous waters of the Euphrates, when they rose to their greatest height after the melting of the snows, and it was then necessary to close its mouth that it might not drain the main stream. But on account of the softness of its bed, this was an extremely difficult operation, which commonly required the incessant labour of 10,000 men for three months. Alexander turned his thoughts to devise a remedy for this inconvenience, and, having found that about three miles beyond the mouth of the canal, the ground on the right bank became firm and rocky, he determined permanently to stop up the ancient entrance, and to make a new cut, which might be more easily closed at the proper season. He then sailed down the Pallacopas into the lakes which received its waters, and examined the channels by which they were connected with each other. On a part of the shore his eye was struck by a point, which seemed to him well adapted for the site of a city, and he ordered one to be built there, which he afterwards peopled with a colony of Greek mercenaries. The circuit was large, and the passages so intricate, that he was once separated for

¹ Mr Williams (*Geogr. of As. As.*, p. 174.) labours hard to prove in the teeth of Arrian,—who happens expressly to mention that Alexander, as he sailed back from the lakes, had Babylon on his left,—that the Pallacopas was *above* Babylon. With more than the usual ill fortune which seems to attend his remarks on the text of the ancient authors, he thinks that *every scholar will see* that *ὑπὸ* (he resolved) in Arrian vii 21 should be changed to *ἀπὸ* (he despaired). The question is one with which scholarship has very little to do. Who can believe that Alexander *despaired of forming an efficient barrier* at the entrance of the canal, when the Babylonian satrap formed one every year, which lasted until it became necessary to open it again? and if he had despaired, what was the use of the new cut?

some time from the main body of the squadron. On his return through this maze of waters, an accident occurred, trifling in itself, but sufficiently ominous, it seems, to revive the uneasy feelings with which he had entered Babylon, and which had subsided when he saw himself once more out of it, and the prediction of the Chaldeans apparently belied. On the reedy margin of the lake stood here and there some monuments, tombs, it was said, of ancient Assyrian kings. As the royal galley, which Alexander steered himself, passed near one of them, a sudden gust of wind carried away his *causia* into the water, and lodged the light diadem which circled it on one of the reeds that grew out of the tomb. One of the sailors immediately swam off to recover it, and, to keep it dry, placed it on his own head. Alexander rewarded him with a talent, but at the same time ordered him to be flogged, for the thoughtlessness with which he had assumed the ensign of royalty. The diviners, it is said, took the matter more seriously, and advised the king to avert the omen by the infliction of death on the offender. In later times his offence, for the sake of the omen, was ascribed to Seleucus.

On his return he found all the preparations for his intended expedition nearly complete. The fleet was equipped, and he exercised it frequently in manœuvres and rowing-matches on the Euphrates. Fresh troops had arrived from the Western provinces, and Peucestes had brought an army of 20,000 Persians, and a body of mountaineers from the Cossæan and Tapyrian highlands. The Persians Alexander incorporated with his Macedonian infantry; so as in every file of sixteen to combine twelve Persians, armed with bows or javelins, with four heavy-armed Macedonians, selected from those who had been rewarded for their services, and taking the places of honour, the first three, and the last in the file. And now the envoys whom he had sent to the oracle of Ammon returned with the answer, that Hephestion was to be worshipped as a hero. This was probably as much as Alexander had desired. He immediately

proceeded to give effect to the injunction, and sent orders to his satrap Cleomenes, to erect two temples to the new hero, one in Alexandria, the other on the isle of Pharos : and he was weak enough to add, — if the letter which Arrian quotes was genuine, — that, if Cleomenes did but show himself diligent in this business, and in the care of the Egyptian sanctuaries, all else that had been, or should be, faulty in his administration should be overlooked, — an extraordinary licence indeed, unless Alexander thought it prudent to temporise with a man conscious of many flagrant offences, who had so important a province in his hands.

Fresh envoys had also arrived from Greece — from what states we are not informed — to render him the divine honours which he had demanded.¹ They came crowned, according to the custom of persons sent on a sacred mission to a temple, offered golden crowns to him, and saluted him with the title of a god. But, Arrian observes with emphatic simplicity, he was now not far from his end. It seemed to be announced by another sinister omen. The king had been busied with the enrolment of the newly-arrived troops, in council with his officers, who were seated on each side of the throne. Feeling thirst, he withdrew to refresh himself ; the council rose for a time, and none were left in the hall but the attendant eunuchs. Before he returned, a man entered the apartment, mounted the steps of the throne, and seated himself on it. The slaves had probably been kept motionless by amazement, when they should have prevented him : but, when the deed was done, the etiquette of the Persian court forbade them to lay their hands on one who occupied the seat of royalty, and they rent their clothes and beat their breasts in helpless consternation. The man was examined, and put to the torture, by Alexander's orders, who suspected a treasonable design. According to some accounts, he

¹ Mr Williams, not knowing, it seems, that these honours had been required by Alexander, speaks, with the indignation befitting a professed admirer of the Chinese constitution, of the *scruple republicans*, who *hailed him with divine honours*.

was a Messenian, named Dionysius, who had been a long time in prison, and had just made his escape. We may infer, that he was out of his senses. He could give no explanation of his act, but that it had come into his mind. Hence it seemed the more manifest to the sooth-sayers, that it must be viewed as a sign of impending evil. Alexander himself probably so considered it, and it was the more alarming, as it followed so many others. For, on his arrival at Babylon, he had inquired of Peithagoras as to the nature of the tokens which he had seen in the victims, when he was consulted by his brother; and when he heard that the same part of the liver was wanting in that which was inspected for a revelation of his own destiny, as in that which had suggested the prediction already fulfilled by the death of Hephæstion, it is said that he did not dissemble the impression which the omen made on his mind. That he was haunted by his gloomy forebodings, and superstitious fancies, to the degree which Plutarch describes, is hardly credible, unless he was already unconsciously affected by the disorder which proved fatal to him: as on the other hand it seems probable that its secret germs may have been cherished by the dejected state of his spirits. The same causes may have led him to indulge more freely than usual in the pleasures of the table, while even slight excesses were peculiarly dangerous. From the presence of the disease, before its symptoms had become manifest, we may perhaps best explain the behaviour which Plutarch attributes to him in the interview which he had with Antipater's son, Cassander, shortly before his death; a scene, which appears to have been attended with very important consequences. Alexander confronted Cassander with Antipater's accusers: and when Cassander treated their charges as groundless calumnies, sternly interrupted him, and asked whether men who had suffered no wrong would have travelled so far to prefer a calumnious charge? Cassander pleaded, that the greater the distance from the scene of the alleged injury, the safer was the ca-

lunny. But the king indignantly replied, that Cassander showed how well he had studied Aristotle's sophistry, by which every argument might be turned two opposite ways, but that it should avail nothing, if the complaints proved to be in any degree well-founded. So far indeed we only see a proof that Alexander retained the full vigour of his mind and character. Plutarch however adds, what is more difficult to believe, that, because Cassander, at his first audience, could not keep his countenance at the sight of the Persian ceremonial, which was entirely new to him, Alexander seized him by the hair, and dashed his head against the wall. This may be a gross exaggeration: but that Cassander's reception was so harsh and violent as to leave an indelible impression of fear and hatred on his soul, is confirmed, as strongly as such a fact can be, by his subsequent conduct.

The preparations for the projected campaign were now so far advanced, that Alexander celebrated a solemn sacrifice for its success. On this occasion he distributed victims and wine among the troops by companies, that the Macedonians and Persians, who had been so lately brought together, might be disposed by his liberality, and by the season of convivial enjoyment, to more cordial union. He at the same time entertained his principal officers at a banquet, and continued drinking with them to a late hour of the evening. As he was retiring to rest, he was invited by Medius — who it seems had of late been admitted to an intimacy with him something like Hephæstion's — to a revel, which was to be followed by a fresh drinking-bout. He complied, and the greater part of the night seems to have been thus spent. The next evening he again banqueted at the house of Medius, and again the carousal was prolonged to a very late hour. It was at the close of this banquet, after he had refreshed himself with a bath, that he felt the symptoms of fever so strongly as to be induced to sleep there. The grasp of death was on him, though his robust frame yielded

only after a hard struggle to the gradual prevalence of the malady.

We have a minute and seemingly complete account of his last illness, in an official diary which Arrian transcribed. Nevertheless various reports, which it does not sanction, were current in ancient times, and one of them, which ascribed his death to gross intemperance, has always been very generally believed. Another, which has been as generally rejected, attributed it to a dose of poison, contrived by Aristotle, conveyed by Cassander, and administered by Iollas, another of Antipater's sons, who filled the office of cup-bearer to the king. As this report was undoubtedly invented by Cassander's enemies, so the other may have been first circulated by him and his partizans. It represents Alexander as having drained an enormous cup, a bowl of Hercules, as it was called, and as having instantly sunk as from a sudden blow. This incident certainly would not have appeared on the face of the journal; but neither does it seem quite consistent with Alexander's habits, who, according to Aristobulus, drank chiefly for the sake of prolonging conversation, nor with other details which have been preserved concerning the banquet.¹ If he had been in his usual state of health, the debauch described in the journal would probably have produced no effect on him. It may however both have hastened the outbreak of the fever, and have rendered it fatal. Aristobulus related another fact, which the journal passed over in silence; that in a paroxysm of the fever, the patient quenched his thirst with a large draught of wine.

It seems that, for three or four days, though the disease was making steady progress, he was not sensible of his danger. On the morrow of the first attack he fixed the time of departure, both for the army and the

¹ Nicobulë (Athen xii 53) related that Alexander on this occasion recited a passage out of the *Andromeda* of Euripides, from memory. It is added indeed, that he drank freely, and urged others to follow his example. But this description conveys the impression that the entertainment still preserved its intellectual character.

fleet. The land force was to move on the fourth day, and he himself to embark the day after. He then crossed over to the royal park on the other side of the river, and spent the next day chiefly in the company of Medius, but appointed to give audience to his generals the next morning. During the night the fever raged without intermission, yet he gave his orders to Nearchus, and the other generals, as if he should be ready to embark on the day after the morrow. And so, from day to day, as his strength declined, he continued to admit them into his presence, and to make fresh arrangements for the commencement of the expedition. But on the sixth day it was with difficulty that he could bear the exertion necessary for his customary morning sacrifice. Still he retained hope, or at least would not part with the show of it, but conferred with his officers on the subject of the voyage. The next day however he seems to have felt that he was dying, and ordered himself to be conveyed back from the park to the state-palace: and here, when the generals were admitted into his chamber, they found him still sensible, but speechless.

All around him now began to despair: a report ran through the army, that he was already dead; and the men, partly to ascertain the fact, partly that they might once more see him alive, insisted on entering the palace. They were permitted to pass in succession through the room where he lay. Though unable to speak he still recognized them, and had strength enough, though with difficulty, to make signs to them with his hands and his head, and with expressive glances. It was felt that no human aid could be of any avail. Four of the generals, Pithon, Attalus, Demophon, and Peucestes, passed a night in the temple of Serapis¹, seeking an

¹ Mr. Williams (Al. p. 395) has taken occasion from this mention of Serapis to make a very unjust attack on Tacitus, whom he ventures to stigmatise as a *gross perverter of the truth*, on account of the story which he reports on the authority of the Egyptian priests, Hist. iv. 83 fol. The existence of the temple at Babylon does not even *prove that Serapis was an Assyrian god*, and Tacitus does not profess to give an account of the introduction of the worship of Serapis into Egypt. On the contrary he

oracular vision, which might suggest a remedy. The god, it seems, was silent. Seleucus and two others then inquired at his shrine, whether it would be better for Alexander to be brought into the temple, as a suppliant for relief. And now a voice was heard from the innermost recess, enjoining that he should not be brought, but should stay where he was: so it would be best for him. Soon after he had received this answer, he expired.

But if for himself this was the happiest end of all earthly cares, there was still a question of deep importance to those who survived him: how he wished to dispose of his empire. On this subject however nothing was recorded in the official diary, or by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. It seems that he himself had never mentioned it, while he was still able to express his will, and that no one else had ventured to touch on it. There were reports that in his last moments he was asked who should succeed him, and that he replied, the worthiest: adding, that he foresaw a great contest at his funeral. But if this had been his mind, he could not have uttered it. There was only one act credibly attested by the sequel, which might be interpreted as an intimation of his wishes on this point. Just before he breathed his last, he drew his ring from his finger, and gave it to Perdiccas.

So passed from the earth one of the greatest of her sons: great above most, for what he was in himself, and not as many who have borne the title, for what was given to him to effect. Great, not merely in the vast compass, and the persevering ardour, of his ambition: nor in the qualities by which he was enabled to gratify it, and to crowd so many memorable actions within so

mentions that Ptolemy built the Serapeum, on ground where there was *aeclium, Serapidi atque Indi antiquatus sacratum*. It is not Tacitus who has in this instance perverted the truth: he has only had the misfortune not to be understood, which he shares, as we have seen, with other ancient authors. On the story itself, the reader may find some remarks in the *Philological Museum*, &c. p. 180.

short a period: but in the course which his ambition took, in the collateral aims which ennobled and purified it, so that it almost grew into one with the highest of which man is capable, the desire of knowledge, and the love of good. In a word, great as one of the benefactors of his kind. This praise however would be empty, unless it be limited as truth requires, and his claim to it must depend on the opinion we form of his designs.

It is not to be supposed, that, in any of his undertakings, he was animated by speculative curiosity, or by abstract philanthropy. If he sought to discover, as well as to conquer, it was because the limits of the known world were too narrow for his ambition. His main object undoubtedly was to found a solid and flourishing empire: but the means which he adopted for this end, were such as the highest wisdom and benevolence might have suggested to him in his situation, without any selfish motive. And as his merit is not the less, because so many of his works were swept away by the inroads of savage and fanatical hordes, so it must be remembered, that his untimely death left all that he had begun unfinished, and probably most of what he meditated unknown: that he could hardly be said to have completed the subjugation of all the lands comprised within the limits of the Persian empire. Still it cannot be denied, that the immediate operation of his conquests was highly beneficial to the conquered people. This would be true, even if the benefit had been confined to those advantages which may seem purely material: for none were really so. The mere circulation of the immense treasures accumulated by the ancient rulers, which Alexander scattered with such unexampled profusion, was doubtless attended by innumerable happy results: by a great immediate increase of the general well-being, by a salutary excitement of industry, and commercial activity. The spirit of commerce however was still more directly roused, and cherished, by the foundation of new cities, in situations peculiarly adapted to its ends: by the opening of new channels of communication between opposite extra-

mities of the empire, and the removal of obstructions— arising from the feebleness and wantonness of the ancient government— which before impeded it: by the confidence inspired by the new order of things, the growing consciousness of safety, and expectation of protection and encouragement. Let any one contemplate the contrast between the state of Asia under Alexander, and the time when Egypt was either in revolt against Persia, or visited by her irritated conquerors with the punishment of repeated insurrection, when almost every part of the great mountain-chain which traverses the length of Asia, from the Mediterranean to the borders of India, was inhabited by fierce, independent, predatory tribes: when the Persian kings themselves were forced to pay tribute before they were allowed to pass from one of their capitals to another. Let any one endeavour to enter into the feelings, with which a Phœnician merchant must have viewed the change that took place in the face of the earth, when the Egyptian Alexandria had begun to receive and pour out an inexhaustible tide of wealth: when Babylon had become a great port: when a passage was opened both by sea and land between the Euphrates and the Indus: when the forests on the shores of the Caspian had begun to resound with the axe and the hammer. It will then appear that this part of the benefits which flowed from Alexander's conquest cannot be easily exaggerated.

And yet this was perhaps the smallest part of his glory: it was much indeed so to cultivate, enrich, and beautify this fairest portion of the earth: it was something more, to elevate the intellectual and moral character of the people: and this was in a great degree the effect, in a still greater degree the tendency, of Alexander's measures and institutions. It may be truly asserted, that his was the first of the great monarchies founded in Asia, that opened a prospect of progressive improvement, and not of continual degradation to its subjects: it was the first that contained any element of moral and intellectual progress. That it did so is certain; but it has been disputed, how far this entered

into Alexander's intention. We cannot regard him as entitled to much honour on this account, unless we admit that the great thought of his life was to unite his new subjects with the old, so as to form one nation, and that for this purpose he wished to raise the Asiatics to a level with the Europeans, and, according to the modern expression, to Hellenise Asia. It has been contended, that such a project of amalgamation was too chimerical to have been adopted by a prince of Alexander's sagacity and judgment: that he must have been too well aware of the obstacles which must always have rendered it impossible for the new element to penetrate and assimilate so vast and heterogeneous a mass, as the population of his Asiatic dominions: and that we must therefore consider those of his measures which seem most clearly to indicate such a design, as merely temporary expedients of a conciliating policy, forced upon him by his relative weakness. It seems however a sufficient reply to this objection to observe, that we can hardly now determine what Alexander would have found practicable in the course of a long reign: that if there were limits, in extent and degree, beyond which he himself could not have hoped to realise such an idea, it was still an object worthy of all his efforts: and that when we see him adopting a series of measures clearly tending to this end, it is reasonable to infer that he had the end in view. It may be said, that he planted Greek cities in Asia, merely as either commercial or military posts, to fill his treasury, or secure his possessions: that he educated the barbarian youth in Greek schools, merely to recruit his army; that he promoted intermarriage between the Europeans and Asiatics, merely to soothe the conquered nations. But he cannot have been blind or indifferent to the ultimate tendency of all these steps: he must have foreseen, that from each of his new colonies the language, arts, and manners, the whole genius, of Greece, would radiate through the adjacent regions, and would gradually enlighten, civilise, and transform their population: he must have known, that by the

domestic ties which he formed, and by the education of the young, he was raising up a generation which would be more open to receive this influence. The extent to which the interfusion actually took place, and the Asiatics became Greeks in every thing but blood, was by no means small: if Alexander had lived to become the founder of a peaceful dynasty, which might have prosecuted his plans, the changes wrought would have been incalculably greater.

It is another question, whether this change of nationality was in all respects an unmixed good: whether, in the old frame of society, in the literature, the arts, the manners, and even perhaps in the speculative systems of the conquered races, much was not lost and destroyed through it, that was worth preserving: whether the new forms were not in most cases destitute of life and reality, an empty varnish, or spiritless imitation. Still less should we venture to maintain, that the infinitely diversified combination and confusion which ensued, between the religions and mythologies of Greece and Asia, was anything in itself desirable: or that the new rites and creeds, which were the progeny of this unnatural mixture, were not often as odious and baneful, as they were wild and fantastic. They at least did not enter into Alexander's plans, who merely extended his politic protection alike to all modes of worship and belief: and it would be as unjust to charge him with their mischievous consequences, as it seems false to represent him on this account as the Precursor of a better Light, which, on the contrary, they contributed more than any other cause to refract and obscure. But it became Alexander, as a Greek, to believe, that the change was on the whole highly beneficial: and we, who owe so much of what is best among us to the same culture, can hardly charge him with blind partiality. We must rather admire the greatness of mind by which he rose above the prejudices of his Macedonians, who, themselves foreigners, indebted for all that made them worthy, or even capable, of their fortune, to their Greek

education, were loth to share it with others, whom they wished to trample on as barbarians.

Still there is one side on which Alexander's administration appears in a much less favourable light. We must speak with caution on this subject, because we are very imperfectly acquainted with his measures, and he had scarcely time to unfold his views. Yet it must be owned that we cannot perceive even the first lines, that we catch no hint of any political institutions framed to secure the future welfare of his subjects. We do not find that in any case he had begun to assume the character of a lawgiver: though Arrian thought him as well entitled to divine honours as Minos or Theseus. It is probable indeed that he intended his new colonies at least should enjoy all the municipal freedom consistent with the maintenance of an absolute government. But we do not know what security he had provided for their privileges; and he seems to have left the mass of the people in this respect nearly as it had been under its former masters. The only improvement which he appears to have introduced into the old system, was to restore, perhaps to multiply, the checks by which, according to the earlier policy of the Persian kings themselves, their great officers in every province were enabled to control one another. These checks, as he discovered on his return from India, proved utterly ineffectual for the protection of life and property; and though he punished the offenders with the utmost rigour, we hear of no other precautions that he took against the recurrence of such abuses. When he seated himself on the throne of Darius, he assumed, as perhaps was necessary, the fulness of despotic sovereignty that had been exercised by his Persian predecessors: and he too was represented by his satraps. Though he might be able to restrain them, it was to be expected, that a successor of inferior energy would be forced to connive at their licence: from the highest station to the lowest, there was no permanent safeguard against misrule. The condition of the people was bettered; but it remained precarious.

It must even be admitted, that, if he raised the Asiatics, he brought down the Macedonians and the Greeks, to meet them on the same level.

What has been said, relates only to the effect which his conquests produced in Asia : it is another question, how far they were beneficial to Greece. Some advantages she no doubt derived from them. A boundless field, with brilliant prospects, was thrown open for Greek adventurers. A part of the new commerce of the East found its way into Greek ports. But we should seek in vain for any benefits of a higher order, which resulted to Greece from Alexander's expedition ; while, in many respects much more important, her condition was changed for the worse. She was treated no longer as a humble and useful ally of Macedonia, but as a province of the Persian empire, and made to feel her subjection by despotic, and apparently wanton and arrogant commands. And yet she had scarcely begun to taste the bitter fruits, which she was to reap from the fulfilment of those splendid visions, with which Isocrates would have consoled her for the loss of freedom.

CHAP. LVI.

FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER TO THE END OF THE
LAMIAN WAR.

Our attention will now again be chiefly occupied with the affairs of Greece. The connection indeed between the events, which took place there, and the contests carried on by Alexander's successors in Asia, becomes henceforward so close, that it will be necessary to keep both constantly in view: the latter however, as subordinate to the proper subject of our history. Before we turn to it, we must proceed as far as the first settlement that was made of the great interests, which were left in so much confusion and uncertainty by the sudden vacancy of the Macedonian throne.

It may easily be believed, that Alexander's death was sincerely deplored by all around him, whose immediate interest was not too deeply affected by it to allow room for grief. When the royal pages, unable to contain their excitement, rushed out of the palace with loud wailings, and made the event generally known, the whole city soon resounded with the voice of lamentation. The Macedonians mourned for their hero¹, the Persians for their king. Many and various were the honours afterwards paid to Alexander's memory, by word and work, in monuments and spectacles, in smooth verse and well turned periods: but the most honourable tribute was offered by Sisygambis, the mother of

¹ Curtius (x 5 11) goes so far toward one extreme, as to say that they reproached themselves for having refused him divine honours. Justin xiii 1) still farther on the opposite side, for he would have us believe that they rejoiced, as if delivered from an enemy, so much were they disgusted with his severity and endless adventures.

Darius. She, who had survived the massacre of her eighty brothers, who had been put to death in one day by Ochus, the loss of all her children, and the entire downfall of her race, now, on the decease of the enemy and conqueror of her house, seated herself on the ground, covered her head with a veil, and, notwithstanding the intreaties of her grandchildren, refused nourishment, until, on the fifth day after, she expired.

But even the genuine regret of the common people gave way almost immediately to anxiety about their own safety, and to mutual suspicions. The Macedonians passed the night after the king's death under arms: as if feeling themselves surrounded by enemies. The peaceable inhabitants of Babylon, perhaps with better reason, dreaded lest their wealthy city should become the scene of military tumult and license. They hardly ventured to creep out of their houses to gather news; lighted no lamps in the evening, but watched for the morning in darkness and silence, eagerly listening, and trembling at every sound they caught. The great officers on whom the care of the state chiefly devolved, probably spent the same interval, together or apart, in no less anxious deliberation. By Hephæstion's death the number of those who bore the title of somatophylax was reduced to seven: Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Perdikkas, Ptolemy—the reputed son of Lagos, but, according to a report rather widely spread, one of Philip's bastards, his mother having been the king's mistress¹—Pithon, and Peucestes. When Alexander died, they were all in Babylon. The next day they summoned a council of the other Macedonian officers, some of whom were but little inferior to them in rank and influence, to confer on the great question of the succession. The soldiers wished to take part in it also; and, though forbidden, forced their way into the palace, and filled the avenues of the council-hall, so that many witnessed the proceedings. There a mournful object met their eyes, and revived the consciousness of their

¹ Pausan. i 6. 2., and the commentators on Curtius, ix. 8. 22.

loss: the vacant throne, on which had been laid the diadem, with the royal robes and armour. The sight called forth a fresh burst of lamentation, which however was hushed into deep silence, when Perdiccas came forward to address the assembly. First¹ he placed the ring, which he had received from Alexander in his last moments, on the throne. "The ring," he said, "was the royal signet, which Alexander had used for the most important state-business: it had been committed to him by the dying king: but he placed it at their disposal. It was however absolutely necessary for their own safety, that they should forthwith elect a chief, capable of guarding them against the dangers to which they would be exposed without a head in a hostile land. It was to be hoped, that in a few months² Roxana would give them a heir to the throne. In the mean while it was for them to choose, by whom they would be governed." He had probably hoped, that the wish which he so modestly dissembled, would have been anticipated by general acclamation. But the meeting waited for advice. Nearchus had a different plan to propose. He, as we have seen, had married a daughter of Mentor's widow, Barsinè: and Barsinè was also the mother of a son by Alexander. He therefore pointed out to the Macedonians, "that there was no need to wait for the uncertain issue of Roxana's pregnancy: there was an heir to the throne already born: Hercules, the son of Barsinè: to him the diadem belonged." But Nearchus was the only man present, who had any interest in this choice. The soldiers clashed their spears and shields together, in token of vehement dissent: and Ptolemy gave utterance to their feelings on this point. "Neither Barsinè, nor Roxana, could be mother of a prince, whom the Macedonians would acknowledge as their sovereign. Was it to be borne, that the conquerors of Asia should

¹ So Curtius, x. 6 4.

² Curtius, x. 6 9 *Sextus mensis est*. But Justin (xiii. 2. 5.) has *enecio menses octavo*. The *ἐνέκιο*, with which Photius, in his epitome of Arrian (p. 69. b. 16) introduces the birth of the child immediately after the partition of the satrapies, can hardly be said to favour one of these statements more than the other.

become subject to the son of a barbarian captive? It was better that the throne should remain vacant, and that the persons who had formed Alexander's council of state, should continue to have the supreme management of affairs, deciding all questions by a majority of votes." This motion however gained few partizans: its effect would have been permanently to exclude the royal family from the succession: a step for which few were prepared. Thus most minds were turned toward the advice of Perdiccas: for there was a clear distinction between Barsinè, and Roxana, Alexander's beloved wife, who was then in the palace, while Mentor's widow had been left with her son at Pergamum. It was now the right time for some friend of Perdiccas to come forward in his behalf, and Aristonous, perhaps according to previous concert, undertook the task. He observed, "that Alexander himself had already decided who was worthiest to command, when, having cast his eyes round all his friends who were at his bedside, he gave his royal signet to Perdiccas. They had only to ratify Alexander's choice." Still the assembly was not inclined to invest Perdiccas alone, under any title, with supreme power. The result of the whole deliberation was a sort of compromise between the proposals of Ptolemy and Aristonous. It seems to have been decided, but not without clamorous opposition, that, if Roxana should bear a son, he should succeed to the throne: and that in the mean while four guardians should be appointed for the future prince to exercise the royal authority in his name. Perdiccas and Leonnatus were to be regents in Asia, Antipater and Craterus in Europe.

The cavalry—the aristocratical portion of the army—acquiesced in the resolution of their chiefs. But it was very ill received by the whole body of the infantry. No motive appears for their dissatisfaction, except that they had not been consulted on the question, and that they wished to dispose of the crown. Still it is not clear whether they acted quite of their own accord, or were excited to resistance by Meleager, who seems to

have been impelled, partly by ambition, and partly by personal enmity to Perdiccas. The accounts remaining of his conduct are contradictory as to details, but agree in representing him as the leader and soul of the opposition. According to some authors, he quitted the council of the officers after bitter invectives against Perdiccas, declaring that the people was the true heir of the monarchy, and alone could rightfully dispose of it, and hastened to instigate the soldiery to insurrection and plunder.¹ According to others, he was deputed to appease their discontent, but took the opportunity to inflame it, and placed himself at their head.² We are left equally in doubt, whether it was he who first proposed another competitor for the throne, whose name was soon mentioned in the popular assembly. This was Arridæus, a son of Philip, by Philinna, a Thes-salian woman, who is commonly described as of low condition. Arridæus was either naturally deficient in understanding, or had never recovered from the effects of a potion, said to have been administered to him by Olympias, whom jealousy rendered capable of every crime.⁴ It seems that Alexander either through pru-

¹ Curtius, x. 6

² Diodor. xviii. 2

³ Justin (xiii. 2. 8) represents Meleager as proposing Arridæus in the council of the officers, but only by way of an alternative, advising them to choose between him and Herrules. Meleager's subsequent conduct from which it is evident that he relied entirely on the soldiery, renders the account which Curtius gives of his language and behaviour at the council, far more probable. Droysen however (*Geschichte der Nachfolger Alexander's*, i. p. 25) has partly adopted Justin's statement, making Meleager simply propose Arridæus. But he then endeavours to combine this statement with that of Curtius, and supposes, that, while Arridæus was proposed in the council by Meleager, his name was accidentally mentioned in the assembly of the troops, and that, before they were joined by Meleager, they had determined to proclaim him king. Such a coincidence is in the highest degree improbable, and Curtius and Justin alike lead us to suppose, that the soldiers took no step, before they heard of the decision of the council — I must here make a remark, which has been forced upon me by a number of similar instances, that Droysen, in his excellent work, has apparently adopted the principle, of combining all the accounts relating to his subject, which are not palpably inconsistent with one another. He has certainly often shown great ingenuity in the manner in which he has pieced his materials together. But the principle is one, which, if uniformly applied to such writers as those from whom we have to collect the history of this period must often lead into error: and the present case is one of many in which it seems to me to have been unfortunately applied. Droysen has here carried it so far, that he first makes Meleager propose Arridæus, and then in a second speech (suggested by that in Curtius) protest against the authority of the council.

⁴ Plut. Al. ad fin.

dence or compassion, had removed him from Macedon, though he had not thought him fit to be trusted with any command: and he was now in Babylon. Most probably, Meleager, perceiving that whoever should raise such a prince to the throne, would reign under his name, was the foremost to recommend him as the sole legitimate heir. To the army Arridæus must have been personally indifferent: but he was Philip's son, without any mixture of barbarian blood, and, which probably weighed more with them, he would be purely their creature. The proposal therefore was agreeable to their pride and their prejudices, which were stronger than their regard for Alexander now, as they had been in his lifetime. After a short pause perhaps of surprise, that a name so seldom heard should have been put forward on such an occasion, all, as if some happy discovery had been made, broke out into loud acclamations in favour of Arridæus; and Pithon, who, it seems,—having apparently been sent by the council to soothe them—endeavoured to show the folly of their choice, only incurred their resentment.¹ Meleager was deputed to bring the prince into the assembly; and, when he came, they saluted him as king, under the new name of Philip.

He immediately proceeded to the palace, accompanied by Meleager, and escorted by the troops. The officers, it seems, were still in council there, and when Arridæus appeared, some attempt was made to terminate the affair by discussion. But as the chiefs refused to sanction the choice of the infantry, they soon found themselves threatened with violence, and obliged to retire. Arridæus mounted the throne, and was invested with the royal robes. Perdiccas had ordered the door of the room in which Alexander's body lay, to be locked, and prepared

¹ Pithon's presence in the assembly, which is only mentioned by Curtius, seems to remove an objection raised by Droysen, against the statement of Diodorus, that Meleager was deputed by the council. Droysen objects, that the council would have sent some more trustworthy person. Whether they had any reason at the time to distrust him, does not appear; but if Pithon was joined with him in the embassy, they might at least well have thought themselves safe. It is remarkable that Droysen takes no notice of Pithon's part in this transaction.

to guard it with 600 chosen men ; and he was joined by Ptolemy at the head of the royal pages. They were however soon overpowered by superior numbers. The soldiers of the adverse party broke into the chamber : blows were interchanged ; Perdiccas himself was attacked with missiles, and blood was beginning to flow, when some of the elder among the assailants interposed, and, taking off their helmets, intreated Perdiccas and his followers to desist from their useless resistance. Their mediation put an end to this prelude of the long contest which was to take place for Alexander's remains. But the greater part of the generals, and the whole body of the cavalry, quitted the city, and encamped outside the walls. Perdiccas did not yet accompany them : he hoped, it seems, that some change might happen in the disposition of the multitude, which he might more easily turn to his own advantage, if he staid. But Meleager, probably apprehending the same thing, and eager to satisfy his hatred, urged the king to give an order for the execution of Perdiccas. This he could not obtain : Arridæus was perhaps too timid to strike so great a blow. Meleager therefore was forced to interpret the silence of his royal puppet as consent, and sent an armed band to the house of Perdiccas, with directions to bring him to the palace, or to kill him, if he should resist. Perdiccas had only about sixteen of the royal pages with him, when his door was beset. He however appeared on the threshold with a firm countenance, and overawed those who came to arrest him by the severe dignity of his looks and his words. They probably did not think Meleager's authority a sufficient warrant for the murder of a man of such high rank. When they had withdrawn, he and his attendants mounted their horses, and hastened to the camp of their friends.

One eminent person of their party however remained in the city : Eumenes the Cardian, who had already decided on the course which his own interests required, and on this occasion gave proof of the sagacity and

dexterity, which afterwards carried him through so many dangers, and even brought him so near to the highest fortune. Eumenes, in his boyhood, had attracted Philip's notice by his promising talents¹; he was brought up at the Macedonian court, and was employed by Alexander both as his principal secretary and keeper of the records, and in military commands. He had risen so high in favour with the king, that he could even venture on more than one occasion to quarrel with Hephæstion: but, after the favourite's death, he laboured, by ingenious contrivances and profuse expence in honour of his memory, to remove all suspicion that he viewed the event with pleasure. In this liberality, he showed the greater self-command, as he was habitually parsimonious. Plutarch relates that when the leading officers contributed to the equipment of the fleet in India, Eumenes, whose share was rated at 300 talents, produced only a hundred, pretending that it was with great difficulty he had been able to scrape this sum together. Alexander made no reply, but soon after ordered his slaves secretly to set fire to the secretary's tent. It was then discovered that Eumenes had amassed more than a thousand talents. Alexander however forgave him, as he did Antigènes, and allowed him to keep all: though he had himself to regret the loss of many valuable papers, which perished in the flames.

Such a man was formed for the times which followed Alexander's death. Eumenes felt that he could only be safe in the strife of parties, as long as he could guard against the jealousy to which a foreigner in high station was exposed among the Macedonians. He remained, as we have observed, in Babylon after the flight of Perdikkas, under the pretext that he had no right to take a part in disputes concerning the succession; secretly however purposing to promote the interests of Perdikkas, as far as he could; for he probably foresaw that this side would finally prevail. He assumed the character

¹ Various accounts are given of his original station by Plutarch (*Eum. Init.*), *Ælian* (*V. H.* xii. 43.), and *Nepos*, who describes him as *domesticus summo genere*.

of a peacemaker ; and his seeming neutrality gave great weight to his mediation. It was seconded by vigorous measures on the part of the seceders.* They began to stop the supply of provisions, and to threaten the Great City with famine. Meleager found his condition growing every day more embarrassing. He had been called to account by his own troops for the attempt he had made against the life of Perdiccas, and could only shelter himself under the royal authority. At length the soldiers came in a body to the palace, and demanded that an embassy should be sent to the cavalry, with overtures of peace. Three envoys were accordingly despatched : and it is remarkable, that one of them was a Thessalian, another an Arcadian of Megalopolis ; so that probably the third. Perilaus, whose country is not mentioned, was not a Macedonian. The negotiations which followed are reported too obscurely to be described. It is said that the party of Perdiccas refused to treat, until the authors of the quarrel had been given up to them : and that this demand excited a violent tumult in the city, which was only calmed, when Arridæus, displaying more vigour than he had been believed to possess, offered to resign the crown. Yet it does not appear that this condition was granted. The terms on which the treaty was concluded, were, according to the most authentic account, that Arridæus should share the empire with Roxana's child, if it should be a boy¹: that Antipater should command the forces in Europe ; that Craterus should be at the head of affairs in the dominions of Arridæus ; but that Perdiccas should be invested with the command of the horse-guards, the chiliarchy, before held by Hephæstion, in which Alexander would permit no one to succeed him. This, it seems, was a post, which, at the Persian Court, had been equivalent to that of prime minister, or grand

¹ Arrian in Phot. 92. init. διαλαμβάνει . . τὴν ἀνάδοχον Ἀρριδαίου . . ἢ καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρον ὃν ἱμαλλεν ἔξ Ἀλεξάνδρου τίςτινι Ῥαξάνῃ, συμβασιλευσιν αὐτῷ ὃ καὶ γίνονται, ὡς φῶς ἀχθόντες τοῦ παιδός. I have quoted the words because Droysen, it seems through an oversight, observes that Arrian, at least Photius, had not mentioned this clause, and adopts it only on the authority of Justin.

vizier of the whole empire.¹ It was however stipulated, that Meleager should be associated with Perdiccas in the regency, though with a subordinate rank. Of Leonnatus we hear no more as a member of the government. The compact was ratified by a solemn reconciliation between the contending parties. The cavalry returned to the city: the phalanx marched out to meet them: Perdiccas and Meleager advanced between the lines to salute each other as friends. The troops on each side followed their example, and were once more united in one body.

It was however impossible, after what had happened, that Perdiccas and Meleager should ever trust each other. Meleager probably relied on the infantry for protection. But Perdiccas had now taken possession of the imbecile king, who was as passive in his hands as he had been in his rival's, and had resolved to strike the first blow. Before he directly attacked his enemy, he thought it necessary to deprive him of the support which he might find in the army; and he seems to have devised a very subtle plan for this end. He suborned emissaries to complain among the foot soldiers, that by the recent arrangement Meleager had been elevated to an equality with himself; not apparently for the purpose of exciting discontent, or of gaining a party among these troops, but to lead Meleager himself blindfold into a snare. Meleager was soon informed of the language that had been used against him in the camp, and indignantly complained of it to Perdiccas, whom he probably suspected to be its secret author. But Perdiccas was so great a master of dissimulation, that he completely lulled his suspicions. He affected to sympathise deeply with his resentment, and proposed to arrest the agitators. It was agreed between them², the more safely and surely to effect their object, that

¹ Some remarks on this subject may be found in the Philological Museum, i 380.

² It seems at all events more probable that Perdiccas obtained Meleager's consent, than that, as Justin says, he gave his orders for the lustration *repente ignaro collegâ*.

the whole army should be drawn out in the adjacent plain, under the pretext of a solemn lustration, to be celebrated with the old Macedonian rites, to purify it from the blood shed in the late quarrel. The usage on such occasions was to kill a dog, and to carry its entrails, divided into two parts, to opposite extremities of the field, so that the army might be drawn up between them, the phalanx on one side, the cavalry on the other.¹ Such at least was the order now adopted by the two chiefs. On the appointed day Perdiccas, with the king at his side, placed himself at the head of the cavalry and the elephants, facing the infantry, which was commanded by Meleager. After a short pause, he ordered them to advance. Meleager's troops were alarmed at the sight of this movement, for they now observed that the ground was favourable for the operations of the cavalry, and that, if they were attacked, they should not be able to make good their retreat without great loss. But, as they received no orders from their chief, and were quite uncertain as to the design of Perdiccas, they remained motionless, until a very narrow interval was left between the two lines. The king then rode up with a single squadron, and, having been previously instructed by the regent, demanded that the authors of the late dissensions should be given up to punishment; threatening, if they refused, to charge with the whole force of the cavalry and the elephants. The men were dismayed by the suddenness of the proceeding; and Meleager, who now perceived his own danger, had not sufficient presence of mind to make any attempt at self-defence. Perdiccas took advantage of their consternation, to select about 300 of those who had most distinguished themselves as his adversary's partizans, and immediately caused them to be trampled to death by the elephants in the sight of the whole army, and with the apparent consent of the

¹ Droysen attempts to connect this scene with that described by Livy, xi. 6, where it is said that the lustration was usually closed with a sham fight. But Livy does not say that the fight was between the cavalry and the infantry, which indeed would be scarcely credible, nor does Curtius hint that a sham fight was to form part of the ceremony at Babylon.

king whose cause they had maintained. After this execution Meleager could have no hope of safety but in flight. He was not arrested on the field, but soon after took refuge in a temple at Babylon, where he was despatched by order of Perdiccas.

By this blow the regent's authority was firmly established, as far as related to the king and the army. A more difficult task remained. He was still surrounded by rivals as ambitious as Meleager, and more formidable from their ability and influence. His next care was to satisfy their pretensions, so as least to weaken himself. A new distribution of the satrapies was settled by general consent, but probably in most points under his direction ; in some at least we clearly trace his hand. It was not necessary for any purpose to make a total change ; and the general principle adopted seems to have been, to retain as many as possible of the satraps appointed by Alexander in their governments. The provinces which lay near the eastern and north-east frontier of the empire, were probably the least coveted, and in these scarcely any alteration was made. There were others from which, as they were more desirable, it might have been more difficult to displace their actual occupants. Thus not only was Taxiles permitted to rule in India, Oxyartes in the Paropamisus, Philippus in Bactria and Sogdiana, Phrataphernes in Parthia and Hyrcania, Stasanor in Aria and Drangiana, Siburtius in Arachosia and Gedrosia, Tlepolemus in Carmania ; but Peucestes was left in possession of Persis, and Atropates of Northern Media, while the southern portion of that country was committed to Pithon, Babylonia to Archon, Mesopotamia to Archelaus. The most important part of the new arrangement was that which related to the governments west of the Euphrates. Ptolemy, who was not only honoured on account of his reputed connection with the royal family, but also much beloved for his personal qualities by the army, had fixed his eyes on Egypt, and obtained it with the adjacent regions of Arabia and Libya. Cleomenes was not re-

moved, but placed under his orders. Laomedon remained in Syria, Philotas in Cilicia, Asander¹ in Caria, Menander in Lydia, and Antigonus in the great province which included Phrygia Proper, Lycia, and Pamphylia. But since Lycia and Pamphylia are also said to have been given to Nearchus, we may infer, that he held these provinces with a subordinate rank: a suspicion which is confirmed by his subsequent relations with Antigonus. The Hellespontine Phrygia was assigned to Leonnatus — perhaps as a compensation for his share in the regency, or for the sake of removing him from court: and Eumenes, whom Perdiccas regarded as his steady adherent, was rewarded with the title of satrap over Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. But these countries, which Alexander had never subdued, were still to be won by the sword from their native ruler, Ariarathes, who had held them as an hereditary vassal of Persia. In Europe the government of Macedonia and Greece, together with that of the western countries on the coast of the Adriatic, which might afterwards be annexed to the empire, was to be divided between Antipater and Craterus: a partition in which Perdiccas may have seen a prospect of collision between them likely to promote his ascendancy. Thrace, or the whole maritime region to the north-east of Macedonia, a province which had never been reduced to tranquil submission, and where the Odrysians had lately been roused to revolt by their chief Seuthes, was committed to Lysimachus, a warrior of iron frame, and unflinching hardihood. There are two other names which might have been looked for in this list. Aristonous might have been expected to occupy a prominent place in it, since he had shown himself a decided partizan of Perdiccas; yet we hear of no provision made for him. Hence it has been conjectured that Perdiccas retained him near his person, as one of his staunchest friends. It was perhaps for a like reason that he entrusted Se-

¹ This seems to be the true name, and at least serves to distinguish him from Cassander, with whom he is often confounded in the manuscripts.

leucus—who was destined to act so great a part in the history of the ensuing period—with the chiliarchy which had been assigned to himself: a highly honourable and important post indeed, but one which he might safely part with, as it could add little or nothing to the power he possessed as regent.

There still remained a question on which he felt it necessary to consult the army, that he might relieve himself from a dangerous responsibility. Papers had been found in Alexander's cabinet, containing the outlines of some vast projects. It would seem that they might easily have been suppressed; but it was known that they corresponded in part with the instructions which had been given to Craterus, and therefore they could not safely be neglected without the general consent. Some related to the equipment of a great armament—a thousand galleys, it is said, of the largest size—destined for the conquest of Carthage, and of the whole coast of Africa on the Mediterranean as far as the Straits, and those of Spain and the adjacent maritime regions, as far as Sicily: for which end a road was to be made along the African shore. Others were plans for new colonies, to be planted in Asia with Europeans, and in Europe with Asiatics. There were also directions for six new temples to be built in Europe—at Delos, Delphi, Dodona, Dium, Amphipolis, and Cyrrhus—each at the cost of 1500 talents, beside one of extraordinary magnificence to the goddess of Ilium, and for a monument to his father in Macedonia, which was to equal the largest of the Egyptian pyramids in its dimensions. It must be owned, that there are some points in these schemes which look suspicious, and which, even if they had crossed Alexander's mind, we should not have expected he would have committed to writing. But the part relating to the temples can scarcely have been fabricated, and was probably contained in the instructions given to Craterus. The plan for an interchange of population between Europe and Asia, is also quite conformable to the views which Alexander dis-

closed in his lifetime. This however, and that of the expedition to Africa, could not any longer have entered into any one's thoughts, and might have been silently dropped. But perhaps Perdiccas apprehended, that the sums destined for the other objects might be demanded from him by his colleagues, and therefore deemed it advisable formally to annul the whole by the highest authority. That he forged the project of the expedition, to render the real contents of the papers the less acceptable to the Macedonians, seems a very improbable conjecture.¹ All were laid before a military assembly, and rejected as impracticable or useless.

During the tumultuous scenes which followed Alexander's death, his body had lain in the palace unburied. There are various reports as to the place selected for its interment. According to one, it was to have been transported to the sanctuary of Ammon.² But the more probable is, that it was determined it should be deposited in the sepulchre of his ancestors at *Ægæ*.³ And Aristander the soothsayer is said to have declared that it had been revealed to him, the land where it rested was destined to be ever prosperous and secure from invasion⁴: which however was no more than an ancient Greek superstition as to the virtue of a hero's relics. Orders were now given to construct a funeral car worthy of these precious remains, and the general Arridæus was appointed to escort them toward the western coast.

While such honours were paid to the conqueror's corpse, two of the living objects of his affection fell victims to the revenge of Roxana, and the ambition of Perdiccas. Roxana, with the regent's concurrence, invited Statira and her sister Drypetis to Babylon by a friendly letter, and when they came caused them to be assassinated, and secretly buried.⁵ In the course of

¹ Fläthe, i. p. 441.

² Diodorus, xviii. 3. Curtius (x. 5. 4) mentions a report, manifestly false, that Alexander himself had so ordered at the same time that he gave his ring to Perdiccas.

³ Pausanias, i. 6. 3.

⁴ Elian, V. H., xii. 64.

⁵ Plutarch, Al. ult.

time she was delivered of a boy, who was acknowledged as partner of Arridæus Philip in the empire, and bore the name of Alexander (*Ægus*).

Such was the state of the empire in Asia, and the attitude in which the principal persons who might pretend to a share in it, had been placed toward one another, when Greece became the scene of a conflict, which led to a fresh series of momentous changes.

Unless the nature of the Greeks could have been changed, or their judgment blinded, by the success of the Macedonian arms, it would have been impossible that they could generally have viewed the progress of Alexander's conquests with complacency. Even if it had been acknowledged, that the supremacy acquired by Philip, might in itself — at least as it was exercised by him and his son — be a wholesome restraint on the spirit of discord which had caused so many calamities to Greece, it did not follow that any Greek patriot could look forward without alarm to the period when this supremacy should belong to a king of Macedonia, who was also master of Asia. It was at such a time not infatuation, but dishonest artifice, to treat the Persian king as the enemy of Greece¹, and to blame Demosthenes for the secret negotiations into which he entered with the Persian court. The change which had taken place in the relations between Greece and Persia after the battle of Salamis, was as great as that which Europe has experienced in its relation to the Turks since the battle of Lepanto. The power of Persia had become one of the chief securities of Greek liberty. Already, under a government which professed to derive its authority from the Amphictyonic council, and the assembled representatives of the nation, and to be the guardian of the national institutions, the people had been made to feel the value of the political independence it

As we find *Æschines* (c. *Ctes* § 132) dexterously confounding the past with the present. The Persian king, *ὁ τὸν Ἀθῶν διερχόμενος, ὁ τὸν Ἑλλησπόντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδαρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αἰτῶν* — and so on — *οὐκ οὐ πικρὸν τοῦ περὶ τοῦ Κέρξεος εἶναι διαγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας*. As if Xerxes and the last Darius had been one person,

had lost. The bondage of Thebes, when it was placed at the mercy of a lawless garrison, the destruction which followed its attempt to release itself, the demand for the surrender of the Athenian orators, and other acts which will be mentioned hereafter, were warnings, which showed what might be expected from the future, if the power which had been thus exercised should become absolutely irresistible, if it should fall into the hands of princes, strangers to Greece, and educated in the maxims of Oriental despotism. It was not through a paltry jealousy, but from a well-grounded anxiety, that the Athenians willingly listened to Demosthenes, when he encouraged them to believe that the invader would be overwhelmed by the collected forces of the Persian empire. They may notwithstanding have regarded Alexander's exploits with admiration, not the less sincere because it was reluctantly yielded, and seldom openly expressed. The marks of favour they received from the conqueror were more likely to bias their judgment, but still never induced them for a moment to consider his cause as having anything in common with their interests. Her citizens entered into the service of his enemy, with the feeling that they were engaging in the defence of their country.

It is rather surprising that when Agis, encouraged by the great distance which separated Alexander from Europe, by perhaps exaggerated rumours of the dangers that threatened him in Asia, and by the disasters which had befallen the Macedonian arms at home, ventured on his ill-fated struggle, Athens remained neutral. It was afterward made a ground of accusation against Demosthenes, that he had taken no advantage of this occasion to display the hostility which he always professed toward Alexander. The event proves that he took the most prudent course; but his motives must remain doubtful. He was perhaps restrained, not by his opinion of the hopelessness of the attempt, but by the disposition to peace, which he found prevailing at home, whether the effect of fear or of jealousy, or of

any other cause.¹ Had the people been ready to embark in the contest, an orator probably would not have been wanting to animate them to it. But Demosthenes may still have given secret encouragement and assistance to the Peloponnesian confederates, and may have alluded to this, when, according to his adversary's report, he boasted that the league was his work.² The issue of that struggle, and the news which arrived soon after, of the great victory by which Alexander had decided the fate of the Persian monarchy at Gaugamela, must have crushed all hope at Athens, except one, which might have been suggested by domestic experience, that the conqueror's boundless ambition might still lead him into some enterprise beyond his strength.

There was however a party there, which did not dissemble the interest it felt in the success of the Macedonian arms. Before the battle of Issus, when Alexander was commonly believed to be in great danger, and Demosthenes was assured by his correspondents, that he could not escape destruction, *Æschines* says, that he was himself continually taunted by his rival, who exultingly displayed the letters that conveyed the joyful tidings, with the dejection he betrayed at the prospect of the disaster which threatened his friends. *Æschines* was the active leader of the Macedonising party: all his hopes of a final triumph over his political adversaries were grounded on the Macedonian ascendancy. But *Phocion*, though his motives were very different, added all the weight of his influence to the same side. His sentiments were so well known, that Alexander himself treated him as a highly honoured friend; addressed letters to him from Asia, with a salutation which he used to no one else except *Antipater*, and repeatedly pressed him to accept magnificent presents. *Phocion* indeed constantly rejected them; and when

¹ If *Plutarch's* anecdote about *Demades* (Relp. Ger. Pr. c. 25.) had contained the real cause, it at least required extraordinary impudence in *Æschines* and *Dinarchus* (Ctes. § 165. c. *Demosth.* § 36.) to lay the blame on *Demosthenes*.

² *Æsch.* Ctes. § 167

Alexander wrote that their friendship must cease if he persisted to decline all his offers¹, was only moved to intercede in behalf of some prisoners, whose liberty he immediately obtained. Even among the instructions which Craterus took with him, one is said to have been, to put Phocion in possession of an Asiatic city, which he should select from four that were to be offered to him. All this may be considered as a pure tribute of disinterested reverence for extraordinary virtue, but it was not the less likely to produce a powerful effect on minds not formed to prize virtue as its own reward, or to believe that it could be so esteemed by others.

The disaster of Chæroneia had held out a signal to the enemies of Demosthenes at Athens, to unite their efforts against him. He had been assailed in the period following that event until Philip's death, by every kind of legal engine that could be brought to bear upon him; by prosecutions of the most various form and colour. All these experiments had failed; the people had honoured him with more signal proofs of its confidence than he had ever before received: he had never taken a more active part, or exercised a more powerful sway, in public affairs. Yet it seems that after the Macedonian arms had completely triumphed, both in Asia and in Greece, Æschines thought the opportunity so favourable for another attempt of the same nature, that he resolved to collect all the force of his eloquence, and all the strength of his party, for a last attack on his great rival. He endeavours indeed to shield himself from this reproach, and from the charge which he was conscious might be brought against him, that his main object was to display his zeal in Alexander's service, under the flimsy pretext, that the indictment had been laid before Philip's death. This was true; but it was no less evident, that the cause had been dropped for seven or eight years, and that the state of political affairs alone had now induced him to revive it. This trial, the most celebrated of ancient pleadings, the most

¹ Plut. Al. 39. Phoc. 18.

memorable event in the history of eloquence throughout all past ages, deserves mention here, chiefly for the light it throws on the character and temper of the Athenian tribunals, at a time when the people is supposed to have been verging toward utter degeneracy, so as to be hardly any longer an object of historical interest: a time, it must be remembered, when the rest of Greece was quailing beneath the yoke of the stranger, and his will, dictated to the so-called national congress at Corinth, was sovereign and irresistible.

The occasion of this prosecution arose out of two offices with which Demosthenes had been entrusted, in the year, it seems, after that of the battle of Chæroneas (B. C. 337). He had been appointed by his tribe to superintend the repairs which, according to a decree proposed by himself, the city walls were to undergo, the work being equally distributed among the ten tribes.¹ At the same time he filled another post, which, if not among the highest in the state, was one of the most important in the eyes of the people; the treasurership of the theoric fund, which, as Æschines takes great pains to prove, involved a large share in the general controul and direction of the finances. In both offices he had made a liberal contribution out of his own property to the service of the state. On this ground, but more especially as a mark of approbation for his public conduct on all occasions, a decree was passed, on the motion of his friend Ctesiphon, that he should be presented with a golden crown, and that the honour conferred on him should be proclaimed in the theatre, at the great Dionysiac festival, the time when Athens was full of strangers, who came to attend the spectacle. For this decree Æschines had indicted Ctesiphon as having broken the law in three points: first,

¹ This decree must be distinguished from that mentioned, vol. vi. p. 71, where I would now omit the statement of the sums Droysen, in an elaborate examination of the records inserted in the oration for the crown (in the *Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1839), has shown that the hasty reparation of the walls which took place immediately after the battle of Chæronea, must be distinguished from that to which Demosthenes contributed three talents, and which gave occasion to Ctesiphon's decree.

because it was illegal to crown a magistrate before he had rendered an account of his office : next, because it was forbidden to proclaim such an honour, when bestowed by the people, in any other place than the assembly-ground in the Pnyx, but particularly to proclaim it, as Ctesiphon had proposed : and, lastly, because the reason assigned in the decree, so far as related to the public conduct of Demosthenes, was false, inasmuch as he had not deserved any reward. Among these points, there was one on which it seems clear that the charge of illegality was well grounded. Though the superintendence of the repairs was probably not a magistracy in the eye of the law, which indeed forbade any one to hold two at once, the treasurership of the theoric fund certainly was one, and one to which the law which forbade the crowning of a magistrate still accountable, applied with peculiar force. As to the mode of the proclamation, it seems doubtful, whether the law on which the prosecution rested had not been modified by another, which declared that proclamation might be made, as Ctesiphon proposed, if the people should so decree ; though Æschines speciously contended, that this exception was only meant to relate to crowns bestowed on citizens, not by the people, but by foreign states. But the third point, the truth or falsehood of the reason alleged in the decree, was that on which, according to the manifest sense of both the parties, of the court, and of all present at the trial, the case really turned. The question at issue was in substance, whether Demosthenes had been a good or a bad citizen. It was on this account that the court was thronged by an extraordinary conflux of spectators, both citizens and strangers. Hence the prosecutor, after a short discussion of the dry legal arguments, enters, as on his main subject, into a full review of the public and private life of Demosthenes : and Demosthenes, whose interest it was to divert attention from the points of law, which were not his strong ground, can scarcely find room for them in his defence of his own policy

and proceedings, which, with bitter attacks on his adversary, occupies almost the whole his speech.

The preceding history will perhaps enable the reader, even if he should not have read that speech, to form a general conception of the principles on which the orator vindicated his public conduct. Suffice it here to observe, that his boast is, that throughout his political career he had kept one object steadily in view: to strengthen Athens within and without, and to preserve her independence, particularly against the power and the arts of Philip. He owned that he had failed; but it was after he had done all that one man in his situation — a citizen of a commonwealth — could do. He had failed in a cause in which defeat was more glorious than victory in any other, in a struggle not less worthy of Athens than those in which her heroic citizens in past ages had earned their fame. In a word, the whole oration breathes the spirit of that high philosophy, which, whether learnt in the schools or from life, has consoled the noblest of our kind in prisons, and on scaffolds, and under every persecution of adverse fortune, but in the tone necessary to impress a mixed multitude with a like feeling, and to elevate it for a while into a sphere above its own. The effect it produced on that most susceptible audience can be but faintly conceived by the finest critics in their closets. Yet there have certainly been few readers — perhaps none but those whose judgment has been perverted by prejudices — in whom it has not left a strong conviction of the speaker's patriotism, if not of his general integrity and political virtue. The result was that the prosecutor not only lost his cause, but did not even obtain a fifth part of the votes, and consequently according to law incurred a small penalty.¹ But he seems to have felt

¹ Plut Dem 24. X Or. Vit. 840 C p 846. A. The absurd scepticism with which this fact has been questioned, on the pretence that "Æschines would hardly have ventured to prosecute his accusation without assurance of support from the party which looked to Phocion, as its head," might surprise us, if it did not occur in a work which, though cast in a historical form, was intended to convey, not historical information, but first of all opinions, and then such facts as could be made to square with them. It

it insupportable to remain at the scene of his defeat, where he must have lived silent and obscure. He quitted Athens, and crossed over to Asia with the view it is said of seeking protection from Alexander¹, through whose aid alone he could now hope to triumph over his adversaries. When this prospect vanished, he retired to Rhodes, where he opened a school of oratory, which produced a long series of voluble sophists, and is considered as the origin of a new style of eloquence, technically called the Asiatic, which stood in a relation to the Attic not unlike that of the composite capital to the Ionic volute, and was destined to prevail in the East wherever the Greek language was spoken, down to the fall of the Roman empire. He died at Samos, about nine years after Alexander, having survived both his great antagonist, and his friend Phocion, and probably was preserved by his exile from a similar fate.

The spirit displayed by the tribunal which decided in favour of Demosthenes on such grounds as he alleged, is at least as noble as that of the Roman senate and people, when they went out to meet and thank the consul on his return from Cannæ. But the case may seem to exhibit the Athenian administration of justice in a much less favourable light. On one point at least it is clear that Ctesiphon's decree was contrary to law. The attempt made by Demosthenes to prove that the law, which forbade an accountable magistrate to be crowned, did not apply to his case, only shows the extreme looseness of legal reasoning which was tolerated in Athenian courts. It seems indeed to have been admitted, that there had been numerous precedents for

is well matched with the exquisite learning which describes "the numbers composing the Athenian courts," as "all standing" during a trial. It would be almost affronting the reader to refute so ridiculous a fiction by evidence, as e.g. the proclamation in the Vesp. 752 *τὴν ἀφρόνητον ; ἀνιστάμεν*. It is the proper penalty of wilful ignorance so to expose itself.

¹ X. Or. Vit. p. 840. D. The story of the sympathy which Demosthenes showed to Æschines after his defeat (Vit. X. Or. p. 843. E.) is in strange contrast with all we know of the public life of the two rivals. Yet from the other version, in which Demosthenes is represented as the object of similar generosity (Plutarch, Demosth. 26), we may hope that it had some foundation. It seems too improbable to be a mere fiction.

whatever was illegal in the decree, as to the circumstances of time and place. But this only proves the laxity which prevailed in the observance of the laws. It appears that according to that theory of the constitution which had been universally approved and acted on in the purest times, immediately after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, the court which tried the author of a decree denounced as illegal, was bound to compare it with the letter of the law, and to give judgment on the simple question of their strict agreement. But it is evident that the courts had afterwards assumed greater freedom ; and it is not at all certain that this was repugnant either to the spirit of the institution, or to the practice of preceding ages, with the single exception of the short period in which the restoration of the democracy awakened extraordinary jealousy for the maintenance of the laws. The will of the people, declared in a decree, had been subjected to the revision of a tribunal which might be expected to possess superior means of information, to secure the people itself against the pernicious consequences of temporary measures into which it might be surprised. This seems to have been the general object, to which all others were subordinate ; and for this purpose it might be necessary that in such cases the courts should be invested with an ample discretion, and should not be required to adhere to the letter of the laws, so as themselves to commit wrong, or to injure the commonwealth. The form of the proceedings was such, that a verdict against Ctesiphon must have been interpreted as a condemnation of Demosthenes : and it was the deliberate will, and the highest interest of the people, to show that it still honoured the man who had not despaired of the commonwealth. It would have been better that the prosecutor should not have been able so to embroil the question : but where he did so, it was desirable that the court should have the power to decide on what it deemed the most important point.

In the course of the same year was tried another

cause, which is interesting in the same point of view. The occasion has been already mentioned. In the eighth year after the battle of Chæronea, the fugitive Leocrates returned to Athens, which he had deserted in her hour of danger, and resumed the functions of a citizen. He was impeached by Lycurgus, under the law which had been passed immediately after the battle, forbidding emigration under pain of death. He pleaded that he had set out in the course of his business as a merchant, without any intention of changing his abode: but his subsequent conduct belied his professions. He was convicted, and probably suffered the penalty of his offence.

Lycurgus, the prosecutor, was one of the few men then living at Athens, who could undertake such a task with dignity, as conscious of a life irreproachably spent in the service of his country. There are few Athenian statesmen of any age who can bear a comparison with him: Phocion equalled him in honesty and disinterestedness; but in his general character, and in his political conduct, seems to fall far below him. It is pleasing and instructive to contemplate the image of such a man; and it is a peculiar happiness that his biography is less meagre than that of most of his celebrated contemporaries: the principal features of his character stand out before us with sufficient distinctness.

Demosthenes was often reproached with a mixture of barbarian blood in his veins. Lycurgus was a genuine Athenian, and his family was one of the oldest and most illustrious in Athens. He traced the origin of his house, which was distinguished by the honourable appellation of the Eteobutads¹, to the royal hero Erechtheus, and thus to a divine stock. By virtue of this descent his family possessed an hereditary priesthood of Poseidon, whose worship, as probably his nature, was intimately connected with that of Erechtheus. In

¹ Importing, the genuine Butads or descendants of Butes. τοῖς δῆμοις Βυρράδης, γένος τοῦ τοῦ Ἐρεχθιδῆος. X. Or. Vit. 841. B. where most of the materials of the following sketch will be found.

the Erechtheum, the temple dedicated in common to the hero and the god, the portraits of the ancestors of Lycurgus who had held that office were painted on the walls. He could also boast of some, more truly noble, whose memory was endeared to the people by real services. Lycophron, his grandfather, had been put to death by the Thirty, and both he and Lycomedes, another of the orator's progenitors, had been honoured with a public funeral. Lycurgus had studied in the schools both of Plato and Isocrates; but had not learnt from the one to withdraw from active life into a visionary world, nor from the other to cultivate empty rhetoric at the expense of truth and of his country. His manly eloquence breathes a deep love and reverence for what was truly venerable in antiquity — his speech against Leocrates, which is still extant, shows that he dwelt with a fondness becoming his birth and station on the stirring legends of elder times — but his admiration for them had not made him indifferent or unjust toward those in which he lived. He possessed an ample hereditary fortune; but he lived, like Phocion, with Spartan simplicity. In an age of growing luxury he wore the same garments through summer and winter, and, like Socrates, was only seen with sandals on extraordinary occasions. Yet he had to struggle against the aristocratical habits and prejudices of his family. He was the author of a law, to restrain the wealthier women from shaming their poorer neighbours by the costliness of their equipages in the festive procession to Eleusis; but his own wife was the first to break it.¹ His frugality however did not arise from parsimony, and was confined to his personal wants. He was reproached with the liberality which he displayed toward the various masters of learning whom he employed, and declared that if he could find any that would make his sons better men, he would gladly pay them with half

¹ According to Vit. X. Or. he paid a talent to the sycophants to avert a prosecution, and afterwards defended himself on the plea that he had given, not taken. Ælian however (V. H. xiii. 24.) represents her as legally condemned.

his fortune. He devoted himself to public life in a career of quiet, unostentatious but useful activity. He was a powerful, but not a ready speaker ; like Pericles and Demosthenes, he never willingly mounted the bema without elaborate preparation ; and his writing-instruments were constantly placed by the side of the simple couch on which he rested, and from which he frequently rose in the night to pursue his labours. But to shine in the popular assembly was not the object of his studies ; he seems only to have appeared there on necessary or important occasions. His genius was peculiarly formed for the management of financial affairs ; and the economy of the state was the business of a large portion of his public life. In the latter part of Philip's reign he was placed at the head of the treasury.¹ The duties of his office embraced not only the collection, but the ordinary expenditure of the Athenian revenues, so far as they were not appropriated to particular purposes. On the administration of the person who filled it, depended both the resources of the state, and the manner in which they were regularly applied. The office was tenable for four years ; a law dictated by republican jealousy, and, it seems, proposed by Lycurgus himself, forbade it to remain longer in the same hands. Yet Lycurgus was permitted to exercise its functions during twelve successive years, selecting some of his friends for the last two terms to bear the title. In the course of this period nearly 19,000 talents passed through his hands.² He is said to have raised the ordinary revenue from 600 to 1200 talents.³ We hear of no expedients but unwearied diligence by which he effected this in-

¹ ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου. See Boeckh. ii. 6

² So the decree of Stratocles at the end of Vit. X. Or. According to another account in the Life of Lycurgus, 14,000 talents : which Boeckh. considers as the result (in round numbers) of a calculation being the amount of the revenue for twelve years. And this he supposes Pausanias to have had in view, i. 29. 16 where he says that Lycurgus brought into the treasury a greater sum by 6600 than Pericles which would be the case according to the amount of the treasure mentioned by Isocrates, *Eic* § 152 *ἐκτακισχίλια τελαντα χαεῖς τῶν πρῶν*, reduced by 100, which Boeckh thinks may have been the more accurate statement

³ In Vit. X. Or. it is said that they were before only sixty talents. Boeckh. i. n. 470 thinks that the biographer confounded the revenue with

crease. It is only as to the application that we are more fully informed. It seems that the amount and the nature of the domestic expenditure were committed in a great degree to his discretion. As the surplus not required for war, fell into the theoric fund which was devoted to the transient gratification of the people, it required all the influence of the treasurer to apply as large a sum as possible to objects permanently useful. The administration of Lycurgus was distinguished above every other since Pericles by the number of public buildings which he erected or completed. Among his monuments were an arsenal, an armoury, a theatre, a gymnasium, a palaestra, a stadium. After the example of Pericles he laid up a considerable treasure in the citadel, in images, vessels, and ornaments of gold and silver, which at the same time served to heighten the splendour of the sacred festivals. It was in a different capacity, under a special commission, that he also built 400 galleys, and formed a great magazine of arms. He seems likewise to have taken Pericles for his model, so far as the difference between their times permitted, in a continual endeavour to raise the character, and to refine the taste of the people. That he instituted a choral contest in honour of his family god Poseidon, may be ascribed to a personal motive. But we find his attention entirely directed to more important branches of art and literature. He was the author of a regulation—the precise nature of which is not sufficiently ascertained to be stated here—for the better management of the comic drama. But he conferred a more lasting benefit on his country, and on all posterity, by another measure designed to honour and preserve the memory and the works of the three great tragic poets to whom Athens was indebted for so large a part of her literary fame. The dramas of Sophocles and Euripides, if not of Æschylus, were still frequently exhibited: they were

the tribute. But Sauppe (*Z f die Alterthumswiss.* iii. p 420) makes it appear more probable, that *ἱερουργία* should be altered to *ἱεροποιία*.

acknowledged as the most perfect models of dramatic poetry : but this did not prevent them from undergoing a fate similar to that which has so often befallen the works of our early dramatists : they were frequently interpolated and mutilated by the actors. Before the invention of the press, this was a serious evil, as it endangered the very existence of the original works. To remedy it, Lycurgus caused a new transcript or edition to be made of them by public authority, in many cases probably from the manuscripts of the authors, and to be deposited in the state-archives.¹ The value of this edition was proved by its fate. It was afterwards borrowed by one of the Ptolemies to be copied for the Alexandrian library, and fifteen talents were left at Athens as a pledge for its restitution. The king however sent back the copy instead of the original, and forfeited his pledge. By the decree of Lycurgus it was directed that the players should conform in their representations to this authentic edition. The bronze statues of the three poets, which he also caused to be erected, were less durable monuments, and had become a more trivial distinction.

All these works attest the influence of Lycurgus, while they show the spirit in which it was exerted. That influence was founded, not on his birth, or wealth, or eloquence, or ability, but simply on the confidence which a jealous people reposed in his integrity and probity. As the state entrusted him with its revenues, so private persons deposited their property in his custody. When a piece of ground was required for his new stadium, Dinias, its owner, made a present of it to the people, with the extraordinary declaration, that he gave it for the sake of Lycurgus. His testimony was sought as the most efficacious aid in the courts of justice. He was once summoned by an adversary of Demosthenes. Demosthenes said he should only ask whether Lycurgus would consent to be thought like the

¹ See Grynæ, *De Græcorum Tragedia*, p. 7.

man whom he befriended.¹ In his own judicial contests, whether he appeared as prosecutor or defendant, he always gained his cause. He could venture sharply to rebuke the assembled people, when he was interrupted in a speech by clamours of disapprobation. When the philosopher Xenocrates was seized in the street, as liable to the alien-tax, by one of the farmers of the customs, Lycurgus struck the man with his staff, and committed him to prison; and his conduct on this occasion was universally praised. We hear but of one case in which he may seem to have courted popular favour by a deviation from his principles in the management of the public funds. He had convicted a wealthy man named Diphilus² of a gross and very pernicious fraud on the state in the working of the mines at Laurium. The offender was put to death, and his whole estate confiscated, and Lycurgus consented at least to distribute the sum which it brought into the treasury among the people, as the whole produce of the mines had been distributed before the time of Themistocles. The general tendency of his measures, and the impression produced by his character, were rather of an opposite kind. He inspired a feeling approaching to awe by his antique, Spartan-like austerity, as he publicly avowed his admiration of the old Spartan manners. When he was appointed to superintend the police of the city³, the measures by which he cleared it of rogues and vagrants were deemed so rigorous, as to be compared with the laws of Draco. On the other hand, one of his celebrated enactments was a provision against one of the

¹ Rutilius Lupus, ii. 4. Ruhnken's conjecture that the nameless adversary of Demosthenes was Stratocles, is not improbable; but the occasion must have been previous to the affair of Harpalus. Lycurgus was dead, when Stratocles prosecuted Demosthenes on that ground.

² Perhaps the same person for whom Demosthenes had obtained the public honours mentioned by Dinarchus, Demosth. i. 44.

³ *ἔχει τοὺς δέστας τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τὸν παρουργὸν τῆς πόλεως.* Sauppe (u. s. p. 416) rejects this statement, as having arisen from some mistake, because no mention of such an office occurs elsewhere. But his observation, "that the Athenian magistrates had the power of proceeding against offenders, each in his sphere, as the *Thesmothetæ*, the *Areopagus*, and that Lycurgus was in general celebrated for his rigour," seems hardly to explain the anecdote.

grosser abuses of the slave trade, by which it sometimes happened that free persons were sold under false pretexts in the Athenian market.

The account to which every Athenian magistrate was liable, was of course most rigidly exacted from one who filled such an office as Lycurgus discharged for twelve years in succession. He rendered one at the end of each quadriennial period, either in his own name, or in that of the titular minister for whom he acted. No flaw was ever detected in his reckonings, and it appeared that he had on various occasions borrowed between 600 and 700 talents for the public service.¹ Still he himself was not satisfied with the ordinary inspection to which his accounts were liable; he justly considered them as one of his fairest titles to gratitude and esteem, and he therefore caused them to be inscribed on a monument which he erected in the palæstra founded by himself: and it appears that a considerable part of this inscription has been preserved to our day.² A short time before his death — which seems to have a little preceded Alexander's — he is said to have directed himself to be carried to the council-chamber, and to have challenged a fresh scrutiny of his whole administration.³ The only person who came forward to lay any thing to his charge was one Menesæchmus, whom he had prosecuted, and he now refuted all his cavils.

Crowns, statues, and a seat at the table of the Prytanes, had been bestowed on him in his life. After his death he was honoured with a public funeral, and with a bronze statue near the ten heroes of the tribes, and

¹ So Boeckh (ii p 132) interprets the words of the decree of Stratocles, which may however (compared with the corresponding passage in the life of Lycurgus) be understood of a deposit which had been consigned to his care. Sauppe (ii s) would correct the numbers in the decree by those in the life, which are 260.

² Boeckh, *Staats*, ii p 244.

³ It is a question, whether the twelve years are to be reckoned from Ol. 109 3 (342) or from Ol 110 3 (338). The latter is Boeckh's opinion, according to which Lycurgus would not have completed the last term at the time of his death, and Sauppe's arguments on this side seem more convincing than Droysen's (*Z f d Alterthumswiss*, vi p 250) on the other. This opinion seems also to be confirmed by the statement in Vit. X Or p 841, *C. ἡγεμονίας ἐξουσίαν*: for he appears to have exercised the superintendence here mentioned, like the rest, by virtue of his office as treasurer.

the distinction he had enjoyed as a guest of the state was made hereditary in his family. Yet his sons—who it may be suspected from his language on the occasion already mentioned were not worthy of him—were prosecuted for some offence by the same Menesæchmus, who succeeded him in his office, and it is said that they were released from prison through the intercession of Demosthenes; though this may have had no other foundation than the close political, and perhaps personal friendship, which united the great orator with Lycurgus.¹

The fragments here collected from the biography of a truly illustrious man, who has not generally attracted all the notice he deserves, will perhaps not be thought to occupy too much room, when it is considered that they are scattered over a period during which the history of Athens is almost a blank. They lead us to believe that the life of the people at this period cannot have been so worthless and insignificant as we often find it described: a people which in the midst of a swarm of profligate political adventurers, sycophants, and parasites, bestowed its esteem, its confidence, its highest honours, on two such men, so widely at variance with each other, as Phocion and Lycurgus: a people, it may be added, which could even be misled by such a speech as that of Demosthenes in his defence², was not hopelessly corrupt, not dead to all right and noble feelings, nor ready to sink into ruin through its own internal feebleness and levity. Notwithstanding the vast extent of the Macedonian conquests, and the magnificence of the new dynasties which arose out of Alex-

¹ In the Life of Lycurgus the ground of the prosecution is not stated, we are only left to conjecture that it was connected with his administration, and that after his death Menesæchmus renewed his charge with greater success. And such is the state of things supposed in the third letter of Demosthenes, which, though certainly spurious, had probably some authority for this point but seems to have been itself the only authority for the intercession of Demosthenes mentioned in the Life of Lycurgus.

² At the same time I am aware how cautiously such arguments should be used, and into what grievous mistakes we are likely to fall when we attempt to infer the character of an age from the sentiments contained in its books.

ander's empire, we need not be ashamed to regard the struggle which this people made for liberty as not less interesting than the contests of some ambitious soldiers of fortune for their shares of that rich spoil.

During the whole of his administration, if, as appears most probable, he remained in office to his death, Lycurgus had to contend against the influence of Demades. This most reckless and shameless of all the candidates for power that had hitherto appeared at Athens, who in condition and character presented the most complete contrast to Lycurgus¹, had been appointed, it seems, immediately after Demosthenes, treasurer of the theoric fund, and he occupied that station during the twelve following years. The influence which he acquired rested on two grounds, beside his wit, fluency, and impudence: on his avowed connection with Macedonia, from which some advantage had been derived in the negotiations with Philip and Alexander, and on the readiness with which he squandered the public money to gratify the lowest tastes of the Athenian populace. We even find it related, that succours would have been sent to the Peloponnesians in their struggle with Alexander, if he had not warned the people, that they must then forego the sum which he was about to distribute among them for an approaching festival.² The story in this form indeed is hardly credible, or consistent with the complaints which were made against Demosthenes on the same subject; but it does not the less truly mark the man's character, and the basis of his power. He had indeed, as we have seen, been prosecuted with success by Lycurgus; but the result of the conviction was probably only a fine which he could easily pay, and which did not interrupt his political activity. In reputation he had nothing to lose. At the end of the twelve years, he was again impeached for his conduct in

¹ He is generally described (Suidas Quinetilian, ii. 17 16) as having been originally a common sailor (ραυτης, remex); by Proclus (in Poetæ Minores, Gaisf. iii p 6) as *ἰχθυώλης*, of which the other account may have been an exaggeration. The fish market at Athens was a school, not more of scurrility, than of impudence and dishonesty.

² Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Pr 25

his administration. In his defence he had the front to claim the merit of the blessings which the people had enjoyed during the long period of peace. It was probably felt that he might still be useful: at least that it was not the time to punish him: and he was acquitted.

In the course of the year preceding Alexander's death, the stillness and obscurity of Athenian history were broken, partly by the new measures adopted by the conqueror on his return from India with respect to Greece, and partly by the adventures of Harpalus. Alexander's claim of divine honours could not be viewed in Greece with the same feelings which it had excited among the victorious Macedonians. To the people bowed down by irresistible necessity under a foreign yoke it was not a point of great moment, under what form or title the conqueror, in the plenitude of his power, chose to remind them of their subjection. They might consider the demand as a wanton insult: but it was in no other sense an injury. There might not be many base enough to recommend it, but there were perhaps still fewer so unwise as to think it a fit ground for resistance. It involved no surrender of religious faith, even in those who were firmly attached to the popular creed: and the ridicule for which it afforded so fair a mark, was, with most, sufficient revenge for its insolence. The Spartan answer to the king's envoys was perhaps the best: "If Alexander will be a god, let him."¹ At Athens there was something more of debate on the question; yet it hardly seems that opinions were seriously divided on it. The motion, as was most fitting, was made by Demades; and even in this proposal he did not go much farther than Epicrates, who had ventured to say, that instead of the nine archons the people would do well to appoint as many ambassadors to Alexander.² It was opposed by a young orator, named Pytheas, who seems to have fluctuated greatly in his political alliances³, but on one occasion at

¹ *Ælian*, V. H., ii. 19.

² *Athenæus*, vi. 58.

³ *Demosthenes*, *Epist. Nil.* § 29. *fol.* *Plutarch*, *Phoc.* 31.

least expressed himself strongly on the notorious contrast between the private habits of Demades and Demosthenes.¹ Pytheas perhaps took that view of the question in which it afforded the best subject for vehement declamation. It was observed by the more practical statesmen, that he was not yet of an age to give advice on matters of such importance. He replied that he was older than Alexander, whom they proposed to make a god. Lycurgus appears to have spoken, with the severity suited to his character, of "the new god, from whose temple none could depart without need of purification."² But it does not follow that he wished to see the demand rejected. At least Demades and Demosthenes were agreed on the main point, and their language, as far as it is reported, seems to have been very similar. Demades warned the people not to lose earth while they contested the possession of heaven³: and Demosthenes advised them not to contend with Alexander about celestial honours. Yet it is said that on a previous occasion he had carried a motion, forbidding innovations in the objects of public worship⁴; whether with reference to rumours of Alexander's pretensions, we do not know. The assembly acquiesced in the king's demand.

But the order relating to the return of the exiles awakened much stronger feelings, partly of fear, and partly of indignation. It appears that Alexander, before he set out on his expedition, when it was his object to conciliate the Greeks, had engaged by solemn compact with the national congress at Corinth — perhaps only confirming one before made by Philip — not to interfere with the existing institutions of any Greek state, but to preserve them inviolate. At the time of this treaty Messene, it seems, was governed by a tyrant-

¹ Athenæus, li. 22. A passage not uninteresting, as it helps us to appreciate such reports of the private character of Demosthenes as we find in Athen. xiii. 63.

² Athen. li. 22; Demosthenes, Epist. iii. § 29.; Plutarch, Resp. Græc. Pr. 8. An Seni Ger. 2.

³ *Dictum sapiens* it is called by Valerius Maximus, vii. 2. E. 10.

⁴ Dinarchus c. Dem. § 97.

nical dynasty, the house of Philiades. The tyrants were afterwards expelled, but were restored by Alexander's intervention, under the pretext that the treaty required the governments then standing to be preserved. But this pretence could not be pleaded in another case, when the democratical party at Pellene in Achaia was expelled, their property confiscated, and distributed among their slaves, and Chæron established as tyrant by the power of Macedonia.¹ The tendency of Alexander's new measure was to effect a similar, though it might be a less violent revolution, wherever Macedonian influence was not yet completely predominant, throughout Greece. Nicanor, a Stagirite, had been sent down by Alexander to publish his decree during the games at Olympia. Demosthenes on this occasion proposed himself to fill an office which was commonly confined to unimportant ceremonies : to head the embassy by which Athens was publicly represented at the national festival, that he might there discuss the question, point out the injustice of the measure, and impress the assembled Greeks with his own sentiments. For this purpose he was sent, and at Olympia had a public debate with Nicanor, but without any immediate effect. Nicanor could only obey the king's orders : and there were some thousands of the exiles and their friends collected there, who listened to the proclamation with joy. It was in the form of a letter addressed to them in a style of imperial brevity. " King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities. We were not the author of your exile, but we will restore you to your homes, all but those who are under a curse.² And we have written to Antipater on the subject, that he may compel those cities which are unwilling to receive you."

Great alarm ensued at Athens among those who had reason to dread the execution of the decree. The peo-

¹ Demosthenes de Fœd. Alex. § 8. 12.

² Πλην τῶν ἱερῶν. Explained by Diodorus himself (xvii. 109.) to mean those who had been convicted of sacrilege or murder ; as in Polysperchon's edict (xviii. 56) they are described more fully, πλὴν ὧν τινες ἐφ' αἵματι ἢ ἀτιμίᾳ παρὰ νόμον τιμωροῦσιν.

ple would not comply with it, but still did not venture openly to reject it. A middle course was taken, by which time at least was gained. An embassy was sent to Alexander, to deprecate his interference: and at Babylon the Athenian envoys met those of several other Greek states, who had come on the same business. How far they acted in concert with each other, and whether through the exhortations of Demosthenes, we are not informed. There seemed indeed to be a very faint hope that Alexander's purpose could be shaken by their arguments or intreaties: but yet the event, very unexpectedly indeed, showed that they had taken the most prudent counsel. In the meanwhile there prevailed at home not only great anxiety about the issue of the embassy, but fears for the immediate safety of the city. A strong body of Athenian exiles was collected at Megara, where they might keep up a communication with their friends in Athens, and would be furnished with such aid as Megara could afford: for, as was to be expected from the ancient enmity between the two cities, Megara had warmly embraced the interests of Macedonia, and had bestowed its franchise on Alexander, who smiled at the honour, but was assured that he was the first stranger who had ever received it since his ancestor Hercules.¹ Suspicions were entertained of clandestine meetings with the exiles at Megara: and the Areopagus was directed to investigate one at least of these cases. Another was brought forward by Demosthenes, who was however induced to drop it, probably by his own danger, as well as information which he had received of some designs against the arsenal.²

Such was the state of affairs at Athens, when the appearance of Harpalus gave rise to fresh perplexity and uneasiness. The precise time when he arrived on

¹ Plutarch de Un in Rep. Dem. 2

² Droysen (Alex. p. 534) assumes, on the authority of the adverse pleader (Dinarch. § 97) that Demosthenes fabricated these charges to shelter himself. He does not notice the case of Polyæctus Cydantides (Dinarch. Dem. § 58.), which proves that such suspicions were not confined to him. And who can doubt, under the circumstances of the time, that there was reasonable ground for them?

the coast of Attica, is difficult to ascertain. But it seems most probable that it was after the return of Demosthenes from Olympia. Harpalus, as we have seen, carried away some 5000 talents, and had collected about 6000 mercenaries. He must therefore have crossed the Ægean with a little squadron; and it is probable that the rumour of his approach reached Athens at least some days before him. He had reason to hope for a favourable reception. He came with his Athenian mistress, for whose sake he had conferred a substantial benefit on her native city; and he had already gained at least one friend there, on whose influence he may have founded great expectations: Charicles, Phocion's son-in-law, who had descended so low as to undertake the erection of the monument in honour of Pythionice, and had received thirty talents by way of reimbursement. He might calculate still more confidently on the force of the temptation which his treasure and his troops held out to the people, if they were already disposed to risk an open quarrel with Alexander, and on the ample means of corruption he possessed. These hopes were disappointed, and at first he certainly met with a total repulse. It seems most probable — though our authors leave this doubtful — that his squadron was not permitted to enter Piræus. We know that a debate took place on his first arrival, that Demosthenes advised the people not to receive him, and that Philocles, the general in command at Munychia, was ordered to prevent his entrance. Philocles indeed appears afterwards to have disobeyed this order¹; but it is probable that he did not immediately allow Harpalus to land. The fullest account we have of the proceedings of Harpalus on his first appearance in the roads of Munychia, is contained in the few words of Diodorus²; that, “finding no one to listen to him, he left his mercenaries at Tænarus, and with a part of his treasure came himself to implore the protection of the people.” All the other authors

¹ Dinarchus, Philocl. int.

² xvii. 108

describe him as having arrived but once¹, and this is easily explained, if on his first coming he was not allowed to land ; but still it is possible that, even on that occasion, he found an opportunity of distributing a part of his gold among some of the leading men, and perhaps may have concerted with Philocles, that he should be admitted, when he returned with a single vessel. The sum which he brought back with him was a little more than 750 talents: enough certainly to buy the greater part of the venal orators: and many yielded to the temptation.

That Demades — whose avowed maxim it was to take whatever was offered to him² — was of this number, can only appear surprising, as inconsistent with his Macedonian politics ; but it would only have been so in any other man. Phocion's son-in-law too did not desert the friend whom he had before so humbly served ; and it is said that Harpalus ventured to solicit Phocion himself, with offers which were of course rejected.³ But the most interesting question connected with this transaction, relates to the conduct of Demosthenes. Whether he was one of those who accepted a bribe from Harpalus, has been a disputed point from his own day to ours. It will appear from the following narrative, that the evidence cannot be considered as quite conclusive on either side ; all that can be proved in his favour is, that the more fully the facts of the case are stated, the more glaring are the absurdities and contradictions involved in the suppositions of his guilt, while the few facts which tend that way, may be very easily reconciled with the supposition of his innocence.

The part which he took in the public debates on the affair, is known from good authority: mostly from that of his contemporaries and accusers. It is universally

¹ Beside Plutarch, Phoc. Dem. X Orat. Vit. Dinarchus (Dem. § 115,) speaks just in the same way: *συνερχία πρὸς τὸν Ἀρπαλὸν πατάσκειν καὶ τὴν ἑρμίσιν.*

² Dinarch. Dem. § 107 ; *ὁμιλογῶν λαμβάνειν καὶ λήψασθαι.*

³ Plutarch (Phoc. 21.) makes him offer 700 talents, nearly all he had brought ; and the rest would be comprised in *τὰλλα πάντα.*

admitted, that he was one of those who at the first opposed the reception of Harpalus. After the return of Harpalus to Athens, when he had gained over several of the orators to his side, envoys came from several quarters, from Antipater, from Olympias, and it seems also from Philoxenus, a Macedonian, who filled a high office in Asia Minor¹, to require that he should be given up. Demosthenes and Phocion both resisted this demand; and Demosthenes carried a decree, by which it was directed, that the treasure should be lodged in the citadel, to be restored to Alexander, and he himself was empowered to receive it. Its amount was declared by Harpalus himself; but, out of the 750 talents no more than 308 remained in his possession. It was clear, that nearly 450 had found their way into other hands.² Demosthenes now caused another decree to be passed, by which the Areopagus was directed to investigate the case, and he proposed that instead of the ordinary penalty — tenfold the amount of the bribe — capital punishment should be inflicted on the offenders. A very rigid inquiry was instituted: the houses of all suspected persons — with the single exception of one who had been just married — were searched: the Areopagus made its report against several, and among them was Demosthenes himself. He was the first who was brought to trial³, was found guilty, and condemned to pay fifty

¹ Pausan. ii. 33 4. There seems to be no reason whatever for questioning this fact, unless we choose also to deny that Philoxenus took any part in the business. But the fact is confirmed by Plutarch De Vit. Pud. 5.; a passage which seems to have been overlooked.

² Photius, Bekk p. 494 a.

³ Droysen (Al. p. 533) not only denies this fact, but thinks it an argument against the genuineness of the second letter attributed to Demosthenes, that the writer makes Demosthenes say he had been the first tried (p. 1470. τῷ πρώτῳ δίκηναι), whereas Dinarchus (p. 170) testifies that several were tried before him. For want of the edition which Droysen refers to, I am unable to ascertain the passage of Dinarchus which he has in view, and can only conjecture that it may be one (p. 100. § 84) which might possibly, if it stood alone, seem to admit of such an inference, but is to be explained by reference to p. 98 § 64. of an earlier transaction. But what is certain is, that Dinarchus attests, in the most distinct and unequivocal terms, and more than once, that Demosthenes was the first of the persons found guilty by the Areopagus who was brought to trial: (p. 103) τιμωρίας ἵκανα τῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἐν τῇ ταύτῃ ἀποφασίσει Δημοσθένης δικάσεται πρῶτος, and a little lower down, ἀφ' οὗ τῶν πρώτων εἰσαγγελυμένων πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Of course the accuracy of the writer of the letter on this point neither establishes its genuineness

talents. Being unable to raise this sum, he was thrown into prison, but soon after made his escape, and went into exile.

It must be owned, that if we knew no more than this about the case, it would require a stronger faith than is generally placed in the sagacity and purity of the Athenian tribunals, to be convinced that he was guilty. But it is not either the report of the Areopagus, or the judgment of the popular tribunal, that has been the chief ground of suspicion against him. It has been a story told by Plutarch, and apparently confirmed by a great number of contemporary allusions. According to Plutarch¹, Demosthenes at first warned the people not to receive Harpalus, and so involve themselves in a war with Alexander on a ground neither necessary nor just. But a few days after, when an inventory was taken of the treasure, his eye was struck by a golden goblet, of very fine workmanship: and when night came, Harpalus, who had perceived his admiration and longing for it, sent it to his house, full of gold pieces to the amount of twenty talents. The next day the orator appeared in the assembly, which met to deliberate on the subject, with wrappings about his neck, and, when called upon to speak, made signs that he was disabled by a sore throat. But there were some present, who already knew the secret; and the pretext was received with sarcastic allusions to the bribe which he had taken. It

ness, nor the force of the argument there grounded on the fact. I hardly understand another objection which Droysen makes to the same passage in the letter, in which the writer asks, what plea, of those which saved the persons who were tried after me, did I omit? Droysen affirms that Demades and Aristogeiton were both condemned after Demosthenes. I do not see how this contradicts the letter, if true. But with regard to Aristogeiton, I cannot find the passage of Dinarchus to which Droysen refers. In the third letter of Demosthenes (p. 1483.) the contrary is asserted: *ἐγὼ δὲ Ἀριστογεῖτονα ἀφίκαται, ἐπὶ ταύταις Δημοκρίτου ἐμβολήμασι*. I will notice, that in the oration of Dinarchus against Philocles, there is a passage which might seem to prove that Philocles had been the first tried: (p. 110.) *ἐπεισέκοιτι τὸν δῆμον ἅπαντα παρόντων τούτων γιγινεμένων καὶ προκατακείμενα πρῶτον τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς τιμωρίας ἐν ὑμῖν δοίῃσι*. But whether this relates to the proceedings in the Areopagus, or merely to popular belief and rumour, it cannot be admitted to contradict the express assertion in the speech against Demosthenes.

¹ Demosth. 25.

immediately became the subject of many bitter jests ; and when he afterwards attempted to defend himself in the assembly, his voice was drowned in a tumult of popular indignation.

That Plutarch should have adopted so amusing a story without any misgiving, was to be expected.¹ But had it not affected the character of Demosthenes, we might have been surprised to find it repeated by modern writers, far more learned and sagacious than Plutarch, with as much confidence as if there was nothing in it either improbable, or inconsistent with admitted facts.² Some of the slighter difficulties which raise a doubt about its truth are, that Demosthenes should have accepted a bribe from Harpalus, after the decree had been passed by which the whole treasure was to be taken out of the hands of Harpalus, and committed for a time to his own keeping . that he should have selected a bribe which exposed him to the greatest danger of detection that his accuser, Dinarchus, should not only have made no allusion to the goblet, but should mention twenty talents as the whole sum which Demosthenes had received That part of the anecdote which relates to the orator's silence, is referred by another author — who in the same passage appears to confound Demosthenes and Demades — to a totally different occasion³ :

¹ He must have taken an entirely different view of the case, when he wrote the passage (Phoc. 21) where he says, that Harpalus saw the orators who had accepted his bribes changing sides and accusing him, to avoid detection, while Phocion who had taken nothing, paid some regard to his safety as well as to the public interest.

² Droysen (Al. p. 531) relates the story, according to Plutarch, in its most glaringly absurd and incredible form, and then indulges in a sneer at Niebuhr for his belief in the integrity of Demosthenes, perverting however the sense of the expression to which he alludes (Nieb. Kl. Schrift. p. 467, or Philolog. Museum i. p. 487), by which Niebuhr only meant to describe the unvarying consistency of the orator's public conduct. The unfortunate phrase has also, it seems, been considered as profane.

³ Aulus Gell. N. A. xi. 9. Droysen merely observes, that Gellius erroneously refers the story to an earlier occasion, on which Demosthenes was bribed. Gellius reports it from Critolaus, and certainly the story he relates is not like Plutarch's, a string of absurdities and contradictions. In that a sufficient cause is assigned for the orator's venal silence. But whether the story in this shape belonged to Demosthenes or not, is the more doubtful, as the sequel at least could only be attributed with any probability to Demades, who we know made no secret of his venality even if it had not been related of him — as Gellius mentions in the next chapter — by C. Gracchus. That the comic poet Timocles (Athen., viii. p. 391) mentioned fifty talents

and at least it seems impossible that, in any part of the proceedings concerning Harpalus, Demosthenes should have been driven to any pretext for silence, when he was expected to speak on the question. Even if he had not himself previously opposed the surrender of Harpalus, he might surely have done so without suspicion, when Phocion recommended the same course. After the decree had been passed to retain the treasure, this was all that Harpalus had to desire: and so far Demosthenes openly espoused his cause. There is therefore no motive that can easily be conceived for his silence. Still the scene in the assembly may be rejected as an immaterial circumstance—as it is in itself, though it has had more weight than any other with most readers—and yet the general fact, that Demosthenes received a bribe from Harpalus, may be thought not the less credible. And so, in another account of the transaction, which is in some respects fuller, we find it related that, though he at first opposed the admission of Harpalus, he was afterwards induced, by a bribe of a thousand darics, to change sides, and, when the Athenians wished to give Harpalus up to Antipater, dissuaded them from this step, but proposed that the treasure should be lodged in the citadel.

One point is indisputably clear: that Demosthenes, whether bribed or not, did not change sides: unless Phocion did so too. His conduct, from the beginning to the end of the affair, is at least perfectly consistent with itself, and with the course which has appeared to most observers in later times, as it did to him and Pho-

as the bribe which Demosthenes received, does not, as Droysen truly observes, affect the main question. It only shows how little stress ought to be laid on any argument which might be drawn from the supposed notoriety of the fact. It would appear from the same passage of Limocius, to have been equally notorious that Hyperides the prosecutor had also shared the gold of Harpalus. The jest of Corydus on the goblet (*Athen. vi. 47*), "The man who calls other people swill-pots has drained the great bowl himself" (*οὗτος τοὺς ἄλλους ἀκραταιώδην καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν μεγάλην ἰσκαμῖ*), is not unimportant, as it shows how Demosthenes may have incurred the ill-will of many beside his political opponents. Those who felt themselves wounded by his censure of their vices, were of course delighted to propagate any scandal about him.

cion, at once the safest and the most honourable. So that, even if it were certain that he was justly condemned, he would still be entitled to the benefit of an excuse, similar to that which has been alleged in favour of some celebrated English patriots of the seventeenth century, who labour under a like imputation.¹ But the reputation of Demosthenes has not been left in quite so precarious a state. A fact was brought to light — we know not precisely how long after — which at least counterbalances such a presumption as is raised against him by the judicial decision. Harpalus, notwithstanding the efforts of Demosthenes and Phocion in his behalf, was committed to prison, to await Alexander's pleasure. He however made his escape, returned to Tænarus, and thence crossed over with his troops, and the rest of his treasure, to Crete. Here he was assassinated by Thimbron, one of his confidential officers. His steward fled to Rhodes, where he was seized by order of Philoxenus, and forced to disclose the names of those who had accepted bribes from his master. The list was sent to Athens, and the name of Demosthenes — though Philoxenus is said to have been his personal enemy — did not appear in it.²

As to the trial itself, it must be observed that the in-

¹ See Mackintosh, *View of the Reign of James II*, p. 339. "In these circumstances some of them (the English enemies of the court) are said by the French ambassador to have so far copied their prince, as to have received French money, though they are not charged with being like him induced by it to adopt any measures at variance with their avowed principles. It was not pretended that the largesses were to influence the public conduct of the parties."

² Pausanias, ii. 53. Droysen labours with all his might to get rid of the inference which has been drawn from this fact. Pausanias indeed says, that Philoxenus πάντα ἐπέβητο, ὅσων τῶν Ἀγαίου τι ἴσχυος ἐλάφιστος. But this may be an error. The steward may have been left behind at Tænarus when his master went the second time to Athens (or he might not have known of the transaction with Demosthenes). Then again Pausanias mentions some circumstances which are not confirmed by other authority, as, that Philoxenus demanded Harpalus from the Athenians. When however Droysen adds among the circumstances which excite his suspicions, that one Pausanias is named by Pausanias as the murderer of Harpalus, this is a mere mistake. Pausanias only says that there were some who so related the story; and his knowledge of such a report surely cannot weaken the authority of his own evidence. But even if he had adopted it himself, it would be a new rule of historical criticism to reject the substance of a narrative because it contains some improbable circumstances. In this case the doubtful circumstances can hardly be called improbable.

quiry made by the Areopagus, though Demosthenes had offered to stake his life on the result, was but a preliminary proceeding, and that its judgment was nearly in the nature of a finding by a grand jury: it was afterwards to be confirmed, or set aside, by a court of 1500 common jurors. It may easily be imagined, that, in such a case, unless the evidence offered had been utterly colourless, the Areopagus would not be inclined to take on itself the responsibility of an acquittal. Yet in the speech which Dinarchus wrote for one of the prosecutors, the whole stress of the argument is made to rest, not on the nature of the evidence which had been brought, but partly on the authority of that venerable tribunal, and partly on general invectives against the defendant. Dinarchus tacitly admits, that the evidence was not quite conclusive, and that the truth might be more fully discovered if the slaves of Harpalus, who had been carried to Alexander, should be sent down to be examined at Athens. We have indeed ground to believe, that the only apparent foundation of the charge was, that Demosthenes had neglected some of the precautions which it was thought incumbent on him to have taken to relieve himself from responsibility, and that it arose from the vexation which was generally felt at the escape of Harpalus.¹ That extraordinary engines were set at work to procure his condemnation, appears from the list of his accusers, among whom, beside Himeræus, Patrocles, Menesæchmus, the persecutor of Lycurgus and Stratocles, who rivalled Demades in impudence and profligacy, we find the names of Pytheas and Hyperides, both previously his partisans. The speech of Dinarchus enables us also to perceive the nature of the influence which was exerted against Demosthenes. Dinarchus indeed insinuates, that Demosthenes was at bottom in

¹ V X. Οτ φοβήτης Ἀρπάλου ἐκ τοῦ δισματηρίου αἰτίαι ἔσταιν ὁ Δημοσθένης εὐνοδοκίας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακεκολλημένων μιμησινὰς μὲν τιν τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμύλιαν. If this was so, there is an end of Plutarch's story. It appears that Demosthenes was never suspected before the flight of Harpalus. Droysen has taken no notice of this infinitely more natural and probable version of the story, except to mention that Demosthenes had given no account of the money committed to his custody.

the Macedonian interest: he wishes to give a turn to the mission to Olympia, as if it proved the orator's credit with Alexander: he accuses him, and his friend Polyeuctus, of a secret understanding with Demades. But it is not on this account that he represents the safety of the state as involved in the issue of the trial: he plainly intimates, that a war with Alexander will be the consequence of an acquittal.¹ It was apparently to give greater force to this argument, that the prosecutors brought Demosthenes to trial first. Few of those who were denounced by the Areopagus were acquitted; but we hear of one Aristogeiton, who escaped, though his case strongly resembled that of Demosthenes. On the other hand Demades was convicted, but either was very lightly fined, or neglected to pay the penalty; and he remained, without any diminution of his influence, at Athens. All these indications lead us to the conclusion, that Demosthenes fell a victim to political intrigues, which derived their chief strength from the critical position in which Athens was placed by her resistance to Alexander's decree for the restoration of the exiles.

Another charge, of a very different kind, which seems not to have occurred to any of the ancients, has been brought against him, for his conduct as a statesman in this affair. It has been alleged², that unless he was prepared for unqualified submission to Macedonia, he ought to have seized the opportunity presented by the arrival of Harpalus, and to have advised the people to receive him with open arms, and to make use of his treasure and his troops for a war with Alexander. It does not however seem necessary to conclude, that the faculties of Demosthenes had been weakened by age, because he did not see the need of either of these alternatives. It might be a sufficient answer to say, that a war undertaken for Harpalus and his stolen treasure, would have exposed the Athenians to the charge of injustice, and wanton aggression, it would have deprived them of

¹ Γ 98 γράψις εν Δημόσθενι παλαιῇ ἡμῶς,

² By Droysen, *Al.* p. 532.

all claim to the sympathy of the other Greeks in their quarrel with Alexander. Such in fact is the ground which Demosthenes himself is reported to have taken in his first advice on the question: and the event proved, that there was no necessity for the sacrifice either of liberty or of honour. The Athenians did not pollute themselves by a connection with Harpalus; and they suffered no detriment from the want either of his treasure, or of his mercenaries, in the war which soon after broke out. This indeed Demosthenes could not have foreseen: but still it seems hard to chage a statesman with incapacity, because he did not perceive that it was impossible honesty could be the best policy, in a case where the event proved it to be so.

And yet it appears, that Demosthenes had not concealed from himself or from the people, that a war might arise, which would demand extraordinary sacrifices. He had spoken of an occasion, which might require that they should melt down the ornaments of the women, their plate, and even all the treasure of the temples.¹ This emergency can have been no other, than that which might be looked for, if Alexander should not be persuaded by their envoys to revoke or modify this edict for the return of the exiles. One effect which they had to apprehend from it was that their colonists who had been last planted in Samos would be forced to resign their possessions to the families of their former owners. But there was also reason to fear, that it might lead to a state of things like the tyranny of the Thirty. Disputes must have arisen, which would have afforded a pretext for the introduction of a Macedonian garrison into the city. There would have been no security, either for public or private rights, but the moderation of a powerful party, irritated by the remembrance of past sufferings, and resolved at any price to guard against them for the future. It may at least be presumed, that, when Demosthenes spoke of such sacri-

¹ *Diinarchus*, p. 99.

fices as have been just mentioned, his hearers must have felt that the occasion was worthy of them. That this was the prevailing impression at Athens is both expressly asserted by Curtius¹, and seems to be proved by the burst of popular feeling which took place there immediately on the news of Alexander's death: and we may easily believe Justin's statement², that the publication of his edict in favour of the exiles led many other states openly to avow their resolution to maintain their liberty by arms. Those in which this sentiment was strongest, might still well try the effect of negotiation, before they resorted to an attempt seemingly so desperate.

It is a different question, which the meagre accounts that have been preserved of these times leave in great obscurity, whether any preparations for war had actually been made at Athens before Alexander's death. It can hardly be supposed that any such measures were taken until the envoys who had been sent to remonstrate with him returned from Babylon: and the interval between their return and the arrival of the news of his death, cannot have been very long. Yet that in this interval at least something was done with a view to a war which was believed to be impending, may be regarded as nearly certain.³ For it was at this time that a division of the mercenaries who had been disbanded by the satraps, in compliance with Alexander's orders, was brought over to Europe by the Athenian Leosthenes.⁴ Leosthenes himself had been for a time

¹ x. i. 8² xiii. 5. 5

³ I though Grauert (*Analekten*, p. 238.) has certainly been led into an error on this point by an anachronism of Diodorus (xvii. 111.) which must be corrected from xviii. 9. his view of the state of things at Athens seems in substance perfectly correct and there is no weight in Droysen's argument (*Al* p. 537.) that after the retirement of Demosthenes no one remained to animate the people to resistance. It does not appear that Hypcrides had changed his politics, and it is clear, both from Pausanias and Diodorus, that Leosthenes was then at Athens.

⁴ Pausanias i. 25. 5 viii. 52. 5. In the last passage he erroneously represents Leosthenes as having brought over the whole, amounting to 50,000 men.

in Alexander's service¹, and though still young, had gained a high reputation: but it seems that he had quitted it in disgust², and had already returned to Athens, and that he went over to Asia, to collect as many as he could of the disbanded troops, whom he landed at Cape Tænarus. It can hardly be supposed that he did this without some ulterior object; and his connection with Hyperides — the chief of the Anti-Macedonian party after Demosthenes had withdrawn — and his subsequent proceedings, scarcely leave room to doubt, that the object was to have a force in readiness to resist Antipater, if he should attempt to enforce Alexander's edict. When the news of Alexander's death reached Athens, Phocion and Demades professed to disbelieve the report. Demades bade the people not to listen to it: such a corpse would long before have filled the world with its odour. Phocion desired them to have patience; and, when many voices asseverated the truth of the report, replied, "If he is dead to-day, he will still be dead to-morrow, and the next day, so that we may deliberate at our leisure, and the more securely." But their remonstrances were disregarded. The council of Five Hundred held a meeting with closed doors; and Leosthenes was commissioned immediately to engage the troops at Tænarus, about 8000 men, but secretly, and in his own name, that Antipater might not suspect the purpose, and that the people might have the more time for other preparations. Confirmation of the fact was received shortly after from the mouth of eye-witnesses, who had been present at Babylon when it took place.

As soon as all doubt on this point was removed,

¹ Strabo, ix p. 301. Ταυτην 'Αλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως ἱταῖρος Grauert (Analekt p 231.) suspects that Strabo may have confounded Leosthenes with Leonnatus. This however is highly improbable, but the expression may mean no more than is stated in the text.

² Diodorus, xvii. 111. *μαλίστα ἀνταγόμενοι τοῖς 'Αλεξάνδρου πράγμασιν*. He is described by Plutarch (Phoc. 2.) as *μειράκιον*. He had however been left a widower with children (Paus. i. 13), but was just on the point of marrying again, as appears from a story found by Grauert in Jerome adv. Jovin. l. p. 35.

there was an end of hesitation and secrecy. The popular feeling burst forth, like a flood long pent up. Phocion, and the orators of the Macedonian party, endeavoured in vain to stem it. Their influence was gone: as Demades, before long, experienced to his cost. None were listened to, but those who recommended the most decided and vigorous measures. Hyperides and Polyeuctus, the early coadjutors of Demosthenes, were now among the foremost to propose such as, if he had been present, he would certainly have approved. It was resolved without delay to send a supply of arms and money to Leosthenes for his levies at Tænarus, with directions no longer to make a secret of the object for which they were destined. The remainder of the treasure of Harpalus, and the penalties which had been recovered, furnished the means. It was very important, now that a prospect was once more opened of a general confederacy among the Greeks for a national cause, that Athens should immediately make her determination known as widely as possible. By another decree, the people declared itself ready to assert the liberty of Greece, and to deliver the cities which were held by Macedonian garrisons; for this purpose a fleet was to be equipped of forty trireme galleys, and 200 of the larger size, with four banks of oars. All the citizens under forty years of age were to arm: those of seven tribes to prepare for foreign service, the rest to remain at home for the defence of Attica. Lastly, envoys were appointed to the principal states of Greece, to announce that Athens was again, as in the days of her ancient glory, about to place herself in the front of the battle with the common enemy, and to set her last resources, men, money, and ships, on the venture; and to exhort all, who wished for independence, to follow her example.

The success of the Athenian negotiations appears not to have been so great in Peloponnesus as in the northern states, though these were exposed to the enemy's first attacks. Sparta, Arcadia, and Achaia, kept aloof from the struggle to the end: whether restrained by jealousy

of Athens, or by the remembrance of the last unfortunate contest with Macedonia. Messene, Elis, Sicyon, Phlius, Epidaurus, Træzen, and Argos, joined the confederacy: but even of these, several appear to have held back until they were encouraged by the first success of the other allies. In Northern Greece, Leosthenes himself was one of the most active and successful envoys. As soon as he had completed the equipment of his levies at Tænarus, leaving them, it seems, under the command of an inferior officer, he went over to Ætolia. He found the Ætolians, who had been alarmed and incensed by Alexander's threats about Œniadæ, heartily inclined to the national cause, and obtained a promise of 7000 men. He then proceeded to solicit aid from Locris, Phocis, and others of the neighbouring states. Almost every where, from the borders of Macedonia to Attica, a good spirit prevailed. The Thessalians indeed did not immediately declare themselves, but probably gave private assurances of their favourable disposition. Pellina is mentioned as the only town in the north of Thessaly which did not sooner or later enter into the league; and Thebes in Pthiotis. In the vale of the Spercheius the towns of Malea and Heraclea alone refused their aid. But the Dolopians, the mountaineers of Œta, all the towns of Doris, Carystus in Eubœa, the Locrians and Phocians, many of the tribes in the western valleys of Pindus, as the Ænianians, Alyzæans, and Athamantians, the Leucadians, and a part at least, it seems, of the Acarnanians, sent their contingents. Even from beyond the borders of Greece, the allies received some auxiliaries: from the Molossian chief, Aryptæus, who, however, afterwards deserted and betrayed them, and in very small number from Illyria and Thrace. But the policy by which Thebes had been destroyed, and its territory divided among the Bœotian towns, was now attended with an effect more disastrous to Greece than the conqueror could have foreseen. It was known that the success of the Greeks would be followed by the restoration of Thebes: the Theban

exiles probably formed a strong body in the Greek army: and hence the Bœotians, though surrounded on all sides by the forces of the confederacy, zealously adhered to the Macedonian cause, which was that of their private interest, and their inveterate hatred to the fallen city.

The movements of Leosthenes, before the opening of the campaign, are very imperfectly reported by our extant authors. It might be supposed, from the manner in which they are described by Diodorus, that he never returned to Athens. This however is highly improbable in itself; and it seems to be indicated by Plutarch's anecdotes, that he came back at the head of the troops he had collected, and that he had to encounter strenuous opposition from Phocion, and others, who dreaded the sacrifices and risk of the war. The language attributed to Phocion may serve to exhibit the temper and views of his party: though we need not adopt the assertion of Diodorus, that this party included all the men of property at Athens. Phocion affected to sneer at the young general, who spoke in a high and confident strain of his performances and prospects. "Your speeches, young man," he said "are like cypress trees, stately and lofty, but bearing no fruit." And when Leosthenes was provoked to ask, what benefit Athens had reaped from Phocion's generalship during the many years that he had borne the title: "It has been no small one," he replied, "that our fellow-citizens have been buried in their own graves." Again, Hyperides asked him, when he would advise the Athenians to go to war? "Whenever," was the answer, "I shall see the young willing to keep their ranks, the rich to contribute their money, and the orators to abstain from that of the public." The armament collected by Leosthenes, which excited general admiration, produced no such effect on Phocion; and when he was asked what he thought of the preparations now, he replied that they were well enough for a single heat: but that he feared for the end of the race, seeing that the city had no more money,

or ships, or men, to carry on the contest with, if these should be lost.¹

Diodorus, apparently following the opinion of an author who considered Phocion as representing the wisdom and foresight of Greece, or who judged of the undertaking from the event, asserts that the most intelligent Greeks condemned the rashness of the Athenians, who had not even taken a lesson from the fate of Thebes, but, in their eagerness for glory, heedless of consequences, had rushed into a premature and unnecessary conflict with an irresistible power. If however it is once admitted that it was desirable for Greece to shake off the Macedonian yoke — and this, according to Diodorus, none of those intelligent Greeks was base enough to deny — it seems that something may be said to vindicate the Athenians from the charge of extreme imprudence. It may be admitted, that in this case, as in most others, they were guided rather by an instinctive love of freedom, than by sober calculations of expedience, as the Rhodians, who, on the news of Alexander's death, immediately expelled the Macedonian garrison from their city: but Phocion himself could not point out any time when they might make the attempt with a fairer prospect of success. He could only taunt the people with their presumed unfitness for any great enterprise: a sneer, which, so far as it contained any truth, would be always equally true, but which, as applied to the question, was triumphantly refuted by the event. But the deeper the admiration and the fear with which the Greeks had been impressed by Alexander's genius and fortune, the more excusable was it that they should believe his premature death would be immediately followed by the total dissolution of his huge empire. The news of his death must have been accompanied by some accounts, probably exagger-

¹ In Vit. X. Or., the same sentiment and image (contrast of *συνέσιον* and *δολιχόν*) are attributed to Demosthenes, on the occasion of Antipater's defeat: and Agesistratus is named as the friend to whom Demosthenes expressed his fears.

ated, of the subsequent tumults and beginning of a civil war at Babylon: and even the composition, by which the throne was to be shared between an idiot and an infant yet unborn, did not hold out much promise of permanent tranquillity. The more was known of the character of Alexander's principal officers, the less likely must it have seemed that they would acquiesce in such an adjustment. It was to be expected, that they would be too much occupied with their own contests for power, to be able to afford aid to Antipater, even if there were not some who found it suited their interest to ally themselves with the Greeks. Macedonia itself—almost drained of its military population by Alexander's incessant demands¹—had never been weaker, never more threatened by its northern and western neighbours. It was not extravagant to hope, that the war might be ended in one short campaign, which would raise Greece to the rank of an independent and formidable power. The singular combination of circumstances through which this was frustrated, proved that it had not been rashly conceived.

Antipater received the tidings of Alexander's death—to him no mournful event—nearly at the same time with those of the movements in Greece. His situation was one of great difficulty and danger: and it appears that he sent an embassy to soothe the Athenians, and to persuade them to peace. For it was probably on this occasion, that, when his envoys extolled the mildness of his character, Hyperides answered: We do not want a mild master.² Antipater can only have hoped to gain time by this step: and he greatly needed it. The whole force immediately at his disposal was small, and, if he marched against Greece, it would be necessary to leave a part of it for the protection of Macedonia. He had no clear prospect of aid but from one quarter, and that a distant one: for Craterus, with his army of ve-

¹ Diodor. xviii. 12

² Vit. X. Or. Hyperides, p. 850. *A. ab imperio xperem dicitur.*

terans, had advanced no farther than Cilicia ; and however he might be induced to quicken his march, it would be long before he could reach the theatre of war. Nevertheless Antipater determined not to wait for reinforcements, nor to remain on the defensive, but to seek the enemy. The force which he was able to bring into the field amounted to no more than 13,000 foot, and 600 horse. It might seem that he, rather than the Athenians, was acting rashly, when, with so small an army, he ventured to invade Greece : and perhaps he relied somewhat too confidently on the superiority of the Macedonian discipline and tactics, and on the recollection of his victory over Agis. It must however be observed, that he calculated on the support of the Thessalians, and probably of some other northern states ; and he might hope by a rapid movement to crush the confederacy, before it had collected its forces, or at least to prevent it from receiving fresh accessions of strength. He had also ordered Sippas, whom he left to supply his place in Macedonia, to levy troops with the utmost diligence, and may have expected to be speedily reinforced by these recruits.¹ His coffers were well filled, for he had received a large supply of treasure from Alexander : and the fleet which had brought it over, consisting of 110 galleys, remained with him, and was now ordered to attend the operations of the army.

Thermopylæ was the place appointed for the rendezvous of the allies : a position, by which they were enabled to cover their own territory, and to prevent a junction between the enemy and the Bœotians. It is not clear, whether it ought to be considered as an effect of the tardiness which Demosthenes so often complained of, that the contingents of the northern states were assembled, before the Athenian troops had begun their march. Leosthenes had joined them with his mercenaries, and perhaps with all the Peloponnesian

¹ That they were not supposed to be needed, as Droysen represents, p. 67 for the defence of Macedonia, seems to follow from the expression of Diodorus, xviii. 12, *ὅτις ἐργασίαν τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς*.

levies. He was elected commander in chief, not more in honour of Athens, than on account of the confidence which was reposed in his abilities.¹ The Athenians could spare no more than 5000 infantry, and 500 cavalry, of Attic troops: to these they added 2000 mercenaries. But now the Bœotians, encouraged perhaps by the tidings of Antipater's approach, collected their forces to oppose the passage of this little army, and encamped near Platæa, no doubt in very superior numbers, to watch the passes of Cithæron. Leosthenes, apprised of their movement, hastened with a division of his troops to the relief of his countrymen, effected a junction with them, and gave battle to the enemy. He gained a complete victory, raised a trophy, and returned, with this happy omen of more important success, to his camp.

Antipater was joined on his march by a strong body of Thessalian cavalry, under Meno of Pharsalus, which gave him, in this arm, a decided advantage over the allies. He drew up his forces, it seems, in the vale of the Spercheius, and offered battle. Leosthenes did not wait to be attacked. It is possible that he may have had a secret understanding with the Thessalian general. But his army was 30,000 strong: and it may have been the sight of his superior force that fixed Meno's wavering inclination. The fortune of the day was decided by the Thessalian cavalry, which went over in the heat of the battle to the Greeks.² We are not informed what loss Antipater suffered: but he did not think it safe to attempt to retreat through Thessaly. He looked about for the nearest place of refuge, and threw himself into the town of Lamia, which stood in a strong position on the south side of mount Othrys, about three miles from the sea, began to repair the fortifications, and laid in a supply of arms and provisions fur-

¹ Pausanias, i. 25. 5.

² Diodorus, xviii. 12. distinctly represents the desertion of the Thessalian cavalry as having caused the loss of the battle: and it is surprising that Droysen should have adopted the supposition more honourable to the Greeks, that the victory was the cause of the desertion.

nished perhaps by the fleet. His only remaining hope was that he might be able to sustain a siege, until succours should arrive. Leosthenes immediately proceeded to fortify a camp near the town, and after having in vain challenged the enemy to a fresh engagement, made several attempts to take it by assault. But the place was too strong, the garrison too numerous: the assailants were repulsed with the loss of many lives; and at length he found himself obliged to turn the siege into a blockade.

Antipater had no reason to be much ashamed of his defeat, nor the Greeks to be very proud of their victory: but it everywhere produced a great effect on the public mind. It was the first advantage that had been gained for many years over the Macedonian arms, which were beginning perhaps to be thought invincible; and it had certainly reduced an enemy, late the master of Greece, to a state of extreme distress and danger. At Athens the news was received with boundless exultation: the streets were thronged with festal processions: the altars smoked with continued sacrifices of thanksgiving. The orators who had advocated the war loudly triumphed in the seeming fulfilment of their sanguine predictions. Phocion, alone perhaps among those who wished well to their country, would take no part in the universal joy, and did not suppress his gloomy forebodings. As the glad tidings flowed in, he bitterly asked "When shall we have done conquering?" And when he was asked, whether he could have desired better success for himself, replied, "No: but better counsels."¹ The confidence of the people was raised to its utmost height by an embassy from Antipater, by which he sued for peace. We are not informed what terms he proposed: but his overtures were probably treated as a sign of despair. The people looked upon him as already in their power, and demanded that he should surrender at discretion.² Yet they did not relax their efforts, but made use of the

¹ Plut. Phoc. 23. Timol. 6.

² Diodorus, xviii. 18.

advantage they had gained, to procure additional strength for the common cause. Polyæctus was sent with other envoys into Peloponnesus, to rouse the states which had hitherto remained neutral, to action. Here he was opposed by some of the traitors whom Athens had lately cast out from her bosom : but he was seconded by the voluntary exertions of his old colleague Demosthenes.

As soon as Alexander's death released the Athenians from the restraint which his power had imposed on them, the orators of the Macedonian party, deprived of the foreign stay on which they had hitherto leaned, sank under the contempt and indignation of the people, and several of them paid the penalty of their former insolence and baseness. Demades was perhaps most mildly treated in proportion to his offences. The remembrance of some good offices which he had rendered to his country in times of calamity, might plead in his behalf : his very impudence rendered his servility less odious ; since at least he could not be charged with treachery or dissimulation ; and his extraordinary talents, in which he did not acknowledge even Demosthenes as his superior¹, had more than their due weight with such a people as the Athenians. Yet he was brought to trial on several indictments : among others, as the author of the decree which conferred divine honours on Alexander, for which he was condemned to a fine of ten talents : a very trifling sum for his means : especially if, as seems probable, the penalty which he had incurred for the bribe he took from Harpalus had been remitted. But the most important effect of the sentences passed on him appear to have been, that he was partially disfranchised, so as to be made incapable of taking part in public affairs. The bronze statues also, with which he had been honoured, and the city disgraced², were melted down. and applied to purposes the most expressive of contempt and loathing for the original.³ He

¹ Plut. Demosth. 10. 11. explained by Plut. Resp. Ger. 7.

² Dinarchus Demosth. § 104

³ Plutarch Resp. Ger. Pr. 37. τοὺς Δαμάρου (ἀνδρίωντας) καταχέουσας ἐν ἑστίαις

however remained at Athens in the enjoyment of his ill-gotten wealth, waiting till the accomplishment of Phocion's denunciations should raise him once more out of his ignominious obscurity, and should compel the people to listen to his voice. The timeserving Pytheas, the prosecutor of Demosthenes, and the witty glutton Callimedon¹, who had been accused by Demosthenes of a treasonable correspondence with the exiles at Megara, were also convicted, we know not on what charges, and were obliged, either by sentence of banishment, or to escape worse evils, to quit Athens. They now threw aside the mask, openly entered into the service of Macedonia, and were employed by Antipater to counteract the influence of the Athenian envoys in Peloponnesus with all the power of their oratory.

Demosthenes had not resigned himself so contentedly as Æschines to perpetual exile. It was perhaps a weakness, but one which does not lower him in our esteem, that he met the thought of it with less courage than that of death. He lingered, mournfully, we are told, and impatiently waiting for a change which he could scarcely have hoped to see, on the coast of Trœzen, or the cliffs of Ægina², where he could still gaze on Athens, and might distinguish many scenes which recalled the recollection of his most glorious days. Sometimes, it is said, he gave vent to his grief in bitter complaints which would have been worthier of Phocion : as when fixing his eye on the Acropolis, he was heard to exclaim : " Goddess, what favourites hast thou chosen ! the owl, the serpent, and the Athenian people." The young men who sought his society, he would warn to shun that public life which he had too late discovered to be beset with fear, and envy, and

¹ Nicknamed *ἡ Κάλαρος* from his favourite shellfish. (Athenæus, iii. 57.) He belonged to the *Sixty*, a club of joke-makers, about which Athenæus, xiv. 3 has some curious details.

² Schlosser, i. 3 p. 384 observes : Demosthenes, it is well known, fled to Megara. So indeed says Justin, xlii. 5. : but the place where the exiles of the Macedonian party were assembled, was certainly not that which he would have chosen for his sojourn. Plutarch's authority is infinitely preferable.

danger, worse than death itself. But when he heard of the successes of Leosthenes, when he learnt that an Athenian embassy was making the circuit of Peloponnesus to advocate the cause of national independence, and that it was thwarted at every step by Antipater's hirelings, his despondency and resentment vanished: he quitted his retreat, joined the envoys, and accompanied them to the end of their mission. To him it owed its most important results. He repelled the calumnies of Pytheas, who was not ashamed to resort to general invectives against Athens for the service of his employer.¹ The Arcadian congress was the most celebrated scene of their contests: and we are informed that Demosthenes not only overcame Pytheas in debate, but prevailed on the Arcadians to abandon the Macedonian alliance.² It does not appear however that they sent any succours to their countrymen.³ But Sicyon, Argos, and even Corinth are mentioned among the states which were brought over to the league by his eloquence.⁴

There may be an error as to some of these names: but that his activity and success have not on the whole been exaggerated, is proved by the consequences which ensued to himself. The people was touched with gratitude and admiration by the report of his zeal and his services.⁵ His kinsman Demon took advantage of the

¹ Phylarchus in Plut. Dem 27 Pytheas compared an Athenian embassy to asses' milk, which never comes but into a sick house Demosthenes retorted Yes as a remedy.

² Vit X Or p 846 C

³ Justin xiii 5 10

⁴ Pausanias, viii 6 2 expressly says that they remained neutral: and this account seems so much more conformable to the known bias of the Arcadi in politics, that it is not easy to see why the other should be thought more accurate

⁵ So Justin xiii 5 11 and Plutarch Demosth 27 Vit X Or p 846. C. Droysen rejects these testimonies, and places the return of Demosthenes after the death of Leosthenes, chiefly because in the sixth letter, which he believes to be genuine, Demosthenes is made to mention Antiphilus as commander-in-chief I can see nothing in that letter, except its brevity and dryness that entitles it to such confidence But if it was written by Demosthenes, it must have been still later than Droysen himself supposes: for the battle alluded to in it can hardly be any other than that of Crannon, or at the earliest that in which Leonnatus fell. The whole groundwork of the letter seems as absurd as any that was ever invented by a sophist. Whatever the battle was, could the Athenians need to be informed

general feeling to propose a decree for his recal. It was passed, and not in the form of an act of grace, but of a respectful invitation. A vessel was sent by public authority, to bring him over from the place of his sojourn. When it returned with him to Piræus, a solemn procession, headed by the magistrates and the priests, came down to greet him, and to escort him back to the city. He now again raised his hands — perhaps to the goddess whom he had unjustly reproached — and congratulated himself on a return so much happier than that of Alcibiades, as it was the effect of the free goodwill of his fellow-citizens, not extorted from their fears. It was indeed a day of glory so pure — not to be effaced by a thousand scandalous anecdotes — that he might gladly have consented to the price which he afterwards paid for it. The penalty to which he had been condemned still remained to be discharged : and it was one of those obligations which it seems could not be legally cancelled. But Demon contrived an expedient to reconcile law and equity. He carried a decree by which fifty talents were assigned to Demosthenes from the treasury, nominally to defray the cost of an altar, which was annually adorned at the public expense for one of the festivals.

But these bright gleams of joy and hope were soon to be overcast. The Greeks had been victorious in the first stage of the race, but that which was to decide the contest still remained : and it was destined to be a series of reverses. Antipater's fortune had sunk to the lowest point : it was now to be gradually gaining the ascendant.

about it by an eye-witness sent to them out of Peloponnesus by Demosthenes? Droysen does not explain how it happened that the recal of Demosthenes was delayed so long as he supposes was the case. He tells us indeed — though without any evidence — of suspicions entertained against Demosthenes by his own party, which however were removed by the zeal he showed on the occasion of the embassy to Peloponnesus. What then either delayed, or finally procured, his recal? Droysen intimates that his letters may have had a great deal to do with it. But not to notice the arbitrariness of this assumption, it seems sufficient to observe, that the enthusiastic reception the orator met with, indicates the impression made on the people by recent services, rather than a favour obtained with difficulty by written assurances of his goodwill, and a state of public feeling in which joy and hope were predominant.

The first disaster which befel the Greek cause, was the death of Leosthenes. Antipater had directed a sally against the besiegers, who were employed in the work of circumvallation. A sharp combat took place¹; and Leosthenes, hastening up to the support of his men, was struck on the head by a stone from an engine, fell senseless, and was carried back to the camp, where he died, the third day after. He was buried, Diodorus says, with heroic honours: but it does not appear that in this respect he was distinguished from the other citizens who had fallen in the war, and were afterwards interred with the usual pomp in the same ground which contained the sepulchres of the ancient heroes. The funeral oration was delivered by Hyperides. Diodorus thought it incredible that this task should have been assigned to him, unless in the absence of Demosthenes. But Demosthenes had discharged it on a former occasion; the honour might seem more properly due to Hyperides, both as a principal mover of the war, and on account of his close intimacy with Leosthenes.² Even in eloquence, he was esteemed by his contemporaries little inferior to Demosthenes; and he seems to have been roused by the theme, and by the presence of the great master, whom he had heard in the same place, to an extraordinary display of his art. A fragment has been spared—one of the very few that remain of his works—which seems to have belonged to this speech, and is not unworthy of the admiration it excited. It offers consolation to the survivors in the deathless glory of their lost friends, which was sufficient to compensate for length of days, and for every blessing of life. It was difficult to say anything new on such a topic; but the concluding sentence is remarkable. "If death is as the state of those who have not been born, they are released .

¹ The comparison in Pausanias (ii. 6.1) with the battles of Leuctra and Delium is a little strange, but must probably be understood to refer, not to the importance of this trifling engagement, but to the subsequent disasters, which Pausanias elsewhere (i. 25. 5.) attributes to the loss of Leosthenes.

² Which led Plutarch (De Frat. Am. 15.) to couple them together in a manner however, which does not imply more than a political friendship.

from disease, and grief, and from all the accidents to which the life of man is liable: but if, as we suppose, there remain in the unseen world sense, and capacity of divine favour, none can have a better title to it than those who have vindicated the profaned majesty of the gods." If this was an allusion to Alexander's impiety, it can only be said, that language, which would have appeared extravagant in a political discussion, might very well suit this kind of sacred oratory.

It remained to be considered, who should take the place of Leosthenes. The choice, we find, was left without dispute to Athens. It seems almost incredible, that any should have thought of Phocion: yet we are informed that there was a strong disposition to appoint him. • His political opponents dreaded, with reason, to see such a trust committed to a man who avowed such sentiments. One of them ironically professed that, as an old friend, he could not consent to expose so precious a life to such a risk. Phocion disclaimed his acquaintance, but thanked him for his good offices. Antiphilus, a young man who had acquired high reputation for courage and military skill, received the command.

But in the meanwhile succours were approaching for the relief of Antipater. Leonnatus had come down to take possession of his satrapy, with instructions from Perdiccas, to aid Eumenes in the conquest of Cappadocia: for it was known that Ariarathes would not be easily overpowered: and Antigonus was directed to co-operate with them for that purpose. He however had higher aims, and paid no attention to the regent's orders. The hopes of Eumenes therefore rested wholly on Leonnatus, who, when he came to the Hellespont, still professed his intention to undertake the expedition. But, if he was ever in earnest about this enterprise, he was soon diverted from it by other projects. He had entered into a secret correspondence with Olympias, who, being in open enmity with Antipater, and very much dissatisfied with the recent arrangements, desired to form an alliance, through her daughter Cleopatra,

the widowed queen of Epirus, with some one powerful enough to protect her interests. The history of such negotiations is seldom accurately known: it only appears, that Leonnatus received a letter from Cleopatra, in which she promised him her hand, if he came to Pella¹: with a sufficient force, it must be supposed, to overpower Antipater, and to secure the throne of Macedonia for himself. He was a man of sanguine temper, as well as of towering ambition, and eagerly grasped at the offer. While he was occupied with this scheme, but was still believed to be preparing for the expedition against Ariarathes, he received a message from Antipater, now blocked up in Lamia, to implore his speediest succour. Antipater's envoy had probably been chosen on account of his personal enmity to Eumenes. It was Hecateus the tyrant of Cardia, against whom Eumenes was known to have exerted all his influence with Alexander, though without effect: and he was empowered to offer the hand of one of Antipater's daughters² to Leonnatus. Eumenes endeavoured to dissuade

¹ Plut. Eum. 3. If, as Droysen assumes (Nachf. i. p. 68.), Memnon in his History of Hecaleia (Photius, 224. v. 6.) had really supposed that Cleopatra had taken up her residence at Sardis in her brother's lifetime, it would only seem to follow that he was mistaken. But since the place of Cleopatra's residence is not mentioned in the extract from Memnon, it appears unnecessary to suppose a contradiction between him and Plutarch.

² According to Diodorus (xviii. 12.), Antipater, before he set out from Macedonia, sent to Philotas, who had received the satrapy of the Hellespontine Phrygia (πρὸς Φιλώτα τὸν ἡλεσποντίνου σατραπείας τὴν ἰσ' Ἑλληνιστοῦ Φρυγίας) to ask for succour, offering him the hand of one of his daughters. Weeseling naturally suspects that the name of Leonnatus, to whom alone such a description appears to be applicable, should be substituted for that of Philotas. But Droysen (Nachf. i. p. 68.) objects to the alteration on three grounds. 1. At the time when Diodorus mentions the embassy, Leonnatus had not taken possession of his government. 2. The message brought by Hecateus after Antipater was blocked up in Lamia, appears to have been the first which Leonnatus received from Antipater. 3. Leonnatus was a man of too high rank, and too aspiring views, to be tempted by the offer of a daughter of Antipater.—None of these arguments seems to have the smallest weight. 1. Diodorus appears to have committed an anachronism exactly of the same kind as that which Droysen himself observes with regard to Leosthenes (xvii. 111. compared with xviii. 9). This would be far less surprising than that he should so have described Philotas, after having mentioned in c. 3, that the Hellespontine satrapy was given to Leonnatus: and Arrian in Photius (p. 696.) says, that the satrapy given to Leonnatus had before been held first by Calas, and afterwards by Demarchus. 2. Certainly the first embassy which Leonnatus received from Antipater appears to have been that brought by Hecateus: and Diodorus, when he relates it (xviii. 14.) seems by the use of the participle (παρεγγυμίζοντι πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἐπαταίου πριεσβυτοῦ, καὶ Διομήνου βοηθήσαντι)

Leonnatus from compliance with this request: and professed to consider his own life as in danger from the enmity of Antipater and Hecatæus. Leonnatus therefore thought he might safely trust him with the secret, let him see Cleopatra's letters, and assured him that his intentions were nothing less than friendly to Antipater. But the project did not at all suit the views of Eumenes, who saw that he should probably forfeit his satrapy with the patronage of Perdiccas; and felt no confidence in the impetuous character of Leonnatus. He therefore made his escape by night, accompanied only by 300 horse, and 200 armed slaves, with his treasure, which amounted to 5000 talents, and fled to Perdiccas, whose favour he secured by this proof of fidelity.

Leonnatus had now no choice left. It was in Macedonia alone that he could hope to establish himself. But it seems that he thought it necessary for his own sake, first to quell the insurrection of the Greeks, and then to rid himself of Antipater. He therefore crossed over to Europe, and marched toward the theatre of war. In Macedonia, he added a large body of troops to his army, which then numbered no less than 20,000 foot and 2,500 horse. When Antiphilus heard of the approach of this formidable force, he immediately perceived that the siege must be raised: and he seems to have taken his measures with great judgment and energy. He fired his camp, sent the baggage and all his useless people to Melitæa, a town on the Enipeus, which lay near his road, and himself, crossing the chain of Othrys, advanced with his unincumbered troops to meet Leonnatus, before he could be joined by Antipater. Since the beginning of the siege of Lamia, the army of the allies had been much weakened through some of those causes which commonly paralyse the movements of such confederacies. Before the death of Leosthenes,

to refer to his previous statement, c 12 διαρίματα . . πρὸς Φιλώταν . ἀξίων βοηθήσει. 3. Unless Leonnatus had been a higher, or more ambitious personage than Perdiccas, or Ptolemy, or Craterus, an alliance with Antipater might well have been thought a desirable object for him.

the Ætolians had obtained leave from him to return home for a time, on some plea, which Diodorus only describes by the vague expression, *national affairs*.¹ We are left entirely to conjecture as to its nature and urgency: but the term seems equally to exclude the supposition of a festival², and of a hostile inroad³, which might otherwise have been probable motives: while it perfectly suits the occasion of an assembly held for the election of magistrates, and the transaction of other public business.⁴ There is no reason to suspect the Ætolians either of lukewarmness or jealousy. Leosthenes himself may have believed that they might be spared for a time, as the blockade could be carried on without them. But he was also compelled to allow many of his other troops to withdraw. They too had, if not public business, private concerns to call them home, and they willingly believed that the end of the contest was already secured, and could not be endangered by their absence. Whether any others arrived from Peloponnesus to supply their place, does not appear: but the army which Antiphilus led into Thessaly was still superior, by 2000 foot, and 1000 horse, to that of Leonnatus.

The part of Thessaly where the two armies met, is not mentioned: it is only described as a plain skirted by hills, and containing some marshy ground. It must have been that which is crossed by the high road from Macedonia between the Peneus and the Enipeus. The strength of the Greeks lay in their cavalry, which included 2000 Thessalians, the finest troops of the kind then to be found. Leonnatus however, whose gallantry is better attested than his judgment, did not hesitate to engage them with his Macedonian horse, which indeed was more numerous than the Thessalians alone,

¹ Διὰ τινος ἰδιωτικῆς χρείας, xviii. 13

² As Grauert, *Analekten*, p. 258.

³ Lukas, *Ueber Polybios' Darstellung des Ætolischen Bundes*, p. 64 n. And Schorn, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 3.

⁴ This seems to have been first perceived by Droysen (*Nachfolg.* i. p. 73). The time agrees perfectly with that at which, as we learn from Polybius (iv. 37.) the Ætolians were used to hold their electoral assemblies: a little after the autumnal equinox.

and may have been so much superior in his opinion to that of the other Greeks, as to render the inequality but trifling. He placed himself at its head, and charged with his wonted valour: but after a sharp combat, his troops were broken, and put to flight, and driven into the marsh, where he himself fell, pierced with many wounds. His body was rescued, and carried to the camp. The infantry on both sides appear to have taken no part in the action: but when the victory was decided, and Leonnatus had fallen, the commander of the phalanx judged it prudent to decline a battle, and drew off his troops to the higher ground, where they would be safe from the attacks of the cavalry. The Thessalians made some fruitless attempts to disturb them: but the Greeks remained masters of the field, and erected their trophy: the third which they had won since the beginning of the war.

To Antipater however the loss which he suffered through the defeat of Leonnatus, was more than compensated by the advantage he gained from the death of a formidable rival¹: though he may not have known the whole extent of his danger. He had followed the march of the Greeks, and it seems was at no great distance when the battle took place: for the next day he effected a junction with the army of Leonnatus, which immediately acknowledged him as its chief. He now saw himself at the head of a force, before which the allies, but for the superiority of their cavalry, would not have been able to stand. Still, such was the terror inspired by the Thessalian horse, that he did not venture to descend into the plain; and he had probably already received intelligence of the approach of Craterus. He therefore advanced along the higher ground on the skirts of the plain toward the borders of Macedonia.² Antipater and Meno could only watch his movements, and

¹ So Justin, xiii. 5. 15. Antipater. . . morte Leonnati letatus est; quippe et æmulum sublatum, et vires ejus accessisse sibi gratulabatur.

² Justin (xiii. 5. 16.) says, *in Macedoniam concessit*: which is probably a little beyond the truth.

made no attempt to obstruct them : but remained in the central vale of Thessaly.

In the meanwhile the Athenians, who had undertaken the whole burden of the war on the sea, had been defeated on what they were used to consider as their own element. Diodorus has probably confounded several things in his brief account of this naval war. If we may trust him, the Macedonian fleet had been raised, by some reinforcement of which he gives no account, to 240 sail : the precise number which was to have been equipped by the Athenians, according to their decree : while the fleet with which they finally put to sea, consisted of no more than 170 galleys. The part of this statement which relates to the Macedonians is certainly very suspicious.¹ But when we remember the strength of the naval armaments which had been sent out by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, the effort which they made on this occasion appears, even according to this account, very great. . And yet the manner in which Diodorus expresses himself raises a suspicion, that the decree may have been carried into full effect. The Macedonians, he says, being masters of the sea, the Athenians, in addition to the galleys which they had before, fitted out others, so that in all they amounted to 170. And he then relates that the Macedonian admiral Clitus, with his 240 sail, gained two victories over the Athenians, who were commanded by Eetion, and destroyed a great number of their ships. The scene of both these sea-fights is laid by Diodorus near the Echinades, that is, off the coast of Ætolia. But it is certain, that one of them at least took place in the Ægean near Amorgus, one of the Cyclades.² It seems

¹ Droysen (*Nachf.* i. p. 81.) has done strange injustice to Grauert's remark (*Analekten*, p. 268) on the suspicious character of these numbers, which had also struck Wesseling : one might almost think, merely for the sake of a sneer at the Athenians. It would certainly not be surprising, as Grauert himself observes, that they should not have been able to equip so vast an armament as they had decreed : and, if they really fought with a force so much inferior to the enemy's, their spirit is the more admirable. But it is surprising, that the force which they decreed, but failed to raise, should be exactly that which the Macedonians, who are not said to have received any addition to their numbers, brought against them.

² Plut. *De Fort. Alex.* li. 5.

to have been on this occasion that Stratocles had the impudence to amuse the people with false tidings of a great victory, and to say, when the truth was ascertained, that they owed him two days of rejoicing.¹ Clitus, according to Plutarch, celebrated the battle of Amorgus, with extravagant vanity : assuming the name of Poseidon, and the trident. The victory therefore cannot have been so trifling as Plutarch himself represents it² : and we may suspect that it was now the Athenians, having by fresh exertions collected 170 galleys, again sought the enemy, and suffered a second defeat, probably still on the eastern side of Greece, which in so critical a posture of affairs, the Macedonian admiral is not likely to have quitted for the coast of Ætolia.³

On every supposition the Athenians in this part of the contest, displayed a degree of spirit and perseverance quite worthy of their best times ; and the few glimpses which we catch of their proceedings at home, show them in a similar light. It had been with great difficulty that Phocion, as general, had restrained them from an incursion into Bœotia. He would not undertake it without a levy of all the men left under sixty. Soon after, when the Macedonians had become masters of the sea, a squadron was sent, with a strong body of troops, Macedonians as well as mercenaries, under the command of Micio, to invade Attica. He did not now refuse to second the general ardour, but led as strong a force as could be mustered to meet the enemy, who had landed on the eastern coast, not far from Marathon, and was overrunning the country. Plutarch has reported some pointed sayings of Phocion, as delivered on

¹ Plut. Demetr. 19. Præc. Relp. Ger. 3.

² Τεῦς ἡ νικηθεὶς Ἑλληνικὴς ἀναγίγναι τελέχεια, Περσίδων ἀνηγαγίθη, καὶ τελευτᾷ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. Perhaps however the only foundation for this story was a statue or picture which so represented him.

³ Droysen (i. p. 82.) makes a very bold, and I think improbable, supposition, to reconcile Diodorus with Plutarch. He imagines that Clitus, after his victory near Amorgus, sailed round to the western coast, to observe the allies of Athens, and to prevent the Ætolians from marching into Thessaly; therefore after the autumnal equinox; that the Athenians followed them with a new fleet, and were again defeated, off the Echinades. This is really going to a great expense of ingenuity to save the credit of such a writer as Diodorus, who after all remains convicted of gross carelessness.

this occasion, which seem to show that there was more zeal than discipline among his troops. When advice was obtruded on him, he remarked, that there were many generals, but few soldiers. Leosthenes and Antiphilus were perhaps more fortunate in the men they commanded: for we do not find that they had any cause to complain: or they may have been less addicted to sarcastic speeches. But Phocion himself cannot have been very ill served: for the enemy was defeated, and driven back to his ships with great loss, and Micio was left among the slain. So that even this naval war, though it probably inflicted a severe injury on the Athenians, terminated in a manner which reminded them of better days.

Not long after, the aspect of affairs in Thessaly was again changed by the arrival of Craterus. He had brought, beside the veterans, 4000 heavy armed, 1000 Persian bowmen and slingers, and 1500 cavalry. He probably entered Thessaly by one of the western passes, as this was the direction which Antipater had taken. When they had joined their forces, Craterus resigned the supreme command to his colleague. They then marched down into the plain, where the allies were posted, and encamped near the banks of the Peneus. The Macedonian army now amounted to between 40,000 and 50,000 heavy infantry, 3000 light troops, and 5000 cavalry. The Greeks were little more than half as numerous: for the Ætolians had not returned to the camp, and few reinforcements had arrived to make up for the deficiency. They had fought the last time with 22,000 foot: they had now 25,000. The cavalry, though now inferior in number to that of the enemy, was still their main strength, and their sole hope. Diodorus, very confusedly, mentions a spirit of insubordination which arose among them from the decrease of their numbers. We may easily believe, that their commanders found it difficult to keep them together, after so many desertions, in the presence of so formidable an enemy. It must have seemed almost intolerably hard,

that they were to fight at such fearful odds in behalf of those who had shamefully abandoned them. The situation of the generals became every day more embarrassing. When Antipater drew out his forces to offer battle, they declined it for some days, still hoping that they might be rejoined by those who had left them, or might receive fresh succours, which had no doubt been earnestly solicited. But the approach of Craterus had probably induced all who were lukewarm or wavering to regard the contest as hopeless. No reinforcements arrived : and it became evident to Antipater, and Meno, that they must hazard a battle, or soon be deserted by the greater part of their troops. Meno still relied much, and not without reason, on his Thessalian horse. They therefore resolved to accept Antipater's challenge. The engagement took place on the plain of Crannon, a little to the west of the road between Larissa and Pharsalus¹, not far from the foot of a range of low hills which stretch across from the Enipeus to the Peneus. It began, as before, with the cavalry. That of the Macedonians was probably commanded by Craterus, but it was still unable to cope with the Thessalians : and the event of the day might have been similar to that in which Leonnatus fell, if the Macedonians had not now had the advantage of two able and experienced generals. Antipater, who was at the head of the phalanx, when he saw his horse giving way, fell upon the enemy's infantry. They were quite unable to sustain the shock, but still were so ably commanded, that they retreated in good order to the adjacent high ground, and there took up a position from which the Macedonians vainly attempted to dislodge them. We seem to collect from this fact, that Alexander was still more fortunate in his enemies, than in his officers. But Meno, perceiving the retreat of his infantry, did not venture to prolong the combat, in which he was on the point of gaining a decided victory : he drew off his troops, and the Macedonians remained everywhere masters of the field.

¹ Leake, *Northern Greece*, iii. p. 365.

The Greeks had not lost more than 500 men¹: but though the loss was trifling, it was the result of a defeat: and this, in such circumstances, was inevitably fatal to their cause. Antiphilus and Meno conferred together on the course now to be adopted: whether it was better to wait where they were, on the faint hope of a reinforcement, which might enable them again to meet the enemy in the field, but with great danger of fresh desertions: or should make overtures to Antipater, while they were still at the head of a formidable army. Diodorus intimates that they reluctantly yielded to the emergency²: they thought themselves forced to negotiate. Unhappily in this field the enemy they had to deal with was still more an overmatch for them than in the other. Antipater at once saw that an opportunity was presented to him of dissolving the confederacy without another blow. When the Greek heralds came to him with proposals of peace, he declared that he would enter into no treaty with the confederacy, but was willing to receive envoys from the allied states separately. He knew that this would be an irresistible temptation to each to renounce the common cause, that it might make the better terms for itself. But to hasten their resolution, he and Craterus laid siege to some of the Thessalian towns, among the rest to Pharsalus, which the allies were compelled to abandon to their fate. This proof of weakness, and the danger which extorted it, overpowered all reluctance in the inferior states of the confederacy. One after another sent its envoys to the Macedonian camp, and submitted to the terms dictated by Antipater, which were unexpectedly mild. Their lenity attracted those who still hesitated, and in a short time all had laid down their arms.

The two states which had excited and guided the insurrection, now remained exposed to the conqueror's

¹ Of these it appears that 900 were Athenians: for there can be little doubt that Pausanias, vii. 10. 5., means the battle of Crannon, the scene of which is also confounded with Lamia by Polybius, ix. 29.: though Pausanias elsewhere (x. 3. 4.) distinguishes between Lamia and Crannon.

² Τῶ ἀναγκῇ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐπιβουλῇ. xviii. 17.

vengeance, unable to afford any help to one another, unable, had their forces been united, to offer any resistance to him. Athens, as she had been first and last in the field, had reason to apprehend the first attack, and the most rigorous treatment. Antipater advanced from Thessaly into Bœotia, with the avowed object of laying siege to the city¹; and, as his fleet commanded the sea, there appeared no prospect of deliverance, or of relief from the miseries of a protracted blockade, except in timely submission. The only hope of any fate milder than death or slavery, rested on Antipater's mercy: but from a man who had boasted of his clemency, who had just experienced such vicissitudes of fortune, this was not an unreasonable ground of confidence. Phocion now had the melancholy pleasure, of exerting the influence he had gained by his long connection with the enemies of his country, in her behalf. For the readiness he showed on this occasion, we may well forgive his gentle reproach; that if she had followed his counsels, she would not have needed his aid: as in truth if she had followed those of Lycidas, in the Persian war², she would not have become an object of envy and hatred, and would perhaps never have been subject to a Macedonian master. The honour of his mediation he shared with Demades, to whom the eyes of all were first turned in this emergency. While the storm of war was rolling toward the frontiers of Attica, Demades sat aloof, like Achilles, an unconcerned spectator, brooding over his dishonour, and could only be induced to interpose by intreaties and gifts. He was a disfranchised man, who had no right to offer his advice. But he was not inexorable; and when his franchise was restored to him, proposed a decree, which was immediately carried, to send envoys, Phocion and himself in the number, with full powers to Antipater. They found the Macedonian army encamped on the site of Thebes, and preparing to invade Attica. Phocion's first request was, that Antipater would not move forward, but would

¹ Vit. X. Or. p. 846. E.

² See Vol. II. 326

conclude the treaty where he was. Craterus thought that Phocion asked too much, when he desired that they should spare their enemies, and continue to burden their friends. But Antipater, taking him by the hand, gently insisted: We must grant this favour to Phocion. He would not however listen even to Phocion on any other point, and would be satisfied with nothing but absolute submission. The Athenians he observed, had demanded no less from him, when he sued for peace. With this answer the envoys returned.¹

The people could not recede: for they had no refuge. Another embassy was immediately despatched, with Phocion at its head, but including a new envoy, whose character, it was hoped, might make a favourable impression on Antipater: the philosopher Xenocrates, of whom Plutarch says, that there was no degree of insolence and cruelty which would not, it was supposed, give way before his presence. Antipater was neither insolent nor cruel: but he was not a man to give up a solid advantage for the sake of a philosopher: even if he had not a private dislike to Xenocrates, and did not wish to show his displeasure at the treatment of his friend Aristotle, who had been forced to withdraw from Athens soon after Alexander's death, on a charge of impiety,

¹ Here again Droysen seems to have been misled by his praiseworthy reluctance to part with a single grain of tradition which is not demonstrably false. In Vit. X. Or. it is said that Antipater, after he had taken Pharsalus, threatened to lay siege to Athens, unless the Athenians should deliver up their orators. On this ground, Droysen not merely conjectures, but relates in his text, that the Athenians sent three embassies to Antipater, suing for peace: the first, while he was still in Thessaly, and that the answer they received was, that he would lay siege to Athens, unless they delivered up the orators. But in the first place, no ancient author mentions more than two embassies, and Plutarch, who describes the whole course of the negotiations so copiously in his Life of Phocion, 26, 27., could hardly have passed over the first. In the next place it is quite inconceivable that, when the Athenians sent to ask on what terms Antipater would grant peace, he should either have mentioned no other condition than this, or have accompanied this demand with a threat. Still more difficult, if possible, is it to believe, that, after he had made this demand to the first embassy, he should have required the Athenians, when they were represented by his friend Phocion, to submit generally to his discretion, as they had before required from him. Surely this answer could only have been returned at the beginning of the negotiations, not after he had already specified one condition. It might be known without an embassy, that Antipater meant to besiege Athens, and that he threatened vengeance against the adverse orators: and this would have been sufficient foundation for the above-mentioned statement.

which was probably a pretext for those who hated and feared him on account of his intimacy and correspondence with Antipater : though it would not follow that there was any foundation for the story, that Xenocrates was Aristotle's enemy. Antipater, however, is reported to have behaved to him with studied rudeness, to have withheld from him the ordinary salutation with which he received the other envoys, and to have interrupted him so often in his speech, as at last to compel him to desist.¹ Xenocrates is said to have observed, that he considered it as an honour to be so treated by Antipater, when he was about to deal so harshly with Athens. The terms finally granted, on which the Athenians were to be admitted into amity and alliance with Macedonia, were, that they should deliver up a number of their obnoxious orators, including Demosthenes and Hyperides ; that they should limit their franchise by a standard of property : that they should receive a garrison in Munychia, and pay a sum of money for the cost of the war. Xenocrates is said to have been the only person who murmured at these conditions, and to have remarked, that they were mild for slaves, oppressive for freemen. His colleagues professed to be delighted with their moderation : only with regard to the garrison, Phocion thought proper to intercede. But when Antipater asked him, whether he would engage for the observance of the peace without it, he did not venture immediately to reply. While he paused, Callimedon, the exile, started up, and said : And if he should talk so idly, will you, Antipater, trust him, and change your purpose ?" All the articles were accepted by the

¹ On the other hand there are sundry anecdotes in the Life of Xenocrates in Diogenes Laertius, which seem to indicate that the philosopher was on very friendly terms with Antipater. Antipater is said to have sent him a present of money, which however he would not accept : to have paid him a visit at Athens, when however Xenocrates would not interrupt the discourse he was holding to return his greeting. Even on the occasion of the very embassy to Thebes, Diogenes relates that Xenocrates, who had come to obtain the release of some Athenian prisoners, was invited by Antipater to his table, and replied in the words of Ulysses to Circe, which so pleased Antipater, that he at once released the prisoners. Perhaps from all this we must infer, that Antipater's sternness was confined to the audience on the terms of peace.

plenipotentiaries, and ratified by the people; and soon after the Macedonian garrison marched into Munychia, to settle the interpretation of those which had not been precisely defined.

It was remarked, as a contrast which aggravated the present misery and dejection, that the entrance of the foreign troops took place on the day of the mystic procession to Eleusis: the same on which, according to the Attic legend, in the Persian war, when Attica was abandoned to the barbarians, the mystic shout, raised by unearthly voices, had announced the approaching destruction of the invader. The presence of the Macedonian garrison however was chiefly galling, as it constantly reminded the people of its servitude. There was no reason immediately to apprehend any of the outrages which Thebes had suffered, while it was occupied by Philip's troops: for the command at Munychia had been given to Menyllus, a man of humane disposition and one of Phocian's friends, perhaps appointed at his request. The clause in the treaty relating to the change which was to be made in the constitution, had probably been expressed at first in general terms, and its import, or Antipater's design, only fixed when the time came to carry it into execution. If we might lay stress on the language in which Plutarch reports it, we should be led to conclude, that the Athenians had been induced to expect a revival of the ancient limited democracy, perhaps as it existed in the time of Solon: by which the poorest would indeed have been excluded from several offices, but not from the privileges which they exercised in the assembly and the courts of justice. Hopeless as the condition of the people was, it seems doubtful, whether they would have ratified the treaty, if they had known beforehand how Antipater understood it on this point.¹ The new regulation which he decreed sounded

Droysen, defending Antipater against Grauert, who describes the measure as a change from democracy to oligarchy, asks (l. p. 93.) whether the government of 20,000 citizens over half a million of people was less oligarchical? It was, according to the definition of the ancients, who confined the term oligarchy to a government founded on distinctions of property. The question seems to imply that, because the Athenian constitution limited

very moderate, if not necessary, or just : but its practical effect was, that nearly two thirds of the citizens were disfranchised, and many transported out of Greece. It provided, that a qualification of 2000 drachmas should be required from every citizen, and this has been commonly understood as the entire amount of property of every kind to be possessed by each. If this was the case, it remains an inexplicable mystery — one to which the great master of this subject resigns himself as in despair¹ — that out of 21,000 persons then exercising the franchise, no more than 9000 could be found possessing that sum. It would follow that 12,000 were living nearly in the condition of Lazzaroni : for it appears that the interest of 2000 drachmas at the highest ordinary rate, would have been scarcely sufficient to purchase the mere necessities of life for a man who had no family to support. We may indeed suppose, though no cause has been assigned for the fact, that the distribution of property had become very unequal at Athens, while its general amount had been much reduced. And yet the accounts we have remaining of the administration of Lycurgus do not suggest the idea of general poverty, but rather of growing prosperity. Since that time to Alexander's death, the state had enjoyed uninterrupted peace. The visions of Isocrates, who had represented the conquest of Persia as the beginning of a golden age for Greece, had in this respect been fully realised. A part of the treasures of the East had in fact crossed the Ægean, and it might have been supposed, that Athens would have shared this benefit, and still more that which flowed from the increased activity imparted to commerce by Alexander's conquests. It is true that such difficulties could not

the franchise one way, according to universally received Greek notions, it could be no hardship to limit it in another totally different, and that this ought not to be regarded as an essential change. Least of all can our sympathy with the Athenians be destroyed by generalities and exaggerations, such as Droysen's remark, that "one cannot form an adequate conception of the corruption of the Athenian state." It seems quite as possible to go beyond the truth on this subject as to fall short of it.

¹ Boeckh. *Staatsk.* iv. 3. Compare iv. 9.

resist one well-attested fact. But the main fact on which the question here depends is not attested at all. We are not informed how the inquisition was made, nor what objects it included — whether, for instance, it took account of the profits derived from any occupation which needed only a very small capital — nor whether it related to the whole or only a part — that which was liable to taxation — of each citizen's property. It has been thought by a high authority a fatal objection to this last supposition, that in this case the standard of property would have been too high.¹ But at least it would not have been too high for Antipater's views: and that which he is commonly believed to have established, would not even have answered the purpose which might have been thought the only reasonable ground for the innovation: to provide that every one who retained the franchise should possess some independent means of decent subsistence.²

To the disfranchised citizens Antipater offered a town and district in Thrace. We are not informed where it lay; but it may easily be supposed that it was not a maritime position, and therefore could not have been regarded as a desirable settlement. It does not appear that any were compelled to migrate: but the offer seems to show that Antipater wished to remove as many as he could without a display of force: and the prospect at home was gloomy enough to induce many to embrace this alternative. A great number of a higher class were formally banished.

It speaks well for the 9000 who remained in possession of the franchise, that Antipater still thought the garrison at Munychia a necessary precaution: but if his only object had been security, it might have been supposed that the presence of the troops would have been a sufficient protection for those who were disposed

¹ Boeckh. iv. 3.

² Diodorus (xviii 18) says that they all migrated. If this had been the case, the *τοὶς βουλευμένοις* would be only the official language. But it is clear from Plutarch, Phoc 28, that a part actually remained at Athens. Yet from the manner in which the *ἄτιμοι* are mentioned by Plutarch, Phoc 33 one might be inclined to suspect that they were not allowed to reside in the upper city.

for peace. At least after these measures there was left no plea of necessity to excuse his demand for the blood of the men who had guided the public counsels. Alexander indeed had called for such a sacrifice, but under very different circumstances; when it might have seemed requisite for his safety; it was the only one he asked; and still he had been induced to dispense with it. We can hardly acquit Antipater of the charge of a cowardly revenge. If policy required that resistance to Macedonia should be treated as a crime, exile, when return appeared so hopeless, might have seemed a sufficient punishment. And from the manner in which the sentence was executed, it is but too clear, that it was not merely a concession which he made to the rancour which his Athenian hirelings bore to the sufferers though it is likely enough that Pytheas, and Callimodon, and Demades, encouraged him, in this instance too, to adhere to his purpose. It would have been pleasing to find that Phocion had attempted to divert him from it: especially, if he himself had on former occasions been protected by the eloquence of Demosthenes.¹ In other cases he procured pardon for some who had been condemned to banishment by Antipater, or prevailed on him to remit the severest part of the penalty, and to let the exiles remain in Greece. It is plain from these instances, though they were not needed to show it, what the real character of the new constitution was: and we are the less tempted to speculate on the meaning of Diodorus, when he says, that the 9000 were governed by the laws of Solon. It seems that the contribution which had been mentioned in the treaty was not immediately exacted: perhaps was purposely reserved as an additional security for their good behaviour. The question about Samos was referred to the king's council, and, by order of Perdiccas, the Athenian colonists were soon after expelled from their possessions. The republic, it appears, was also deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyrus.

¹ So Nepos, Phocion. ii. 3 Yet this is rather hard to believe.

Demosthenes and his partners in misfortune had retired from the city before the Macedonian garrison arrived: yet hardly so soon as it was heard that Antipater was on his march against Athens¹: for we are informed that when he demanded them, Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, made an effort, more honourable to his feelings than his judgment, to induce the people to resist, and, to animate the spectators, entered the assembly in armour. It is doubtful whether this was before the return of the second embassy: but then Demades proposed a decree, which was passed as a part of the treaty, condemning Antipater's victims to death. They had certainly escaped, before they could be arrested under this decree²: and their first place of refuge was Ægina. Here Hyperides, a man certainly, according to the accounts which have come down to us, not estimable in his private character, but one who had never descended to any political apostasy, and who had never been polluted by Macedonian gold, besought Demosthenes to forgive his temporary estrangement, thus apparently acknowledging the injustice of the charge he had brought against him, and took a last farewell of him. With them were Aristonicus, and Himeræus, also one of the accusers of Demosthenes, and brother of Demetrius the Phalerian, who was destined soon to rise to a bad eminence in the history of Athens.³ As the danger grew more pressing, the friends parted, seeking separate asylums. Aristonicus and Himeræus took shelter in the Æaceum. Hyperides, it seems, first sought refuge at the altar of Poseidon in the same island, but afterwards passed over to Peloponnesus, and fled to the temple of Demeter at Hermione⁴, once deemed

¹ As Plutarch represents, *Phoc.* 26. and *Demosth.* 28. This may seem to favour Droysen's conjecture, but cannot, I think, be admitted to outweigh the objections I have stated against it.

² It appears from Arrian in *Photius* (p. 69. b. that they were already in Ægina when the decree was passed.

³ Lucian (*Demosthenis Encom.* 31.) adds the name of Eucrates, who however is not mentioned either by Plutarch or Arrian.

⁴ So Suidas, seemingly better informed than either Plutarch (*Demosth.* 28.) or the author of *Vit. X. Or.* p. 849, who says he was torn from the statue of the god.

a shrine of awful sanctity. Demosthenes chose the sanctuary of Poseidon in the isle of Calauræa near Trœzen. There remained no hope of safety for the fugitives, but in the protection of the gods. But Antipater had taken his measures to render even this safeguard unavailing.

It was not in Athens alone that Antipater pursued the friends of liberty to death. To carry out his purpose, he had engaged the services of a band of men, who, from their infamous occupation, acquired the title of the *EXILL-HUNTERS*. The leader of this pack was an Italian Greek of Thurii, named Archias. He had been a player, and afterwards, it seems, had studied, perhaps practised, rhetoric : but we find no trace that he was connected with any political party in Greece, where indeed, as a foreigner, he could scarcely have been admitted into one. He served probably for nothing but his hire : yet he displayed as much zeal in his commission, as if he had been instigated by private enmity. He was attended on his circuit by a guard of Thracians, and with their assistance dragged most of the Athenian exiles, whom, as the prey for which his master most longed, he had undertaken to seize himself, from the altars to which he found them clinging. Aristonicus, Himeræus, and Hyperides, were conveyed to Antipater, who was then at Corinth or Cleonæ, and the first two at least were immediately put to death. Hyperides, according to the more authentic report¹, was reserved to be executed in Macedonia. But all seem to have agreed that Antipater was not satisfied with his blood, but ordered his tongue to be first cut out, and his remains to be cast to the dogs. His bones however were secretly rescued by one of his kinsmen, and carried to Athens, where they were buried in the grave of his fathers.

Demosthenes calmly awaited the coming of Archias in the temple at Calauræa, well knowing that he should not be sheltered by the sanctity of the place, and prepared

¹ Of Hermippus, Vit. X. Or. p. 849. B.

for his end. He had dreamt, it is said, the night before, that he was contending with Archias in a tragic part: that the judgment of the spectators was in his favour, but that he lost the prize, because he had not been furnished with the outward requisites of the exhibition: an apt illustration at least of his failure in the real contest, which was the task of his life. When Archias came to the door of the temple with his satellites, he found Demosthenes seated. He at first addressed him in language of friendly persuasion, to inveigle him out of his retreat, and offered to intercede with Antipater in his behalf. Demosthenes listened for a time in silence to his bland professions, but at length replied: "Archias, you never won me by your acting, nor will you now by your promises." When the player found that he was detected, he flung away the mask, and threatened in earnest. "Now," said Demosthenes, "you speak from the Macedonian tripod; before you were only acting: wait a little, till I have written a letter to my friends at home." And he took a roll, as to write, and as was his wont, when he was engaged in composition, put the end of the reed to his mouth, and bit it: he then covered his face with his robe, and bowed his head. According to another report, he was seen to take something out of a piece of linen, and put it into his mouth: the Thracians imagined that it was gold. In one way or other, he had swallowed a poison which he had kept for this use. When he had remained some time in this attitude the barbarians, thinking that he was lingering through fear, began to taunt him with cowardice: and Archias, going up to him, urged him to rise, and repeated his offers of mediation. Demosthenes now felt the poison in his veins: he uncovered his face, rose, and fixing his eyes on the dissembler, said, "It is time for you, Archias, to finish the part of Creon, and to cast my body to the dogs. I quit thy sanctuary, Poseidon, still breathing: though Antipater, and the Macedonians, have not spared even it from pollution." So

saying, he moved with faltering step toward the door, but had scarcely passed the altar, when he fell with a groan, and breathed his last.

His end would undoubtedly have been more truly heroic, though not in the sight of his own generation, if he had braved the insults and torture which awaited him. But he must not be judged by a view of life which had never been presented to him: according to his own, it must have seemed base to submit to the enemy whom he had hitherto defied, for the sake of a few days more of ignominious wretchedness. And even on the principles of a higher philosophy, he might think, that the gods, who were not able to protect him, had discharged him from their service, and permitted him to withdraw from a post which he could no longer defend. The ancients saw the finger of Heaven in the fate of the vile instruments of his destruction. That of Demades will be afterwards related: Archias ended his days in extreme indigence, under the weight of universal contempt. It was later before Athens was permitted to do justice to the services of her great citizen, who indeed had never lost her esteem. The time at length came when his nephew Demochares might safely propose a decree, by which the honours of the prytaneum, and of the foremost seat at public spectacles, were granted to his descendants, and a bronze statue was erected in the agora to himself. It bore an inscription, corresponding in its import to the dream which he was said to have had at Calaurca. *Had but the strength of thy arm, Demosthenes, equalled thy spirit, never would Greece have sunk under the foreigner's yoke.* The statue itself was believed in Plutarch's time to have confirmed the general persuasion of his innocence as to the only charge which ever threw a shade on the purity of his political character.¹ The honours paid to his memory were not confined to Athens. A monument was erected

¹ Plutarch (Demosth. 81) relates the story of the gold deposited in the hands of the statue, as of recent occurrence. Yet it was also told of a statue at Thebes, Plin. N. H. xxiv. 19. 4. Athenæus, i. 34.

to him in the sanctuary where he died: and both at Calauræa, and in other parts of Greece, he continued, down to the age of Hadrian, and probably as long as the memory of the past survived there, to receive marks of public reverence approaching to the worship of a hero.¹

We are not informed how far Antipater advanced into Peloponnesus. At Corinth it is not improbable, that he may have assembled the mock congress, and again have used its name in the title of his despotic edicts. His presence was not needed to enforce submission to his pleasure. After he had sated his vengeance, and struck the disaffected with awe, he returned to Macedonia, accompanied by Craterus, whose friendship he secured, against the intrigues of Olympias and his other enemies, by the hand of his daughter Phila, the most amiable and estimable person of his family. But very soon after the nuptials, as the year was now verging to a close, the two chiefs set out on an expedition against the Ætolians, the only state of the late confederacy which had not submitted to the conqueror. The army with which he invaded Ætolia consisted of 30,000 foot, and 2500 horse: an irresistible force, since the utmost efforts of the Ætolians could only raise 10,000 men, at least of heavy infantry, for the defence of their hearths. But they were mountaineers, not wanting in self-confidence — there was indeed rather too much of a Biscayan vein in their character — and they relied still more, and with better reason, on the natural barriers and fastnesses by which their rugged country seemed to be formed for a home of liberty. They made no attempt to propitiate the invader, though wholly unable to withstand him in the field. In this sense of security we probably perceive the main cause which led them to abandon their allies in the latter part of the war. They now forsook all their towns in the open country, and transported their families and moveable property from all quarters to the impregnable

¹ Pausanias, li. 33. 5.

strongholds which crowned the summits of their highest hills. The Macedonians made some attempts to storm these fortresses, but they had no Alexander at their head, and they were everywhere repulsed with great loss. But a more terrible danger threatened the Ætolians. They had expected that the enemy would withdraw before winter, which in their highlands is often very rigorous, had set in. But the Macedonian generals, though not men of impetuous energy, were not to be diverted from their purposes by such difficulties, from which, in fact, the enemy had more to fear than they. Antipater, it seems, returned to Macedonia, where his presence might be necessary to watch the turn of affairs in Asia, and even to secure himself against the royal family: but Craterus remained, with the greater part of the army, in Ætolia, and ordered his men to prepare for a winter in the field. Amid frost and snow he continued in his position at the foot of the hills on which the enemy had taken refuge. Cut off from all supplies, and even destitute of fuel, they soon began to experience the sharpest gripe of cold and hunger. A miserable death seemed their inevitable lot, unless they either descended from their heights, and forced a passage, only to be won by a decided victory, through the Macedonian lines: or accepted such terms of peace as the vindictive and irritated foe might be willing to grant. Yet from this strait they were extricated — as the Athenians might perhaps have been, if they had stood a siege¹ — by the turn which affairs were taking in Asia. The events to which they owed their deliverance will be related in the next chapter. Antipater found it necessary to withdraw his troops from Ætolia, that he might employ them against a more formidable enemy. The Ætolians were probably surprised at the moderation which he showed in the conditions of peace unexpectedly offered to them: and perhaps, through ignorance of the cause, lost an opportunity of vengeance, which

¹ As Pausanias thought, vii. 10. 4.

they might have inflicted on his retreating host. They were left, it seems, in complete independence. Antipater and Craterus were probably the more liberal in their offers, because they had secretly agreed, as soon as they should have the means, to transport the whole Ætolian nation into a remote region of Asia.¹ Such a measure would certainly have been in the spirit, it may even have been in the letter, of Alexander's posthumous commentaries.

¹ Diodorus, xviii. 25.

CHAP. LVII.

FROM THE END OF THE LAMIAN WAR TO CASSANDER'S
OCCUPATION OF ATHENS.

WE must now resume the narrative which we dropped at the partition of the empire, and distribution of the provinces, that immediately followed Alexander's death, and relate the events which led to the result mentioned at the close of the preceding chapter, and were pregnant with other more momentous consequences. One of the first occurrences which marked the administration of Perdiccas after he had established himself in the regency, was a wound which he inflicted on Greece in a distant corner of Asia: a triumph of the Macedonian arms memorable rather because it prevented than because it produced an important change in the course of affairs, but which serves to illustrate his character, as well as the footing on which he stood. While the struggle which we have seen brought to such a disastrous issue was just beginning in Greece, and the states which took part in it could with difficulty raise a force sufficient to maintain it, a body of Greeks, who, if they had been present in their native land, would probably have thrown their whole weight into the same scale, and might have turned it decisively on the side of freedom, was suddenly swept from the earth. The Greek colonists, whom Alexander had planted in the new cities which he founded in the eastern satrapies, had only been detained by fear during his life in what they considered as a miserable exile. None probably of the Greek adventurers who sought their fortune in Alexander's wars had any other thought than to return as soon as they could with their earnings and plunder to settle in Greece. None assuredly could have been induced by any thing

but compulsion to fix their abode on the banks of the Iaxartes, or in the high valleys of the Paropamisus, or on the skirts of the Persian deserts. None could have consented to renounce their liberty for life, and to condemn themselves to perpetual banishment. Even before Alexander's death, some had betrayed the feelings which, as afterwards appeared, animated them all. We have already noticed a revolt which broke out in Bactria, on the false rumour occasioned probably by the wound he received in Multan. It is from Curtius alone that we learn any of the details; and his narrative is not quite clear. He represents the insurrection as arising out of a sedition, for which he assigns no cause, but in which blood was shed, and which urged them through fear of punishment to open rebellion. But he also mentions, that their leader Athenodorus, though he assumed the title of king, had no other motive than the desire of returning to his country. The mutineers, if they ought to be so called—for their end seems to have been only to exercise an indisputable right—made themselves masters of the citadel at Bactria, and drew a part of the native population into the revolt. Athenodorus was murdered by one of his officers, who aspired to the command, and who, after some scenes of military tumult, led a body of 3000 out of Bactria, and marched toward Europe. Curtius says that he reached home with them: and it is possible that they were among the troops collected by Leosthenes. But from the language of Diodorus¹ it seems more probable that they wandered about in the East, until Alexander's death became the signal for a general insurrection among their countrymen, who had been impatiently suffering a like confinement.

As the intelligence spread from one colony to another, a concert was formed among those who longed for freedom: they at length united their forces, and elected Philo, an Æniaman, for their leader. Their numbers amounted to more than 20,000 foot, and 3000 horse:

¹ xviii 7.

an army much larger than Antipater, as we have seen, was able to bring against the allies at the beginning of the Lamian war: all men inured to arms by long service in Alexander's campaigns. Perdiccas was justly alarmed at the tidings of this movement, and yet had no force which he could immediately dispose of, sufficient to suppress it. He could only spare 3000 foot, and 800 horse, at least of his Macedonians, who were draughted by lot from his army: these, according to Diodorus, by their own choice, he placed under the command of Pithon, who eagerly coveted the commission, which he saw might enable him to make himself independent of the regent. Perdiccas suspected his views, and met them with a sanguinary precaution: he ordered that no quarter should be given to the insurgents, and that the spoil should be abandoned to his troops. With Pithon he sent instructions to the satraps of the eastern provinces, to furnish him with 10,000 foot, and 8000 horse. With these forces Pithon marched against the insurgents: but before an engagement took place, he found means to corrupt one of their chiefs, an *Ænianian* named Lipodorus, who commanded a division of 3000 men. During the action, at a critical moment, the traitor drew off his whole brigade to an adjacent height: his desertion created a panic among the rest, and the Macedonians remained masters of the field. Pithon now thought that the season had arrived for the accomplishment of his private design, which was to draw the Greeks by gentle treatment into his own service. He invited them to lay down their arms, under the most solemn assurances that they should be permitted to return in safety to their several settlements. But when on the faith of his oath they had placed themselves in his power, the Macedonians, encouraged by the order of Perdiccas, and greedy of the promised spoil, fell upon them by surprise, and butchered them all. No acts of a brutal soldiery can excite surprise, hardly indignation: the whole guilt of this atrocious massacre rests with Perdiccas, who ha l

contrived it in cold blood.¹ Pithon returned to him, deeply disappointed, but dissembling his resentment. It was not very long before the hour of retribution came.

About the same time that Antipater was extricated from his dangerous position at Lamia by Leonnatus, Perdikkas, accompanied by the titular sovereign, set out on his march to Asia Minor. His first object was to establish Eumenes in his satrapy. Ariarathes had collected an army of natives and foreign auxiliaries, amounting in all to 30,000 foot and 15,000 horse. But one so composed could not withstand troops like those of Perdikkas. Ariarathes was defeated and taken prisoner, with his whole family. The ruthless conqueror ordered them all to be put to a cruel and ignominious death: it was indeed that which Alexander had inflicted on Musicanus: but in that case the barbarity was in some degree palliated by the revolt which provoked it, and by the policy of a terrible warning. Eumenes then received quiet possession of Cappadocia: but still continued to accompany his patron. Perdikkas next marched into Pisidia on another bloody business, for which indeed he had a fairer plea, but which still afforded fresh indications of his ferocious nature. Balacer, who had been appointed by Alexander general and satrap, to subdue and govern the province, had been killed by the natives²: whether in the first struggle for freedom, or in a subsequent insurrection does not appear.³ A severe punishment might be necessary. Perdikkas decreed that none should suffice but the utter destruction of two cities, Laranda and Isaura, which had the chief share in the resistance to Balacer. Laranda was stormed, all the men put to the sword, their families reduced to slavery, and the town

¹ Droysen (*Nachf.* i p 57), as if to soften the horror of this tragedy, talks of the *guilt* of the unfortunate Greeks. Wherein it consisted he thinks it needless to explain. They were happy men, if they had nothing worse on their conscience than compliance with one of the best and purest instincts of their nature. It is carrying the doctrine of passive obedience to an extraordinary length, to represent an attempt to escape from captivity as a

² Diodorus, xviii 22.

³ Droysen adopts the former supposition, and yet coolly talks of the necessity of *humbling* them.

raised to the ground. Isaura, a strong, large, and opulent city, made a more vigorous defence. For two days its hardy population, with a great sacrifice of life, repelled the assaults of the besiegers. But on the third day the Isaurians found their numbers so much reduced, that seeing themselves unable to hold out much longer, and knowing what they had to expect from the mercy of Perdiccas, they resolved on a deed which might have been called barbarous, if that epithet did not more properly belong to their enemy. They shut up their wives and children, set fire to their houses, and threw all the treasure they could collect, into the flames. At the sight of the conflagration Perdiccas renewed the assault, expecting little resistance, and was surprised to find the walls defended with the same spirit as before, while the city was burning. After they had once more forced the enemy to retire, the Isaurians threw themselves into the flames which had consumed all that was dear to them. The Macedonians entered the next day, and found only a mass of smoking ruins; but when they had quenched the fire, were still able to rake out a rich booty of gold and silver.

From Pisidia Perdiccas marched, it appears, into Cilicia, where he was at a nearly equal distance from the points on which his attention was now chiefly bent. While he remained here, he sent Eumenes, nominally to his own satrapy, but on a mission really concerning the bordering province of Armenia, where Neoptolemus, a man of high birth and rank, who was either satrap, or held a military command there, seemed to be endeavouring to make himself independent. He was not however prepared for resistance, and quietly submitted to Eumenes, who humoured his arrogance and vanity with great address. On this occasion Eumenes began to discover that he could not safely rely on his Macedonian troops, who, proud and intractable toward their own generals, were peculiarly impatient of obedience to a foreign chief. He therefore determined to raise a body

of cavalry in his own province, and in a short time, by the promise of extraordinary privileges, collected 6,300 volunteers, and brought them, by sedulous training and the spur of emulation, into such condition as to extort the admiration of the Macedonians themselves.¹

Perdiccas having thus settled the more urgent affairs of the empire, was at full leisure to direct his undivided attention to his private interests. He could not feel himself secure, still less see his way open, to the great end of his ambition, while he was surrounded by so many powerful rivals. There were two who had already shown that they were not disposed to submit to him, even in his character of regent. Antigonos, as we have seen, had disregarded his orders in the case of Eumenes; and Ptolemy had given more than one indication of the light in which he viewed his satrapy, or rather had taken several steps to erect it into an independent and powerful kingdom. One of the first acts of his government was to put to death Cleomenes, who had indeed deserved this punishment for his rapacity and tyranny, but suffered it because Ptolemy considered him as a creature of Perdiccas.² The fruits of the extortion which Cleomenes had practised with extraordinary ingenuity for many years fell into Ptolemy's hands. They amounted to 8000 talents³, and enabled him to collect a strong army of mercenaries, as well as to gain many friends by his munificence. The current story of his illegitimate birth was confirmed by the royal liberality of his nature, which delighted in acts of bounty: and a saying is attributed to him, worthy of Alexander: that it was better to make rich, than to be rich.⁴ He had not been long in possession of Egypt, before an opportunity offered itself which he readily seized, to make another most important acquisition. We have seen that Harpalus was assassinated in Crete by one of his officers named Thimbron, who thus became master of his treasure and his troops. With these he crossed over to Africa, embraced the cause

¹ Plutarch *Eum.* 4.

² Diodorus, xviii. 14.

³ Pausanias, i. 6. 3.

⁴ *Ælian*, V. H. xiii. 12.

of a party which had been exiled from Cyrene, and made war with the city. After many vicissitudes of fortune, he seemed at last to be on the point of attaining his object. He defeated the Cyrenæans in battle, cut off their communication with their port, and reduced them to great distress. The scarcity gave rise to a sedition, in which most of the wealthy citizens were expelled. They perhaps belonged to the party which Thimbron professed to befriend: for some sought his protection. Others, perhaps distrusting the reckless adventurer, applied to Ptolemy for aid. Ptolemy sent them back with a squadron of ships, and a strong body of troops, under the command of Ophellas. On their arrival the exiles in Thimbron's camp attempted to join them in the night, but were detected and cut to pieces: while the party in the city, to save themselves from their countrymen, entered into alliance with Thimbron. But he was defeated and taken prisoner by Ophellas, and given up to the vengeance of the inhabitants of Teucheira, whose town he had taken during the war. Most of the Cyrenaic cities now submitted to Ophellas: but fresh disturbances which ensued, induced Ptolemy to make an expedition in person to Cyrene. His measures established perfect tranquillity, and he might now consider this rich country as a province of Egypt.

In another transaction of less moment he had come more directly into collision with Perdiccas, and had still more plainly disclosed his aspiring pretensions. It had been resolved in the council of Babylon, as has been mentioned, to transport Alexander's remains to *Ægæ*; and Arridæus, the general, had been charged with the superintendence of the preparations and with the command of the escort. It may be suspected that this arrangement had been contrived by Ptolemy: for Arridæus was his friend, and it enabled him both to conceal his purpose as long as was needful, and then easily to effect it. The funeral car was a wonderful display of art and magnificence, glittering from the vaulted roof to the wheels with ornaments of massive

gold, and of the most elaborate workmanship. It was drawn by eighty-four mules, and more than a year was occupied in the journey from Babylon to Syria. At Damascus it appears that a contest arose between Arridæus, and Polemo, an officer in the service of Perdiccas, about the place of destination.¹ It was with great difficulty, and according to some accounts only by force of arms, that Arridæus was able to keep possession of his charge.¹ He may have been aided by Ptolemy, who is said to have advanced as far as Syria with his army to meet the venerable relics.² They were first carried to Memphis, and then to Alexandria³, where they were finally deposited in a cemetery within the precincts of the palace, which was afterwards the burial-place of Ptolemy's successors.

There could be no peace between Perdiccas and a man who showed himself so fit for a throne, and so determined and able to mount it. Both had long-foreseen that their relative positions could only be determined by a war, and both had been endeavouring to fortify themselves by alliances, particularly with Antipater. Perdiccas, it is said before he felt himself established in the regency, had solicited the hand of Antipater's daughter, Nicæa :—the marriage treaty was concluded, and, when he came down into Asia Minor, Nicæa was sent to meet him.⁴ But in the meanwhile a change had taken place in his prospects : they reached to the throne of Macedonia, and to Alexander's whole empire, now shared between a simpleton and an infant, who might be easily removed. Antipater's alliance might rather obstruct than promote his designs, while a connection with the royal house might give a colour of legitimacy to his usurpation. The alliance recently formed between Antipater and Craterus probably

¹ Arrian in Photius, p 70. b. *Ælian*, V. H. xii. 64.

² Diodorus, xviii. 28.

³ By Philadelphus, according to Pausanias, i 7. 1. The other writers, including Strabo (xvii. 427. Tauchn.) suppose the first Ptolemy to have executed his design.

⁴ Diodorus, xviii. 23

strengthened his resolution. He had made proposals for Cleopatra's hand to Olympias, who had been forced to retire into Epirus, but was eager to return and revenge herself on Antipater. She was no less willing to grant it to Perdiccas than to Leonnatus, and sent the princess over to Asia, to accelerate the negotiation.¹ Perdiccas now deliberated with his brother Alcetas and Eumenes, which he should accept. Alcetas was fearful of a rupture with Antipater, and advised his brother to fulfil his engagement with Nicæa. Eumenes, who dreaded a coalition between Antipater and Perdiccas, to which he might himself be sacrificed took the other side. Perdiccas however chose a middle course, best suited to his heartless and faithless nature: he resolved to give his hand to Nicæa, but to keep up a correspondence with Cleopatra, and to discard her rival as soon as it was safe to drop the mask of friendship with Antipater. In the meanwhile he made another sacrifice, not less grateful to her and to Olympias, who hated with all her soul every member of Philip's family except her own children. Cynanè, Philip's daughter, whom he had married to his nephew Amyntas, had refused since his death to accept the hand of another, and had lived in retirement, occupied with the education of her only child Adea, or, as she was afterwards called, Eurydice. She was herself a woman of masculine character and habits, delighting in camps and battle-fields, where she sometimes gave proof of her prowess. She had acquired this taste from her mother, the Illyrian princess Audata, who seems only to have followed the customs of her country, when she trained her daughter to martial exercises: and she educated Eurydice in like manner.² Eurydice was now of marriageable age; and Cynanè, resolved to unite her to the young king. She entered into no previous negotiations—which indeed would have been impracticable, since the measure was equally opposed to the interests of Antipater

¹ Arrian in Photus, p 70 a. Diodorus, xviii. 23.

² Polyænus, viii. 60.

and of Perdiccas—but relying entirely on her personal influence determined to pass over into Asia, collected a sufficient guard to force her way through a body of troops whom Antipater had sent to intercept her at the crossing of the Strymon, and arrived safely on the other side of the Hellespont. She was proceeding, it appears, towards the camp of Perdiccas, in the hope of gaining his army to her cause, when he sent Alcetas, with a division of his forces, to stop her, and put her to death.¹ She was taken prisoner, but not daunted by the sight of the armed host which surrounded her; and she boldly reproached Alcetas with his ingratitude. The Macedonians were moved with compassion and respect for Philip's daughter: but their fierce leader, insensible both to pity and shame, executed his brother's orders. Eurydice was spared: for it would not have been safe to destroy her: the sympathy of the Macedonians had been too strongly excited on behalf of her mother: and Perdiccas, to still their murmurs, and make her subservient to his ends, consented to marry her to the young king.

He had now, he believed, secured Antipater's acquiescence, and had only to rid himself of Antigonus, and to crush Ptolemy. Antigonus he hoped to ensnare, and gently complaining of his insubordination, summoned him to give an account of his conduct before an impartial tribunal. But Antigonus was aware of his designs against himself, and of his intrigues with Cleopatra. He met his artifices with politic dissimulation, and publicly professed himself ready to answer any charges that might be brought against him, while he secretly made preparations for flight. With his young son Demetrius he embarked in some of the Attic ships which had been brought into one of the Ionian ports, and crossed over to Europe, to seek Antipater. From

¹ I cannot find, either in Arrian or Polyænus (viii. 60) any trace of the alternative mentioned by Droysen, who says that Alcetas was ordered to bring her *alive or dead*. As a prisoner she would have been very troublesome to Perdiccas.

him Antipater learnt the treachery of Perdiccas, and the danger with which he himself was threatened. This was the motive which induced him to make peace with the Ætolians, that he might direct his arms against the more formidable enemy in Asia. At the same time he sent envoys to Ptolemy, to renew their ancient friendship, and to contract a closer alliance against their common foe, which was to be cemented with the hand of Antipater's daughter Eurydice.

The flight of Antigonus convinced Perdiccas that he must prepare for immediate war with Antipater, and he now sent Eumenes to Sardis with presents for Cleopatra, and a message that he had resolved to send Nicæa back to her father, and to give his hand to the princess. Menander, the satrap of Lydia, who appears to have been secretly disaffected to Perdiccas, conveyed intelligence of this transaction to Antigonus. It confirmed the truth of his report, and added an impulse of personal resentment to Antipater's jealousy of his powerful rival. Perdiccas soon heard of his preparations, and found that he must now decide whether he would march in person against Antipater or against Ptolemy, for it had become necessary to wage war with both at the same time. He held a council in Cilicia on this momentous question, in which the arguments on each side were maturely discussed. There was on the one hand the advantage which might be derived from the influence of Olympias and the royal name, if the war were carried into Macedonia: on the other the fear that in the meanwhile Ptolemy might make himself master of Western Asia.¹ Perdiccas determined to attack Ptolemy first, and to commit the defence of Asia to Eumenes. His motive for this choice may have been, that he considered Ptolemy as the more formidable enemy, and hoped that Antipater might be detained in Europe or prevented from making much progress, until the war should be terminated in Egypt. But it may also be suspected, that he did not

¹ Justin, xiii. 6. 11.

feel secure as to the disposition of his troops, and did not care to risk his own person against the reputation of Antipater and the popularity of Craterus, until the additional force which he might acquire by the conquest of Egypt, should enable him to overpower all opposition. For the war with Antipater and Craterus, his colleagues in the regency, was likely to be viewed by the Macedonians in a very different light from one waged against a simple satrap, who had disobeyed the royal commands. It was a contest in which even the most complete success, the destruction of his rivals, would be attended with much odium and danger. This danger was for the present at least shifted on Eumenes, whose distrust of Antipater rendered him worthy of perfect confidence, and who had already displayed military talents not inferior to those of Perdiccas himself. Eumenes therefore was invested with a command which, it seems, extended over the whole of Asia Minor. Alcetas and Neoptolemus were joined with him, but in an inferior rank. His instructions as to military operations appear to have left the management of the war entirely to his discretion, with the single limitation that he was not to carry it over into Europe, but to resist, as he could, the threatened invasion.

The difficulties which Eumenes had to encounter after the departure of Perdiccas, were even greater than the regent could easily have foreseen. It seemed as if he would hardly be able to retain any of his forces about him. He had sent a detachment to secure the passage of the Hellespont; but its commander was induced by a message from Antipater and Craterus to allow them to land their forces without any obstruction. Alcetas declared that, knowing what he did of the temper of the Macedonians, their respect for Antipater, and love for Craterus, he would not undertake to lead them against the enemy. Neoptolemus, who had always been jealous of Eumenes, and affected to consider him as a mere man of letters, not fit to command soldiers, entered into a secret correspondence with Antipater

Eumenes himself was at the same time solicited by Antipater's envoys to betray his trust: they urged him to be reconciled to Antipater, and not to draw the sword against his old friend Craterus: they promised that he should not only retain the provinces assigned to him by Perdiccas, but should receive an addition of territory, and be placed at the head of a larger army. He answered that he would not lay aside his ancient enmity to Antipater at a time when he saw Antipater breaking with his old friends: that for Craterus, he was ready to use his efforts to reconcile him on equitable terms with Perdiccas: but that he would resist their aggression, and would sacrifice his life rather than his honour. The treachery of Neoptolemus did not long escape his vigilance: and Neoptolemus, finding himself detected, threw off the mask and drew up his troops, who eagerly embraced his cause, to offer battle. An engagement took place, in which Eumenes gained the victory: but he owed it entirely to his Cappadocian cavalry, which turned the fortune of the day when it had been nearly lost by the infantry. He made himself master of their camp, and compelled the Macedonian phalanx to lay down their arms and enter into his service. Neoptolemus himself escaped and joined Antipater with about 300 horse. His report, notwithstanding his defeat, was on the whole encouraging, for he declared his belief that the mere sight of Craterus would induce the Macedonians to come over to him in a body. This confidence proved fatal both to Craterus and to himself. Antipater, who was impatient to overtake Perdiccas or to unite his forces with Ptolemy, sent Craterus and Neoptolemus against Eumenes, while he himself pursued his march toward Cilicia.

Neoptolemus had not exaggerated the popularity of Craterus among the Macedonians. Eumenes himself was so well aware of it, that when he heard of their approach, he did not venture to disclose the truth even to his officers, but gave out that Neoptolemus was coming, accompanied by a general named Pigres, at the

head of some Cappadocian and Paphlagonian horse. On the morning of the day when he expected their appearance, he endeavoured to cheer his men with the description of a dream, by which he professed to have received a clear intimation of victory the night before: an artifice, it seems, to which he resorted on other occasions, and which is related so as to imply that he was well informed of all that passed in the enemy's camp.¹ Still the great difficulty, which would have driven most other men to despair, was how the presence of Craterus could be concealed from his army, when he should be actually in their sight. Even for this purpose however he devised an expedient, which was perfectly successful. He had learned beforehand in which wing Craterus commanded, and on this side he stationed two brigades of cavalry, composed of Thracians, Paphlagonians, and other barbarians, under the command of an Asiatic, named Pharnabazus, and Phoenix, a Greek of Tenedos, who probably did not know Craterus by sight. These he ordered to charge, as soon as the enemy should appear, with the utmost vigour, so as to allow him no time to wheel about, and not to listen to any parley if a herald should be sent toward them. His instructions were obeyed. From the brow of an eminence which afforded the first view of the enemy, they poured down furiously to attack Craterus. He was astonished at the rapidity of the onset, began to believe that he had been deceived by Neoptolemus, yet bared his head, that he might be more easily recognised, while he advanced with his wonted courage to encounter their charge. In the combat which ensued, after many feats of prowess, he was pierced through the side by a Thracian, and sank from his horse. For some time he lay unheeded in a lingering agony: he was at length recognised by an officer of Eumenes, named Gorgias, who placed a guard round him to protect him. Meanwhile Eumenes, with a select escort of 800 horse, charged the enemy's right

¹ Plut. Eum. 6. It was adapted to the enemy's watchword,

wing, where Neoptolemus had posted himself. As soon as they perceived each other, they engaged, both thirsting for revenge, in deadly conflict. When their horses met, they dropped the reins, seized each other's hands, and fell struggling to the ground. Eumenes rose first, and twice wounded his adversary: the second blow stretched him, seemingly lifeless, at his feet. The victor proceeded, according to the old savage custom, to tear off his armour: but as he bent over the body, Neoptolemus, collecting his failing strength, pierced him in the groin: yet with a hand already unnerved, so that the wound did not prove fatal. Eumenes, though he had received three others in the struggle, was still able to mount his horse, and, after he had stripped his slain enemy, rode off toward the other wing, ignorant of the event which had there decided the fortune of the day in his favour. He now learnt the fate of Craterus, was conducted to the place where he lay, and found him still breathing, and in possession of his senses. He dismounted from his horse, took his dying friend tenderly by the hand, and with tears and bitter invectives against the treachery of Neoptolemus, bewailed the hard destiny which had brought him into this fatal conflict with his old comrade.

Hitherto the cavalry alone had been engaged, and after the death of the two chiefs, their broken squadrons took refuge behind the phalanx. Eumenes, faint from his wounds, and hoping to reap the fruits of victory without further bloodshed, called off his troops from the pursuit by the sound of the trumpet, reared his trophy, and buried the slain. He then sent to propose a parley with the defeated enemy, invited all who would to join his army, but permitted those who might refuse to return whence they came. All accepted his offers, and after the oaths had been interchanged, obtained leave to seek provisions in some of the adjacent villages, before they entered his camp; but in the course of the following night, they marched away by stealth to rejoin Antipater. Eumenes made an attempt to overtake them;

but his bodily weakness, and their excellent discipline, compelled him to give up the pursuit, and they effected their junction with Antipater in safety. Eumenes had gained a brilliant victory, which raised his reputation for ingenuity and hardihood to the highest pitch: but he was doomed to pay dearly for it. Not only were the defeated troops inflamed with the fiercest resentment by the humiliation they had suffered, and the loss of their favourite leader, but even among his own the prevailing feeling was one of shame and indignation, which vented itself in deep murmurs against the upstart foreigner, who, by an impudent artifice, had employed the arms of the Macedonians themselves to destroy their most illustrious general. And in the meanwhile events had taken place in another quarter, which deprived him of the rewards he had reason to expect from Perdiccas.

Ptolemy, awaiting the approach of the invading army at Pelusium, had taken every precaution to strengthen the natural defences which render Egypt so difficult of access on this side. He had fortified every assailable point, and had laid in ample stores of ammunition. The regent, however, when he arrived, soon discovered that he had other difficulties to encounter, beside those which the nature of the country, and his enemy's preparations placed in his way. Already on his march a great number of his officers and men had deserted to Antipater¹: and he thought it advisable, when he reached Pelusium², to begin with an appeal to the sense of the army on the justice of his cause. He called a general assembly, and it seems summoned Ptolemy to defend his conduct. We cannot believe that Ptolemy appeared there in person, though Arrian seems to have related so³: but it is not

¹ Justin, xlii. 8. 2 ad Antipatrum gregatim profugiebant.

² Παραγινισται ἐπὶ Δαμασκού Περδίκκας ἐκ' Αἰγυπτου. Arrian (Phot. 71. a.) Droysen (i. 1 1/4.) concludes from these words, combined with the following καταρχήσας δι Πτολεμαίου, that Perdiccas accused Ptolemy (by which he understands a formal trial), at Damascus. To me they seem inconsistent with that supposition.

³ Καταρχήσας δι Πτολεμαίου, μέμινεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπολυμένον τὸ μένος.

improbable, that Ptolemy sent one of his friends to represent him. Perdiccas perceived that his accusation made a less favourable impression on the army than Ptolemy's vindication of himself, and that he had nothing to rely on but the success of his arms. Every accidental disaster which befel him in his operations — as the bursting of a canal which he had begun to clear out — aggravated the discontent which prevailed among his troops, and desertions grew more and more frequent. He resolved therefore to make an attempt to cross the river at a point several miles above Pelusium, and having set out in the evening, carefully concealing his object from his own officers that the enemy might not be apprised of it, after a forced march arrived the next morning at a ford of the Nile, over against a fortress named Camel's Wall. After a short interval of repose, he ordered the elephants to be led over, followed by a train with scaling ladders, and by the light troops destined for the assault of the place, and a select body of cavalry to intercept any succours that might be sent to it. Ptolemy however had learnt or suspected the aim of his movement, and was already within the fortress, before the enemy had reached the foot of the walls. His arrival was announced by a flourish of trumpets, and by the shouts of the garrison, and he took his stand, surrounded by his officers, on the top of the battlements at the water's edge. Perdiccas nevertheless directed that the assault should proceed. It was carried on with great vigour the whole day long by successive divisions, which relieved one another: but all their efforts were defeated by the patient resolution of the besieged, who, though comparatively few in number, had the advantage of a strong position, and were animated by the example of Ptolemy, whom they saw exposing his own person in the place of greatest danger, and displaying extraordinary prowess.

In the evening Perdiccas recalled the assailants to the camp, convinced that the attempt was hopeless. He seems to have felt that his adversary's genius and spirit were superior to his own, and that he had no prospect

of effecting his object unless he could elude Ptolemy's vigilance. In the following night he again broke up his camp, and marched towards Memphis, designing to transport his army to the great island there formed by the Nile, before Ptolemy should be aware of his intention. Between the island and the east bank the river was fordable ; but the water in the middle was up to the soldier's chin, and the current so strong, that the men could scarcely keep their footing. There was however no enemy on the other side to oppose their passage ; and to render it easier Perdiccas ordered the elephants to be ranged above the ford, so as to break the force of the stream, and the cavalry to cross below it, so that they might lend assistance to any who should be carried out of their depth. In this manner one division crossed over safely ; but now arose an unforeseen impediment to the passage of the rest. The sand at the bottom, stirred up by the trampling of so many feet of beasts and men, was at length carried away by the stream, so that the ford was no longer practicable. As the cause was not immediately suspected, the change was attributed to a sudden rising of the river, and this persuasion heightened the general consternation. Those who had already crossed were not in sufficient numbers to defend themselves against Ptolemy, who might soon be expected to appear : and Perdiccas knew that they would not be reluctant to lay down their arms. He therefore ordered all to return, as best they might. Some who were unable to swim, or saw certain death in the attempt, or who gladly seized the opportunity of desertion, escaped to the enemy's camp. The strongest and most expert swimmers with great difficulty made good their passage. But the less robust and skilful either sank exhausted by their efforts, or were carried down the stream, to meet a still more dreadful death. The scaly monsters of the Nile, attracted by the prey, flocked in shoals to the place. From the shore the spectators could see the water tinged with the blood of their comrades, could see their limbs

crushed by those horrible jaws, could hear their shrieks, without the power of stirring for their relief.

When this scene was at an end, and there was leisure to calculate the loss, it was ascertained that 2000 were missing, and one half of the number was believed to have been devoured by the crocodiles. Among them were some officers of high rank. The thought which most deeply embittered the grief of the survivors, was that the sacrifice of life had been perfectly useless; that so many brave men had perished by a fate at once cruel and ignoble. From this kind of sympathy it was an easy transition which led the mourners to vehement indignation against the author of the calamity. Perdiccas had always been disliked, while he was feared: he began now to be despised as an incautious general, or detested as one reckless about the lives of his men. The contrast which of late they had so often been led to draw between their stern, imperious, inhuman chief, and his mild and affable competitor, was now renewed, more than ever to the disadvantage of Perdiccas: and Ptolemy heightened the impression already made in his favour by an act of prudent generosity. He collected as many of the remains of those who had perished as could be recovered from the river, and after he had burnt them with the usual solemnity in his own camp, sent their bones to their friends. The sight irritated their rage against Perdiccas, and pleaded more powerfully than words in Ptolemy's behalf. Perdiccas, it seems, attempted to check the mutiny which he saw rising in his army by severity. But it was too late either to conciliate, or overawe the discontented. A great number of his officers were estranged from him: and openly accused him: the phalanx testified its judgment by threatening clamours. Pithon, who had never forgotten the bloody stratagem by which he had been baffled and dishonoured, took the lead in the conspiracy, which was shared by about a hundred more, among whom were Antigenes and Seleucus. The cavalry adhered longest to the regent's side; but it was also partly won, and Pithon with those

whom he had gained, proceeded to the tent of Perdiccas. Antigenes struck the first blow; after a short struggle he fell pierced by their sarissas.¹

Thus was the world delivered from a man, who, in the course of a short career, had shown himself capable of every crime to which ambition can instigate: had already shed torrents of innocent blood, and did not shrink from the basest murder, more than from open massacre. That such a man did not succeed in his contest for power with such an adversary as Ptolemy, can hardly be considered otherwise than as a gain to humanity: though Perdiccas, if he had seated himself securely on a throne, might perhaps have reigned as mildly as his rival. His death immediately put an end to the civil war. Ptolemy, who perhaps was not a stranger to the plot, came the next day to the camp, and addressed the Macedonians in vindication of himself. The effect of his speech was enforced by a supply of provisions which they greatly needed, and his influence was soon so firmly established in the royal army, that he was invited to assume the office which Perdiccas had left vacant. Ptolemy however had the prudence to be satisfied for the present with the possession of his rich province. He saw that the title of regent would contribute nothing to his independence, and might involve him in troublesome and dangerous quarrels. He therefore declined the offer, and turned the choice of the army on Pithon, and the general Arridæus, who were both now his friends, and not likely ever to become dangerous rivals.

Only two days after the death of Perdiccas the news arrived of the great victory which Eumenes had gained over Neoptolemus and Craterus, and of their death. Two days earlier this intelligence might have been useful to Perdiccas, though it could hardly have extricated him from his embarrassment, or have decided the con-

¹ Diodorus (xviii. 36) names only Pithon among the conspirators; Nepos (Eumenes v. 1) only Antigonus and Seleucus. That Antigonus struck the first blow, is mentioned by Arrian (Phot 71 b). Droysen, it seems to me erroneously, supposes that Pithon was not present.

test in his favour. It now only inflamed the hatred of the Macedonians against him and his friends. They immediately put to death several of his adherents, and in their fury did not even spare his sister Atalante, the wife of his admiral, Attalus : and they condemned Eumenes and fifty of his principal officers, including Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, to the same punishment. Attalus, when he heard of these proceedings, sailed away from Pelusium, and made for Tyre. Here, though it seems his brother's fate was already known, he was cordially received by the commander of the garrison, a Macedonian named Archelaus, who put him in possession of the city, and of the treasure, amounting to 800 talents, which had been deposited there by Perdiccas. At Tyre he remained for a time, to collect as many of his brother's friends as should be able to make their escape from Egypt, and to concert future operations in his own defence.

For the interests of Greece the fall of Perdiccas was perhaps to be regretted. As a master indeed he was as much to be dreaded as any of his rivals : but he might have proved a powerful and useful ally. Pausanias observes that, through the treachery of Demades and his party, the Athenians were terrified into a premature surrender of their freedom, which they might have preserved, if they had been aware of the danger that threatened Antipater, which would soon have forced him to leave Greece unmolested.¹ This remark is confirmed by the events which followed. Perdiccas had sent agents into Greece, who concluded an alliance between him and the Ætolians : and when Antipater had passed over into Asia, the Ætolians again collected their forces, 12,000 foot, and 800 horse, who, under their general Alexander—the military chief of the nation—first invaded the territory of Amphissa, and, though they were not able to reduce the capital, took several of the towns, and then marched into Thessaly. They were met on their way by the Macedonian general Polycles : but in a battle which

¹ VII. 10. 4.

ensued, he was defeated and slain, and the sale or ransom of the Macedonian prisoners appears to have yielded a considerable booty. In Thessaly they were still warmly aided by Meno, through whose influence the greater part of the Thessalian towns were induced to engage in the new war: and the army of the confederates, including it seems some mercenaries, amounted to 25,000 horse and 1,500 foot. Again the power of Macedonia was unable to withstand even this small portion of the force which Greece, if united, might have brought into the field. Polysperchon, who had been left at the head of the government in Macedonia, was obliged to resort to negotiation and intrigues, to divide, before he could conquer. The Acarnanians, the ancient enemies of their southern neighbours, were induced to make a diversion in Ætolia; and the Ætolians were obliged to withdraw their native troops from Thessaly, and to return to defend their homes. They indeed soon drove the Acarnanians out of their country: but while they were thus employed, Polysperchon marched into Thessaly, and gave battle to Meno. He was probably now greatly superior in numbers, gained a decisive victory, and Meno himself was among the slain. The whole of Thessaly submitted without further resistance to the conqueror.

After the pacification of Memphis, Pithon and Arridæus returned with their royal charge into Syria, to join their forces with those of Antipater, on whom, after Ptolemy had declined the regency, the power of Perdiccas really devolved. They sent messengers to hasten his coming, and also to summon Antigonus from Cyprus, where he was perhaps raising a naval armament for the defence of Egypt. The two new regents, on their march into Syria, found their situation growing every day more embarrassing. They had not to deal with an imbecile prince, who passively lent his name to every measure that was prescribed to him, but with an enterprising young queen, ambitious of power, who inherited her mother's hatred of Antipater, and who hoped before he arrived to make herself independent of

his authority. She had quailed before the commanding energy of Perdiccas ; but she entertained no such fear of Pithon and Arridæus : and claimed her share in all the deliberations of the council. They indeed repelled her prétensions, and declared that, until Antipater and Antigonus came, they would continue to exercise the supreme authority. But she did not cease to intrigue with the army, in which she had acquired great influence by her birth and character. She had also, it seems, entered into a negotiation with Attalus : and he was induced by the prospect of a counter-revolution, to quit Tyre, and to appear in the Macedonian camp. Such was the state of things which Antipater found, when he joined the regents at the town of Paradisus, or Triparadisus, in Upper Syria.

It was to him that all demands were now to be addressed. The Macedonians of the royal army, who had served in the East, claimed the pay and rewards which had been promised to them by Alexander. Antipater did not venture to refuse : but professed that he must first inquire into the state of the royal treasury, and would then endeavour to satisfy them to the utmost of his power. This answer might perhaps have appeased them, if their discontent had not been fomented by the arts of Eurydice and Attalus¹ : but the queen seized the pretext to excite the impatient soldiery against him. She harangued them in a speech which had been composed for her by Asclepiodorus, who filled the office held under Alexander by Eumenes. Attalus seconded her with his eloquence ; they were listened to with universal applause, and a tumultuous scene ensued, from which Antipater, who had ventured almost alone into the camp, escaped with great risk of

¹ Arrian ap Phot. c 92 p 71 b καὶ Ἀττάλος δὲ Droysen (Nachf. : 145) observes that " this Attalus is of course not the brother-in-law of Perdiccas " and his appearance in the Macedonian camp is certainly surprising. Nevertheless the Attalus mentioned in this part of the extract from Arrian seems to be afterwards most clearly identified with the admiral, by the words (p 72 a.) οὗτος κατὰ Ἀντιπατρὸς στασιασὶς αὐτὸς εἶπεν τὰ διωγνῆα, of which Droysen takes no notice, but which I can only explain as an allusion to the sedition at Triparadisus.

his life, through the mediation of Antigonus and Seleucus, to his own troops.¹ The intercessors themselves were violently threatened. The cavalry however declared itself in his favour; and its leading officers successfully exerted their influence to restore tranquillity. We know no more of the steps through which Antipater was invested by the army with the supreme power, but Attalus disappears — having returned, it seems, to Tyre — Eurydice is silenced; and Antipater is permitted to make such changes as he thought fit in the distribution of the provinces.

Among the particulars of this new arrangement, which is celebrated as the partition of Triparadisus, a few only need be here mentioned. Ptolemy not only retained Egypt, which was now looked upon as his own by right of conquest, but was also invested with all the territories which he had acquired, or might conquer, to the west of his province. Seleucus received the satrapy of Babylon; and Antigonus was rewarded with that of Susiana for the share he had taken in the revolt against Perdiccas. About three thousand of the most turbulent of the Macedonians, who belonged to the class distinguished by the title of the Argyraspids, from their silver shields, were placed under his orders, to serve as an escort for the treasure which he was directed to bring down from Susa. Arridæus was appointed to the Hellespontinè Phrygia; Antigonus was reinstated in his old province, and was also promoted to the command of the army which had served under Perdiccas, and charged with the care of the royal personages, and with the prosecution of the war against Eumenes. The only precaution which Antipater took to prevent any abuse of this vast power with which he entrusted a man, who, though deeply indebted to him, had not given him any clear proofs of attachment, was to place his son Cassander, with the title of chiliarch, at the head of the cavalry. He also conferred the rank of somatophylax

¹ Arrian, Phot p 71 b. Polyænus has dressed up the story into a stratagem of Antigonus, iv. 6. 4.

on Autolycus, Amyntas, a brother of Peucestes, Ptolemæus, and Alexander, the son of his friend Pylæperchon. These he had probably reason to consider as persons devoted to himself. The approbation with which his measures were received is described as most lively and universal. They were indeed an appearance of moderation and disinterestedness, worthy of his consummate prudence. He then set out with his own troops on his return to Macedonia, taking the road through Lydia to the Hellespont; while Antigonus, it seems, marched into his own satrapy, to make preparations for the war against Eumenes.

It was a great change that the revolution which had taken place in the government of the empire made in the position of Eumenes. He had been hitherto uniformly contending on the side of legitimate authority: if he was attached to Perdiccas, it was not as to his patron, but as to the lawful regent: if he was opposed to Antipater, it was not as to his private enemy, but as to one who had taken up arms against his sovereign. This was the only footing on which as a foreigner he could stand with safety in the midst of the civil wars of the Macedonians. Now the state of things on which he had grounded his hopes was completely reversed. All the titles behind which he had shielded himself were turned as weapons against him: the court was in the hands of his worst enemy: he was himself outlawed and proscribed in the name of his sovereign: every step he took in his own defence exposed him to the charge of treason and rebellion: he was left to depend entirely on the adherents he could preserve or gain by his personal influence: and this was much shaken by the connection with Perdiccas, which had been his main support. On the other hand he maintained his correspondence with the royal family of Macedonia, which gave some colour of legitimacy to his proceedings. He was still at the head of a strong and victorious army: and there were other adherents of Perdiccas proscribed like himself, from whom he might expect powerful aid. Alcetas, though he had refused to lead his division

against Craterus, seemed now to have no prospect of safety but in union with him: and Attalus, after his return from Triparadisus, had collected a body of 10,000 foot and 800 horse. The combination of all these forces with his own might have enabled him to defy any attack. But both Alcetas and Attalus, beside that they probably shared the common jealousy of him, and had always submitted impatiently to his command, had each his separate views; and the plans which they had formed for their own security and aggrandizement were quite independent of his concurrence. The aim of Attalus was, it seems, to establish himself with his fleet and army in some maritime settlement. Alcetas hoped to find a permanent refuge in Pisidia, and to become in fact master of the province. With this view he had taken great pains to efface the recollection of his brother's cruelty, and to conciliate the goodwill of the natives, by liberality, marks of distinction, and affable demeanour. By these arts he so won the affections of the mountaineers, that they were ready to lay down their lives for him. Still it appears that he had opened a communication with Attalus, and that they had concerted a plan for mutual co-operation. Their project seems to have been, to make themselves masters of a part of the southern coast of Asia Minor, so as to provide a retreat for either in case of need, and to enable them readily to take advantage of any new turn of affairs, whether in Asia or Europe. It was toward Rhodes and the opposite coast of Caria, that Attalus directed his first attempts; but he was repulsed by the Rhodians, and, it seems, defeated in a sea-fight. We hear no more of his naval armament; perhaps his loss in the battle had been so great, that he did not think himself able to keep the sea: and he certainly joined his land-force with that of Alcetas.

It was about this time that Antipater arrived in Lydia. It may be concluded that the forces of Eumenes, Alcetas, and Attalus, combined, might have obstructed his march, and have placed him in great peril, since Eumenes thought himself alone strong enough, on account of

the superiority of his cavalry, to encounter him, and advanced as far as Sardis to offer battle in the adjacent plain. He was however induced to withdraw by the persuasions of Cleopatra, who was still at Sardis, and feared that the movements of Eumenes might be imputed to her instigation, and that she might fall the first victim of Antipater's vengeance. She had reason for such anxiety; Antipater, when he arrived at Sardis, reproached her with the countenance she had shown to Perdiccas and Eumenes. It seems that she was obliged to defend herself in public: and she met the accusation with counter-charges, and cleared herself so ably, that Antipater thought it prudent to let the matter drop, and a formal reconciliation took place between them. Though Eumenes was still at no great distance, Antipater did not feel confidence enough in the strength of his army to seek an engagement with him; and his attention was now drawn toward the movements of Alcetas and Attalus. We do not know either the precise object or scene of their operations: but Antipater ordered Asander, the satrap of Caria, to stop their progress. The result was an engagement, in which, though the fortune of the day inclined but little on either side, it finally rested with them. Still Eumenes, though he invited them by an embassy, could not prevail on them to join him. They perhaps thought themselves safer in Pisidia, especially as Antigonus had now led the royal army into Phrygia.

Antipater did not proceed from Sardis directly on his march toward the Hellespont. He was induced, it seems, by letters which he received from Cassander and Antigonus, to deviate from his route in order to meet them in Phrygia. Antigonus complained of Cassander's insubordination: Cassander charged Antigonus with ambitious designs, and in his next interview with his father, strongly urged him not to leave so great a trust in hands which might soon be turned against himself. Antipater, though he openly censured his son for his want of deference to the commander-in-chief, was not the less imbued with his suspicions. His confidence

was indeed in some degree revived by the respectful address and the seeming honour and probity of Antigonus; but still, before he resumed his march, he made some changes in his previous arrangements. He determined to carry the royal persons with him to Macedonia. This he seems to have regarded as a sufficient precaution against the rivalry of Antigonus. On the other hand, to ensure his success against Eumenes, he is said to have transferred to his command a large part of the forces which he had brought from Europe—between 8000 and 9000 Macedonians, and cavalry, or light troops, in equal number.¹ But he retained seventy, being one half of the elephants, which had never yet been seen in Europe, for himself. One motive for the extraordinary liberality with which Antipater weakened his own army to strengthen that of Antigonus, may have been that he found himself unable to satisfy the demands of his men; whether for arrears of pay, or for a donative which he may have promised to keep them in good humour at Triparadisus. The supply of treasure which he had received from Alexander had been exhausted in the subsequent wars, and the Macedonians were again growing clamorous. It was with difficulty he could quiet them with an assurance that

¹ Arrian, Phot. 72 b. Droysen conceives that it was only an exchange, and that Antipater took almost the whole of the royal army away with him to Europe. The only ground he assigns for this conjecture is, that it is afterward said of Antipater's troops: *στασιάζει πάλιν ὁ στρατός αὐτῶν τα χρεῖματα*: words which certainly appear to refer to the previous demand of the royal army. Yet this is not so clear, as it is that Photius, when he used the expressions, *ἐπιλασθῆναι—ἀντιπέραι—ὡς ἂν διαπολεμήσειεν τὸν πρὸς Εὐμένην πόλεμον*, did not understand Arrian's meaning to have been, that Antipater showed the strongest mark of suspicion, and deprived Antigonus of the best troops he had to carry on the war with Eumenes. As to the argument which Droysen puts into Antipater's mouth, that it might be dangerous to employ such turbulent troops, who had been long in the service of Perdiccas, against Eumenes, it seems to have very little weight, since Perdiccas was abhorred by those who had served under him, and Eumenes was more hated by the old army on account of the death of Craterus, than he could be by the fresh troops who had served under Craterus but a very short time. The means of securing the fidelity of the army by the payment which it demanded were more readily to be found in Asia than in Europe. The words in Photius relating to the cavalry: *ἰστίαι τῶν ἵππων* (al. *ἵππων*) *ἵππων*, are very obscure. Droysen thinks they mean as many as Antigonus had before. We find him immediately after opposed to Eumenes with 9000 horse. I have thought it possible that in the abridgment of Arrian *ἰστίαι* may include troops of other kinds.

he would satisfy them when they reached Abydos. There he embarked clandestinely in the night with the princes, and having crossed over to the Chersonesus, repaired to Lysimachus, who was in the neighbourhood. The army followed him across the Hellespont, but, overawed perhaps by Lysimachus, did not venture immediately to urge its claim; otherwise the man who had just been disposing of the whole empire, might have returned to his own province a defenceless fugitive.

It was late in the year 321 before he left Asia. Eumenes fixed his winter quarters at Celænæ, and Antigonus in some other part of Phrygia. In the following spring Antigonus opened the campaign. Eumenes was superior in cavalry, and did not fear to meet the enemy in open combat on even ground; but he was in continual danger from his own troops, and a series of stratagems and contrivances was necessary to provide them with pay, to secure their fidelity, and to baffle the attempts of the enemy who was constantly tampering with them. A price of 100 talents was set on his head, and the reward was published in his own camp by written notices. But his Macedonians had sufficient sense of honour to resent this base temptation, and they decreed that a guard of a thousand select men should be appointed to protect him. Still Antigonus continued to rest his hopes mainly on treachery, and this at length effected his object. He first induced a general, named Perdikkas, to desert with a division of 3000 foot and 500 horse. But through the activity of Eumenes the traitor was overtaken and punished, with his principal abettors, and the troops won by clemency to return to their duty. A second similar attempt proved more successful. Eumenes had encamped in one of the broad plains of southern Cappadocia, where there was ample space for the evolutions of his cavalry, and confidently expected the enemy's approach. But Antigonus had corrupted one of his officers named Apollonides, who commanded a brigade of horse: he deserted in the midst of the battle

with the whole of his division, and his treachery decided the day in favour of Antigonus. Eumenes lost 8000 men and all his baggage. He however not only eluded the enemy's pursuit, but by a dexterous counter-march returned to the field of battle, where he encamped and paid the last honours to the slain, employing the timber of the dwellings in the adjacent villages for the funeral piles, and raised separate barrows over the remains of the officers and men — monuments of his hardihood and presence of mind which excited the admiration of Antigonus himself, when he again passed that way. The two armies were still sometimes so near each other, that Eumenes once had an opportunity of making himself master of the whole of the enemy's baggage, which would have enriched his troops with an immense booty. He feared that the possession of such wealth would render them eager to quit his toilsome and perilous service, sent secret warning under the pretext of private friendship to Menander, the general who had been left in charge of the baggage, and enabled him to withdraw into an unsailable position. This seemingly generous action excited the gratitude of the Macedonians, whose wives and children it had saved from slavery and dishonour, till Antigonus pointed out to them that Eumenes had spared them only that he might not encumber himself.

At length however Eumenes himself, after an unsuccessful attempt to escape into Armenia, seeing his ranks thinned by frequent desertions, thought it best to put an end to this life of perpetual wandering, fatigue, and hairbreadth escapes, which could lead to no useful result, and he recommended to the greater part of his men to return to their homes, and wait for better times. He reserved only 500 horse and 200 heavy-armed, with which he took refuge in the impregnable fortress of Nora, on the confines of Lycaonia and Cappadocia.¹ It

¹ Kinneir (*Journey through Asia Minor*, p. 110.) says: "On quitting Kara hissar (Castabala, according to him) at day-break, we followed a narrow path conducting us through the gorges of a chain of hills immediately to the west of the town. At the end of the third mile we passed under a high

was a rock, not more than about two stadia in circumference at the top, and precipitous on all sides, containing a copious spring of water, and a well-filled magazine of grain and salt, but no other kind of provisions. Seeing that many of his friends were dismayed by the prospect of the dreary imprisonment which awaited them during a long siege in such a place, he permitted them to depart, and dismissed them with expressions of the kindest regard. Antigonus soon surrounded the place with his army, and invested it with a double line of circumvallation. But, as he could scarcely suppose that Eumenes could intend to sustain a siege, he invited him to a parley. Eumenes would neither treat with him as his superior, nor consent to come down, until he had received his brother Ptolemæus as a hostage. He then repaired to his camp, and they embraced each other with the cordiality of old friends. But when they began to discuss conditions, Eumenes insisted on nothing less than the restitution of his satrapy, and of all the grants he had received from Perdiccas. The bystanders were astonished at such demands from a man whose situation seemed so hopeless: and Antigonus desiring to leave an opening for future negotiation, promised to refer them to Antipater, and sent him back to the fortress. The Macedonians crowded about him, eager to gaze on the extraordinary person whose name, since the death of Craterus, was in every mouth. They were surprised to see, not the frame of a sturdy warrior, worn with toil and hardships, but a figure of the most delicate symmetry, seemingly in all the freshness of youth¹, with a gentle and engaging aspect. The impatience of their curiosity alarmed Antigonus for his

and perpendicular rock crowned with an ancient fortress, called by the natives Yengi Bar, or Nour, and well known in history by the name of Nora, where Eumenes stood a siege against Antigonus" He adds in a note, "The castle of Nora is stated to have been two stadia in circumference, and that of Yengi Bar exactly corresponds" He does not say how he ascertained this exact correspondence; but altogether these coincidences, with the position (which agrees with Droysen's conjecture), seem to leave little doubt as to the identity.

¹ *Παύρος καὶ νεώτερος*. Plut. Eum. 11. He was however at this time past forty.

safety : he ordered them to keep at a distance, and at last throwing his arm round the waist of Eumenes, conducted him through a passage formed by his guards to the foot of the fortress. He then left a force sufficient closely to blockade the place, and marched away to crush the remaining friends of Perdiccas.

His army was strengthened by a great part of the troops of Eumenes, so that it now amounted to 40,000 foot and 7000 horse. His only care now was to prevent the enemy's escape. By a forced march, he reached the borders of Pisidia in seven days, and, arriving thus unexpectedly, was enabled to occupy a pass which might have been easily secured. Alcetas and Attalus were encamped in the plain below. Their army numbered no more than 16,000 foot and 900 horse. Alcetas made a desperate attempt to dislodge the enemy from the heights, but was repulsed, and with difficulty effected his retreat through the hostile cavalry, with which Antigonus descended to cut him off from the main body. He had scarcely time to form his line of battle, before the enemy poured down in an irresistible mass, with the advantage of higher ground. Terror and confusion spread through his ranks, and excluded every thought but that of flight. Attalus, with Polemo, Docimus, and several others of his chief officers, was taken prisoner. The bulk of the fugitives laid down their arms, and consented to enter the service of Antigonus. But Alcetas with his guards, some slaves whom he had armed¹, and 6000 of his trusty Pisidians, made good his retreat to Termessus. Antigonus immediately proceeded to encamp near the place, which was so strong as to defy the assault of the most numerous host. He only desired to become master of the person of Alcetas, and sent to demand him. The elder Pisidians had no wish to endanger their city for the sake of a single stranger : but the young warriors who had served under Alcetas, refused to surrender him,

¹ Παίδαν, Diodor xviii 45 Pages, according to Droysen: yet they seem the same as the δούλοι who are mentioned in the next chapter.

bade him rely on their devotion, and resolved to defend him to the last.¹ The old men now sent a private message to Antigonos, promising to deliver up Alcetas, alive or dead, if he would draw the younger citizens out of the town by a feigned attack. When this had been done, they fell upon Alcetas, who was left without any guard but his slaves. To avoid capture he slew himself; and his body placed on a couch was carried out to Antigonos, who ordered it to be mutilated, and at the end of three days marched away. The young Pisidians, in the first transports of their indignation, resolved to fire the town, and retiring to the mountains, to ravage the open country, which acknowledged the authority of Antigonos; and, though they were diverted from this design, they did not cease to infest this territory by marauding excursions. The body of Alcetas, which had been left unburied, they honoured with a splendid funeral.

By the result of this campaign, Antigonos was brought a great step nearer to the end of his ambition. His army was now raised to 60,000 foot and 10,000 horse: and there was no limit to the numbers by which he might augment it, by means of the treasures which it placed at his disposal. He saw no power in Asia that could resist such a force, and might safely, whenever he would, lay aside the character of a subject, and profess the independence which he actually possessed, and which he was fully resolved to maintain. Yet a lingering feeling of gratitude and respect for Antipater might have induced him to dissemble his designs sometime longer. But all his scruples were removed by intelligence, which he received before he had repassed the borders of Pisidia, of Antipater's death, and especially of the state in which he had left the affairs of Macedonia. Antipater had

¹ This contest between the old and the young may perhaps remind some readers of one of Niebuhr's beautiful discoveries in Roman history (vol. i. p. 832). Here however we have only a natural result of the difference in age and circumstances. The young men are those of military age. No such explanation presents itself of the feud described by Polybius (iv. 53.) between the *neotatavoi* and *pauciores* at Gortys. But so, in the siege of Florence in 1530, we find the *giovani* and *vecchi* taking opposite sides. (Varchi, *Storia Fiorentina*, l. xii. princ.)

been carried off by the combined effects of age and disease. His death gave occasion to very important revolutions both in Asia and in Greece.

After the peace which the Athenians had purchased so dearly, the city remained as tranquil as Phocion himself could have desired. The business of the public assembly, and of the courts of justice, seldom interrupted the private affairs of the 9000 citizens: when they met, they were no longer agitated by the declamations of any brawling orators.¹ The most simple expression of Phocion's opinion, or of the judgment of his good friend Menyllus, was sufficient to decide every question. Athens, in her more turbulent days, had witnessed many combinations between orators and generals for political purposes: but few in which there had been so complete an understanding between the parties, none so efficacious, as this. His own independence and dignity however Phocion maintained unimpaired. He would neither accept any presents, such as he had declined when offered by Alexander, from Menyllus, or Antipater, for himself, nor permit his son Phocus to receive any. So that it was remarked by Antipater that, of his two Athenian friends, he could neither prevail on Phocion to take, nor satiate Demades by giving. Phocion ventured even to resist Antipater's will, when he was required to become himself the instrument of some unseemly measure, and sternly observed, that Antipater could not have him at once for a friend, and a flatterer. If there was any thing to disturb the complacency with which Phocion contemplated this calm and orderly state of affairs, it was perhaps the petulance of Demades, who, like a satyr by the side of a heroic person, would be committing some extravagance, or making some roguish speech, which tended to destroy the illusion of his graver friend's administration. He not only took pleasure in an ostentatious display of his ill-gotten wealth, but was proud of the corruption from which it was de-

¹ Suidas, Δημάδης. Antipater, κατιλυσί τα δικαστήρια καὶ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἐγγυῖαι.

rived. When he celebrated the marriage of his bastard Demeas, he observed that the wedding-feast was furnished by kings and rulers. Another time he had undertaken to defray the expense of a chorus, and as the law forbade the employing of foreign performers under a penalty of a thousand drachmas for each, Demades produced a chorus consisting of a hundred foreigners, and exhibited the amount of the penalties—a sum sufficient to have preserved fifty citizens from transportation—with them in the orchestra. It was perhaps during this period, which seemed to realise Plato's ideal of a commonwealth governed by a philosopher, that Demades proposed to Phocion to introduce the Spartan discipline at Athens, and offered himself to draw up and recommend a decree for that purpose. "A fit advocate indeed," Phocion observed, "for Spartan fare, and the institutions of Lycurgus, with that rich cloak, and that scent of perfumes."¹

At bottom however Demades was not entirely satisfied with Phocion's ascendancy. Though he enjoyed all the license he could wish, his importance in the state, and consequently his opportunities of enriching himself, were not such as he could have desired. We may collect from the above-quoted saying of Antipater, that Demades was continually applying to him for money, and did not always obtain as much as he asked. Accordingly when the movements, and partial success, of Perdiccas appeared to hold out a prospect of a revolution in Greece, Demades turned his eyes toward him as a patron, who might have greater need of his aid, and therefore would probably pay more liberally than Antipater. He resolved at all events to provide for his own safety, so as not to be involved in Antipater's fall; and sent a letter to Perdiccas, in which he urged him to appear, and save Greece. *which was hanging by an old rotten thread.*² The time was at hand, when his policy and his wit were to cost him dear.

¹ Plut. Phoc. 20

² Σωζων τοῦ: "Ἑλλῆσας ἀπὸ σαφροῦ καὶ παλαιῦ στήμονος ἤρτημαίοντες (A. G.)

It might have been supposed that the government established by Phocion was at least perfectly conformable to the wishes of the citizens whose franchise had been spared. They were now plagued by no sycophants, taxed for no wars, had no entertainments to provide for a hungry multitude. Yet the garrison at Munychia, which secured the continuance of these blessings, was an eyesore to them. They desired to be rid of it, as eagerly as if they had been impatient of the government which it supported: and Phocion was repeatedly urged to exert his interest with Antipater for its removal, as he had induced him hitherto to postpone the exaction of the sum imposed on them at the peace. Phocion however declined to undertake an embassy in which he neither expected nor wished to succeed. A call was then made on Demades, as the person next in influence with Antipater: it was an opportunity for earning a bribe; and in an evil hour he accepted the commission, and set out for Macedonia accompanied by his son Demas. They found Antipater in the last stage of his disorder, but yet strong enough to give audience to the ambassador: and willing perhaps to enjoy his confusion in the scene which was prepared for him. Antipater was in possession of the letter—which had been found among the papers of Perdiccas—in which Demades had at once betrayed and ridiculed his benefactor. He was introduced into Antipater's presence, and permitted to unfold his business, and urged the petition of the Athenians with his wonted boldness. Antipater it seems did not deign to answer him: but an Athenian named Dinarchus who, as a friend of Phocion, had perhaps been sent to oppose his application, became his accuser. The fatal letter was probably produced, and now, for the first time in his life, his impudence may have failed him. He and his son were led away by Antipater's guards to

rian, Phot. p 70 a. Plutarch, Demosth. 31. less accurately, Phoc 30) But there seems to be no ground for Droysen's interpretation of the metaphor, as if it represented the Greek states as a bundle, kept together by a thread.

a dungeon. It is not quite clear whether Antipater himself had doomed them to death: it was at least Cassander who directed the execution. He ordered Demeas to be put to death first: he was pierced by the swords of the soldiers immediately under his father's eye, so that his blood sprinkled the old man's robe: and then Demades, having witnessed this end of one who was perhaps the only being he loved, after he had been loaded with reproaches by Cassander for his treachery and ingratitude, underwent a like fate.¹ A termination, which might have appeared almost too tragical for so contemptible a life, if he had not been the man who, to serve Antipater, proposed the decree which sentenced so many better men to death.

It may probably be collected from the share which Cassander is said to have taken in this scene, that he had already, during the latter part of his father's illness, begun to exercise some of the functions of the government, which, as he expected, was shortly to devolve on him. He was at least no less surprised than mortified, when Antipater, on the point of death, declared his will to be, that Polysperchon should succeed to the regency, and that his son should continue in the subordinate station of chiliarch. Antipater's motive in this arrangement is indeed by no means evident: Polysperchon was no way related to him: and though much respected by the Macedonians as one of the oldest generals of Alexander's wars, can never, as the sequel shows, have earned the reputation of eminent ability: while Cassander had already given sufficient proofs of his energy and talents. We can hardly conclude otherwise, than that his father distrusted his character and temper, which were certainly far from amiable, and perhaps had already made him unpopular in Macedonia, and were likely to lead him to an immediate rupture with Antigonus, whom he had already provoked. Yet Cassander was not wanting in self-command. He dissembled his indignation, pretended to

¹ Arrian, *Phot.* 70. a. Plutarch, *Phot.* 30 Diodorus, *xviii* 48

resign himself to his father's pleasure, and withdrew into the country with a few intimate friends, under the pretext of the chase, in which he seemed to have forgotten the affairs of the state. But the time ostensibly devoted to his hunting-parties, was really spent in earnest conference with his friends on the subject which engrossed his thoughts. He acquainted them with his resolution to recover what he considered as his patrimony, and engaged them by large promises to embrace his cause. At the same time he sent secret agents to Ptolemy, who had probably already married his sister, to renew their friendship, and implore succours, and particularly to request that he would send a naval force to the Hellespont from Phœnicia. For not long after the transactions at Triparadisus, Ptolemy had sent Nicander, one of his generals, with an army into Syria; the satrap Laomedon, who had rejected Ptolemy's offers¹, had fallen into Nicanor's hands, and the whole province had submitted to him.² The part of Asia which contained all the elements of a maritime power in the greatest abundance, was thus annexed to Egypt; and the manner in which this invaluable acquisition was made, proved more clearly than ever, that to Ptolemy at least the imperial government, the titles and decrees of the regents, were mere empty sounds. Cassander at the same time endeavoured by means of his agents to interest other leading persons, and some foreign princes, in his behalf. Among the precautions which he took to secure his interests, one was to send a trusty adherent, named Nicanor, to succeed Menyllus in the command of Munychia. Nicanor arrived before the news of Antipater's death had been received at Athens, and took possession of Munychia without opposition. When the tidings were made public, loud murmurs arose against Phocion, as having

¹ Appian, Syr. 52 who adds that Laomedon afterwards escaped, and joined Alcetas in Caria.

² Droysen combines this expedition of Nicanor with the capture of Jerusalem on the sabbath related by Agatharchides in Josephus, Ant. xii 1. and in Apion, i 22. But according to Agatharchides Ptolemy surprised Jerusalem in person.

connived at the deception: and the suspicion was confirmed by his intimacy with Nicanor, though he still exerted his influence with him in behalf of his fellow-citizens, and even induced him, among other popular acts, to accept the office of president at one of their public games. In Macedonia Cassander saw no prospect of forming a party powerful enough to withstand Polysperchon, who was generally esteemed; and therefore, while he continued to lull suspicion, made preparations for a clandestine flight. He received a favourable answer from Ptolemy; but it was from Antigonus that he determined first to seek protection; though he gave him no notice of his intention, well knowing that he would not suffer the remembrance of their quarrel to outweigh the grounds of policy, which must induce him to espouse the cause of Polysperchon's enemy.

Antigonus no sooner heard of Antipater's death, than he proceeded with a steady hand to grasp the prize which lay before him. His immediate object was to secure himself in the possession of Asia Minor, before Polysperchon could collect his forces to interfere with him. And his first step for this end was to attempt to draw Eumenes over to his side. Eumenes indeed was apparently powerless, and in a condition more desperate than ever. He was still blockaded at Nora, without any prospect of relief. It was only by extraordinary expedients, suggested by his fruitful genius, that he had kept the bodies and spirits of his followers from sinking under the privations and hardships which they had been suffering during a year's siege. The ground afforded no room for the accustomed exercises of the men, still less for those of the horses. For the latter he contrived a substitute, which was among the most celebrated examples of his never-failing ingenuity. He caused the heads of the horses to be raised by ropes fastened to the roof of the stable, so that their fore feet barely touched the ground. In this uneasy position, they were lashed from behind by the grooms, until the struggle, which strained every limb, had produced all the effects of a

hard ride. For the men he set apart a room, one-and-twenty feet long, where he directed them to walk, gradually quickening their pace, so as to combine exercise with amusement. He received them all by turns at his own table, and though he had nothing but the common fare to set before them, he seasoned the plain unvaried meal by his cheerful and lively conversation. At the end of the year both horses and men were in as good health, and as ready for action, as when they entered the fortress.

Antigonus had formed a just estimate of the extraordinary abilities of Eumenes. He knew that, if he recovered his liberty, he might in a few days become a formidable adversary: and that the siege might be raised by succours from some quarter or other. He would perhaps before have granted the terms which Eumenes demanded, if he had not been restrained by regard to Antipater's enmity. He now sent Hieronymus of Cardia, a friend of Eumenes, who afterwards wrote the history of his life, to solicit his alliance, and to propose an agreement, by which on that condition alone Eumenes was to recover his province, and all the other gifts which he had received from Perdiccas. The agreement was drawn up in writing: it mentioned the royal family, for form sake, at the beginning: but the pledge of fidelity was to be given to Antigonus alone. Eumenes affected to consider this as an oversight: he inserted the names of Olympias and the princes, and made the treaty to run as a promise of allegiance to them, and to Antigonus only as acting in their behalf. The Macedonians unanimously approved of the alteration, and not suspecting that it was contrary to their general's wishes, took the oath from Eumenes, and allowed him to depart. In a short time he had collected a number of his old troops who were still scattered over the country, and had a body of more than 2000 horse under his standard. In the meanwhile the agreement was sent back to be ratified by Antigonus, who, when it was too late, despatched his orders to continue the blockade,

with a sharp rebuke to those who had accepted the amendment of his proposals.

He had not waited for the issue of this negotiation, but had already turned his arms against the satraps of the western coast. Arridæus had afforded him a welcome pretext, by an unsuccessful attempt to make himself master of Cyzicus. Antigonus came, as to its relief, a little too late to seize it for himself, and then required Arridæus to resign his satrapy. Arridæus answered him with open defiance, threw garrisons into the principal towns of his province, and sent a body of troops to raise the siege of Nora. Antigonus detached a division of his army against him, and marched in person with the rest, into Lydia, where Cleitus, Antipater's admiral, had been appointed in the room of Menander by the partition of Triparadisus. Cleitus likewise garrisoned his chief cities, and then sailed away with his fleet, which contained the captured Athenian vessels, to Macedonia, to warn Polysperchon. Antigonus however took Ephesus by assault, with some aid from within, just in time to seize four gallees which put into the harbour, having on board 600 talents, which they were conveying from Cilicia, where the treasure brought by Antigones from Susa had been deposited in the fortress of Quinda, for the supply of the royal coffers. He calmly declared that he needed it for his own levies. While he was engaged in the reduction of the other Lydian towns, Cassander, having crossed the Hellespont, arrived at his camp, and besought his protection. Antigonus received him as the son of his benefactor, with the warmest welcome, and readily promised to supply him with ships and men to vindicate his rights. No event could have been more seasonable than one which enabled him to keep Polysperchon fully employed in Europe, while he himself established his dominion in Asia.

Polysperchon was well aware of the storm which threatened him from the East. He saw his means reduced, through Antipater's imprudent confidence, to

the possession of Macedonia, and a title which was every day losing more of its power over public opinion. It was a time when no aid was to be despised. There were three quarters to which he might look for support: and he addressed himself to each without delay. The name of Olympias had great weight in Macedonia, and wherever else Alexander's memory was revered. Polysperchon saw that she might be a useful ally to him, not only against Cassander, but against Eurydice, who, as she had submitted reluctantly to Antipater, would probably be no less eager to shake off the authority of his successor. He must have been aware that he had himself something to apprehend from the ambition of Olympias, but might think that in the presence of so many common enemies, their joint interests would keep them closely united. He therefore wrote to invite her to leave Epirus, and to come and take charge of her infant grandson. Still more efficacious assistance was to be expected from Eumenes: and to him also he addressed a letter in the king's name, exhorting him to persevere in hostility to Antigonus, now in open revolt, and to adhere to the royal cause. It left him to choose, whether he would join the regent in Macedonia, and share his office, or would prosecute the war with Antigonus in Asia. It confirmed all the grants that had been made to him by Perdiccas, and appointed him to the command of the king's forces in the East. He was also informed that orders had been sent to Antigones and Teutamus, to put him in possession of the treasure which they had brought from Susa, and to place themselves with their troops under his command, and he was empowered to take 500 talents for his own use, to indemnify him for his past losses. Polysperchon offered, if necessary, to go over to Asia in person with the royal family and all the forces he could raise, to support him. About the same time Eumenes received a letter from Olympias, also intreating him, in the name of his ancient loyalty, to take Alexander's infant son under his protection; and she requested his advice on Poly-

Polysperchon's proposals to herself. He did not need these pressing appeals to his honour, to determine the course which he should take. He had seen it clearly from the beginning: nothing had occurred to change his views; the recent events confirmed them. We need not doubt that he was sincerely attached to the royal house, to which he owed his fortunes: that he was not indifferent to the reputation of gratitude and constancy which he must have forfeited, if he had acted a different part. But it happened that his personal interest, as he had the good sense to understand it, concurred with these motives. To Antigonus he well knew that he could never appear in any other light than that of a tool, to be laid aside or broken, when it had done its work. The greater his services, the deeper the jealousy which they would awaken: the higher Antigonus might rise through them, the more unwilling he would be to own Eumenes as his benefactor. To the royal family he came as a friend in need: they might acknowledge and reward the merits of a faithful servant without humiliation: they would probably always require his support; and under the shadow of their name he might occupy a station which, as a foreigner, he could not safely aspire to on any other side. He answered Polysperchon with promises of zealous assistance. Olympias he advised to wait for the present in Epirus, until she saw what turn the war took. If however she could not control her desire to return to Macedonia, he warned her to forget past injuries, and to use her power with the greatest lenity. It was no doubt because he knew how little command she had over her passions, that he dissuaded her from the step to which he saw she was strongly inclined.

The third quarter toward which Polysperchon turned his eyes in this emergency was Greece. This was a sign of a new epoch in Grecian history. It was the opening of a prospect, that Greece might still recover so much political importance, as would at least insure her independence. This was an advantage reasonably

to be expected from the inevitable dissolution which awaited Alexander's colossal empire, and from the struggles which could not fail to ensue among his successors. It was not beyond hope or likelihood that Greece might become the arbiter of these contests. Her position, and the force which she was still able to raise, enabled her, if the scales should be nearly balanced, to throw in a weight which would make either preponderate. If, as was most probable, these contests should terminate in the permanent establishment of several rival states, she, though the least powerful, might rank among them on terms of perfect equality, and might be as effectually secured by their mutual jealousy, as any sovereign in the European system; no member of which can be said to enjoy more than a like precarious independence, as none could resist a general coalition, and many have no other security against the encroachments of their neighbours. It is a great mistake to consider the political history of Greece as at an end, when she was once compelled to submit to the Macedonian yoke. The events of the last half century alone ought to preclude such an error. If she did not recover the position in which she stood when Philip mounted the throne of Macedon, it was not because her strength was exhausted, nor because she was surrounded by too powerful neighbours: not even because events which might have proved favourable to her interests, took an adverse turn: but chiefly because she wanted an eye to see her new position and relations, and a hand to collect, husband, and employ her remaining resources. It imparts a kind of tragic interest to the history of Greece, which is hardly to be found in that of any other fallen nation, to observe that she sank almost unconsciously while she still possessed the means of deliverance, and that the insight and the effort came too late to be of any avail, even if they had been attended with immediate success.

It was a singular effect of Polysperchon's situation, that though he had succeeded to Antipater's authority, and had been placed in it by his choice, as a friend

whom he valued and trusted more than his own son, he could only maintain himself by the closest union with his predecessor's bitterest enemies, and by the repeal of all his measures. The power which Antipater had acquired in Greece, though he had nominally recovered it in behalf of his sovereigns, was really reserved to himself and his family. He had committed the command of the garrisoned places to his personal adherents: and it was not to the regent, but to Antipater, that the Greek parties whom he favoured, felt themselves indebted for their triumph over their adversaries. It was not therefore to Polysperchon, whose office gave him no claims on them, but to Cassander, their patron's son, that they transferred their good will. Polysperchon saw that the only way by which he could hope to wrest Greece out of Cassander's hands, and to turn its arms against him, was to reverse Antipater's policy, and to overthrow all that he had established there. The royal authority was still sufficiently strong to effect a revolution, which would place the government of the principal Greek cities in the hands of men who would be no less firmly attached to himself, than their adversaries were by hereditary connection to Cassander. He was encouraged in his design by the envoys of several states, or representatives of the exiled parties, who were then at the Macedonian court: some perhaps having come before Antipater's death, to obtain a relaxation of their condition, such as the Athenians had requested: others may have been attracted by the prospect of a change which that event opened. All were graciously received by the regent, and obtained his promise, that the democratical institutions should be every where restored; and he sent them back to Greece with a royal rescript to that effect. This edict ran in the name of the king Arridaeus Philip: it began with a declaration of the goodwill which, after the example of his predecessors, he bore to the Greeks: and asserted that he had no sooner mounted the throne, than he sent directions to all the Greek cities for the restoration of peace, and the re-

establishment of the constitutions by which they had been governed in the time of his father Philip. It then touched very delicately on the imprudence with which, while he was at a great distance, a part of the nation had engaged in war with Macedonia: it spoke in a tone of sympathy of the harsh treatment which they had suffered from the royal generals, to whom alone this severity was to be imputed. The king was now ready to heal the wounds they had inflicted, to restore harmony, and the political institutions which had subsisted in the reigns of his father and of Alexander: and he decreed that all the Greek citizens who had been transported or banished by his generals from the time of Alexander's passage to Asia — unless there were any of them condemned for homicide or sacrilege — should be permitted to return to their homes and to enjoy all their property. A part of the Megalopolitan exiles, and all those of Amphissa, Tricca, Pharcadon, and Heraclea, were excepted from this amnesty. For the rest, a day was fixed as the term of their banishment. This part of the decree provided for the overthrow of all the oligarchical governments founded by Antipater. A following clause directed that, if there were any forms of government which Philip or Alexander themselves had abolished as contrary to their interests, these cases also should now be laid before the king, that he might make such regulations as should seem expedient both for his own advantage and that of the cities concerned. The Athenians were to be replaced in the condition in which they stood under Philip and Alexander; even Samos, Philip's gift, was restored to them: only Oropus was to remain independent. In return for these favours, the king required that the Greeks should pass a decree in the national congress, forbidding all hostility and adverse practices against himself, under penalty of banishment and confiscation on the offenders and their posterity. The direction of the whole business was committed to Polysperchon: and the edict concluded in the imperial strain: "Ye then, as we before wrote

to you, obey him: for we shall permit none to neglect our commands."

Such was the language designed for the public ear. It could not be pleasing to any patriotic Greek: this was not the way in which, whatever might be his party, he could have wished to see Antipater's measures abolished. It was an exercise, and a formal assertion, of the Macedonian sovereignty. Yet the effect might have been advantageous, if the Macedonian garrisons had been withdrawn, and things had been left in other respects to take their natural course. This, indeed, would probably not have been peaceable or bloodless, but would not have been attended with the evils which ensued through Polysperchon's intervention. His object was to loosen his hold on Greece as little as possible, and to excite a violent reaction against the partisans of Antipater. He therefore wrote to Argos and to other cities, directing that the persons who had held the chief station in the oligarchical governments should be punished with death or exile and confiscation; and he announced in a letter to the Athenians that the king had restored the democracy, and exhorted them to return to their hereditary institutions. In the meanwhile he prepared to march into Greece to give effect to his measures, and sent his son Alexander forward into Attica with a body of troops, to dislodge Nicanor from Munychia, and to make himself master of Athens. There his letter had roused an impatient desire in the people to rid themselves immediately of the foreign garrison; and they required Nicanor to withdraw. The force under his command was hardly strong enough to repel an attack, and he therefore amused them with evasive answers, while he secretly introduced fresh troops into Munychia and collected others in Salamis. To gain time, he consented, on Phocion's undertaking for his safety, to attend a meeting of the council which was held in Piræus: but Dercyllus, who was in command there, had laid a plan to arrest him, and he was only apprised of it in time to effect his escape. This breach

of faith, it appears, was held to be justified by the information which had been received of his perfidious designs against the city ; and Phocion was reproached because he had not concurred in it. He declared, that he would rather suffer than do a wrong : but professed to disbelieve the reports which he heard of Nicanor's projects. These reports gained strength every day ; the popular ferment increased ; assemblies were repeatedly held on the subject ; a decree was passed on the motion of Philomedes, that all the citizens should arm and be in immediate readiness to obey Phocion's orders. Phocion however continued to express entire confidence in Nicanor, and took no precautions against the attack which was generally expected. The event justified the suspicions which he disregarded. Nicanor brought over his troops from Salamis, and surprised Piræus in the night. Phocion and two other friends of Nicanor were sent to remonstrate with him : but he now bade the Athenians address themselves to Cassander, whose officer he was : he would take no steps without Cassander's commands.

A letter had already been sent to Polyasperchon, urging him to hasten to the relief of the city : but before either he or his son arrived, one was received from Olympias, in which she commanded Nicanor to restore Munychia and Piræus to the Athenians. It diffused universal joy among the people, who had heard that Olympias was about to return to Macedonia, to resume her ancient authority, and to undertake the guardianship of her grandson : they hoped that it would awe Nicanor into compliance, and that they should quietly recover their liberty. Nicanor himself affected to treat it with respect, and promised to withdraw his troops, but continued to invent pretexts for delay. Affairs were in this state, when Alexander appeared with his forces before the walls. He was accompanied by a great number of the Athenian exiles, but also by a mixed rabble of strangers and disfranchised citizens, who hoped to take advantage of the tumultuous re-action which might be expected,

some to recover their lost privileges, others to assume title which at this juncture was not likely to be disputed. Yet for a few days they remained tranquil, not doubting that Alexander was come to enforce the execution of the royal edict, and that Nicanor would shortly be compelled to retire. It appears indeed that they proceeded immediately to hold an assembly, in which Phocion was deposed from his office, but that no other measures were taken against him, and that he was left at liberty to have several interviews with Alexander. In these it is said he represented to him, that he could not safely depend on the Athenians, unless he occupied Munychia and Piræus with his own troops. But there can be little doubt, that this was Alexander's design from the first, and that he acted according to his father's instructions. The suspicions of the people were soon awakened by his conduct. He held repeated conferences with Nicanor, to which no Athenians were admitted. Their object was divined, and Phocion was denounced as the author of the plot. The vengeance which had been long gathering now burst upon him; and Agnonides charged him with treason. This was the signal for the most notorious of Antipater's partizans to quit the city. Callimedon, and others of his stamp, did not think themselves safe within the reach of Polysperchon: but Phocion, and several of his friends, sought refuge in Alexander's camp. They were graciously received by him, and furnished with letters, by which he recommended them to his father's protection, as men on whose fidelity he might rely.

Polysperchon had entered Phocis with his army, accompanied by Philip. He was encamped at the village of Pharygæ¹, when he received his son's letters from Phocion and the partners of his misfortune, and at the same time an embassy from Athens, headed by Agnonides, which had been sent to accuse them and to claim relief from the presence of the garrison. A throne was set under a golden canopy for Philip, as the judge of the

¹ Strabo ix 426. Plutarch (Phoc 38.) calls it a village of Phocia. It stood on the site of the ancient Tarphe.

cause, and he took his seat surrounded by his council, in which Polysperchon really presided. Dinarchus the Corinthian, Antipater's chief agent in Peloponnesus, who had left Athens with Phocion—it is said out of regard for him, but perhaps also hoping to find shelter by his side—and had been detained by illness for some days at Elatea, no sooner presented himself, than Polysperchon ordered him to be led away to torture and execution; he then gave audience to the Athenians. Their pleadings soon rose into a storm of clamorous invectives, in which all order was lost, until Agnonides stepped forward with the proposal: "Put us all into one cage¹, and send us back to be tried at Athens." The king smiled at the image, which was ludicrously appropriate to the scene before him: but in compliance with the wish of the Macedonians, who formed the outer circle, and who, though perfectly indifferent to the parties, found amusement in their contention, the ambassadors were ordered to proceed with their accusation in due form. Polysperchon listened to them with evident partiality: but when Phocion began his defence, interrupted him so often and so rudely, that at length he indignantly struck the ground with his staff, and spoke no more. Hegemon, another of the accused, ventured to appeal to Polysperchon himself, as a witness of the goodwill he had always borne to the people; but Polysperchon angrily exclaimed: "Have done calumniating me to the king." And Philip started from his seat to strike at the audacious slanderer with his lance. Polysperchon however seized his arm, and, to prevent any further indecency, broke up the council. The result of his deliberation was to send Phocion and his friends as prisoners, ignominiously bound on waggons, to Athens, that they might receive their final judgment from the people.

The only probable motive which can be assigned for Polysperchon's conduct in this transaction, is one which

¹ Γαλαργεον, Plut. Phoc. 33. In Athenæus (xiv 6) we read that Lysimachus ordered Telesphorus *ἐμβληθῆναι εἰς γαλαργεον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀσθενίαν περὶ τοῦ ἐμβλῆναι καὶ τρεφόμενον . . . ἀποθνήσκον*

involves a degree of baseness and cruelty not common even among the Macedonian generals of this age, but of which he afterwards proved himself fully capable. It was impossible that he could entertain any personal resentment against Phocion for his adherence to Antipater or that he could feel the slightest interest in the quarrel of the Athenian parties. He had besides been assured by his son, that Phocion was willing to submit to his government, as he had done to Antipater's, and would probably serve him with equal zeal. It was therefore apparently without the slightest bias of passion, on the coolest calculation of policy, that he consigned Phocion to the fate which was prepared, according to his own express commands, for all the most eminent of Antipater's partizans. The point however which seems most strongly to mark the nature of his conduct, is, that the gain which he could expect from Phocion's death, was at the utmost very small, and on the whole doubtful. Diodorus indeed attempts to connect his sacrifice of Phocion with a resolution which he is said to have formed on the subject of the garrison in Piræus. He had now, Diodorus believes, abandoned his original purpose, which was to occupy it with his own troops, as too flagrantly inconsistent with his recent public professions. But no information which could have been preserved as to Polysperchon's intentions, could convince us that, while he was every day expecting an attack from Cassander in this quarter, he meant to leave Piræus in the hands of the Athenians, when he had wrested it from Nicanor. Nor in that case could there have been any need of another sacrifice to propitiate their goodwill. It is far more probable that because, on the contrary, he had determined to retain possession of the place, and thus to disappoint and irritate the Athenians, he resolved to soothe them with the blood of victims which cost him nothing. Yet it might have seemed that even Phocion's enemies, after their first resentment had subsided, must have honoured him more, if he had sheltered the man whose virtues had won the respect of Alexander and Antipater, and even of his political ad-

versaries. But respect for virtue or for misfortune was a feeling to which Polysperchon was always a stranger: and in a Greek they probably excited the brutal soldier's especial contempt.

And yet it must be owned that our own sympathy with Phocion's fate is not a little weakened by the thought that such were the rulers under whose dominion he had himself contentedly bowed, and whom he had aided with all his influence to impose their yoke on his country: that he had offered his services for the same purpose to the very man who now, for the chance of a trifling advantage, exposed him to insult and doomed him to death. It was indeed an ungrateful requital of his faithful attachment to the Macedonian cause: but he had scarcely a right to complain of it. It was by his own consent that he had become subject to the foreigner's pleasure: he had steadfastly discouraged every attempt which others had made to deliver Greece from such dependence: he had acquiesced—it is to be feared approvingly—in the condemnation of Demosthenes and other enemies of Antipater. We can hardly consider it as other than a just retribution that he was himself now about to suffer for his adherence to Antipater, at the instigation of Antipater's bosom-friend and successor.

Cleitus was ordered to escort the prisoners to Athens. Phocion was accompanied by four friends: Nicocles, the most intimate of all, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythocles. While the carriage in which they were chained slowly rolled through the suburb Ceramicus, exposing them to the gaze of some pitying, but of more threatening and exulting spectators, the theatre, which had been appointed as the place of an assembly summoned to decide their doom, was gradually filled. No care was taken to exclude those who had no right to sit in judgment there; and the seats were crowded with the mixed multitude which had followed Alexander to Athens: even women, it is said, were admitted.¹

¹ Πᾶσι καὶ γυναιξί, Plut. Phoc. 34.

It was no doubt the object of Phocion's private enemies to render the approaching scene as disorderly and noisy as possible: and the intruders, who were safest in tumult, were likely to be the most clamorous. But, without any artificial excitement, most breasts already burnt with indignation and the thirst of vengeance against Phocion and his associates. By the exiles Antipater's friend was regarded as the author of their calamity: by most of those who had remained under his administration he was suspected of a treasonable correspondence with Nicanor, which had defeated their hopes of deliverance from a galling chain. Such was the prevailing disposition of the assembly, when Cleitus entered the theatre with his charge. He first read a letter from the king, which declared that in his judgment the prisoners were guilty of treason: but as the Athenians were now free and independent, he committed the case to their decision. Cleitus remained as a simple spectator of the proceedings, though his presence, after such a letter, could not but affect them. A friend of Phocion's came forward to propose that, since so grave a business had been referred to them by the king, the strangers and slaves should withdraw. But this motion was lost in an outcry, raised no doubt chiefly by the persons whom it concerned, against the oligarchs, the enemies of the people. The accusers were then heard, in silence or with applause, while they traced all the evils which had befallen the city since the Lamian war—the banishment of so many citizens, the death of so many illustrious orators, the loss of their ancient institutions, the continued presence of the foreign garrison—to Phocion's intrigues. When the time came for the defence, Phocion made several fruitless attempts to obtain a hearing. His voice was drowned in a tumult of hostile sounds. At length, in one of the short intervals which broke the uproar he was heard to say, that as to himself he gave up his plea and resigned himself to death: he only desired to intercede for his innocent friends. He was as little

listened to in their behalf as others who generously came forward to defend him. At length Agnonides mounted the bema, and renewing the foulest iniquity of the proceedings which followed the battle of Arginusæ, produced a decree which he had prepared, directing that the people should decide by show of hands whether the prisoners were guilty or not, and that, if the show of hands was against them, they should be put to death.

The temper already manifested by the assembly was such that a man was found, more impudent than Agnonides, who ventured to suggest as an amendment, that Phocion should be put to death with torture. This was too much for Agnonides, especially as he saw that Cleitus was disgusted: he therefore rejected the proposal, observing that such a death would be fit for a wretch like Callimedon, if he should fall into their hands, but that as to Phocion, he would move nothing of the kind. "You do well," a voice exclaimed; "for if we should torture Phocion, what shall we do to you." Very few however entertained, or at least ventured to express, such sentiments. The decree was carried, and at the show of hands, the spectators rose as one man to give their verdict against the prisoners. Many even crowned themselves before the act, as for a joyful solemnity. Sentence of death was likewise passed against several absent persons: among them were Demetrius the Phalerian, Callimedon, and Charicles.

On his way to the prison, Phocion suffered some gross insults from the populace with meekness and dignity. Though the day was a holiday, and marked by an equestrian procession, the sentence was immediately executed. Phocion met his end with the playful composure, and gentle equanimity, of Socrates. He endeavoured to cheer his fellow-sufferers, and as the strongest proof of friendship, permitted Nicocles to drink the hemlock before him. When he was asked if he had any message for his son Phocus: "Only," he said, "not to bear a grudge against the Athenians." As the draught prepared proved

not sufficient for all, and the jailer demanded to be paid for a fresh supply, he desired one of his friends to satisfy the man, observing, that Athens was a place where one could not even die for nothing.

His body, according to law in cases of treason, was carried to the waste ground on the confines between Megaris and Attica, where, as his friends did not venture to take part in the funeral, it received the last offices from the hands of hirelings and strangers. His bones were collected by a Megarian woman. When the angry passions of the people had subsided, the remembrance of his virtues revived. His bones were brought back to Athens, and publicly interred, and a bronze statue was erected to his memory. Agnonides was condemned to death by a popular assembly, and two of his other accusers, having been found to quit the city, were overtaken by the vengeance of Phocus. These were effects of a change rather in the times than in the opinions of men. But the more the Athenians resigned themselves to the prospect of permanent subjection to foreign rule, the better they were disposed to revere the character of Phocion.

Had he lived in an earlier period, he might have served his country, like Nicias, with unsullied honour. In a later age he might have passed his life in peaceful obscurity. His lot fell on dark and troubled times, when it was difficult to act with dignity, and the best patriot might be inclined to despair. But he despaired, and yet acted. He despaired, not merely of his country, which any one may innocently do: but also for her, which no man has a right to do. He would have forced her to despair of herself. He resisted every attempt that was made by bolder and more sanguine patriots to restore her independence. He did not withdraw from public life: he acted as the tool of his country's enemies, as the servant of a foreign master: content to mitigate the pressure of the degrading yoke which he had helped to impose. Toward the close of his life he descended lower and lower, constant only in his opposition to

whatever bore the aspect of freedom. The fellow who spat on him in his way to execution, was perhaps a more estimable person than the man to whom he would have surrendered Athens, as well as himself. He left a character politically worse than doubtful: one which his private worth alone redeems from the infamy that clings to the names of a Callimedon, and Demetrius; a warning to all who may be placed in like circumstances, to shun his example, whether they value their own peace, or the esteem of posterity.

While the Athenians were expecting help from Polysperchon, and Alexander was negotiating with Nicanor, Cassander appeared in the roads with a fleet of thirty-five galleys, having on board 4,000 men, furnished by Antigonus. He was immediately admitted by Nicanor into the harbour, and suffered to take possession of Piræus. But Nicanor, who seems to have had some private views, continued to occupy Manychia with the troops which he had lately engaged in his service. On this intelligence Polysperchon advanced into Attica, and encamped close to Piræus. His army amounted to 24,000 foot, 20,000 of whom were Macedonians, a thousand horse, and sixty-five elephants. He made some attempts on Piræus, but found the fortifications too strong to permit any hope of immediate success, and the resources of Attica insufficient for the maintenance of so large a force. He therefore left a body of troops under the command of his son, and himself, with the bulk of his army, marched into Peloponnesus, to second the efforts of his partizans, and especially to reduce Megalopolis, which openly defied the royal authority, and embraced the cause of Cassander. At Corinth he convoked a congress of deputies, to receive the acknowledgement of subjection which was called alliance, and sent his envoys to the states which submitted to him to enforce the execution of his orders. Under their direction the adherents of the oligarchical governments were in most places condemned to death or banishment. But the resistance of Megalopolis demanded his own presence,

and military force to overpower it: and he pursued his march to lay siege to the city.

There, through an unhappy combination of ancient prejudices with party interests, Antipater's cause had become really popular. We have seen that Megalopolis refused to join the national confederacy in the Lamian war. It had always shown a strong attachment to Macedonia, for it was indebted to Philip for the humiliation of Sparta, the object of its inveterate implacable enmity. Polybius¹ very unjustly, though with a natural partiality, censures Demosthenes for the bitterness with which he reviled the leaders of the Macedonian party in Megalopolis as traitors to the cause of Greece. The historian represents the orator as blinded by his Athenian patriotism; but certainly the views of the Macedonising Arcadian statesmen were not larger or clearer, when, in their jealousy and hatred of their neighbours, they overlooked the danger which threatened Greece from a foreign power; though Philip, secure of their attachment to him, did not think it necessary to introduce his garrisons into their cities. These feelings continued to animate the Arcadians, after they had become more glaringly unreasonable and irreconcilable with the national interests. Their devotion was successively transferred from Philip to Alexander, from Alexander to Antipater, as the regent of Macedonia. Antipater had strengthened it by personal ties. Yet there can be little doubt that it would have descended to Polysperchon as his legitimate successor, if he had not deemed it expedient everywhere to introduce a violent change in the existing order of things. But the leading men, who saw their fortunes and lives threatened by his measures, as their government had hitherto been in accordance with the strongest popular feelings, might easily persuade the people that their safety against Sparta depended on their fidelity to Cassander. It was probably through these causes, that Polysperchon, when he appeared before Megalopolis, found, not a city

¹ Fr. Lab xvii.

divided between two factions, but a whole population unanimously resolved to resist him to the last gasp.

They had made the most vigorous and judicious preparations for defence, had removed their property out of the country into the city, had enrolled the citizens, aliens, and slaves, capable of service, and found that they amounted to 15,000 men, who were distributed, according to their various qualifications, for the purposes of labour or military duty. The fortifications were repaired, and strengthened with a new ditch and rampart: arms and engines were fabricated with unremitting activity: an officer named Damis, who had served under Alexander, was appointed to command. Polysperchon, having encamped before the city, proceeded to assail it with all the engines and contrivances known in his time. He brought up wooden towers higher than the walls, which poured showers of missiles on the besieged. But the open attack seems to have been chiefly designed to divert their attention from a mine, which he at the same time began to carry under the walls. When it had advanced far enough, fire was set to the props which supported the roof, and it fell in with a tremendous crash. The breach thus effected included three of the largest towers with the intervening parts of the wall. Even this disaster however did not shake the resolution of the citizens: a remedy was immediately devised and applied. Their forces were divided into two parts; and while the one body repelled the assailants who mounted the breach, the rest began to build a new wall behind it. The ruin, which of itself obstructed the advance of the Macedonians, was defended until the approach of night compelled Polysperchon to sound a retreat. During the night the new works were carried on with unwearied zeal. The next day Polysperchon proceeded to clear the ground of the ruins, to open a passage for the elephants, whose strength would, he expected, bear down all resistance. Damis was aware of his design, and prepared to meet it with a stratagem suggested to him by his familiarity with the nature of the elephants. He caused doors set with spikes,

the points upward, to be laid in the opening, covered with a thin layer of earth. The way was left clear in front, but a strong body of dartmen and bowmen were stationed in each flank, with engines for the discharge of more powerful missiles. The beasts were blindly driven into the snare. At the same time that their feet were entangled in the spikes, they were assailed from each side by the iron shower. Maddened by pain, and mostly losing their drivers, they spent their strength in attempts to escape, which only succeeded so far as to spread confusion and havoc in the ranks behind them. Several of the best were left dead: a still greater number was entirely disabled: and those which suffered less injury did the more to their friends.

This repulse, while it deprived Polysperchon of a valuable part of his force, discouraged him from the renewal of the assault. The possession of Megalopolis did not seem an object worth the delay which it was likely to cost if he remained there in person, while he had so many active enemies in his rear. The impression so signal a failure might make on the minds of the Greeks he appears not to have heeded. He however left a division of his army to blockade the place, and marched away with the main body to concert measures for the protection of Macedonia, which was threatened by Cassander and Antigonus. He had reason to apprehend that Antigonus might attempt to invade Macedonia from the north, and he therefore sent his fleet under the command of Cleitus to the coast of Thrace, with instructions to effect a junction with the satrap Arridæus, who had taken refuge with a body of troops in the Bithynian town of Cios. Cleitus sailed into the Propontis, reduced several places on the Asiatic coast, and was joined by Arridæus. But Cassander, hearing of this expedition, sent Nicanor against him with his squadron, which was increased to more than a hundred sail by the remaining ships of Antigonus. A battle took place near Byzantium, in which Cleitus gained a brilliant victory: seventeen of the enemy's vessels were

sunk, and forty taken with all their crews : the rest took refuge in the harbour of Chalcedon. But the confidence engendered by this triumph turned it into the occasion of a fatal disaster. Cleitus drew up his fleet on the European shore in fancied security. But Antigonus, on the tidings of the lost battle, came to Chalcedon, and surprised the victors by a stratagem something like Lysander's at Ægos-potami. He procured transports from Byzantium, in which he sent over a body of troops in the night with orders to attack the camp of Cleitus a little before daybreak, and directed Nicanor to sail across with the remnant of his fleet, so as to arrive at the same time off the coast. Both these operations were completely successful. The troops of Cleitus on shore were thrown into confusion by the sudden attack, and fled to their ships, leaving their baggage and prisoners in the enemy's hands. They had scarcely embarked, before Nicanor's fleet was seen approaching. It fell upon them while they were still in disorder, and totally routed them. All, except the admiral's galley, were captured with their crews. Cleitus himself escaped only for the time. When he reached a place of safety on the coast of Thrace, he quitted his vessel, to return to Macedonia over land. But on his way he fell in with some soldiers of Lysimachus, who slew him, either for the sake of plunder, or as their master's enemy.

In the meanwhile Polysperchon's affairs were not more prosperous in the south. His defeat at Megalopolis shook the confidence of his adherents in Greece, and in many cities led to a counter-revolution in favour of Cassander. This was the effect it produced at Athens. It had become clear that Polysperchon was less than ever able to deliver and protect the city, and that to remain in alliance with him, while Cassander was master of Piræus, would subject it to the evils of a lingering siege, to the ruin of its commerce, and to constant danger from surprise and treachery. To Cassander on the other hand it was important, for the sake of his influence in the rest of Greece, to make Athens entire'y

his own by fair means. At length one of his leading partizans ventured to propose that a negotiation should be opened with him. His motion gave rise to a violent debate: but the advantages of peace were so evident, that an embassy was decreed to treat with Cassander. The terms he offered might appear liberal when compared with those which his father had dictated. Yet the difference was rather in sound than in substance, so far as the freedom of the people was concerned. The Athenians, becoming friends and allies of Cassander, were to be restored to the possession of their city, their territory, their revenues, and ships. But Cassander was to continue to occupy Munychia with a garrison until he should have brought the war to an end. The constitution was to be altered only in two points. A qualification of property was again required for the franchise: but it was reduced to the half of the amount fixed by Antipater. Another article stipulated that the people should receive a governor, under the title of guardian of the city¹, elected by Cassander. Phocion had in fact, though not in name, exercised such authority under Antipater²: and indeed so long as the Macedonian garrison remained, this was a very slight additional encroachment on liberty. The person whom Cassander chose for this office was Demetrius son of Phanostratus the Phalerian: perhaps as one who was well suited, both by his character and his private relations, to act as mediator between the contending parties. His brother Himeræus was one of the orators put to death by Antipater³, though he himself had been recently forced to fly the city as one of Antipater's adherents. He had beside the reputation of a philosopher, simple in his habits, moderate in his desires, a lover of literature and the arts. In one point Cassander's forbearance was conspicuous, from its contrast with the

¹ ἑταίρου ὀνόματι τῆς πόλεως, Diodor. xviii. 74.

² Diodor. xviii. 65 ὁ τῶν πάντων ἑλκων ἀρχηγός.

³ In what sense we are to understand the Epiphania which he celebrated on the occasion of his brother's death (Athenæus, xii. 542. E.) remains very obscure after all the explanations of the commentators.

conduct both of his father and of Polysperchon. He demanded no sacrifices to policy or revenge: no decrees of death or banishment against his political or personal enemies.

This treaty with Cassander forms an epoch of some importance in the history of Athens; and it invites us to pause for a few moments, to reflect on the destinies and prospects of Greece. So far indeed as they depended on those of Athens, they were darker than ever. She was about to sink under a tyranny more degrading and corrupting than any she had hitherto experienced: one which tended to make her more and more familiar with the dominion of a foreign master: more willing to purchase tranquillity at the expense of liberty and honour. But for the nation the future was not without its bright side. It was indeed impossible for the most sagacious to have foreseen the work which Cassander was destined to accomplish: that he was about to revenge the ruin of her freedom in a manner from which her own humanity would have recoiled. But it was apparent that a separation was going forward between Macedonia and the Asiatic provinces of Alexander's empire: that Thrace was becoming a distinct, independent state, from which Greece had little to fear, and much to hope. There was ground to believe that the time might not be far distant, when the ruler of Macedonia might find an equal alliance with Greece necessary to his safety: and when it might even be desirable for her, that he should be a man of energy and talents like Cassander, rather than one so feeble and contemptible as Polysperchon. Even apart from these calculations, the glorious resistance which Megalopolis alone had opposed to the whole power of Macedonia, might well have stirred every Greek bosom with joy and hope. It proved, that the nation had not yet very deeply degenerated from her heroic ancestors: that she was still worthy of her bright inheritance of fame: it showed what her united strength might still effect, if it was roused for a common cause: if a deliverer should step

forth, superior to the petty jealousy, to the narrow ambition, which had so long divided and wasted it, and capable of controlling and directing it to a worthy end. The event however depended on the issue of the struggle between Cassander and Polysperchon, and of that in which Antigonus was about to engage with his rivals in the East; and then on the position in which the conquerors might be placed toward one another.

CHAP. LVIII.

FROM CASSANDER'S OCCUPATION OF ATHENS TO THE
TREATY BETWEEN ANTIGONUS AND PTOLEMY, CAS-
SANDER AND LYSIMACHUS IN 311 B. C.

WHILE Antigonus was engaged, as we have seen, on the western coast of Asia, Eumenes had availed himself of the leisure thus afforded him, to take possession of the authority with which he was invested by Polysperchon. It was a task of infinite difficulty and danger. He was soon forced to quit Cappadocia, by the arrival of Menander and a body of troops, sent in pursuit of him by Antigonus. By a forced march he crossed the Taurus, and in Cilicia met Antigenes and Teutamus. They submitted to the royal mandate, and received him with respect, as commander-in-chief. The jealousy of the Macedonians was subdued by admiration of his genius, and by sympathy with the strange vicissitudes of his fortune. The guardians of the treasury at Quinda also surrendered it to his disposal. Still he saw himself surrounded by officers of high spirit and ambitious views, who looked upon themselves as personally superior to the foreigner whom accident had placed above them, and by troops, proud of their services, spoiled by license and flattery, impatient of discipline and subordination. He perceived that their fidelity could only be secured by the most studied show of moderation and humility: that he must keep his personal pretensions as much as possible in the back-ground, and put forward the legitimate authority in the name of which he claimed their obedience. He therefore declared at once, that he would not accept the 500 talents which had been assigned to him for the supply of his own wants. He had none which required

so large a sum: he had no private aims: he was merely the servant of the royal family, and had reluctantly undertaken the difficult office with which he had been entrusted. The more effectually to suppress the spirit of rivalry and discord, he pretended to have been favoured with a dream, in which he had seen Alexander, as when alive, arrayed in the ensigns of royalty, seated in his tent, and despatching affairs of state: and he proposed, that they should erect a magnificent tent, should place a golden throne in the centre, on which should be laid a diadem, sceptre, and royal apparel, and that there they should transact business as in the presence of the departed king. All were pleased with the thought; and in this form the councils were held. Each of the generals, when he entered the tent, burnt incense on an altar in front of the throne, and adored Alexander as a god, and then took his place on one of the seats which were ranged on each side of the throne. The awe of an invisible presence was felt in some measure by those who thus met; and the multitude was prepared to revere orders, which issued from a place where they might seem to be suggested by Alexander himself: while Eumenes, without prejudice to his authority and influence, could on these occasions preserve the appearance of perfect equality with his officers.

While he declined the royal bounty for himself, he made free use of the treasures at Quinda for the public service. He sent his friends to levy troops in the neighbouring provinces of Asia Minor, and in Syria, Phœnicia, and Cyprus, with offers of large pay, which drew many Greeks, as well as Asiatics under his standard. In a short time he had collected 10,000 foot and 2000 horse: so that with the Argyraspids and the troops which he brought with him, his army may have fallen not far short of 20,000 men.

Both Ptolemy and Antigonus were alarmed at the progress which he appeared to be making: and both nearly at the same time set similar engines at work against him. Ptolemy sailed in person with an armament to

Cape Zephyrium near the mouth of the Calycadnus in Cilicia, and while he staid there, sent a message to the generals of the Argyraspids, urging them not to obey a man who had been condemned to death by the unanimous votes of the Macedonian army: and another to the commanders at Quinda, protesting against their surrender of the treasure, and offering his protection to them if they would resist the demands of Eumenes. Ptolemy however inspired neither fear nor respect sufficient to counterbalance the royal authority, and no attention was paid to his messages. Antigonus sent a confidential agent named Philotas to the camp of Eumenes, with a letter addressed to the Argyraspids themselves, and to the other Macedonians in his service, accompanied by thirty Macedonians selected for their volubility and address, with instructions to engage Antigones and Teutamus, and as many more as they could, by bribes and promises, in a conspiracy against their chief. Teutamus grasped at their offers, and tried to persuade his colleagues to concur with him. But Antigones had a clearer view of their common interest, and convinced Teutamus, that it was not Eumenes, a foreigner, who would never venture to injure them, but Antigonus, whose ambition was ready to level all before it, that should be the object of their jealousy. The letter brought by Philotas was read to the soldiers in the absence of Eumenes, and at first produced a strong impression on their minds. It exhorted them immediately to arrest Eumenes, and put him to death, and threatened that otherwise Antigonus would march against them with all his forces, to punish their disobedience. But when Eumenes appeared, and read the letter, he made a speech which dissipated their fears, confirmed their loyalty to the royal house, and strengthened their attachment to himself. The occurrence however admonished him to quicken his preparations for war. He soon after marched into Phœnicia, to collect a fleet, which might secure the command of the sea for Polyperchon, and enable him to transport his forces into Asia, to meet Antigonus, whenever he would. Another ob-

ject of this movement was, it seems, to wrest Syria from Ptolemy. But before he had accomplished either, he found himself compelled to quit the coast and to retire into the upper provinces, by the approach of Antigonus himself. He had received a warning in the loss of a squadron of Phœnician vessels which was bringing treasure to him from Quinda. It was moored near Cape Rossus, when the fleet of Antigonus was seen sailing by, adorned with trophies of the recent victory over Cleitus. Sosigenes, the commander of the squadron, was on shore waiting for a calmer sea. The Phœnician sailors plundered the treasure, and surrendered their ships to the enemy.¹

After his victory near Byzantium, Antigonus no longer entertained any fear of an attack from Polysperchon. It was not his interest immediately to decide the contest for the possession of Macedonia, but rather to let the two parties spend their strength and waste its resources; and since Cassander appeared now to be quite able to maintain his own cause, there was no further need of his presence near the Hellespont. The preparations of Eumenes were assuming a threatening aspect; and after the failure of the attempt made through Philotas, Antigonus selected 20,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry from the mass of his forces, and advanced with the utmost speed into Cilicia. He came however too late to overtake Eumenes, who had already set out on his march towards the Euphrates. Antigonus followed him into Mesopotamia, and there put his army into winter quarters. Eumenes took up his in Babylonia², and entered into negotiation with Seleucus

¹ Polyænus, iv. 6. 2.

² So Diodorus, xix. 12. But he adds the name of the place, *ἐν ταῖς ἀνομοκρίταις Καρὸν πέποις*. Wesseling remarks: *Diceres propter Carrhas fuisse, mora Abrahami et Crassi clade nobilitatas, nisi illæ (L. xix. 91) extra Babyloniam, uti erant, locarentur*. Droysen has no such scruple, but he takes the place to have been the village mentioned by Diodorus (xvii. 110.), which lay east of the Tigris. But I do not understand why Eumenes, whose object it was to reach Susa as soon as possible, should have recrossed the river, voluntarily exposing himself to the difficulty and danger which he experienced at the passage. Droysen says, that it was to frighten Seleucus and Pithon. But after the failure of the negotiation, this seems hardly an object worth the risk and the delay.

and Pithon, who were both at Babylon, to persuade them to join in the defence of the royal authority against Antigonus. They professed themselves ready to serve the royal house, but declared that they would never submit to the orders of Eumenes, a condemned criminal; and they sent an envoy to Antigones and the Argyraspids, calling on them to depose him from his command. But the fidelity of the Macedonians seemed now so secure, that such attempts only afforded a fresh opportunity for the display of their zeal in his behalf. When the season permitted, he resumed his march eastward. His first object was to gain Susa, and make himself master of the treasures remaining there. At the passage of the Tigris he encountered some resistance from Seleucus and Pithon; though their forces were not sufficient to meet him in open battle. But while he lay on the western side, they cut the bank of a canal and flooded his camp. He was reduced to great danger and distress, until he discovered the bed of another, which he cleared out, and thus drew off the waters. Seleucus was now anxious to deliver his province from this formidable enemy, and consented to a truce, that he might cross the river without molestation: at the same time, he apprised Antigonus of the event, and urged him to advance without delay, before the satraps of the upper provinces should have brought their forces down into his territory.

This coalition of the eastern satraps, against which Seleucus sought the aid of Antigonus, had been caused by Pithon's indiscreet ambition. He had put to death Philippus, the satrap of Parthia, and had appointed his own brother, Eudamus, in his room. This violent proceeding, while it betrayed his aspiring views, alarmed all the satraps who had been placed under his authority by the partition of Triparadisus. They formed a league against him, defeated him in battle, and drove him out of Parthia. Even in his own province, Media, he did not feel secure, and had repaired to Babylon to engage Seleucus in his interest. It is not clear why Seleucus espoused

his cause ; and still less why Antigonus declared himself on the same side : since neither Pithon nor Seleucus was strong enough to oppose him, and by a different course he might have deprived Eumenes of many powerful allies. Eumenes had transmitted the royal letters to the satraps, who willingly promised obedience, and, according to his directions, advanced to meet him in Susiana. The principal confederates were Peucestes, the satrap of Persia, Polemo of Carmania, Siburtius of Arachosia, Oxyartes of Paropamisus, who had sent his contingent under the command of Androbazus, Stasander of Aria and Drangiana, who also brought a body of Bactrian troops, and Eudamus, who, after Alexander's death, had assassinated Porus, and made himself master of 120 elephants. Eumenes thus found himself joined by an army of little less than 20,000 foot and 5000 horse, beside the elephants which Eudamus had brought with him. But in proportion to the magnitude of this reinforcement was the difficulty of preserving harmony and subordination among the leaders. Peucestes, who, as the highest in rank, and as governor of the province which furnished the largest amount of troops, had hitherto held the chief command, was not willing to resign it : and Antigenes, as the leader of the veterans who had shared the glory of all Alexander's conquests, would not acknowledge a superior. Eumenes could not venture to urge his own pretensions, and had need of all his dexterity to prevent a fatal rupture between them. He resorted to his old expedient, and persuaded them not to elect any one commander-in-chief, but to deliberate together, with the ceremonies before adopted, as in Alexander's presence. There was however one important advantage which he reserved for himself. Xenophilus, the governor of the citadel at Susa, complied with the royal orders, which directed that Eumenes alone should dispose of the treasure. From this he drew six months' pay for the Macedonians, while the satraps maintained their own troops, and secured the attachment of Eudamus by a grant of 200 talents, nominally to defray the ex-

pense of the elephants, which were deemed an arm of peculiar importance.

The intelligence of their union induced Antigonus, who was on the point of setting out in pursuit of Eumenes, to wait some time longer in Mesopotamia, to strengthen himself with fresh levies. He then marched to Babylon, and having concluded an alliance with Pithon and Seleucus, and joined their troops to his army, crossed the Tigris, and advanced toward Susa. Eumenes, when he heard of his approach, prevailed on the confederates to retreat and to take up a position behind the Pasitigris, extending their lines as far as the coast. To defend this long range of country, he induced Peucestes to send for an additional body of 10,000 bowmen from Persis, which is said to have been collected in a surprisingly short time by a chain of oral signals. On his arrival at Susa, Antigonus bestowed the satrapy on Seleucus, and, as Xenophilus refused to surrender the citadel, left him with a body of troops to besiege it, while he himself marched forward to the Coprates. The river was not fordable: and he could collect but few transports. In these he sent a division of his army across, but before he could join it with the main body, it was attacked by Eumenes, and completely routed. The fugitives crowded into the boats, which sank under their weight: numbers perished in the river: 4000 were forced to surrender. This disaster induced Antigonus to fall back on the Eulæus: and he lost so many of his men on the march, through the heat of the weather, that he resolved to change his route, and proceed to Ecbatana, with the hope, it seems, that the confederacy might be broken up by the danger which threatened the eastern provinces. To avoid the heat, he took the shortest road, which led through the Cossæan highlands; but suffered great loss, and narrowly escaped destruction, from the attacks of the still unconquered mountaineers. So many of the horses and other beasts had perished in this march, that he was obliged to send Pithon to collect a fresh supply from the Median pas-

tures. His men had begun to murmur at the hardships they had undergone, but were soothed by his liberality, when Pithon returned, bringing not only a number of beasts sufficient to repair their losses, but 500 talents collected for the royal revenue.

His movement, as he had foreseen, created perplexity and discord among the allies. Antigones, and Eumenes himself, with all who had followed them from the West, thought it most advisable to return, and take advantage of his absence in the maritime provinces. But the satraps, who were alarmed for their own possessions, refused to leave them exposed to the enemy: and Eumenes, seeing that, unless he complied with their wishes, the confederacy would be dissolved, consented to march into Persia. On their arrival at Persepolis, the army was entertained by Peucestes with a sacrifice in honour of Philip and Alexander, to whom altars were erected by the side of those of the gods, and a magnificent banquet, which so won their hearts, that Eumenes, to preserve his own influence, forged a letter which he pretended to have received from Orontes, satrap of Armenia, a friend of Peucestes, announcing that Olympias had returned to Macedonia, with her grandson, that Cassander was slain, and that Polysperchon had crossed over into Asia with an army, and was already in Cappadocia. All eyes were now turned with respect and anxiety toward Eumenes, as the future dispenser of royal favours and punishments; and he made use of this impression to bring Siburtius, the most intimate friend of Peucestes, to trial; and forced him to fly for his life. Eumenes however won the goodwill of Peucestes by friendly words and liberal promises, and to secure the attachment of the officers whom he most suspected, pretended to be in want of money, and borrowed large sums of them in the king's name.

In the midst of these festivities and rejoicings for imaginary success, the enemy was almost forgotten, when tidings came that Antigonus was on his march toward Persia. Eumenes carried a resolution to advance

and give him battle. On the road he was seized with illness, the effect, it is said, of unusual intemperance at a banquet which he gave, as if to vie with Peucestes; he was obliged to halt for some days, in great danger, and remained so weak that he let himself be carried in a litter in the rear, while Peucestes and Antigenes commanded in his stead. But when the enemy suddenly came in sight, the foremost ranks of the column halted, and, grounding their arms, refused to proceed until Eumenes should put himself at their head. When he learnt what had happened, he ordered himself to be transported with the utmost speed to the front, and as he approached, causing the curtains of his litter to be withdrawn on each side, waved his hand toward them. They in return greeted him with shouts and the clash of their arms, and loudly expressed their eagerness to meet the enemy, and he immediately began to form his line of battle. Antigonus, who had heard of his illness and had quickened his march to take advantage of it when he observed the dispositions that had been made to receive him, and saw the litter moving from one wing to the other, remarked to his friends with the loud laugh with which he usually accompanied his good things, "The enemy's tactics seem to be in that litter:" but he immediately gave the signal for retreat¹ and took up a strong position behind a ravine intersected by a river. Eumenes encamped not far off on the other side. Neither general ventured to begin the attack, and they remained several days inactive.² During this interval Antigonus made another attempt to gain over the hostile Macedonians and their chiefs by promises that the satraps should retain their provinces, and that the men should be sent back to their country with honour and large donatives, or should be taken into his own service. The Macedonians however still adhered firmly to Eumenes, who exposed the perfidy of his ad-

¹ Plutarch, Eum 14, 15

² Diodorus (xix. 25). He seems to know nothing of Plutarch's anecdote, which however appears to be fully entitled to credit.

versary's offers by the fable of the lion, who was persuaded to part with his teeth and claws.

Antigonus now found it necessary to decamp, as both armies were suffering from scarcity of provisions. Eumenes divined that his intention was to reach Gabiene, a district of Elymais, hitherto untouched, and capable of supplying all his wants. He himself had the same object, and gained the start of Antigonus by a stratagem, but afterwards let himself be deceived in his turn, and was obliged to give battle. Their forces were pretty equally balanced: Antigonus was stronger in cavalry, Eumenes had a greater number of elephants. But after a day's hard fighting, in which Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, for the first time headed a brigade of horse, no decisive advantage had been gained on either side. The number of killed and wounded was indeed greater on that of Antigonus; and there prevailed in his army a general consciousness of defeat. Yet he was able to return first to the field and bury his dead, because Eumenes could not prevail on his men to encamp at a distance from their baggage, so that he found it necessary to apply to Antigonus, as conqueror, for leave to bury his slain.¹ But the troops of Antigonus were so disheartened that he resolved to resign possession of Gabiene to the enemy, and to take up his quarters in a distant part of Media, and he detained the herald of Eumenes until he had finished the preparations for his retreat.¹ Eumenes did not think it prudent to pursue him, as his own men needed refreshment and repose, and after a magnificent interment of his slain, in which the widow of an Indian officer mounted the funeral pile, he marched into Gabiene and put his army into cantonments for the winter.

The part of Media in which Antigonus wintered, was within nine days' march of Gabiene by the most direct road: but this road led through an arid desert. Antigonus however resolved to attempt to surprise the

enemy. He set out in the depth of winter, having spread the belief that Armenia was the object of his expedition, and having ordered the men to provide themselves with victuals for ten days, ready dressed. To ensure secrecy, he forbade them to kindle fires during the night. But the severity of the cold forced them to neglect this prohibition, and when they were within three or four days' march of their destination, the camp-fires betrayed their approach. The tidings were carried with the utmost speed, by couriers mounted on dromedaries, to the head-quarters of the allied satraps, and plunged them into consternation. It seemed certain that Antigonius would fall upon them before they could collect their troops from the villages where they were cantoned, which were spread over a great extent of country. Peucestes proposed to retreat to the opposite extremity of the province, where they might at least re-assemble a part of their force before the enemy came up. Eumenes alone preserved his presence of mind, and was ready with an expedient to meet the emergency. He saw that the movement proposed by Peucestes was likely to be attended with a total dissolution of the confederacy, and he undertook to stop the progress of Antigonius long enough to afford them time to bring all their troops together. The desert tract which Antigonius was crossing, in great part level, was bounded on the side of Gabiene by a ridge of high hills. On their summits Eumenes caused a number of fires to be lighted so as to present the appearance of a great encampment. The blaze was seen far and wide; and Antigonius was warned that his approach had been discovered, and that the enemy appeared to be assembled in full force to receive him. As he did not venture to expose his wayworn troops to the chance of an engagement, he turned aside out of the desert, and halted some days to refresh them. During this interval, Eumenes fortified his camp, laid in an abundant stock of provisions, and was rejoined by his whole force except the elephants, which however also reached the camp

in safety, notwithstanding an attempt which Antigonus made to intercept them.

The two armies remained only a few days within a short distance of each other, before they joined battle. Eumenes now had a great advantage in numbers. His infantry amounted to near 37,000 men: that of Antigonus to no more than 22,000. But the cavalry of Antigonus was nearly 10,000 strong: that of Eumenes scarcely exceeded 6000. The spirit of his army was excellent. But on the eve of the battle he discovered, through the information of Eudamus and another officer, who, as his creditors, felt an interest in his safety, that the principal satraps, at the instigation of Antigenes and Teutamus, inflamed with jealousy stronger than ever of his growing popularity, had resolved to get rid of him as soon as he should have won them a victory over Antigonus. He had, it seems, a few friends whom he still trusted, and with them he is said to have deliberated whether he should not abandon his faithless associates, — a herd of wild beasts, as he justly called them¹, — and even to have made his will, and burnt such of his papers as might involve the writers in danger after his death. But it seems that he at last determined to commit himself to the goodwill of the troops, who manifested extraordinary zeal. The Argyraspids, notwithstanding their age, believed themselves, and were commonly believed to be almost invincible. Just before the signal was raised for the onset, Antigenes ordered a horseman to ride up within hearing of that part of the enemy's line where the Macedonians were stationed, and to admonish them that they were about to begin an unnatural combat with their fathers: the veterans to whom Philip and Alexander owed all their conquests, and who would still show themselves worthy of the renown they had earned in so many glorious fields. This address made some impression on the troops of Antigonus: murmurs were heard among them, which showed that they pain-

¹ Προς τοὺς φίλους εἶπεν ὡς ἐν πανηγύρεϊ θηρίων ἀναστρέφεται. Plut. Eum.

fully felt its truth : while on the other side the men loudly demanded to be led against the enemy.

Antigonus had collected the main strength of his cavalry in the right wing, where he commanded in person with his son Demetrius. To meet this disposition, Eumenes strengthened his left with the best part of his cavalry and elephants, and the Argyraspids, and took his station there together with most of the satraps. His right wing he placed under the command of Philippos with orders to avoid an engagement, and to wait the issue of that which was to begin on his right. The event of the battle however was not determined either by the tactics of the generals, or by the valour of the men, but by the nature of the ground on which they fought. It was a plain, covered with fine, loose sand, partly covered with a salt crust : and the trampling of the horses and men soon raised a cloud of dust, through which no object could be discerned at more than a few yards distance. It is not quite clear whether it was to escape from this annoyance, and to gain a part of the field where he might see the enemy better, or from want of spirit, or with a treacherous purpose, that Peucestes did not wait to receive the charge of Antigonus, but wheeled off with his division of cavalry, which amounted to 1500 men. Eumenes, though so much weakened, maintained the unequal combat for a time, but at length was forced to retreat, and moved off in good order to the right, to reinforce himself with the troops of Philippos, which were not yet engaged. But in the meanwhile Antigonus had obtained a more important advantage through the dust which darkened the air. He was enabled to send some select squadrons of horse round to the enemy's camp, as under cover of night. They reached it unobserved, routed the troops which had been left to guard it, and made themselves masters of all it contained, which included the wives and children of the Argyraspids, and all the earnings of their long services. The Argyraspids sustained their reputation in the battle ; and although Diodorus must be exaggerating their ex-

plots, when he says that they killed 5000 of the enemy, and yet did not lose a man, the success of the infantry of Eumenes was probably due chiefly to them. But when the combat of the cavalry was decided, Antigonus divided his into two bodies, and while with one of them he himself watched the movements of Eumenes, he sent Pithon with the rest to charge the Argyraspids. They however gave proof of their wonted coolness and soldiership; though they had no horse to protect them, they formed themselves into a square, which Pithon found himself unable to force, and retired in safety from the field; and then discovered the irreparable loss they had suffered.

When night had parted the combatants, Eumenes and the satraps held a council of war. Eumenes wished to renew the battle the next day, observing that their infantry had been victorious, and even the cavalry had not been defeated. But the satraps, thinking this too great a risk, proposed to retreat into the upper provinces. Both parties adhered to their opinions, and the council broke up without any decision. There was however a third party, which they had not consulted, but which soon made its sentiments known. The Argyraspids were furious at the discovery of their loss, indignant at the conduct of Peucestes, which seemed to have deprived them of the victory, when it was already in their hands, incapable of any thought but the immediate recovery of their families and property. When they learnt the subject on which the council had been divided, they loudly declared that, while all that was dear to them was in the enemy's power, they would neither fight nor retreat: "What had they any longer either to hope or to fear?" All feelings of loyalty and honour were now extinguished: the only expedient that seemed to be left to them, was to apply to Antigonus for the restitution of what they had lost. Teutamus, who had always been inclined to change sides, and now probably saw no other way to preserve his authority, himself opened a secret negotiation with Antigonus. Antigonus was will-

ing not only to grant their request, but to confer other favours on them if they would enter into his service, and deliver Eumenes into his hands. These terms were accepted, and the Argyraspidæ prepared to execute their treacherous purpose. A number of them entered the tent of Eumenes together under various pretexts, wrested his dagger from him, overpowered him, and fastened his hands behind his back with his own belt.¹ Antigonus was immediately apprised of the event, and sent an officer named Nicanor to take possession of the prisoner. He earnestly entreated, it is said, that he might be allowed to die either by their hands, or by his own, before he was surrendered to the enemy: on that condition he was ready to acquit them of the guilt of treachery: but he could not obtain even this last favour. Antigonus, who had not dropped all hope of engaging him in his own service, ordered him to be committed to the closest custody until his fate should be determined. When the question was discussed in the council, two voices only pleaded for his life: his old friend Nearchus, and the young Demetrius, who was capable of admiration for a noble adversary. Nor perhaps was Antigonus himself, though, it is said, violently incensed against the prisoner, entirely callous to such feelings: but in him they were speedily overpowered by the remonstrances of his other generals, who, each regarding Eumenes as a rival, pressed for his execution, and even threatened, if he were spared, to quit the service of Antigonus. The army too, or at least the wretches who had betrayed him, began to be clamorous for his life²; and Antigonus was forced to give way. He was still so reluctant to shed the blood of the man who had once been his friend, that, with cruel superstition, he ordered his food to be withdrawn. But as the camp was broken up two or three days after, the prisoner was dispatched, before he sank under the torments of hunger, either by command of Antigonus,

¹ Justin (xiv. 3 12) represents him as having taken to flight, and as having been seized and brought back.

² Nepos, Eum. 12.

or to satisfy some more jealous, or more merciful enemy. So perished, in the forty-fifth year of his age, the ablest and best of Alexander's surviving captains: if we ought not rather to say the only one who united very eminent abilities with a character entitled to respect. His talents and zeal, with which he might have conferred important benefits on his country, were wasted in the service of foreigners, who could never forgive the superiority of a Greek. It not only interfered with the ambitious views of his rivals, but shocked the self-complacency—always strongest in the most barbarous and worthless races—with which a nation of military boors, intoxicated with the good fortune which had made them the instruments of great achievements, regarded itself as the first people on the earth.

No opposition, it seems, was offered by the rest of the army to the mutiny of the Argyraspids: and the surrender of Eumenes was presently followed by the submission of almost all the allied satraps, and their forces. Peucestes was among the first to fall in with the current, and joined Antigonus with his 10,000 Persians. The blame of their resistance was of course thrown upon Eumenes; and Antigonus received their excuses graciously; he excepted only a few, who had shown either personal attachment to Eumenes, or hostility to himself. Antigenes had excited his especial resentment; as the man who had baffled his early attempts to corrupt the Argyraspids. He was now, by order of Antigonus, cast into a pit, and burnt alive. Eudamus, Celbanus, and some others, were likewise condemned to death. Thus was the league of the eastern satraps suppressed, and the royal house lost the only man who had ever shown a true devotion to its cause, and was able effectually to support it. Antigonus had now only to make use of the advantage he had gained, quietly to remove all the obstacles which still opposed the accomplishment of his ends.

He soon quitted Gabiene, to take up his quarters for the rest of the winter near Ecbatana, and cantoned his

army in the northern districts of Media, chiefly in the territory of Rhagæ. While it remained here, he received information, that Pithon was endeavouring, by a free distribution of money, to draw as many as he could of the scattered divisions into his own service, and was meditating a sudden attack upon him. He dissembled his purpose, affected to treat the reports he received with indignation, as fully assured of Pithon's fidelity, and publicly announced his intention to leave the satrap of Media in the station he had before occupied, — the superintendence of the eastern provinces. When he had allowed sufficient time for his language to reach Pithon's ear, he wrote to apprise him, that he was on the point of returning to the West, and desired his immediate presence, to confer with him on affairs of the highest moment. Pithon fell blindly into the snare: he came, expecting, according to the information he had received from his friends, that he was to be invested with the government of the East. But Antigonus brought him to trial before his council, and caused him to be condemned, and immediately put to death. The satrapy of Media he committed to Orontobates, a native of the country, and appointed Hippostratus to the military command with a body of 3500 Asiatic troops. He then collected his forces, and proceeding to Ecbatana, took possession of the treasure remaining there, which amounted to 5000 talents, and set out on his march to Persepolis. While he was on the road, a feeble attempt was made by two generals, Meleager and Menætas, who had engaged in Pithon's plot, to excite an insurrection in Media, and they nearly surprised the camp of the new satrap and Hippostratus; but the revolt was soon suppressed, and the leaders punished with death.

In Persis Antigonus was received with royal honours, and he held a council, to deliberate on the distribution of the eastern provinces. Most of the more distant he thought it prudent to leave in the hands of the satraps who had hitherto held them, who could only have been

removed by force : and he sent for Siburtius from Arachosia, as assured of his attachment by his enmity to Eumenes, confirmed him in the possession of his satrapy, and placed the most turbulent of the Argyraspids under his command, with secret instructions to employ them, by small parties at a time, in services which would ensure their destruction. This number included the men to whom he had been chiefly indebted for the surrender of Eumenes, who thus received the just recompense of their treachery. Persis was too important a province to be left in the hands of a man so popular among the natives, and so aspiring, as Peucestes. Antigonus removed him ; and, when the people loudly expressed its discontent, and an officer named Thespius had the boldness to represent their wishes, he put Thespius to death, and appointed Asclepiodorus to the government, leaving a sufficient force under his command. Peucestes, whom he carried away with him, he soothed with hopes, which were probably never fulfilled. We hear no more of his name, and can only conjecture his fate. On the banks of the Pasitigris, he met Xenophilus, who had surrendered to Seleucus. Antigonus received him with a show of favour, not feeling secure of his object until he had advanced to Susa, and had taken possession of the treasure. It still included the celebrated tree of pure gold, and other precious works of art which were valued at 15,000 talents : and the crowns, and other presents, together with spoil which had been lodged there, amounted to 5000 more. So that, with what he had brought from Ecbatana, he found himself master of 25,000 talents. Carriages and camels were collected to convey the whole to the western coast, and Antigonus, leaving Aspisas, a native, satrap of Susiana, pursued his march with it to Babylon.

Seleucus, probably by his orders, had previously returned to Babylon, where, stifling the resentment and suspicion which he must have felt, he received the conqueror with magnificent presents, and entertained his whole army. He hoped to disarm his jealousy, but

perhaps rather strengthened it by his munificence ; Antigonus resolved to rid himself of a man, whose talents and spirit, together with the influence he had acquired by his mildness and liberality, rendered him a formidable rival. He called him to account for his administration of the revenues of his province. Seleucus, reflecting on Pithon's fate, augured that which was designed for himself. He publicly remonstrated against the requisition of Antigonus, alleging that he owed no account of a province, which he had received by the vote of the army, as a reward for his services under Alexander. The discussion lasted some days : but, as it grew warmer, he saw the danger increasing, and made his escape. Accompanied only by fifty horsemen, he took the road to Egypt, to throw himself on Ptolemy's protection. Antigonus at first rejoiced at his flight, which, while it left the satrapy vacant, spared him the necessity of violent measures against a man universally beloved. But his fears were soon awakened, it is said, by a prediction of the Chaldeans, who foretold, that the fugitive, if he escaped, was destined to become master of Asia, and Antigonus to lose his life in battle with him. The prophecy perhaps was forged after the event : but Antigonus ordered him to be pursued, when it was too late to overtake him, and dismissed Blitor from the command he held in Mesopotamia, because he had not exerted himself to arrest the fugitive : ¹ unless indeed this was a pretext for the removal of an officer whom he could not trust. Seleucus was reserved to accomplish his high destiny. Pithon the son of Agenor, whom Alexander had left in India, was invested with the vacant satrapy.

While Antigonus was making such progress in the east, as might encourage him to hope that ere long he should unite Alexander's whole empire under his rule, events had occurred in Europe, which, though they raised up a new rival to resist his pretensions, also seemed to

clear the way for his ambition. It appears that Polysperchon, when he returned to Macedonia after his disastrous attempt on Megalopolis, with an army much reduced in numbers, and a still greater diminution of his military and political reputation, found himself no longer able without assistance to withstand the machinations of Eurydice. Her imbecile husband's name afforded her a sufficient title to supreme authority, and she had begun to form a party in Macedonia, which would enable her to exercise it, and to set Polysperchon wholly aside. It may be inferred from the correspondence between Polysperchon and Olympias, and from the letter of Olympias to Eumenes, that the life of Roxana's child was believed to be in danger from Eurydice: and it is probable that before Polysperchon made his expedition to Greece, he had sent both mother and son into Epirus, to seek protection from Olympias. Eurydice's proceedings now rendered a decisive step necessary. He had still indeed the army at his command, but he did not venture so far to try its fidelity, as to make an attack on the young queen in his own name. It was only under that of Olympias that he could hope to overthrow her influence. Olympias, who had always been eager to return to Macedonia, and had only been restrained by her distrust of Polysperchon, could hesitate no longer, when she saw her grandson expelled from his patrimony by one whom she hated as the grand-daughter of one of her rivals. She accepted Polysperchon's proposals: and it was agreed that he should march into Epirus, and conduct her and the young prince to Macedonia. Her nephew, Æacides king of Epirus, promised to join him with his forces. These preparations did not escape Eurydice's notice, but she resolved to meet force with force. She was already, it seems, in correspondence with Cassander, and she now urged him to come immediately to her aid. But Cassander was at this time in Peloponnesus, endeavouring to recover what Polysperchon had gained there, and was not able to leave it so soon as Eurydice's emergency required. She however had so far strengthened her party

in Macedonia, that she was able to raise an army with which she could venture to encounter the united forces of Polysperchon and Æacides.

They found her encamped near the Macedonian town of Eira, and she did not decline a battle. The two armies were drawn up in battle-array, and Eurydice was seen in front of her line, completely armed in the Macedonian fashion, forming and animating her troops. Yet it appears that no combat ensued. Before the signal was given Olympias came forward, it is said, with an air of sacred frenzy, and accompanied with the instruments of Bacchanalian processions.¹ It is not difficult to conceive that the Macedonians of her rival's army were so awe-struck, as well by her unearthly aspect, as by the recollection of her dignity, that they could not be brought to raise their hands against her. Philip was immediately taken with all his retinue. Eurydice escaped from the field, accompanied by Polycles, the only one of her council that remained faithful to her, and fled toward Amphipolis, designing no doubt to proceed to the Hellespont: but she was arrested on the way, and delivered up to her rival. Olympias was not satisfied with a common revenge on her two prisoners. She determined to make them taste the bitterness of death in long-protracted tortures: and immured them both in a dungeon built for the purpose with only one narrow opening for the admission of food. In this state she kept them some days: but then finding that the Macedonians were disgusted by this refinement of cruelty, she ordered the Thracians who guarded them to despatch Philip. For Eurydice she still reserved what she thought a bitterer death. The young queen had not suffered her spirit to be bowed by her reverses. She spoke as boldly as ever, and asserted her right to the throne. While her husband's bleeding corpse lay at her feet, she received a message from Olympias, with a sword, a cord, and a cup of hemlock, bidding her choose which she would. She

¹ Βακχικόν τετον μετὰ τυμπανον Athenæus, xiii 560. F

spoke only to pray that like presents might one day be brought to Olympias : then, having paid such offices as the circumstances permitted to her dead husband, she unclasped her own girdle, and with it put an end to her life. Olympias next gave loose to her vengeance against the family of Antipater. Nicanor, one of his sons, fell into her hands, and was put to death : and she now propagated the report that Alexander had been poisoned by Iollas, whose tomb she demolished. Even these victims did not satiate her : she selected a hundred of Cassander's friends, all men of high rank, and condemned them to death, it seems, without any form of trial. The advice of Eumenes was forgotten : and the effects which he foresaw soon attended this reckless indulgence of her ferocious passions.

Cassander was still in Peloponnesus, engaged in the siege of Tegea, when he received intelligence, perhaps at the same time, of the return and victory of Olympias, and of her bloody dealings with her royal prisoners, and with his own family and friends. His own appetite for revenge was as keen as hers. He had not forgotten the affronts he had suffered from Alexander : but this last injury forced him immediately to lay aside every other care but that of vengeance. Though Polysperchon's son Alexander was in Peloponnesus, ready to take advantage of his absence, and many cities which had recently embraced his alliance looked to him for protection, he raised the siege of Tegea, and set out for Macedonia. Polysperchon and Olympias expected his coming, and had taken precautions to secure Macedonia from invasion. They had engaged the Ætolians, who were led to espouse their cause, partly by the recollection of Antipater's enmity, and partly by the private influence of Polysperchon, to occupy the pass of Thermopylæ ; and Polysperchon himself crossed the mountains of the southern frontier, and took up a position in Perrhæbia. Cassander did not waste his strength in an attempt to dislodge the Ætolians from Thermopylæ. He collected a number of small craft

from Eubœa and Locris, and transported his army across the Maliac gulf into Thessaly. There he divided it into two main bodies, one of which he sent under the command of Callas into Perrhæbia, with orders to keep Polysperchon employed; while with the other he himself pursued his march toward the nearest pass. This manœuvre entirely disconcerted the plans of Polysperchon and Olympias, who had believed that Macedonia was safe as long as Polysperchon retained his position in Thessaly. Olympias, when it was too late, sent some troops to seize the pass of Tempe, toward which Cassander was moving: it was already occupied by a detachment which he had pushed forward under the command of Deinias. She now saw herself in imminent danger; and appointing Aristonous to meet Cassander with the forces which Polysperchon had left in Macedonia, she took refuge in Pydna with a great number of royal and noble persons, among whom, beside Roxana and the young prince, were Thessalonice, one of Philip's daughters, and Deidamia, the daughter of Æacides. She was attended by a very small force, chiefly the household troops, and by the remainder of the elephants: nor was the town supplied with provisions for a long siege. She however resolved to remain there, not doubting that succours would soon be brought to her in abundance by sea, both from Macedonia and Greece.

Cassander, having crossed the mountains, moved directly upon Pydna. He drew a trench round the town from sea to sea, and sent for ships, engines, and ammunition, to besiege it both by land and sea. While he was thus engaged, he learnt that Æacides was preparing to bring succours from Epirus. He therefore sent Atarrhias, with a division of his army, to occupy the passes between Epirus and Macedonia. The Epirots felt no interest in the expedition, and broke out into open mutiny: so that Æacides was compelled to make a proclamation, by which all who desired it were allowed to return to their homes; and so many availed themselves of this permission, that the king found himself

unable with his remaining forces to make head against Atarrhias. Even the loyalty of his peaceful subjects was undermined by the seditious language of the men who had quitted his camp. A national assembly was held, in which, by a proceeding never before heard of in the history of Epirus, the king was declared to have forfeited his crown. It was transferred to the family of Neoptolemus, a remote branch of the royal line. Pyrrhus, the infant son of *Æacides*, was with great difficulty and danger preserved from the pursuit of his enemies, and conveyed to the court of Glaucias, king of Illyria, who afforded him shelter. The authors of the revolution made a treaty with Cassander, who sent Lyciscus to act as regent in Epirus, which thus became devoted to his interest. The partizans of Olympias in Macedonia, who before wavered between hope and fear, were so disheartened by this event, that they dropped the preparations which they were making to come to her assistance: and she was soon after deprived of her last remaining hope by the intelligence that the greater part of Polysperchon's troops had been seduced by Callas to abandon their chief, who was obliged to take shelter with the few who adhered to him in the Perrhæbian town of Naxium, where he was closely blockaded by the enemy. The aspiring woman, so lately absolute mistress of Macedonia, was left without a prospect of relief, exposed to the attack of her implacable foe.

The season however was so far advanced that Cassander found it impracticable to proceed by the way of assault, and contented himself with maintaining a strict blockade. In the course of the winter the scarcity of provisions began to be severely felt by the besieged, and soon all the horrors of famine appeared in their most terrible form. The soldiers were reduced to a scanty ration, the elephants were fed on sawdust, and gradually pined away: the horses and beasts of burden were slaughtered for the sake of their flesh. The riders were not permitted to share the common allowance, and they, and at length more and more of the

other soldiers perished of hunger. The barbarians betook themselves to the bodies of the dead: the streets were encumbered with corpses, which the survivors scarcely retained strength or spirit either to bury or to throw over the walls. The hideous spectacle and the noisome stench diffused universal despondency. Desertions became frequent, and all who repaired to the camp of the besiegers were graciously received by Cassander, who sent them to their homes, where they spread the report of the desperate condition of Olympias, which extinguished every hope that might have animated her partizans to make an attempt for her deliverance. As the spring advanced and the famine grew every day more pressing, the soldiers assembled round the palace, and called upon her, since she was no longer able to support them, to permit them to depart. She was obliged to comply with their demand, and at length saw herself so generally abandoned, that she concerted measures for her own escape. A galley was prepared to carry her away with her friends. But before they had embarked, Cassander was apprised of her design, sailed into the harbour, and took the vessel.¹ She was now reduced to utter despair, and sent to negotiate with the conqueror. He at first insisted that she should surrender at discretion, but at length consented to promise that her life should be spared. He knew that when he had once made himself master of her person, this condition would not long stand in the way of his revenge.

After the fall of Pydna all Macedonia submitted to

¹ So Diodorus, xix. 50. Polyænus (iv 11. 3) tells a different, and less probable story. According to him, the vessel was furnished by Polysperchon—who, one would think, was hardly in a situation to have done so—and intercepted by Cassander, who prevailed on the messenger to carry the letter, in which Polysperchon exhorted the queen to make her escape, to Olympias, suppressing the fact of the capture. Olympias repaired by night to the water-side, but not finding the vessel there, concluded, without farther inquiry, that Polysperchon had deceived her, and abandoned herself to despair: a consequence that could hardly have been foreseen; and it is rather surprising, that Cassander did not carry his stratagem a little farther, man the vessel with a crew of his own, suffer Olympias to embark, and then make himself master of it and her. There is a suspicious resemblance between this and the stratagem by which he soon after certainly attempted to draw her into his power.

him except Pella, which was held by Monimus, and Amphipolis, to which Aristonous had retired with a considerable body of troops. Monimus however surrendered at Cassander's first summons. Aristonous was inclined to hold out, for he had recently gained a victory over Cassander's general Crateuas, and having besieged him in the Bisaltian town of Bedys, had compelled him to capitulate on condition that he should lay down his arms. He still hoped for succours either from Eumenes, of whose death, which happened in the preceding winter, he had not yet heard, or from Polysperchon, or Alexander. Cassander however forced Olympias to send him an order to surrender, and with this he complied, on a stipulation for his personal safety: but Cassander, who was jealous of his rank and influence, eluded the fulfilment of the treaty, and instigated some of the family of Crateuas, who resented their kinsman's disgrace, to put him to death.

There were still some difficulties to overcome before he could wreak his revenge on Olympias. He did not think it safe openly to violate the pledge which he had given: the pity of the Macedonians might be revived by her misfortunes. He thought it necessary at least to obtain the sanction of his army, and wished that she might herself furnish him with a pretext for her destruction. The first object he easily accomplished. The kinsmen of the numerous victims whom Olympias had sacrificed to her hatred of Cassander, readily undertook to accuse her in a general assembly: and as she was absent, and had no one to plead for her, she was condemned to death. Still this sentence did not release Cassander from his engagement, and he endeavoured to inveigle her into a step by which she would forfeit the benefit of it. He sent some of his friends to her with a private message, affected to be touched with compassion for her wretchedness, and to apprehend that he should not be able to protect her from the fury of the army which had condemned her to death: he therefore offered to prepare a galley in which she might make

her escape to Athens. His plan was, if she fell into the snare, to have her killed at sea, and thus, while he satisfied his hatred, to shift the imputation of breach of faith on her. Olympias however, whether suspecting fraud, or confident in the influence which she believed herself still to retain over the Macedonians, declined the proposal. All that she asked for, was a fair trial before a national assembly, in which she might be heard in her own defence. Cassander became alarmed, lest he should be obliged, by the voice of the people, to grant this demand. He was resolved not to incur the danger which would arise from the public appearance of the aged queen as a prisoner and a suppliant, before the multitude: he therefore sent a party of soldiers—200 men whom he selected as the most willing to render him any service—to surround the palace and despatch her. Olympias received warning that she must prepare for death. She put on her royal robes, and came forward, leaning on two of her women, to meet the soldiers. Even they were so overpowered by the majesty of her presence, and by the numberless great recollections attached to her name, that they could not bring themselves to execute Cassander's order. He was obliged to commit the deed of blood to the persons who had accused her, and who were eager enough for revenge to undertake it themselves. She submitted to her fate with unbending firmness, neither shrinking from their swords nor uttering a word unworthy of her birth and fortunes.¹

Cassander thus saw himself, in fact, master of Macedonia: it remained for him to secure it against all other claimants in his own independent possession. It was however not more perhaps with this view, than to gratify his hatred of Alexander, that he resolved to rid himself of Roxana and her son. But this was a step which demanded great caution. The scenes which had lately taken place proved the veneration of the Mace-

¹ So Diodorus (xix. 51), and, more expressly, Justin (xiv. 6.). Pausanias (ix. 7. 2.) represents her as stoned to death.

donians for Alexander's memory. It was still uncertain how they might receive the tidings of the death of Olympias, and it would not have been safe immediately to follow up the murder of his mother, with that of his widow and child. It seemed prudent also to wait for intelligence of the course which events were taking in the east, before he ventured on this decisive measure. He therefore removed Roxana and the young prince to the citadel of Amphipolis, which he committed to a trusty officer, named Glaucias. He at the same time dismissed the pages and officers who had before attended them, and ordered that they should be treated as private persons. This was a sufficient declaration of his intention to exclude Alexander's son from the throne; and his partizans probably repeated all the arguments that had ever been urged against the prince's title. But still he required one more legitimate for himself, which could only be acquired by an alliance with the royal house. For this purpose he fixed his eyes on Philip's daughter Thessalonice, who, though her claims could not be considered equal to those of Cleopatra, might still serve to reconcile the nation to his rule. Their marriage was celebrated not long after the surrender of Pydna, and it was in honour of this princess, and probably in the course of the same spring, that Cassander founded the city which so long bore her name at the head of the Thermaic gulph: as it was at this time that he founded one named after himself, Cassandrea, in the peninsula of Pallene, which he peopled with emigrants from Potidæa and other neighbouring cities, and with a considerable number of families which had survived the ruin of Olynthus. He could have taken no measures more tending to multiply his personal adherents, and to accustom the people to view him as the successor of their ancient princes. Such was the character which he publicly assumed, and in this capacity he ordered the remains of Eurydice, Philip, and Cynane, to be buried in the royal sepulchre at Ægæ, and honoured their memory with funeral games.

He was now again at liberty to turn his attention toward Greece, where the state of affairs called for his presence. Alexander had taken advantage of his departure from Peloponnesus, to draw several cities into his own alliance, and to seize several strong positions. Polysperchon himself, when he heard of the death of Olympias, and saw that his cause was irretrievably lost for the present in Macedonia, escaped from Naxium, and joining *Æacides*, took refuge with him in *Ætolia*, where he possessed some personal influence, derived, it seems, from family connections.¹ It was highly desirable for Cassander to crush these rivals, and to make himself master of Greece, before he should be assailed, as he might expect to be in any case, from another quarter. He therefore strengthened his army with new levies in Macedonia, and early in the summer of 316 set out on his march to Peloponnesus. He found *Thermopylæ* again guarded by the *Ætolians*, and was now obliged to force a passage. Though the settlement of Peloponnesus was his main object, there was another of great importance which detained him for some time in *Bœotia*. His position rendered it expedient for him everywhere as much as possible to gain the goodwill of those whom he wished to govern, and to signalise the beginning of his reign by acts of beneficence. It seems to have been his aim to invite a comparison between his own conduct and that of his predecessors, on points in which it would turn in his favour: and it was probably in part this motive which induced him to resolve on the restoration of Thebes. The destruction of that ancient city had excited general sympathy in Greece, notwithstanding the insolence with which it had abused its prosperity. To repair the injury which had been inflicted by the Macedonian arms, was a work of humanity and generosity, likely to be generally approved and admired. But Cassander probably had some more special motives and ends. To rebuild what Alexander had destroyed,

¹ Diodorus, xix. 52. Pausanias (v. 6. 1.) calls him an *Ætolian*, which is explained by *Iscetes ad Lycoph. v. 802*.

and to annul the decree by which he had doomed the site of Thebes to desolation, was in itself an undertaking that interested his personal feelings. In a purely political point of view there was much to recommend it. The Bœotian towns indeed, which had rejoiced in the fall of Thebes, and were still in possession of her territory, might feel themselves injured by it, and would no longer be so warmly attached to the Macedonian government as they had been. But, on the other hand, Thebes, which might again outweigh them all, would be entirely devoted not merely to Macedonia, but to the house of her benefactor. She would help to secure the submission of Athens: and, above all, the Peloponnesian states which retained their jealousy of Sparta, would hail the event with exultation.

On his arrival in Bœotia, Cassander assembled a congress of deputies from the Bœotian towns, informed them of his design, and condescended to request their consent. We do not know what arguments or motives he used, or whether he obtained more than a nominal consent, which could not prudently have been withheld. When this difficulty was removed, he directed that the work should be begun. The Theban exiles returned, to settle again on the hallowed ground: but they had only permission to occupy it; Cassander did not supply them with the means; and the undertaking was far beyond the reach of their broken fortunes. Succours however were brought to them from other quarters, with a zeal which, while it proves the policy of Cassander's plan, makes us regret that the spirit which displayed itself so nobly on this occasion, had not prevailed more uniformly among the Greeks. The Athenians were foremost among those who contributed to the work: they built the greater part of the wall: a generous exertion certainly, in behalf of a people whose ancestors had been their bitterest enemies, and who had no claims upon them but such as arose out of their common origin, and the service which Thebes had rendered to the national cause in the struggle with Macedonia. Megalo-

polis and Messene also remembered that they owed their existence to Thebes, and testified their gratitude by pecuniary aid. Contributions were sent even from the Greek cities of Sicily and Italy. The Thebans were conscious of their altered position: they no longer aspired to dominion over their Bœotian neighbours, but solicited admission into the league, which was headed by their ancient enemies, the Platæans, and sent their sacrifice with the rest to the festival of the great Dædala, which was celebrated every sixty years, to commemorate the interval during which Platæa lay desolate.¹

From Bœotia Cassander advanced toward Peloponnesus. When he arrived at Athens, he found that Alexander had fortified the Isthmus, so as to render the approach extremely difficult on this side. He nevertheless proceeded as far as Megara, but there, having perhaps more accurately ascertained the strength of the enemy's position, he caused rafts to be prepared for the elephants, and transports for the troops, with which he crossed over to Epidaurus. He then marched to Argos, and induced it to renounce its alliance with Alexander. Hermione too submitted to him, either now, or a little later. One is surprised to hear that the chief resistance which he had to encounter was in Messenia. Before he could reduce Ithome, he found himself obliged to retire. Doubtless intelligence which he had received from the East, seemed to render it necessary for him to return with all speed to secure his more important interests in Macedonia. Alexander remained in his position at the Isthmus, but could not prevent Cassander from passing his lines, and declined a battle. Cassander left Molycus, with 2000 men, to occupy the passes of Geranea, and pursued his march northward.

Antigonus, it appears before he left Babylon, sent envoys to Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, formally to acquaint them with his success, and to express his hopes that their alliance with him might continue uninterrupted. Toward the end of the autumn of 316

¹ Pausanias, ix. 3. 6.

he arrived at Mallus in Cilicia, and distributed his army in winter quarters. The treasures at Quinda, still amounting to 10,000 talents, were delivered up to him : and he found that the ordinary revenues of the provinces already subject to him might be estimated at 11,000 talents. In the meanwhile Seleucus had reached Egypt, and was perhaps the first to apprise its ruler of the danger he had to apprehend from the enormous power and the grasping ambition of Antigonus. Ptolemy hastened to fortify himself by a closer alliance with the men, whose safety was now inseparably connected with his own. Lysimachus had by this time firmly established himself in Thrace, though still exposed to formidable attacks from his northern neighbours, and was able to render important assistance. In the absence of Antigonus a new power had sprung up in Asia Minor. Asander, the satrap of Caria, had extended his dominion far and wide, and had nearly made himself master of Cappadocia. They and Cassander were easily induced to send their envoys to accompany those of Ptolemy and Seleucus on a common embassy to Antigonus. In the spring of 315 the ambassadors met Antigonus on his march into Upper Syria, and communicated to him the demands which they were instructed to make. Their masters claimed a share in the fruits of his success to which they had all in some measure contributed. They proposed that the Hellespontine Phrygia should be annexed to the satrapy of Lysimachus, that Asander should be confirmed in the possession of Lycia and Cappadocia, Ptolemy in that of Syria, including Phœnicia, that Babylonia should be restored to Seleucus, and that the treasures which Antigonus had brought from the East should be equally shared among all. We hear of no demand on the part of Cassander : he was no doubt satisfied with the possession of Macedonia and Greece. Antigonus replied with a mixture of scorn and indignation¹, and particularly bade the Egyptian envoys inform Ptolemy, that he would be ready to meet him.

¹ Appian, Syr. 53. characteristically, *ἐπιχλευσάμενος*.

The allies probably did not wait for his answer to make the most active preparations for the contest which they must have foreseen to be inevitable, Antigonus, after his declaration of war, immediately took measures to keep his less formidable rivals fully employed, while he himself bent his main force against Ptolemy. He sent an agent to Cyprus, and others to Rhodes, to secure the alliance of these islands, which was of great importance for the creation of the marine, which was one of his principal objects. He sent his nephew Ptolemæus with a strong body of troops into Cappadocia, to raise the siege of Amisus, which was defending itself against Asander, with instructions afterwards to proceed to the Hellespont to guard the passage against Cassander and Lysimachus. He at the same time provided occupation for Cassander in Europe: he despatched Aristodemus with a thousand talents to Peloponnesus, to treat with Alexander and Polysperchon, and to levy troops which might enable them to carry on the war against the common enemy; and he gave directions for the establishment of a chain of signals and post-stations, to maintain the readiest communication with the eastern provinces.

He then pursued his march to Phœnicia. The operation on which the success of his plans mainly depended, was to make himself master of its ports; and to form a navy, which should give him the command of the sea. He had little resistance to apprehend in the country: but Ptolemy had carried away all the ships and seamen he found there into Egypt. The sides of Libanus however yielded an inexhaustible supply of timber, and the population of Phœnicia furnished abundance of the best mariners. Tyre alone he found occupied by an Egyptian garrison; and having encamped over against it, while he made preparations for a siege, he sent for the Phœnician kings, and the officers who commanded in Syria, and gave his orders for the building of ships, and the collection of magazines of corn for a year's consumption. Three dockyards were speedily established in Phœnicia—at Tripolis, Byblus, and

Sidon—a fourth on the coast of Cilicia, to which the timber was brought down from Taurus, and another in Rhodes, where his envoy had obtained the people's consent. Eight thousand men were kept employed in the forests of Libanus alone, and a thousand team of cattle conveyed the timber to the coast. While these preparations were going on, as Antigonus lay encamped near Tyre, a fleet of a hundred sail, magnificently equipped, and executing its manœuvres with the greatest celerity, appeared in the road. It was commanded by Seleucus, who was on his way from Egypt to the Ægean, and took the opportunity to make this display of his naval power in the enemy's sight. It excited general uneasiness in the camp of Antigonus, especially among those of his allies who inhabited towns on the coast: What, they asked, would the greatest land-force avail to protect them from ravages and annoyance while the enemy was master of the sea? Antigonus bade his friends keep up their spirits: before the summer was over he would put to sea with 500 sail. In Cyprus his ministers found Nicocreon, king of Salamis, and most of the other princes, already gained by Ptolemy: four only, and those among the least powerful, entered into alliance with Antigonus. While his works were proceeding for the siege of Tyre, leaving Andronicus with 3000 men to superintend and protect them, he made an expedition southward, took Joppa and Gaza by storm, incorporated the garrisons with his army, and left troops of his own in their room.

In Asia Minor the success of his arms was more rapid. Ptolemæus compelled Asander's general Asclepiodorus to abandon the siege of Amisus, and to evacuate Cappadocia. He then marched into Bithynia, where the king Zibcetes, either as an ally of the enemy, or for his private aggrandisement, had laid siege to Astacus and Chalcedon. He too was forced to yield, and to join the cities he had attacked in alliance with Antigonus. From Bithynia Ptolemæus was called by pressing orders from his uncle to hasten to protect Ionia and Lydia,

which were threatened by Seleucus. He found Seleucus engaged in the siege of Erythræ: his arrival induced him not only to raise the siege, but to withdraw from the coast. He sailed away to Cyprus, where the state of affairs was sufficiently critical to render his presence desirable. No enemy now was left in Asia Minor but Asander, who was nearly reduced within the limits of his own province, where he might soon find himself attacked both by land and sea.

In Greece Aristodemus executed his commission no less ably and successfully. He first sailed to Laconia, and at Sparta, where Cassander was viewed as a hereditary enemy, obtained the sanction of the government for his levies, which soon amounted to 8000 men. Polysperchon came over from Ætolia, it seems, to treat with him and his son. Alexander was persuaded to make a voyage to Phœnicia, for the purpose of a conference with Antigonus, while the old man remained at the head of the army. He was so deeply humbled by his reverses, that he consented to accept the title of general of Peloponnesus from Antigonus. On Alexander's arrival at the camp before Tyre, Antigonus, having concluded a treaty with him, called an assembly to which not only the soldiers but all the strangers in the camp were admitted. It was his wish to give the greatest possible notoriety to its proceedings, as they were designed to make an impression favourable to his cause on the public mind both in Asia and Europe. He himself harangued the multitude, and recounted Cassander's misdeeds. Among them he enumerated not only the murder of Olympias, his treatment of Roxana and the young king, the violence with which he had obtained the hand of Thessalonice, and his assumption of sovereign power in Macedonia, but also his new settlements in Pallene and Bœotia. It was to dishonour the memory of Philip and Alexander, that he had invited the Olynthians, Macedonia's inveterate enemies, into the city which bore his own name, and had rebuilt Thebes. Having thus roused the indignation of his Macedonian hearers, he proposed a reso-

lution to be adopted by the army, by which Cassander was declared an enemy unless he should release Roxana and the prince, should pull down his new cities, and in all respects pay due obedience to Antigonos, the lawful commander of the forces, and regent of the empire. This latter title he seems never to have assumed before. It was to be regarded as a new dignity conferred on him by the vote of the army, to enable him to protect the royal family; and he would probably not have adopted it, if the confederacy formed against him had been less formidable, and he had not thought it expedient to fix the stigma of rebellion and treason on his rivals, and to give an air of legitimacy to his own cause, without which he might have found it difficult to maintain his authority in the upper provinces. It was chiefly to them and to the satraps who still revered the royal name, or considered it as their only safeguard against his ambition, that this part of the decree was addressed. Another part related to Greece. It declared that all the Greek states should be restored to liberty and independence: no Greek city any longer held by a foreign garrison. The object of this concession was clear enough. Polysperchon had tried to win Greece by a democratical revolution: Cassander by an oligarchical reaction. Antigonos would outbid them both, and attract Greeks of all parties to his side, by the sound most pleasing to every Greek ear. The assembly passed the resolution, and Antigonos sent copies of it to all quarters where it was likely to promote his ends. He then dismissed Alexander with a present of 500 talents, and with hopes, which no one, it seems, knew better how to suggest without any distinct promise.

Ptolemy endeavoured to counteract the effect of the decree, so far as it related to Greece, by another, in which he held out a like promise. This imitation might help to destroy any illusion that had been created by the original, as it became doubly evident that each was only meant to serve a temporary purpose. But the prospect which the new turn of events opened

for Greece was, as to the immediate future, gloomier than ever. The unhappy country seemed destined to be the theatre of endless wars, in which party-rancour was combined with the hostility of foreigners to spread bloodshed and desolation over its whole surface. The rivals were all alike strangers, in feeling and interests, to Greece: and their forces were so evenly balanced, as to ensure many destructive alternations of success, while it was impossible to foresee the issue of the struggle. For a Greek who had the good of his country at heart, there was no motive to prefer one side to another, except that a partition of Alexander's empire was a very desirable event, as it fostered hopes of national independence, which would be lost, if the whole should be united in the hands of Antigonus. On the other hand, the power of Cassander might seem no less fatal to liberty. Yet it was difficult to remain neutral; and a state which took such a position, was perhaps exposed to greater dangers, than if it had actively engaged in the contest. To fight, or be trampled on, were the only alternatives. Two frightful examples of the calamities with which this period could not fail to abound, occurred in the course of about a year after Cassander's last-mentioned return to Macedonia. He had left a man named Apollonides in command of the garrison at Argos. Apollonides had found an opportunity to surprise Stymphalus; but while he was absent on this expedition, the party in Argos adverse to Cassander invited Alexander to come and take possession of the city, which they promised to surrender to him. Relying on his support, they openly declared themselves, and it seems appointed 500 of their number, as the new democratical council. Alexander however delayed, and Apollonides, having been apprised of the revolution, reached Argos before him. He found the council assembled in the Prytaneum, and having barred their egress, set fire to the building: the Five Hundred perished in the flames. The rest of the party were more mildly punished with death or banishment. The conduct of Apollonides seems to us inhuman: but there were few among the

leading Macedonians of the period who had a right to reproach him with it, or who would not have approved of it: and it is only surprising that a man endowed with so much energy of will—in that age commonly admitted as a substitute for every good quality—should not have risen higher among his kindred spirits.

The other occurrence, which affords a melancholy illustration of the state of Greece, was one of the consequences which arose out of the measures taken by Cassander to counteract the operations of Aristodemus. Cassander, when he heard of his arrival in Peloponnesus, and of the success of his levies, hoped at first to be able to detach Polyperchon and Alexander from the cause of Antigonus. They, as we have seen, were gained over by Aristodemus: and Cassander found it necessary to make another expedition into Peloponnesus. In his passage through Bœotia, he halted for some time at Thebes, to aid the Thebans in the completion of their fortifications, and having ravaged the Corinthian territory, and taken two forts which were occupied by Alexander's garrisons near the Isthmus, he advanced against the Arcadian Orchomenus. After some ineffectual attempts to take it by assault, he was admitted by his partizans: Alexander's friends sought shelter in the temple of Artemis. Their enemies obtained Cassander's leave to deal with them as they would. All were torn from the sanctuary, and put to death.

Cassander moved forward into Messenia, where, it will be remembered, he had been obliged the year before to leave Ithome in the possession of Alexander's troops. He was still unable to reduce it. His presence, it seems, was again required in Macedonia. On his return through Arcadia, he appointed Damis governor of Megalopolis, and presided at the Nemean Games in Argolis. But he had no sooner departed, than Alexander and Aristodemus resumed their operations against the Peloponnesian cities which favoured his cause. He again had recourse to negotiation with Alexander, who, shut out from larger views, only desired an independent position in Greece.

Cassander now sent Prepelaus to invite him to abandon Antigonus, with the offer of the same title which had been recently conferred on his father, and of a force sufficient to maintain his authority in Peloponnesus. Alexander accepted this proposal, and declared himself for Cassander. We are not expressly informed that Polysperchon acceded to the treaty; but it appears that he was now considered as Cassander's ally, and he continued to occupy Corinth with a strong body of troops.

Aristodemus however, who had retired into Ætolia, prevailed on the Ætolians to espouse the cause of Antigonus, and, crossing the Corinthian gulf with his mercenaries, renewed the war successfully in Elis and Achaia: where he was aided by the impression which the decree of Antigonus had produced on the towns occupied by Cassander's garrisons. Soon after, Alexander was assassinated at Sicyon. But his widow Cratesipolis, a woman of royal spirit, who had won the hearts of the soldiers by her liberality, kept the troops together, suppressed a revolt which broke out at Sicyon, and held the reins of government with a vigorous hand. Cassander, it seems, thought her and Polysperchon able to uphold his interests in Peloponnesus, and made an expedition into Ætolia and Acarnania, where he persuaded the Acarnanians, for the purpose of more effectual union against their southern neighbours, to concentrate their scattered population in three cities, and left Lyciscus, with a body of troops to protect them. He then marched northward against the Illyrian king Glaucias, whom he had ineffectually tempted, by a bribe of 200 talents, to deliver up the infant Pyrrhus, defeated him in battle, and compelled him to enter into a treaty, by which he engaged not to molest Cassander's allies. Then, having first reduced and garrisoned Epidamnus, he returned to Macedonia.

Having secured his dominions by these barriers on the western side, he was at leisure to turn his attention toward Asia, and it was urgently claimed by the danger which now threatened him from that quarter. Anti-

gonus, eager to complete the conquest of Phœnicia, and to be at liberty for other enterprises, as soon as he had collected a sufficient squadron proceeded to blockade the harbours of Tyre. The garrison however held out fifteen months, and though at last compelled by famine to capitulate obtained honourable terms, being allowed to depart with their baggage. While he was occupied with the siege, Ptolemy had been endeavouring to extend his influence in Cyprus, which after the loss of Phœnicia was doubly important to him. In the first year of the war (216), he sent 3000 auxiliaries to support his ally Nicocreon, and in the following spring fitted out a larger armament, destined partly for the same purpose. It consisted of 100 galleys commanded by Polyclitus, and 10,000 mercenaries under an Athenian leader named Myrmidon: but the whole was placed under the orders of Ptolemy's brother Menelaus.

At Cyprus they found Seleucus with his fleet, and concerted the plan of the campaign with him. It was resolved to send Polyclitus with fifty galleys to Peloponnesus, where it was supposed that Alexander and Polysperchon were still acting on behalf of Antigonus: Myrmidon with his troops to Caria, to the relief of Asander, who was pressed by Ptolemæus; and that Seleucus and Menelaus should remain with the rest of the fleet at Cyprus, to carry on the war against the princes who had allied themselves with Antigonus. Two of them were forced to submit: Lapithus and Cerynia were taken by storm: but Citium made an obstinate resistance. Polyclitus sailed to Cenchreæ, and there hearing of Alexander's alliance with Cassander, and seeing no employment for his squadron, set sail for the coast of Pamphylia, where he heard that a fleet commanded by Theodotus, the admiral of Antigonus, was on its voyage from Patara eastward, protected by a body of troops under Perilaus, which moved along the shore. Polyclitus laid an ambuscade for the land-force, and either killed or captured the whole, and took Perilaus himself prisoner. With his squadron, which he had concealed

from view behind an adjacent promontory, he at the same time attacked the enemy, as they were about to land to succour their friends on shore, and took all their ships with a great part of the crews, with which he returned triumphantly to Cyprus, and then to Egypt, where Ptolemy munificently rewarded his exploit. This occurrence led to a negotiation between Ptolemy and Antigonus, who sent to ransom Perilaus, and some of the other prisoners, and, it seems, instructed his envoys to propose a personal interview with Ptolemy, who was then at Pelusium. It took place on the confines of Egypt and Syria, but we hear no more of it than that it was broken off, because Antigonus would not consent to Ptolemy's demands.

After the reduction of Tyre, Antigonus found himself in possession of a powerful navy, though it fell very far short of the numbers he had talked of. With reinforcements from Rhodes and the Hellespont, and some which he found in the ports of Tyre, it amounted to 240 vessels, of various sizes: among which were ninety of four banks of oars, ten of five, and as many of ten. The increase of dimensions in the ships employed in naval warfare, corresponded to the enlarged scale of the contests carried on in this age, and to the growing attention paid to mathematics and to mechanical inventions. He reserved a squadron of fifty sail, which he designed to send to Peloponnesus. The rest he placed under the command of his nephew Dioscorides, and directed him to cruise about the coasts and islands where he might deem his presence most useful.

Cassander was aware that the preparations of Antigonus would before long be directed against himself: that as soon at least as he had subdued the resistance which was still opposed to him in Asia Minor, he would probably make an attack on Macedonia. He therefore, on his return from his expedition to Illyria, sent Peperlaus with a body of troops to Caria, to the aid of Asander, and required his two governors at Athens, Demetrius and Dionysius, to equip a squadron of twenty

galleys for the recovery of Lemnos. They obeyed the order, and appointed Aristoteles to the command of the expedition. Seleucus deemed the object sufficiently important to call for his own presence. He joined Aristoteles with his fleet. Yet they could not prevail on the Lemnians to abandon the cause of Antigonos, which they probably regarded as that of their own independence; they preferred to see their territory ravaged, and their town invested. Seleucus then sailed away to Cos, leaving Aristoteles to conduct the siege. But Dioscorides, hearing of his departure, sailed to Lemnos. The superiority of his force must have rendered resistance hopeless. Aristoteles himself escaped, but most of the ships, with their crews, fell into the enemy's hands. It was late in the autumn before Prepelaus arrived in Caria, and united his forces with those of Asander: and Ptolemæus supposing that they would not commence operations before the spring, retired into winter-quarters: the earlier, it seems, because he had lately lost his father, and wished to celebrate his obsequies. They sent a division of 8000 foot and 2000 horse under Eupolemus to surprise him. He however was apprised by some deserters of the enemy's approach, collected nearly an equal force from the nearest cantonments, fell on the camp of Eupolemus at midnight, took him prisoner, and forced his troops to surrender themselves. With this occurrence the second year of the war ended.

Antigonos, on the whole, had hitherto been gaining ground and strength: for the successes of Ptolemy and Cassander were not to be compared in importance with his conquests in Syria and Asia Minor: and as his resources were almost inexhaustible, he might calculate on the continual growth both of his military and naval power. But his marine had not yet, it seems, answered his expectations. More time was requisite to enable him to wrest the command of the sea from Ptolemy. We have seen that Dioscorides, though it appears that he had with him the bulk of his uncle's navy, had not ventured to attack Seleucus, or to attempt to relieve Lemnos, be-

fore he heard that Seleucus had sailed away. Yet his numbers cannot have been inferior to the enemy's: and it must be supposed that his crews wanted the practice of the sailors whom Ptolemy had brought from Phœnicia. At all events Antigonus saw that he was not yet in a condition to attack Ptolemy in his own dominions with any hope of success. He determined to turn his arms in person against Cassander and Lysimachus, to put an end to the war in Caria, and carry it over into Europe. When he had become master of Macedonia and Greece, it was probable that Ptolemy alone would not be able to resist him much longer.

With these views, it appears, he resolved, at the end of 314, to take up his winter quarters in his old province Phrygia. He left Demetrius in Phœnicia, to watch Ptolemy's movements, with an army of about 12,000 foot and 5000 horse, and 40 elephants, but appointed four experienced officers—Nearchus, Pithon the satrap of Babylon, who had recently come down to Phœnicia, Andronicus, and Philippus—to aid him with their counsels. In his first attempt to cross mount Taurus, he lost a number of men, and was forced to retreat through a heavy fall of snow. But having waited for more favourable weather, he cleared the defiles and took up his quarters for the rest of the winter at Celænæ. In the spring he sent for his fleet from Phœnicia, and on its passage it fell in with a Macedonian squadron of thirty-six sail, which had perhaps been sent to the assistance of Asander, and captured the whole. The first operations of the campaign on the land were directed against Asander; but at the same time an opportunity seemed to present itself for an attack on Lysimachus, who was threatened by a formidable confederacy of the Greek cities in the western coast of the Euxine. It was begun by Callatia, which had expelled the Macedonian garrison. This example was followed by Istria, Odessus, and other adjacent towns, and they formed an alliance with several of their Thracian and Scythian neighbours. Lysimachus how-

ever crossed the Balkan, recovered Odessus and Istria, and, after having defeated an army of Thracians and Scythians, who were advancing to the relief of their allies, laid siege to Callatia. Antigonus sent a fleet under Lycon, and a land force commanded by Pausanias, to the aid of the besieged, and induced the Odrysian king Seuthes to revolt from Lysimachus, and to occupy the passes of the Balkan. Lysimachus however, leaving a sufficient force at Callatia, marched rapidly with the main body toward the Bosphorus, where Pausanias had encamped. He dislodged the Thracians from the defiles, and soon after carried a strong position in which Pausanias had entrenched himself, killed the general, and forced all his troops to surrender. A part of them entered into his service.

After this check, Antigonus resumed his original plan for the overthrow of Cassander's power in Greece. He now sent Telesphorus with a squadron of fifty sail and a strong land-force to Peloponnesus, with instructions to expel all Alexander's garrisons, and to leave the cities in perfect liberty. The Greeks, whatever they may have thought as to the motives of this proceeding, seem to have been willing to take advantage of it. In a short time all the cities of Peloponnesus were free from foreign tyranny, except Sicyon and Corinth, where Cratesipolis and Polysperchon were strong enough to defy both assault and intrigue. In the meanwhile Asander was so vigorously pressed by Antigonus, that he submitted to a treaty, by which he consented to surrender all his troops, to restore all the Greek cities of his province to independence, and to accept Caria as a grant from Antigonus. He gave his brother as a hostage, but soon after repented of his concessions, recovered his brother out of custody, and sent to implore aid from Ptolemy and Seleucus. Antigonus, indignant at this breach of faith, sent an armament, under Medius and Docimus, to dislodge all his garrisons from the cities on the coast; and while they reduced Miletus, he himself stormed Tralles, and laid siege to Caunus. Iasus in the meantime submitted to

Ptolemæus. The whole province, it seems, was nearly in his hands, when his attention was diverted from it by the movements of Cassander. Before Caunus fell, though he had sent for the fleet under Medius to co-operate in the siege, he received an embassy from the Ætolians and Bœotians. The Ætolians were in great distress. Cassander's general Philippus had been directed to invade Ætolia ; but while he was ravaging the country, hearing that Æacides had returned to Epirus, had remounted the throne, and assembled a strong army to succour the Ætolians, he advanced to meet him, defeated him with great slaughter, and took a number of his principal partisans, whom he sent to Cassander. Æacides however collected the wrecks of his army, joined the Ætolians, and again gave battle to Philippus, but was once more routed, and slain. The Ætolians abandoned their unfortified cities, and retired with their families to their fastnesses and sent the embassy to Antigonus. The Bœotians, who had probably never forgiven Cassander for the restoration of Thebes, were encouraged by the repeated declarations of Antigonus to hope that they might now safely defy his power. Antigonus concluded a treaty with both. But we are surprised to hear, that very shortly after he proceeded to the Hellespont, and had a conference with Cassander on terms of peace. Perhaps his motive will be best explained by the pacification which actually took place a year or two after. He could scarcely expect that Cassander would become his ally, unless he were allowed to retain possession of Greece, which Antigonus had engaged to make free. The negotiation must have been a feint, to answer a temporary purpose : it was however soon broken off, and Cassander determined to secure his hold on Greece by a fresh expedition.

To have returned to Macedonia, collected an army and invaded Greece by land, would perhaps have required too much time, or have left Macedonia too weak. His immediate object was to make himself master of Eubœa, which was especially important to him on ac-

count of its vicinity to Thessaly, Bœotia, and Attica : and for this he seems to have thought that the small force he had with him at the Hellespont would suffice. It was with a squadron of no more than thirty galleys that he sailed to lay siege to Oreus. Chalcis was already occupied by his troops. He commenced his operations so vigorously, that the place was on the point of falling into his hands, when Telesphorus arrived with twenty galleys and a thousand men from Peloponnesus, and soon after Medius with a fleet of a hundred sail from Asia. Cassander was now assailed in his turn. The enemy burnt a part of his ships which were blockading the harbour, and all would have been lost if they had not been protected by succours which arrived from Attica. With these he was still able to make head against the enemy. But in the course of the summer, Antigonus sent Ptolemæus, with 5000 foot and 500 horse, and a reinforcement of fifty galleys to Medius. They were accompanied by ten galleys which the Rhodians had been induced to furnish for what they considered as the cause of freedom. Ptolemæus entered the Euripus, it seems, from the south, was joined by a body of Bœotian troops, drew away the fleet from Oreus, and threatened Chalcis ; so that Cassander was forced to raise the siege of Oreus and to move toward Chalcis. Antigonus in the meanwhile advanced toward the Hellespont, and sent for the fleet under Medius, to cross over into Europe and invade Macedonia. This danger compelled Cassander to return to his dominions. He left his brother Pleistarchus in command at Chalcis, and marched back over land to Macedonia. On his way he took Oropus by storm, engaged Thebes to abandon the Bœotian confederacy, and the Bœotian towns themselves to consent to a truce with him. Antigonus however was compelled to abandon his projected expedition, because the Byzantians, whom he had invited to join him, were induced, by the representations of Lysimachus, to remain neutral. The season too was now so far advanced, that he thought

it prudent to retire into winter-quarters. After Cassander's retreat, Ptolemæus took Chalcis, where, to prove the sincerity of his uncle's professions, he left no garrison, but engaged the Eretrians and Carystians in alliance with him, and marched into Attica. The Athenians had already opened a secret negotiation with Antigonus; and when the forces of Ptolemæus approached the city, expressed their feelings in a manner which induced Demetrius the Phalerian to make a truce with him, and to send envoys to treat with Antigonus. Ptolemæus then marched northward, took the Cadmea, and left it in the hands of the Thebans, and then, in like manner, liberated the Phocian and Locrian towns from the foreign yoke.

While these events were taking place in Greece, Ptolemy, having suppressed an insurrection in Cyrene, made an expedition in person to Cyprus, punished Pygmalion, who had been treating with Antigonus, with death, made himself master of most of the cities which were still wavering, and left Nicocreon as his lieutenant in the government of the island. He then sailed along the coast of Syria and Cilicia, made incursions into the interior, took and plundered several of the towns in Upper Syria, and lastly, having reduced Mallus and ravaged the adjacent country, retired with the booty to his ships, and sailed away to Cyprus. Demetrius was roused by this intelligence, left Pithon in Phœnicia with the elephants and heavy infantry, and made a forced march into Cilicia with his cavalry and light troops. He came too late to overtake Ptolemy, and lost most of his horses through the rapidity of his movements and the lateness of the season (213).

In the following spring Ptolemy, encouraged by his late success and urged by Seleucus, determined to undertake the conquest of Cœlo-Syria. He advanced to the neighbourhood of Gaza, with an army of 18,000 foot and 4000 horse, partly Macedonians, partly mercenaries, and with, it seems, a far greater number of Egyptian troops. Demetrius quickly collected his forces

to meet him. His council advised him not to venture a battle, in his father's absence, against so formidable an enemy; but Demetrius, boiling with youthful impatience, disregarded their admonitions and inspired his troops with his own ardour. Thus the battle of Gaza was fought. His numbers appear to have been very inferior to those of the enemy; but, notwithstanding the valour he displayed at the head of his cavalry, his elephants, on which he had much relied, being entangled in the spikes of an iron palisade invented by Ptolemy for the occasion, became the principal cause of his total defeat. His loss amounted to 5000 slain, among whom were Pithon and other officers of high rank, and 8000 prisoners. Gaza, where he had left his baggage, while it opened its gates to his cavalry on his retreat, fell into the hands of the pursuing enemy. He himself escaped to Azotus, and sent a herald to ask permission to bury his dead. The conquerors not only granted this request, but restored all the baggage of his household and the most distinguished prisoners, without ransom: courteously adding, that it was not for the sake of these things they had quarrelled with Antigonus, but because he had refused to share his conquests with the allies who had borne their part in his wars with Perdiccas and Eumenes, and had unjustly deprived Seleucus of his satrapy. Ptolemy proceeded to reduce the Phœnician cities, one after another, while Demetrius, having retired to Tripolis, called on his father to return with the utmost speed to his aid, and collected his troops from the more distant garrisons.

Antigonus affected to be little concerned by Ptolemy's victory, won, as he said, over a beardless boy: ere long he should have to contend with men: and he soon had the pleasure to hear that his son had surprised Ptolemy's general Cillas, near Myus in Upper Syria, and had taken him prisoner with 7000 men. Demetrius, not to be outdone in generosity, sent Cillas, and several of his friends back to Ptolemy without ransom: almost the only examples of a chivalrous spirit which gleam through

this dark scene of fierce and treacherous warfare; though Ptolemy also earned the praise of extraordinary magnanimity, by his mild treatment of Andronicus, who, as governor of Tyre, had grossly insulted him, and afterwards fell into his hands. But the victory of Gaza led to another event, which proved in the end fatal to Antigonus. Seleucus now thought that the time had arrived when he might recover his satrapy of Babylon. Ptolemy furnished him with no more than 800 foot and 200 horse for this enterprise: but he relied on his popularity at Babylon, and on the omens and prophecies which had announced his high fortune. He was ready, it is said, to have undertaken it alone. His confidence was brilliantly justified by the event. On his march through Mesopotamia he strengthened his little band with a part of the Macedonian colonists at Carræ; and as he entered his old satrapy, the natives flocked to him from all quarters. The news of the battle of Gaza and of Pithon's death, no doubt contributed much to his success. The force left in Babylon appears to have been small; and Polyarchus, one of the officers of Antigonus, went over to him with a thousand men. Those who remained faithful to Antigonus found resistance hopeless, and took refuge in one of the two citadels, where Diphilus the commander held out for some time. Seleucus however took it by storm, and found in it many of his servants and friends who had been confined there after his flight. Before however he had time to assemble any great force, he heard that Nicanor, the military governor of Media, was on his march against him, with an army of 10,000 foot and 7000 horse, collected from Media and Persis. Seleucus, with as much boldness as he showed in the outset of his adventure, advanced to meet him with no more than 3000 foot and 400 horse. He trusted, it seems, partly to stratagem, and partly to the inclination of Nicanor's troops in his favour. In fact, having crossed the Tigris, and kept his little army concealed from view while the enemy approached, he surprised Nicanor's camp in the night: and when Evagrus, the satrap of

Persis, had fallen in the tumult that ensued, the Persian troops, and a great number of the rest—partly it is said through fear, and partly through the offence which Antigonus had given them—passed over to his side. Nicanor, fearing lest he himself should be delivered up to Seleucus, fled with a few companions across the desert. That after this victory, Seleucus soon made himself master of Media, Susiana, and some adjacent provinces, which probably comprehended Persis, seems easy enough to understand; especially when we remember that the Persians had been deeply offended by Antigonus, and that Seleucus had been satrap of Susiana a sufficient time to endear himself to some of the inhabitants, and to render his winning character generally known.

Soon after he had received the news of his son's victory at Myus, Antigonus moved to join him in Syria. Ptolemy deliberated whether he should remain and risk a battle, or retire into Egypt. His council decided for the safer course. He carried away all the treasure he could find, and on his retreat dismantled Acè (Acre), Joppa, Samaria, and Gaza. Thus without a blow Antigonus was again in possession of Syria: but under circumstances how altered from those in which he had left it! He was then master of the East: now it was doubtful whether his authority was acknowledged in a single province beyond the Euphrates. It was however some time after his return to Syria before he was informed of this change in the posture of his affairs. While he might perhaps have prevented it, he was employing his forces in an expedition against the Arabians of Petra. His object was probably to strike a blow at the commerce of Egypt, which received the spices of Arabia through the tribe which he attacked.¹ But his design, whatever it may have been, was foiled by the patient valour of the children of the Desert. Demetrius, who conducted the expedition, was obliged to make an inglorious retreat, and precious time was irredeemably lost. Soon after his return letters arrived from Nicanor,

¹ See Hüllmann, *Handels-geschichte der Griechen*, p. 232.

and some of the other governors of the eastern provinces, announcing the events which had occurred there. The accounts they gave of the rapid progress of Seleucus must have surprised and perplexed Antigonus. It was probably with a twofold motive, to ascertain the real state of affairs, and to make a display of strength which might serve to keep up his reputation in the West, that early in 311 he sent Demetrius with an army of nearly 20,000 men to recover Babylon: but with instructions to return as soon as he should have reduced the province to obedience. Patrocles, who had been left by Seleucus governor of Babylon, with a very small force, was obliged to quit the capital on his approach. Demetrius however found both the citadels prepared to sustain a siege. He very shortly took one of them; but the other held out until he thought it necessary to return to Syria. He left Archelaus with 6000 men to prosecute the siege, and to maintain his father's authority in the province: but the license which he gave to his troops to enrich themselves with the spoil of the country, while it strengthened the interest of Seleucus, showed that he himself considered his possession as very uncertain.

While these important events were taking place in the East, the state of Greece remained unchanged. The only occurrence we find recorded in the interval is that Telesphorus, jealous of the superior rank and authority of Ptolemæus, renounced the service of Antigonus. With somewhat capricious honesty he sent back the squadron with which he had been entrusted, but kept all the troops he could persuade to share his fortunes, and commenced a predatory warfare on his own account. Before his treason was known he made himself master of Elis in the name of Antigonus, and fortified the citadel and garrisoned the port, Cyllene. He next proceeded to Olympia, plundered the temple, and levied fresh mercenaries. He had thus laid the foundation of a little principality. But Ptolemæus, as soon as he heard of his proceedings, marched into Peloponnesus, took and rased the new fortress at Elis—where it seems

he found the spoil of Olympia which he restored to the temple—and recovered Cyllene. Here again he adhered to the principles which his uncle professed, and replaced the Eleans in the unrestricted enjoyment of their city, port, and territory.

Cassander had not been able to make any fresh attempt to regain the footing he had lost in Greece. He had been occupied by a war in Epirus, occasioned by the accession of Alcetas to the throne, and by an expedition against Apollonia, which, with the aid of the Corcyræans, had expelled his garrison, and formed an alliance with the Illyrian king Glaucias. Epidamnus had also revolted; and the Apolloniates had collected an army with which they ventured to give him battle when he appeared before their walls. They gained the day, though, it seems, not any very decided advantage: but it was sufficient, with the lateness of the season, to induce Cassander to return to Macedonia. After his departure Leucas also called in aid from Corcyra, and freed herself from his garrison.

The state of affairs in 311 was such as might naturally incline the belligerents toward a cessation of hostilities. The principal of them had suffered checks and losses which rendered their prospects more than ever doubtful. It seems however to have been Cassander who made the first overtures of peace: and perhaps he now accepted the terms which he had rejected in the negotiation at the Hellespont; at least the conditions of the treaty were most unfavourable to him, and such as he could not have meant to fulfil. But after his reverses on the coast of the Adriatic, he might wish to gain time for fresh preparations, and to strengthen Macedonia before he resumed the struggle for Greece. The motives of Antigonus appear clearly enough from the treaty itself. It was agreed that Cassander should retain his authority in Europe, with the title of Strategus, until the young king Alexander came of age. Lysimachus was confirmed in the possession of Thrace, Ptolemy in that of Egypt and the adjacent regions east-

ward and westward. The government of all Asia was assigned to Antigonus, and the Greeks were declared independent. The great concession made to Antigonus, at a time when so large a part of Asia had actually slipped from his grasp, and the omission of the name of Seleucus, have been thought to cast suspicion on the report which Diodorus gives of the treaty. But we do not know in what sense the authority of Antigonus in Asia was acknowledged by the other parties; and they may have been the more willing to enlarge his title, the more they were led by the conquests of Seleucus to hope that he would never be able to enforce it. That Seleucus was not mentioned, seems to show that as Antigonus was probably unwilling to recognise any of his pretensions, so his allies might not like to limit them. It was perhaps chiefly the prospect of the aid which might in the course of some time be expected from him, that induced Ptolemy and Lysimachus to enter into the treaty. With Antigonus the principal motive may have been the article relating to Greece. If he could have prevailed on the other parties to execute it, and to withdraw their garrisons from Athens, Corinth, Sicyon, and whatever other towns they still held, he would have acquired a great increase of reputation, and would have been able to resume the war against Cassander with a considerable advantage.

Whether the views of the contracting parties were such or not, the treaty was concluded without any sincere intention on any side to execute it, and with dispositions which rendered it certain that the peace would be of no long duration.

CHAP. LIX.

FROM THE PEACE OF 311 TO THE BATTLE OF IPSUS.

THE treaty of 311 was almost immediately followed by a tragical event, which may be considered as the natural consequence of one of its conditions. From the beginning of the war the young king Alexander and his mother had been kept in close custody at Amphipolis, without the attendance befitting their rank. Cassander by this treatment had given sufficient evidence of his ultimate intentions with regard to them. He probably only waited until the Macedonians should have been reconciled to the spectacle of their degradation, and have forgotten them, to rid himself of them for ever. The declaration however, which Antigonus made in their favour on his return from the East, may have revived the hopes of those who were still attached to the royal house: and the treaty, which solemnly recognised Alexander's title to the crown, must have excited still more sanguine expectations. The young prince was now about sixteen, the age at which his father had been entrusted with the government of the state, and the command of armies. His partisans openly expressed their wish to see him immediately released from confinement, and placed on the throne. That they were instigated to this injudicious display of their loyalty, which without any benefit to its object could not but alarm Cassander, and put him on his guard, by any secret machinations of Antigonus, seems a very needless conjecture¹: Antigonus might safely anticipate

¹ Flathe, l. p. 498

that the terms of the treaty would produce this effect, and he was probably able to divine its remoter consequences. Cassander hesitated no longer. He ordered Glaucias, with all possible secrecy, to murder Roxana and her son, and to conceal their bodies. The deed however could not remain long unknown. That it gave the highest pleasure to Cassander's rivals, who saw him loaded with all the infamy, while they reaped the fruits of his crime, might have been easily supposed, even if Diodorus had not expressly asserted it.¹ It is only remarkable that none of them appear to have made any show of regret or indignation, much less were induced to dissolve the treaty, and take up arms against the murderer.

The occasion which led to the renewal of hostilities was of a very different kind. It was connected with a breach which took place between Antigonus and his nephew Ptolemæus. What grounds of complaint Ptolemæus had against this uncle has not been recorded ; but it seems more probable that he had been disappointed in his private views, than that he took so deep an interest in the independence of the Greeks as to quarrel with Antigonus on their account.² Had that been the case, he would hardly have connected himself with Cassander, whose alliance he sought at the same time that he revolted from his uncle. He had it in his power to do great injury to Antigonus ; for Phœnix, whom he had left in command at the Hellespont, was his devoted friend, and Ptolemæus now sent a body of troops to reinforce him, and exhorted him to keep possession of the fortresses and cities of the Hellespontine satrapy, and to pay no regard to the orders of Antigonus. The rivals of Antigonus could not view this event with indifference ; and Ptolemy considered it as a favourable opportunity for an attempt to deprive him of the cities on the coast of Asia, and of the islands,

¹ xix. 105. Yet it seems to be going rather too far to assert, as Schlosser does (i. 3. p. 420.), that the murder was a secret article of the treaty.

² As Schlosser assumes, i. 3. p. 422.

which were subject to him, and thus at once to weaken his maritime power, and to shut him out from Macedonia and Greece. The treaty afforded a fair pretext: it had declared that the Greek cities were to be restored to independence: yet a year had elapsed—it was now 310—and still Antigonus had not withdrawn any of his garrisons from the towns on the coast of Asia, or from the islands. Antigonus perhaps had scarcely thought of any others but those of Proper Greece. Ptolemy however now sent a squadron under Leonidas to the western coast of Cilicia, to dislodge the garrisons of Antigonus from the maritime towns, and at the same time, by means of his envoys, endeavoured to unite those which lay in the territories of Cassander and Lysimachus in the cause of freedom. Antigonus sent his younger son Philippus against Phœnix, and Demetrius to Cilicia, where he defeated Ptolemy's commanders, and recovered the places which had fallen into their hands.

The revolt of Ptolemæus and Phœnix, and Ptolemy's enterprise, would probably be sufficient to explain why Antigonus made no attempt to arrest the progress of Seleucus in the East, even if this had been one of the purposes for which he concluded the treaty. That he should have so far relied on it, as immediately to set out on an expedition against Seleucus, as has been conjectured¹, is in itself highly improbable:—even if it were possible that Diodorus should have passed over such an event in total silence, the murder of Alexander must have warned him, that the peace was not likely to last long, and that he was in more danger than ever from Cassander. But it was apparently toward Macedonia that his attention was incessantly directed; and Alexander's death seems to have suggested a project, by which he hoped to overthrow Cassander, and for which he had perhaps begun to make preparations soon

¹ Droysen (i. p. 399.), who finds a confirmation of his conjecture in Arrian, *Ind.* 43 and Polyæn, *iv.* 9 l. But in the first of these passages Antigonus is not named, and the second may, perhaps, as will hereafter be shown, be referred to a different epoch.

after he heard of that event. The young prince Hercules was still living at Pergamus with his mother Barsine. During the lives of Arridæus Philip, and Alexander Ægus, he had no pretensions to the throne that could render him an object of jealousy or notice. But he might now be considered as the rightful heir: he had claims, at least, which in the eyes of all loyal Macedonians must have appeared incomparably stronger than those of Cassander, and he might therefore be set up against him with the fairest prospect of success. This engine however was in the hands of Antigonus, and could scarcely have been employed by any one without his concurrence. Yet it is not Antigonus, but Polysperchon, hitherto Cassander's ally, who appears as the maintainer of the rights of Hercules. Polysperchon, we are informed, sent for him from Pergamus, and exerted his interest in Macedonia and Ætolia in his behalf so successfully, that he collected an army of 20,000 foot and 1000 horse. Even if the plan had been his own, he would probably have communicated it to Antigonus; and he was perhaps no more than his secret agent. This supposition is a little confirmed by the facility with which Polysperchon abandoned his enterprise. He had advanced with the prince to the town of Trampya, in the district of Stympheæ, on the south-west border of Macedonia, where his own patrimony lay¹, when Cassander met him. The two armies were encamped not far from each other; and Cassander, alarmed at the indications of popular feeling he perceived, which led him to fear that he should be deserted by his own troops, made secret overtures to Polysperchon; representing to him that, if he succeeded in his enterprise, he would sink into a private station as the young king's servant: and offering, if he would change sides, not only to restore all his private possessions in Macedonia, but to share his own authority with him, and to send him with an army to take

¹ Tzetx. ad Lycoph. 802.

the government of Peloponnesus. Polysperchon, whose conduct toward Phocion proved that he was a stranger to every feeling of honour, having calculated the profit of his treachery, consented to sacrifice his ward, and caused him to be either poisoned¹ or strangled² at a banquet. Cassander, it seems, rewarded him with a hundred talents, as an earnest of future favours, and furnished him with a small body of troops for the recovery of Peloponnesus: but he was not able to penetrate through Bœotia, and was forced to winter in Locris. We have the satisfaction to know that he never enjoyed any of the great rewards which had been promised for his crime. His baseness almost reconciles us with Cassander's energy, ruthless and reckless as it was. We have indeed no reason to think Cassander a worse man than any of his rivals: and his most atrocious deeds admit of more palliation from the impulse of ambition and revenge, than they could have pleaded for some of theirs. When we find Seleucus and Ptolemy distinguished for their mildness and humanity, it must not be supposed that they, any more than Cassander, would have scrupled to commit any crime which their interest might seem to require. Of this, in Ptolemy's case, we have a proof in the transactions of the same year. About the same time that Polysperchon was marching against Cassander, he made an expedition to the coast of Lycia, to prosecute his efforts in the cause of Grecian independence. As he moved westward with his fleet, he took several towns, and at Cos sent for Ptolemæus, who was still at Chalcis, to join him, and at first received him very graciously: but as he endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the principal Egyptian officers by his conversation and presents, he soon roused the suspicions of his new ally, who, dreading his enterprising spirit, arrested and put him to death, and incorporated his troops with his own forces. With like vigour, having heard that Nicocles

¹ According to Ixetzes, and Pausanias, ix. 7. 2.

² Plutarch, *De Vit. Pud.* 4.

was engaged in a private correspondence with Antigonus, i.e. ordered him and his brothers to be put to death without further inquiry. A tragic scene ensued. After the death of Nicocles, his wife, Axiothea, killed her daughters, and then herself, having first persuaded her sisters-in-law to follow her example; and his brothers finally set fire to the palace, and died by their own hands.

Demetrius had been sent by his father to check Ptolemy's progress, and compelled him to raise the siege of Ilicarnassus, when it was on the point of falling into his hands. Yet we find Ptolemy in 308 again on the coast of Caria, at Myndus; and thence he sailed, without any opposition, to the Isthmus of Corinth. On his passage he forced the troops of Antigonus to evacuate the isle of Andros, and soon after his arrival induced Cratesipolis, we know not by what motives, to deliver up Corinth and Sicyon to him. It was only by a stratagem, practised on her own troops, that she was able to effect her purpose. They were ready to defend the Acrocorinthus, and perhaps would have refused to surrender it: but she pretended to send for reinforcements from Sicyon, and introduced Ptolemy's troops as the succours she expected. She herself retired to Patræ. Ptolemy, it seems, now hoped to unite the Peloponnesians in a voluntary alliance with himself; and prevailed on them to agree to a supply of provisions and money for the support of his troops. But the engagement was foreign to their habits; and perhaps they began to doubt whether they were not about to expend their resources less for their own defence, than to fix them under the rule of a stranger; and when the time came, they shrank from the fulfilment of their contract. Ptolemy saw, that he could not rely on their goodwill, and entered into a new alliance with Cassander, on the condition that each should retain the places he possessed. He left garrisons in Corinth and Sicyon, and sailed back to Egypt. At the same time he was engaged in an intrigue, which indicated other designs, threatening not only to

Antigonus, but to Cassander. He had been negotiating for an union with Cleopatra, whose alliance, as she was almost the last surviving branch of the royal house, would have given him as good a title as any one now could claim, to the throne of Macedonia. She was probably weary of her long confinement at Sardis, and accepted the offer of his hand as her sole remaining chance of liberty and power. She made no secret of her designs, but openly set out from Sardis to embark for Egypt. Antigonus was apprised of her movements, and ordered his governor of Sardis to arrest her. Soon after fresh instructions arrived, in compliance with which the governor caused her to be assassinated by some of her women. Antigonus, to veil his own share in the infamous transaction, punished the wretched creatures with death, and honoured the remains of his unhappy victim with a royal funeral. We may judge of the sincerity of the indignation he had expressed at Cassander's proceedings. Yet Antigonus was confessedly one of the better and more noble-minded of Alexander's successors.

He now thought it time to make a more vigorous attempt to wrest Greece out of the hands of Ptolemy and Cassander, and thus to open another easier road into Macedonia. Demetrius was eager to undertake the enterprise. He was a youth of ardent spirit, of lively imagination, of inordinate passions: divided, throughout his life, between ambition and the love of pleasure, alike insatiable and ungovernable in each: the Alcibiades of his age. In the midst of his public and private occupations, he found leisure for severer studies, and, if he had not been a statesman and a soldier, he might have been renowned as the most expert mechanician of his time. He delighted in the invention of extraordinary engines, which exhibited at once the grandeur of his conceptions, and the ingenuity and skill with which he could carry them into effect. He was captivated by the thought of becoming the benefactor and patron, rather than the master, of Greece. Athens

especially attracted him by its name, and by the character of the people, in so many points congenial with his own. He aspired to the glory of accomplishing their deliverance, of winning their affection, of ruling over them with their free consent. Early in the summer of 307 he set sail from Ephesus with an armament of 250 sail, a great store of ammunition, and a treasure of 5000 talents, and steered direct for Athens.

It was now more than ten years that Athens had remained under the government of Demetrius the Phalerian, who, under the modest title of Guardian, with the Macedonian garrison, and the fear of Cassander to support him, in fact exercised unlimited authority. The accounts which remain of his administration would be perplexing from the appearance of contradiction they present, if the length of the period during which his rule lasted did not enable us to reconcile them. Demetrius was of very low, if not of servile origin¹: yet he was liberally educated, was a hearer of Aristotle's scholar, Theophrastus, and diligently cultivated rhetoric, criticism, historical learning, and political philosophy. He was an agreeable speaker, an elegant and voluminous writer. It was perhaps by his literary pursuits, that he first recommended himself to the patronage of Cassander, who was so warm a lover of Homer, that he copied out the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* with his own hand, and could repeat almost every verse: and one of the measures of Demetrius was to revive the public recitation of the Homeric poems in a new form.² For some time after his elevation to power, he appears to have wielded it moderately and wisely. It seems as if he aspired to emulate Solon and Pisistratus. He introduced indeed no fundamental changes into the constitution, but preserved its forms, while he enacted many laws, of which Cicero and other impartial judges speak with great approbation. He adorned the city with useful, if not

¹ *Jelian*, V. H. xii. 43.

² *Athenæus*, xlv. 12. See Bode, *Geschichte der Hellenischen Dichtkunst* i. p. 272.

magnificent buildings¹: he raised the public revenue to the same amount (1200 talents) as it had reached during the administration of Lycurgus. A very surprising proof of the general prosperity which Athens enjoyed under his sway², is afforded by a census which he took of the population, probably in the year of his archonship 309, from which it appeared that Attica contained 21,000 freemen, 10,000 resident aliens, and the prodigious number of 400,000 slaves. The 21,000 must have included all the citizens who were debarred from the exercise of their franchise by the want of the requisite qualification: their proportion to the rest is not stated: but, since 12,000 were excluded by Antipater's regulation, the number of slaves possessed by the remaining 9000 citizens, and by the aliens, must have been enormous: not much less, it would seem, than twenty to each. It is remarkable that sumptuary laws were among the acts of Demetrius, which we find mentioned. He limited the number of guests at feasts³, and, to check the excessive magnificence which was displayed by the wealthy at funerals, ordered them to be celebrated before daylight. He himself appears to have retained the early simplicity of his habits, and the philosophical frugality of his meals, even after he had risen to his high station: but probably not for any long time.

A very different picture is drawn of the man and his administration by other hands⁴, but apparently with equal fidelity. The time came when he began to devote

¹ Καὶ προσδοκῶν καὶ κατασκευαίῃς ἤρξαι τὴν πόλιν. Diog. Laert. in Demetr. We are informed indeed by Cicero de Off. li. 15. that Demetrius censured Pericles, for having laid out so large a sum on the Propylæa. But Schlosser, ii. 1 p. 118., and Droysen, who subscribes to his opinion, have pressed this passage too much: it is not clear that Demetrius condemned temples, porticoes, and theatres, or in general every kind of expenditure, which was not to produce some immediate profit. That he was averse to theatrical exhibitions, Cicero does not in the remotest degree hint; and his institution of the Homeric recitations in a dramatic form need not be imputed to parsimony. His patronage of Menander also bears on this question.

² Which was acknowledged even by his enemy Demochares. Polybius, xii. 13.

³ To thirty. Athenæus, vi. 45. Officers called γυναικονόμοι had power to enter houses and count the guests; and the members of the Areopagus were associated with them in this grave function.

⁴ Durlis in Athenæus, xii. 60.

but a small part of the public revenue, which all passed through his hands, to public purposes, and squandered the rest in extravagant luxury. In the costliness of his ordinary banquets he surpassed the Macedonian grandees: in their exquisite elegance the effeminate princes of Cyprus and Phœnicia. It was remarked that even the floors of his rooms were adorned by skilful artists: that his guests were sprinkled with precious ointments, that the superfluity of his table enabled his cook — the most celebrated of his day — to purchase three large houses. He betrayed a ridiculous vanity by the attention which he paid to his personal appearance. The disciple of Theophrastus was not ashamed to colour his hair, to paint his cheeks, to wear an artificial smile. And unhappily this weakness was connected with sensual passions, which he indulged without reserve, at the expense not only of his own dignity but of the peace and honour of his subjects. He became, not only in the political, but in the moral sense, tyrant of Athens.

It is not difficult to account for the change. It was the natural effect of the sudden acquisition of power and wealth on a man of undecided character, who had probably fancied himself a philosopher while he seemed destined to a humble station, but found his desires swell with the growth of his fortune. There was however another cause which contributed to stifle his better dispositions, and to make him more and more indifferent to the esteem of the wise and good. The forbearance and discretion which he showed at the outset probably won the hearts of the Athenians, notwithstanding the prejudice they may have felt against him as Cassander's creature. They repaid him with extravagant tokens of admiration and gratitude. Honours of all kinds had become so common, that only very gross exaggeration could render them significant. Some parasite of the assembly desired a new distinction for the benefactor of Athens: he proposed to erect as many statues in honour of him as there were days in

the year: and in less than 300 days, 360 bronze statues, mostly equestrian, or representing him in a chariot, attested the popular enthusiasm. That it soon cooled, and in time was followed by opposite sentiments, may easily be conceived: as easily, that while this change was taking place, the voice of flattery grew louder than ever, and that his vanity and vices were humoured with more studied obsequiousness. So in the year when he filled the office of archon — the ninth of his government — as he headed the Dionysiac procession, the poet who furnished the hymn of the chorus, celebrated his illustrious birth, and the dazzling radiance of his aspect. When this kind of intoxication was added to that of pleasure, it is no wonder that he forgot himself more and more, and wallowed in the foulest depths of sensuality. Yet in one very important point he continued to the last to deserve praise: his administration appears to have been quite free from the stain of cruelty: he continued, it seems, to exercise his authority mildly, even after he had become conscious that the people were weary of it.¹ We have already seen that they eagerly listened to the promises of Antigonus, entered into a secret correspondence with him, and when they were encouraged by the presence of his general Ptolemæus did not conceal their wish for his alliance, and forced the Phalerian, at least seemingly, to yield to it.

They were therefore quite ready to receive the son of Antigonus with the heartiest welcome: though his appearance was so little expected, that a squadron of twenty gallies, which he sent forward in advance of the main fleet in the direction of Salamis, was taken for one of Ptolemy's, and he found the harbours all open.² He entered Piræus, and when he was within hearing of the multitude that lined the shore, ordered the trumpet to sound a signal for silence and attention. The herald

¹ The fable (Phædrus, v. l.) is alleged by Grauert and Droysen as a proof of the contrary; but surely need not be construed so strictly: and Cassander's hatred of the Athenians, mentioned by Pausanias, l. 25 7., appears to have been provoked by their expulsion of his governor.

² Polyænus, iv. 7. 6.

then proclaimed, that his father had sent him to liberate Athens, to expel the foreign garrison, and to restore the laws and ancient constitution. It may easily be imagined that this announcement was heard with the liveliest pleasure by the great mass of the Athenian spectators. The accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch seem hardly to be reconciled with each other as to the opposition which he had to encounter. According to Diodorus, the Phalerian made an attempt to defend Piræus, but was soon obliged to retire into the upper city. Plutarch says that his troops received his rival's proclamation with shouts of applause, lowered their shields, and invited him to land: and that the Phalerian forthwith sent envoys to treat with the conqueror. It is certain that he soon became anxious only for his own safety, surrendered the city, and departed under an escort of his rival's troops to Thebes, which he himself chose as the place of his retreat. This was the end of his political career. He afterwards found shelter, patronage, and useful occupation at Alexandria, under the first Ptolemy, whom he did not long survive.

At Athens after his departure he was formally impeached and condemned to death. The sentence was executed on the 360 statues, which were destroyed with every mark of ignominy. Yet one was preserved in the Acropolis at the request of Demetrius¹, who did not share the popular resentment against his namesake. In imitation of the proceedings which followed the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, the period of the late tyranny was designated as the *Anomia* (lawlessness). The reaction made itself felt in a very wide circle of the Phalerian's political friends. Even the comic poet Menander was involved in great danger by his patronage, and was only delivered through the intercession of Telesphorus, the nephew of Antigonus. It also extended to a class of persons who might have been supposed still more secure from the effects of a political revolution. A law was passed — proposed by one So-

¹ *Diog. Laert. Demetr. Phal.*

phocles, son of Amphicleides—forbidding any philosopher, under pain of death, to open a school at Athens without the permission of the senate and people.¹ There can be little doubt that this measure was aimed chiefly at Theophrastus, the master of Demetrius, who had distinguished him with extraordinary marks of favour. The influence of Theophrastus, whose disciples are said to have amounted to the number of 2000 at one time, was not contemptible; and it is probable that the philosophers, who were mostly foreigners, were generally regarded—notwithstanding the noble example of Xenocrates—as devoted to the Macedonian ascendancy. It must have been on this ground that Demochares, who in these evil times showed himself not unworthy of his illustrious uncle, lent his support to the measure. The immediate effect was that all the philosophers quitted Athens. Their absence was no doubt felt as a privation, and a loss. It was like the suppression of an university. In the course of a year Sophocles was impeached as the author of an illegal proposition, and though defended by Demochares, was convicted, and sentenced to a penalty of five talents. The law was consequently repealed, and the philosophers returned.

Dionysius was not so easily induced to surrender Munychia as the Phalerian had been to abandon Athens. He sustained a siege of some days; but the place was at length stormed, his troops laid down their arms, and he himself was taken prisoner. If we believe Plutarch, Demetrius refused to enter Athens until it should have been completely restored to liberty by the fall of Munychia, and during the interval occupied by the siege, made himself master of Megara, which, it seems, was only saved from plunder by the intercession of the Athenians. Possibly he may have invested Megara, and then have returned to reduce Munychia. He dismantled its fortifications, and then went up to the city, and presented himself before the assembled people. He announced to them, that henceforth their ancient con-

¹ *Diog. Theophrastus. Athenæus, xiii 92.*

stitution was restored : and in his father's name promised them a present of 150,000 bushels of corn, and of timber for 100 galleys. We cannot wonder at the transports with which his address was received : especially as in the champion of freedom, the mighty chief, who had come with so formidable an armament to execute his generous purpose, they beheld a young hero of noble person, of princely carriage, and a countenance, in which grace, dignity, and spirit, were blended with a peculiar charm, which no painter of the age was able to pourtray. Unhappily the gratitude and admiration of the people found sordid and mischievous interpreters, who vied with each other in new devices of abject and fulsome flattery, which degraded those who offered it, and threw ridicule on its object. It was little that Demetrius and his father were now saluted with the title of kings, which, though they had never claimed it, so properly belonged to them : that two new tribes, the Demetrias and the Antigonias, were added to the ten which derived their names from the old Attic heroes ; and that the council was correspondingly enlarged to the number of 600 : that the name of the month Munychion was altered to Demetrium, one of the days called Demetrias ; and — as it was known that the young prince loved to trace a resemblance between his own person and character and those of the voluptuous conqueror Dionysus — the name of the Demetria substituted for that of the Dionysia. It was not much that the divine honours which Alexander had so rudely exacted, were now freely conferred on Demetrius and Antigonus. It was something more that they were consecrated under the title of the Saviour gods : that it was decreed, a priest should be appointed every year to minister at their altars, with a solemn procession, sacrifice, and games, and that his name should be inserted in all state-records, and private contracts to mark the date, instead of the archon's : that their images should be woven in the peplos borne in the Panathenaic procession, together with those of the tutelary deities : that the spot where De-

metrius had first alighted from his chariot, when he entered the city, should be hallowed by an altar dedicated — with an epithet, before appropriated to the chief of the gods as Lord of the Thunderbolt — to the Descending Demetrius. Stratocles, who on this occasion tasked his ingenuity to exhibit the utmost extent of servile impudence, added the proposal, that all ambassadors sent to Demetrius and Antigonus should bear the same sacred title which had hitherto been given to the envoys who conducted the public sacrifices to the Olympic and Pythian games. This indeed was an honour which had already been bestowed on Alexander, and Stratocles was obliged to yield the palm of baseness to another orator, who moved that Demetrius, as often as he visited Athens, should be entertained with the sacred pomp ordained for the reception of Dionysus and Demeter, and that a reward should be assigned to the person who should celebrate the festival with the greatest magnificence. Still the inventive genius of the time-serving parasites did not flag, and afterwards suggested still deeper strains of adulation.

It could not be expected that any opposition should be offered to such proposals; nor need it be doubted that they were at first carried with a certain degree of sincere enthusiasm. They were not the less pernicious in their effect on the character of the people and of Demetrius, and on the cause of freedom, which they brought into contempt. Demetrius however responded to them by fresh marks of honour and favour, and adhered to the principle which he professed at the beginning of his enterprise. He listened to the mediation of the Athenians — one which reflects some honour on their generosity — in behalf of Megara, protected it from the violence of his soldiers when they were about to plunder it, and left it without a garrison. From Megara he set out, accompanied only by a few light troops on an expedition, which may be called romantic after the Greek fashion, to pay a visit to Cratesipolis, attracted by the fame of her beauty. He ordered a tent

to be pitched for the interview which, it seems, she had granted, at a distance from his camp ; but was surprised by a detachment from Ptolemy's garrison at Sicyon or Corinth, and narrowly escaped. After his return to Athens, to the great delight of the Athenians, he solemnised his marriage with Eurydice, a descendant of Miltiades, and the widow of Ophellas, one of Ptolemy's officers who had fallen the year before in Africa. Nothing seems to have occurred to alienate the affections of the people from him while he remained at Athens : but in the course of a few months he was called away from this scene of cheap and doubtful glory to a new field of harder contests by orders from his father.

Antigonus had in the meanwhile been engaged in a peaceful attempt to perpetuate his name, by the foundation of a new city on the Orontes, which he called Antigonía. Here he received the Athenian envoys, who came to lay the honours which had been decreed to him at his feet, and to solicit the fulfilment of the promises made by his son as to the corn and timber. He granted all their requests, and added a still more acceptable present, the isle of Imbros, the ancient possession of the commonwealth. But it seems that he was now alarmed by intelligence of Ptolemy's naval preparations, and by the firm hold which he had gained on Cyprus, and determined to make an effort to wrest the island from him. He therefore ordered Demetrius to arrange the affairs of Greece as well as he could in a congress, and then to sail away with all speed to the conquest of Cyprus. Demetrius was loth to abandon the career which he had just so brilliantly begun. But his affection and reverence for his father — the best feature in his character — always overpowered every other feeling. Before his departure he made an ineffectual attempt to bribe Cleonidas, Ptolemy's commander, to evacuate Corinth and Sicyon, and early in 306 sailed away with his armament to the coast of Caria. Here he invited the Rhodians to take a part in the war against Ptolemy. But their commerce depended too much on their connec-

tion with Egypt, to render such a step advisable : and they adhered to the neutrality which they had hitherto observed. Demetrius, dissembling his resentment, proceeded towards Cilicia, and having reinforced his armament with fresh ships and men, sailed across to Cyprus. His army consisted of 15,000 foot, and 400 horse : his fleet, besides the transports, amounted to about 180 sail of ships of war : all, it appears, of a size unknown in the ancient Greek warfare, and several capable of containing between 2000 and 3000 men. Demetrius delighted in the contrivance of methods by which these enormous machines might be moved with the greatest ease, so as to be equal in speed to the lighter vessels. Having drawn his fleet on shore near Carpasia, leaving a sufficient force to protect it, he marched towards Salamis, where Menelaus awaited him with a fleet of sixty sail, and all the forces he had been able to collect from his garrisons in the island. His numbers were not much inferior to those of Demetrius, and he ventured a battle, in which however he was defeated with great loss, and immediately began to prepare against a siege, while he sent for succours to Egypt.

Demetrius proceeded to invest Salamis by sea and land ; but the place was vigorously defended, and after he had effected a breach in the wall, his machines were fired in the night by the enemy ; and before he had repaired this loss, he heard that Ptolemy himself had come from Egypt, with an armament of 140 galleys, and transports bearing not less than 10,000 troops. Ptolemy, on his arrival at Citium, about twenty miles from Salamis, sent overland to Menelaus, ordering him, if possible, to send out his galleys to join the fleet. But Demetrius anticipated this movement, and when he sailed to meet Ptolemy, left ten of his larger vessels under Antisthenes to block up the mouth of the harbour. Ptolemy had set sail by night, hoping to surprise the enemy : but at daybreak he saw them drawn up for action. The contending forces were so nearly equal to each other, that the two chiefs interchanged

messages of scornful defiance : Ptolemy, bidding Demetrius sail away if he did not wish to be overwhelmed, and Demetrius offering to permit his rival to withdraw on condition that he would give up Corinth and Sicyon. The battle which ensued was one of the most memorable in the history of ancient naval warfare, as well on account of the forces engaged as for the skill and valour of the combatants. Demetrius gained a complete victory. Ptolemy himself escaped, it is said, with only eight galleys : all the rest of his fleet was either destroyed or taken. Almost all his transports and vessels of burden, with the troops, the arms, the engines, the treasure, and a multitude of persons who accompanied the expedition, fell into the enemy's hands. Menelaus had complied with Ptolemy's orders, and sent out his squadron under the command of Menætius, who, after a hard struggle, forced Antisthenes to retire and seek shelter from the land force. But he came too late to take a share in the battle : and we may suspect did not escape quite unmolested as Diodorus represents. According to another account, Menelaus himself fled with Ptolemy¹ : but it seems to be better attested, that he not long after capitulated, and surrendered Salamis with all his ships and men to Demetrius.

Demetrius on this occasion displayed the generosity which had hitherto tempered his hostility toward Ptolemy. He sent back his brother Menelaus, his son Leontiscus, and several other prisoners of rank, together with his private baggage, and household servants² — retaining however his mistress Lamia, a celebrated courtesan, who soon acquired a pernicious and degrading influence over the conqueror — and honourably interred the enemy's slain. He also sent 1200 complete suits of armour, at once a trophy and a present, to the Athenians.³ At the same time he despatched Aristodemus

¹ Polyænus (iv. 7. 7), whose stratagem Droysen himself cannot reconcile with the other authorities

² *Private instruments ministerio* Justin, xv. 2. 7 Plut. Dem. 16. 17

³ One is inclined to suspect that the shields consecrated at Delphi, about which, by the decree of Dromochides, Demetrius was to be consulted, were a part of this present, though Plutarch mentions them earlier.

the Milesian, to carry the tidings of this signal victory to his father, who, aware of Ptolemy's movements, was waiting with painful anxiety for the result. Aristodemus, when he neared the land, cast anchor, and put off in a skiff to the shore, and proceeded alone toward the palace of Antigonus, who, hearing of his arrival, sent some of his attendants to meet him and learn the news. But the wily Greek preserved an obstinate silence, and advanced slowly, with composed countenance, in the midst of the inquiring crowd toward the palace-gate, where Antigonus himself, no longer able to control his impatience, had come out to meet him. Aristodemus, when he drew near, addressed him in a loud voice, with the salutation: "Hail! king Antigonus; we have defeated Ptolemy in a sea-fight, and are masters of Cyprus, and have taken near 17,000 prisoners." Antigonus breathed lighter, and playfully threatened that the messenger who had kept him so long on tenter-hooks, should in his turn wait for his reward. The title however with which Aristodemus had greeted him was not the least agreeable part of his speech.¹ He had long, as both Aristodemus and the Athenians knew, designed to assume it. It had indeed become almost necessary to place him on an equality with Seleucus, who had already received it from the barbarians, though he did not exact it from the Greeks. Antigonus thought his son's victory a fit occasion to unite

¹ Droysen (l. 458) believes that the scene with Aristodemus was concerted for theatrical effect. He observes that Aristodemus was not, as he is represented by Plutarch and by modern writers, a vulgar parasite, but an officer of high rank and trust. Why he should not nevertheless have been an artful flatterer, does not appear. But Droysen wishes to connect this scene with a peculiar hypothesis which he has formed about the designs and pretensions of Antigonus. He conceives that, after the extinction of the royal family, Antigonus maintained the unity of the empire, with the view that he himself might be declared successor to the vacant throne, with the unanimous consent of the Macedonians, and therefore made war on Ptolemy and his other rivals, who insisted on retaining the shares each had acquired. But whatever may be the internal probability of this conjecture, it is impossible to adopt it without some better historical evidence. And it is difficult to perceive, how the victory of Salamis, or the salutation of Aristodemus, or the acclamations of the multitude at Antigonis, or the decree of the Athenians, could add one jot to the legitimacy of the title which Antigonus assumed, if it was to have the meaning which Droysen supposes.

the name with the substance of kingly power, and now solemnly assumed the diadem, and conferred the same dignity on Demetrius, whom he regarded as the partner of his throne. The intercourse between the father and the son from first to last presented the pleasing spectacle of tender affection, playful familiarity, without breach of filial respect, and unbounded mutual confidence. The example of Antigonus was immediately followed by Ptolemy — whose courtiers were eager to show, that they were not disheartened by his defeat — and soon after by Lysimachus and Seleucus. Cassander also was saluted with the title by his subjects, but did not adopt it in his own letters. The title seems to have made no change in the habits of any of the new kings, at least in their intercourse with the Greeks.¹ In fact it only proclaimed what every one knew before, that they held their dominions in their own right, and acknowledged no superior. Cassander, Polysperchon, and Antigonus, had removed every pretender to a more legitimate royalty. The occurrence however visibly marks the new period, which had succeeded to that in which Alexander's successors were struggling with each other in the name of his empire and his house: and it was a little relief to the world, that, if it was still to be tormented by their ambition, it was no longer to be insulted by their empty professions, and that they no longer affected to be anything more or less than was equal to their real strength.

Antigonus, elated by his son's victory, believed that the time had come when he might crush Ptolemy, and resolved to invade Egypt without delay. He sent for Demetrius from Cyprus, and collected his forces at Antigonia. He himself took the command of the army, which was composed of 80,000 foot, 8000 horse, and 83 elephants: Demetrius was to conduct the fleet, 150 ships of war, and 100 transports, loaded with ammunition, along the coast of Syria. It was

¹ As a specimen see the anecdote about Lysimachus in Plutarch, *Demetr.* 27.

the beginning of October before they set out, and the masters of the fleet warned Antigonus to expect a change of weather at the setting of the Pleiades, which was only eight days later. But he hoped by the rapidity of his movements to surprise Ptolemy, and reproaching them with cowardice, gave orders to proceed. At Gaza he ordered his troops to provide themselves with food for ten days, and loaded a great number of camels which had been collected for him by the neighbouring Arabs with corn. From Gaza Demetrius pursued his course for a few days in a calm, the swifter galleys towing the transports. But the predictions which Antigonus had slighted were exactly fulfilled. The fleet was dispersed, and suffered great damage, by a gale from the north in which many of the transports were lost, several of the war-galleys were driven ashore on the swampy coast near the city of Raphia, and those which weathered the storm, and made their way as far as Mount Casius, not far from the mouth of the Nile, were obliged to remain at anchor there, as it was impossible to effect a landing through the surf. Nor would it otherwise have been safe on a hostile coast. Still three of the larger were lost with almost all their crews, and the rest were reduced to great distress and alarm, as their supply of water was spent, while it was uncertain how long they might be kept at sea. The wind abated in time, and soon after the army appeared to protect their landing, and to afford them needful refreshment.

But the difficulties of the enterprise were still to come. Ptolemy was as well prepared for defence as he had been against Perdiccas. The rewards which he offered attracted many deserters from the enemy's camp. Antigonus was unable to cross the Nile, and Demetrius was repulsed in two attempts which he made at different points, to enter it, and after having suffered fresh loss and damage from another north gale, returned with great difficulty to the eastern coast, to join his father. Antigonus had calculated on the effect of a sudden

well-combined attack: it had failed in all points, and he was not prepared for a longer stay in the enemy's country. His provisions both for men and beasts were nearly consumed: and it can have been only to save appearances that he affected to ask the opinion of his council, whether it would be better to remain, or to defer the conquest of Egypt to a more favourable season. They were unanimous in the recommendation, to retreat with all possible speed, and he may have thought himself fortunate when the remains of the army and navy were brought back in safety to Syria. Ptolemy celebrated his second deliverance, which seemed to ensure him against a recurrence of this danger, by sacrifices and feastings, and wrote to communicate his success, which nearly counterbalanced the loss of Cyprus, to his allies Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander.

It was partly to console himself for this disaster, and partly to punish the Rhodians for their refusal to co-operate with Demetrius in the invasion of Cyprus, that Antigonus now resolved to reduce them to subjection. The changes which had taken place in the commerce of the world, in consequence of Alexander's conquests, especially through the foundation of Alexandria, had it seems been peculiarly favourable to the prosperity of Rhodes. It had now for many years enjoyed uninterrupted peace. After Alexander's death, the Macedonian garrison was expelled, and it seems that no attempt had afterwards been made to compel the Rhodians to receive another. Their friendship was courted by all the rivals who contended for the empire. Their government was a polity highly extolled by the ancients for the wisdom of its institutions. The rulers at least had the prudence to conciliate the poorer class, which was not permitted to share their political privileges, by a liberal provision for its wants. This was not an expedient to serve a temporary purpose: it was a hereditary usage, by which the wealthy had always contributed, in a manner unknown to most other Greek cities, to the relief of the indigent. Thus exempt, partly through a happy com-

bination of circumstances, partly through their own prudence and moderation, from the evils of war and civil discord, the Rhodians had actively cultivated all the resources of their fertile island, and their geographical position. All the arts both of peace and war were carried to the highest point of perfection among them, that they anywhere reached in this age. The magnificence of the public buildings which adorned the city, was hardly equalled in any part of Greece. The masterpieces of sculpture and painting which they could boast of, preserved and enlarged the ancient glory, celebrated by Pindar, of works that seemed to live and move. But it was more especially in those which belonged to the defence of the city and the extension of its maritime power, that the government displayed its activity and forethought. No other Greek city could exhibit arsenals, armouries, magazines, and engines comparable to those of Rhodes. The vigilant attention paid to the navy was indicated by a law forbidding the common people under pain of death to enter the dock-yards.¹ It had been continually gaining strength with the extension of trade; and the Rhodians had felt themselves able to undertake alone the task of suppressing the pirates who had long infested the Grecian waters, and who appear to have grown more numerous and insolent in the confusion which followed Alexander's death: and they had in a great measure cleared the sea of this pest.

In the contests of Alexander's successors it had been the object of their policy to preserve neutrality. They had indeed the greatest need of Ptolemy's friendship: for it was from Egypt they drew their chief supply of corn, and with Alexandria that they carried on their most profitable commerce: but they had also reason to fear the enmity of Antigonos, and had endeavoured, as we have seen, to conciliate him by ready compliance with all his demands for the furtherance of his naval preparations. After their refusal to aid Demetrius

¹ Strabo, xiv. p. 195. Tauchn.

against Ptolemy, Antigonus sent a squadron to intercept all vessels sailing between Rhodes and Egypt; and when the Rhodians forced it to withdraw, interpreted this defensive measure as a declaration of war, and threatened them with his vengeance. In the spring of 305 he prepared to execute these threats, and collected an armament for the siege of the city. It was in vain that the Rhodians attempted to soothe him by flattering decrees, that they humbly besought him not to force them to break their treaty with Ptolemy, who had never injured them. Their envoys were dismissed with a stern reply, and brought back so alarming a description of the preparations of Demetrius, who was charged with the expedition, that for a time the firmness of the government gave way: they offered to submit, and to join Antigonus in his war against Ptolemy. When however Demetrius demanded a hundred of the principal citizens as hostages, and that his fleet should be admitted into the harbour, they saw that they must expect, not an ally, but a master, and prepared for the inevitable struggle. They sent embassies to Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, for succour, and in the meanwhile called forth all their domestic resources. Beside their own citizens they armed as many as they could of the resident aliens; and compelled those who were not able or willing to serve, to quit the city. The number enlisted — 6000 citizens and 1000 strangers — seems smaller than might have been expected. But it must be remembered, that the poorer class was employed in the navy. On the other hand, arms were given also to the slaves — whose number is not reported — and it was decreed, that those who distinguished themselves should be emancipated, and the price paid to their owners by the treasury: and the wise and beautiful Athenian law — by which those who fell in battle were honoured with a public funeral, their parents and children maintained at the expense of the state, their daughters portioned, and the orphan youths, when they came to age, presented each with a suit of

armour, and crowned at the Dionysiac festival — was adopted, as an extraordinary excitement, for this emergency. All ranks were animated with equal ardour, and vied with each other in voluntary contributions, of money, skill, or labour, to the common cause. Demetrius crossed over from the port of Loryma, on the coast of Caria, with an armament that almost covered the intervening channel: 200 ships of war, more than 170 transports, bearing nearly 40,000 infantry, beside a body of cavalry, and of the pirates lately conquered by the Rhodians, whom he had taken into his service, and an immense store of arms and engines: attended by about 1000 vessels laden with provisions. He encamped nearly within bowshot of the walls, felling the trees, and demolishing the buildings, in the outskirts, to form a triple palisade round his camp, and constructed a new harbour close to the great port, sufficient to contain his huge fleet. One of his first operations was to send a detachment, consisting chiefly of the pirates, whose bitter enmity rendered them fittest for this service, to spread devastation over the island.

So began this siege of Rhodes: not less memorable than those of 1480 and 1522 for the energy displayed on both sides: perhaps more interesting, as the successful struggle of a free people against a fearfully superior physical force. The details might have filled an entertaining volume. Demetrius first directed his attack on the side of the harbour, hoping to exclude the enemy from the sea. He made himself master of the point of the mole, where he landed 400 of his troops, and then proceeded to batter the walls with stones of enormous weight, hurled by his terrible floating engines. But though, after an assault which lasted eight days he effected a breach, he was repulsed with so much loss and damage as to be forced to retire into his own harbour, to repair his shattered vessels and machines. After an interval of seven days he renewed the attack. Again his floating batteries played upon the wall: others kept the ships of the besieged at a

distance by a shower of fire: while a palisade covered by plates of iron mounted on a strong raft, warded off their missiles. The danger was pressing: the prytanes made a fresh appeal to the spirit of their countrymen, which was met with new enthusiasm. A band of volunteers manned three of the best ships, and put out, as on a forlorn hope, to attack the iron palisade, and the floating machines behind it. After a hard combat, their desperate valour forced its way through every obstacle, sank three of the engines, took one of his ships, and put the rest to flight. His admiral, Excestus, with some other officers, was wounded, and made prisoner. Demetrius caused another machine to be constructed of thrice the height and breadth of the former. But it was sunk by a sudden gale as it was moving toward the mouth of the harbour, and the besieged took advantage of the confusion which ensued, to make a sally, by which they recovered the point of the mole, and forced the 400 men left there to lay down their arms. Shortly after this victory, they were farther cheered by the arrival of a reinforcement of 150 men from Crete, and 500 sent by Ptolemy, partly citizens of their own, who had entered into his service.

These disasters — which probably could not have been repaired before the approach of winter would have rendered it impossible to renew the attempt on the harbour — determined Demetrius to change his plan of operations, and to assault the city on the land-side, where he would be less subject to mischances, would have fewer obstacles to encounter, and might give free range to his boldest conceptions. Accordingly his preparations for the second stage of the siege were on a scale far surpassing all that he had hitherto devised. With the assistance of an Athenian engineer named Epimachus, he now built his celebrated machine, called with a prognostic which happily failed, the *Helepolis* (city-taker). It was a square wooden tower of 150 feet high, divided into nine stories, communicating by stairs with each other, and furnished with apertures in

front for the discharge of missiles of every kind. The three exposed sides were sheathed with iron. The tower moved on eight wheels, so contrived as to admit of a change in its direction. When it was stored and manned for action, the labour of 3,400 men — the strongest in the camp — was required to set it in motion. The Helepolis had two worthy companions in a pair of battering-rams, each 150 feet long, and requiring 1000 men to propel it, and armed with a beak like that of a ship of war. Thirty thousand workmen were employed in these preparations, which may easily be supposed to have occupied the greater part of the winter. In the meanwhile the besieged were no less actively engaged in measures of precaution against the impending danger. They built a new inner wall, parallel to that which was threatened, and, having no other materials, pulled down their theatre, and the adjacent houses, and even some of their temples, not without a solemn vow to restore them in better condition, if the city was preserved.

During this interval they sent out nine galleys to intercept the transports which were bringing provisions or ammunition for the besiegers. The squadron divided itself into three, which cruised in various directions; all did great damage to the enemy, and returned with valuable prizes. Among these was a galley containing a quantity of royal apparel, with other presents and letters from Phila to her husband. Menedemus, the captor, sent the precious cargo to Ptolemy: and Demetrius, it is said, complained that the letters at least had not been delivered to him. For notwithstanding the terrible earnestness of the conflict, the feeling which prevailed between the parties was rather one of generous rivalry, than of implacable animosity. Demetrius, as he made his approaches, had found in one of the suburbs a picture of Protogenes, painted by order of the state. It had occupied the artist seven years, and only wanted the finishing touches. The Rhodians sent an embassy, not to recover, but to intercede for the picture;

and Demetrius answered, that he would rather destroy his father's statues. On the other hand a proposal, which was made in the Rhodian assembly, to pull down the statues of Demetrius and Antigonus, was, it is said, indignantly rejected ; nor was any change made in the honours paid to them before the war.

At length, in the spring of 304, the Helepolis and its gigantic escort were ready to take the field. A space of nearly half a mile wide was levelled for their approach : and together they faced a part of the wall which included seven towers. The Rhodians, it is said, had been persuaded by an engineer of Aradus named Callias, that he would be able, by a contrivance which he exhibited to them in a model, to carry away any of the enemy's engines and hoist it over the wall into the city : and they were even induced to dismiss their state-engineer Diognetus, and to appoint Callias in his room. But he was now obliged to confess that to transport the Helepolis through the air was an undertaking beyond his means. Diognetus we are informed resumed his station, and contented himself with an attempt to convert the ground over which the ponderous machines were to pass into a swamp.¹ But the delay thus caused appears at least not to have lasted long. Demetrius however did not rely solely on his battering-engines: before they were brought up, he began a mine, which might have spared him farther trouble, if the besieged had not been apprised of it by a deserter, when it had been carried very nearly into the city. They immediately dug a trench parallel to the wall which was in danger, and opened a countermine, which arrested the enemy's progress. Demetrius attempted to bribe the Milesian Athenagoras, who commanded in the countermine, to admit his troops into the city : but Athenagoras disclosed his overtures to the Rhodians, and enabled them to capture an officer of high rank who was sent to examine the passage. The main hope of

Demetrius therefore still rested in the effect of his machines. They were beginning to shake the walls, when an embassy came from Cnidus, to offer its mediation; and Demetrius consented to a suspension of hostilities. But the negotiation proved fruitless: the assault was renewed, and one of the strongest towers fell. At this crisis the public despondency was a little relieved by the arrival of a supply of corn from Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus. The besieged made an attempt in the night to fire the enemy's engines, which, though it failed, did great damage to them: and, while they were under repair, built a third inner wall in the form of a crescent, and opened a new trench to cover the part which had fallen in. During this interval their spirits were again raised by a naval victory in which they captured several vessels of the pirates, and their chief Timocles. But the assault was soon renewed, and the breach widened, so that Demetrius began to consider it practicable, though he had not been able to dislodge the besieged from a tower which remained standing in the midst of the ruins. At this juncture they received a fresh supply of corn, and a reinforcement of 1500 men, from Ptolemy: and nearly at the same time an embassy came to the camp of Demetrius, of more than fifty envoys, sent by Athens and other Greek states, to induce him to make peace with the Rhodians. It would be unjust to suppose that the gallant efforts of the Rhodians excited no sympathy in Greece, and suggested no reflections on the nature of that independence which was to be protected by the besieger of Rhodes. But the main motive, as well as pretext, of the embassy, appears to have been the state of Greece, which in the absence of its deliverer was again threatened by Cassander. Possibly it was also known that their mediation would not be unacceptable to Demetrius. It is probable that he had already conceived strong misgivings as to the issue of his enterprise, and regretted that he had embarked in it, and would have been content to withdraw from it if he

could have done so without dishonour. He therefore consented to a truce for the purpose of negotiation : but still his demands were higher than the Rhodians could grant : and the treaty was again broken off. Demetrius then prepared for what he probably foresaw would be his last attempt to take the city by storm. He made it in the night, trusting rather to the effect of surprise than to force. His plan was to distract the attention of the besieged by a demonstration of a general attack on the side both of the land and the sea, while a select body of about 1500 troops, under Alcimus and Mantias, having approached under cover of the night, made their entrance through the breach. The plan succeeded so far that Alcimus and Mantias penetrated into the city, and took up a position on the site of the demolished theatre, while cries of alarm crossed each other in all directions. We know not to whom in particular the honour belongs, that he remained calm in the midst of the tumult, perceived the enemy's design, and sent orders to all quarters to keep the men to their posts on the walls, while a select band, reserved for such emergencies, and now reinforced by the Egyptian auxiliaries, engaged the division of Alcimus and Mantias. A hard combat ensued, which grew more and more unequal, as the Rhodians were continually strengthened by fresh succours, while none came to the enemy. The assailants were at length forced to retreat, and most of them were killed or taken. Their two leaders themselves were among the slain : though Alcimus, an Epirot, of gigantic strength, wore a corslet of Cyprian steel, which was proof against a dart from a catapult. The Rhodians lost their pyrtanis Demoteles, perhaps the hero to whose presence of mind they were indebted for their victory.

Notwithstanding this repulse, Demetrius still professed his intention to continue the siege. But if he was not weary of it himself, his father perceived that it was interfering with more important objects, and might lead to disastrous consequences : and he directed his

son to make peace on the best terms he could. Demetrius only waited for an opportunity, and one was soon after presented by the arrival of envoys from Ptolemy and the Ætolians, who came for the same purpose. Ptolemy — it seems with a friendly motive — counselled the Rhodians to accept any tolerable conditions from Antigonus. The Ætolians appear to have been impelled by their hostility to Cassander. Both the parties perhaps made some concessions which they had before refused. The Rhodians were allowed to retain their independence, the sole occasion of the long struggle. They consented indeed to enter into alliance with Antigonus, but were neither to receive a garrison nor to be forced to join in any expedition against Ptolemy. On the other hand they were to deliver a hundred hostages, whom Demetrius might select, except persons in office. This was not the demand which had roused their resistance. Demetrius retired from the siege in which he had now been engaged a whole year, after an immense loss of treasure and life, without any compensation but the equivocal title of *Poliorcetes* (the besieger): though it was more properly applied to him, than the name of *Helepolis* to his baffled engine. To the Rhodians there remained the consciousness of heroic efforts, in a noble cause, crowned with glorious success: and the pleasing duty, to fulfil their vows to the gods, and testify their gratitude to their benefactors. The theatre and temples rose again in more than their former beauty; statues were erected in honour of Cassander and Lysimachus. To Ptolemy something more was felt to be due. It is only surprising that the Athenian flattery of Demetrius did not divert them from the thought: but they obtained permission from the oracle of Ammon to confer divine honours on Ptolemy, and consecrated a piece of ground inclosed by a portico, under the name of the *Ptolemæum*. Their concluding transaction with Demetrius was a singular exchange of courtesy. Before he sailed away, they requested, and it seems obtained, some of his engines, as monuments

of his power, and — though this may have been only in their thoughts — of their own gallantry

While Demetrius was wasting his time and strength against Rhodes, Cassander had been making great progress in the conquest of northern Greece, and obtained possession of Corinth, which he consigned to the care of Prepelaus, and had laid siege to Athens. and Poly-sperchon had recovered the greater part of Achaia, Arcadia, and Argolis. Demetrius only waited to collect his forces, and sailing direct to Eubœa, entered the Euripus with a fleet of 330 sail — including perhaps the transports — and a numerous army. He expelled the Bœotian garrison from Chalcis, and pursued Cassander, who on the news of his approach had raised the siege of Athens, and retreated northward, as far as the Spercheus. Near Thermopylæ it seems an action took place between them, in which Cassander was defeated, Heraclea surrendered to the conqueror, and 6000 Macedonians deserted to him. On his return he received the submission of the Bœotian towns, and as he entered Attica, reduced Phyle and Panactum, which were still held by Cassander's garrisons. These were the presents — perhaps not less acceptable than the corn and timber — with which he greeted the Athenians on his entrance into Athens. If his presence did not awaken the same feelings as before, it was hailed with an appearance of even warmer enthusiasm. It was indeed difficult to invent new honours for him which could seem greater than those he had already received: but the flatterers imagined that he might be gratified with the profanation of what still remained most venerable in the eyes of the people. and it was decreed, that the Opisthodomus, the hinder cell of the Parthenon, should be assigned as his lodging. But the charm of novelty was past and he began to be sickened with the incense so prodigally offered. It might seem impossible to insult a people which had so far lost all respect for itself: and Demetrius perhaps did not think that he was giving offence, when he made the freest use of its hospitality,

and polluted the sacred dwelling by scenes of the coarsest debauchery. The most notorious courtesans of the day were the most decent, the least infamous of the inmates with whom he shared the temple of the virgin goddess, his elder sister, as he was used to call her ; and it seemed as if the people did not shudder at this desecration of their Holy of Holies. On the contrary the men who assumed to be its organs, went still a step farther, and proposed temples, and libations, and pæans, for his favourite mistresses, and his vilest parasites : a species of flattery however, in which the Thebans, it seems, had already led the way.¹ Demetrius himself was surprised rather than pleased, at the excess of their servility. It hurt his self-complacency to find himself the champion and protector of so degenerate a race : and he was heard to complain, that in his day there was no Athenian left who possessed any vigour or dignity of soul.

Yet indications were not wanting, which might have convinced him that feelings still survived, on which he was recklessly trampling, and which, though they might be stifled, did not cease to suffer : that there were men still worthy of the name of Athenians, who were painfully conscious of the public ignominy. A youth named Cleænnetus, whose father had incurred a penalty of fifty talents, obtained a written order from Demetrius that it should be remitted. The order was obeyed : yet for a moment the spirit of the people seemed to revive, and a decree was passed that no citizen should present a letter from Demetrius. Soon however it became known that the king had expressed vehement indignation at this faint outbreak of the manly spirit which he affected to regret ; and Stratocles flew to his post. He alarmed the people with a picture of the consequences that might follow from this rash step, and procured a decree, by which its authors were condemned to death or banishment, with a declaration which recognised the principle of Anaxarchus : that whatever king Demetrius should command, was agreeable to piety and justice. There

were still some bold enough to say, that Stratocles must be out of his senses, to propose such extravagant decrees. But Demochares — who knew that he was richly rewarded by Demetrius for his infamous services — remarked, that he would not be in his senses, if he were not out of them ¹. This sarcasm on a creature of Demetrius, touching as it did a secret of state-policy, could not be forgiven: a pretext was soon found on which he himself was condemned to exile.

So the winter passed away: with the return of spring (303) Demetrius started with his usual alacrity from the lap of pleasure, and again took the field. His first object was to recover Peloponnesus from Cassander, Polysperchon, and Ptolemy. The order of his operations is subject to much doubt: but it seems most probable that his first attempts were directed against Sicyon and Corinth. He had already the year before made himself master of Cenchreæ, and this seems to have suggested a stratagem, by which he surprised Sicyon. It appears that he advanced to some distance beyond the Isthmus, and then retreated with the main army to Cenchreæ, where he seemed to abandon himself entirely to pleasure. But he had left a body of mercenaries under Diodorus, with orders to move suddenly on Sicyon from the side of Pellene; the fleet, or a squadron, which lay in the Corinthian gulf, was directed at the same time to appear before the harbour: and he himself after a proper interval set out with the rest of his forces to support them. Diodorus, by a sudden night-attack, had taken the lower city: but the garrison made good their retreat to the citadel. Notwithstanding its strength the governor Philippus, either terrified by the besieger's engines, or won by his gold, surrendered to Demetrius on condition that the garrison should be allowed to re-

¹ Plutarch, Demetr. 24. *μαίνεται μὲν· οὐκ ἔστι μὴ μαίνεται*. Like the saying ascribed to Themistocles *αὐτολεμὸς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ αὐτολεμὸς*.

² So Polyænus, iv. 7. 3, and hence Droysen infers that the fleet had been ordered to sail round Peloponnesus. As we find no other object assigned for this long voyage, it seems rather improbable, and this feature may have been added to the stratagem by the narrator. Diodorus makes no mention of the fleet.

turn to Egypt. Demetrius then persuaded the inhabitants to abandon the lower town, and to transfer their dwellings to the table-mount on which the citadel stood, which from the steepness of its sides afforded the advantages of a natural stronghold, while the abundance of water, and the elevated position, rendered it a more agreeable residence. Demetrius rased the old town to the ground, and the new one was carried rapidly forward by the labour of his troops. It was for some time called after him Demetrias, and the inhabitants, delighted with the change in their situation, for which they willingly resigned the dangerous neighbourhood of the sea, honoured him with annual games and sacrifices as their founder. Their gratitude was the livelier as he left no garrison behind him. He then turned his arms against Corinth. Here he had partisans within, one of whom admitted his troops by night through a postern into the city. The garrison continued to hold the two citadels, the Sisypheum and the Acrocorinthus: but when he had stormed the Sisypheum, Prepelaus, despairing it is said of resistance, or using this pretext to cover the bribe he accepted¹, surrendered the impregnable Acrocorinthus on the same terms which had been granted to the garrison at Sicyon. His conduct was on every supposition dishonourable: yet he appears to have retained his master's confidence. Corinth was a point of too much importance to be risked for the sake of a name: and Demetrius probably suggested the request of the Corinthians which he most readily granted, that he would occupy it with his troops until he should have ended the war with Cassander. After the fall of these places, Polysperchon's garrisons were soon dislodged from the Achaian towns. At Ægium Strombichus the commander, and eighty of Polysperchon's partisans, were put to a cruel death, for which Strombichus alone appears to have given provocation by an insulting defiance of the conqueror. His operations were equally successful in Arcadia, where Mantinea alone offered resistance,

¹ According to Plutarch (*Dem.* 25.) a hundred talents.

and in Argolis. At Argos he made a long stay, not only to celebrate the Heræan games, but to solemnise his marriage with the princess Deidamia, whose brother Pyrrhus had been restored by Glaucias to the throne of Epirus, and as Cassander's mortal enemy was already closely allied in interest with Demetrius. Demetrius was now able to obey the directions which he had received from his father before he last quitted Greece; and he collected an assembly of deputies at Corinth, which in its numbers presented the appearance of a national congress. It invested him with the title which had been bestowed on Philip and Alexander at the same place, and voted a body of troops for his war with Cassander.

As the time spent in these transactions, and the order in which they succeeded each other, cannot be clearly ascertained¹, so the operations of Demetrius, immediately after the congress, which seems to have concluded his campaign in Peloponnesus, are involved in great obscurity. It would have seemed allowable to presume that he returned to Athens for the winter with Deidamia; but we find him elsewhere so early in the ensuing spring, and apparently on his return from a distant quarter, that it is difficult to believe he had been there only a month or two before.* Yet it is nearly certain that in the interval between the autumn of 303 and the spring of 302, he made an expedition to the west of Greece, which was in some way connected with the affairs of Leucas and Corcyra, and was in part directed against the Ætolians, notwithstanding the alliance which he had so lately contracted with them.² We know indeed that Corcyra had lately fallen into the hands of the Spartan adventurer, Cleonymus, who had been sent by the parent state to aid Tarentum in her wars with the Lucanians and the Romans: and Deme-

¹ Diodorus (xx. 102, 103.) only relates the operations on the coast of the Corinthian gulf. Plutarch (Dem 25) mentions the other points in a very confused manner. Droysen supposes that Sicyon, Corinth, and Achaia, were the last objects of attack chiefly, it seems, on account of the expression *ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑσπέραις* and the mention of the fleet in Polyænus.

² Athenæus, vi. 62, 63.

trius may have been tempted by the opportunity of effecting its deliverance, and thus establishing his influence there. His rupture with the Ætolians may have arisen out of his recent alliance with Epirus; and perhaps such an occasion would offer the best explanation of an expedition undertaken at such a season, and at a time when he was preparing to decide his contest with Cassander for the possession of Macedonia. However this may be, toward the end of March, 302, we find him again on his way to Athens, and announcing his approach in a letter to the people with an extraordinary demand, which shows that the impression which had been made on him during his second visit had not been weakened by his absence, and that he had learned to expect, as the price of freedom, unlimited compliance with his will. He had conceived a desire to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries, and to be admitted to their last stage: and he now requested that the whole might be despatched in the course of the next month, after which he designed to set out on his expedition to Macedonia. There were two difficulties in the way: the mysteries called the lesser, at which the initiations took place, were celebrated in the month Anthesterion, nearly answering to February: the greater, in Boëdromion, or September, when another step was taken by the candidate: but between this and the last, which introduced him to the *epopteia* — the full possession of all the secrets hidden in the recesses of the mystic sanctuary from profane curiosity — a year's probation was required by the law which had hitherto been held sacred. But it had already been decreed, that the will of Demetrius was the only measure of piety and justice: and Stratocles lighted on an expedient to reconcile it even with the letter of the law in most points. The next month was called Munychion: but a decree might change its name to Anthesterion: and when Demetrius had been initiated, it might by the same power be transformed into Boëdromion, and such a candidate might well be allowed to pass at once from the second degree to the last. This motion

was carried notwithstanding the opposition of the chief minister of the mysteries, the Torchbearer Pythodorus. Demetrius on his entrance was received with all the honours that could have been paid to a present deity : incense, garlands, libations, sacred hymns and dances. One of the poems sung on this occasion by a chorus, has happily been preserved : less remarkable perhaps for the profaneness of its flattery, in which it could not go beyond Stratocles, than for the boldness with which it avows an utter disbelief of the whole established system of religion. "The other gods are either far away, Or their ears are lacking, Or else they are not, or they heed not us. Thee we see before us : No form of wood or stone, but flesh and blood : " and it proceeds to pray, that he would grant peace to the world, and punish the rapacious Ætoliars, who had now begun to infest the distant coasts of Greece. If, after these honours, and the fruition of the mystic vision, Demetrius laid a tax of 250 talents on Athens, and, when it was collected, distributed it among his mistresses for their dressing-tables¹, or if he permitted them to extort money in his name, we cannot perhaps censure him as ungrateful : but we may reasonably be surprised that he should still have thought that he retained some claims on the gratitude of the Athenians.

In the meanwhile Cassander was aware of the danger that threatened him : he knew that Demetrius, having made himself master of Greece, meant to bring all his forces to bear on Macedonia, and he felt himself unable to resist the attack. Yet before he prepared for defence, he resolved to try the effect of an appeal to the moderation or prudence of Antigonus, and sent to propose terms of peace. The answer was dictated by the consciousness of an overwhelming power : "Cassander must submit to the pleasure of Antigonus : " there could be no peace between them on any other terms. But Cassander had not sunk so low, and perhaps had only

¹ *Εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ*, Plut. D m 27

made the experiment, that he might have a better claim to the aid of his allies. He invited Lysimachus to a conference, and they sent a common embassy to Ptolemy and Seleucus, to represent the danger with which all alike were threatened by the arrogant ambition of Antigonus, who, once master of Macedonia, would be able to overpower every rival. But the enemy was too near to let them wait for foreign succours, and they concerted a plan for a diversion, which might paralyse the movements of Demetrius. It was agreed that Lysimachus should cross over into Asia, with a division of Cassander's forces under Prepelaus, added to his own, to carry on an offensive war with Antigonus, while with the rest Cassander advanced to check the progress of Demetrius. In the spring of 302 Lysimachus executed his part of the treaty, and having crossed the Hellespont, began a series of operations in Asia Minor, the result of which will be hereafter related. Cassander moved into Thessaly, and sent a detachment forward to occupy Thermopylæ.

Demetrius had already assembled his land and sea forces at Chalcis, and now sailed into the gulf of Pagasæ, and made himself master of Larissa Cremastè, and several places in the south of Thessaly. Cassander strengthened the garrisons of Pheræ, and the Pthiotic Thebes, and was still at the head of an army of nearly 30,000 foot and 2000 horse. That of Demetrius was nearly double this number. The contingents of the Grecian states formed its main strength, amounting to 25,000 men: the remainder was composed of 8000 Macedonians, 15,000 mercenaries, 8000 light troops, chiefly the pirates who had served him in the war with Rhodes, and 1500 horse. The two armies remained long encamped in face of each other. Cassander from the sense of his weakness must have wished to avoid an engagement: but Demetrius, with fatal and inexplicable remissness, did not attempt to force him from his position: both were told waited for tidings from Asia,

where, it was seen, the struggle must finally be decided.¹ Demetrius was invited by a party at Phæræ to take possession of the town, and marching against it with a division of his forces, compelled Cassander's garrison to evacuate the citadel. This was the only use he made of his army in Thessaly. Lysimachus began his campaign with great success on the coast of the Propontis, and, having reduced several of the principal towns, sent Prepelaus to overrun Æolis and Ionia. He prepared to besiege Abydos, but a reinforcement sent to its aid by Demetrius induced him to abandon this design, and he quitted the coast to complete the conquest of the Hellespontine Phrygia, and then marched against Synnada, which was held by Docimus, the general of Antigonus, and contained large magazines, and a considerable treasure. He prevailed on Docimus to come over to his side, and thus became master of this important fortress. In the meantime Prepelaus had advanced to Ephesus, which surrendered without resistance. Here he found and released the Rhodian hostages, who had been left there by Demetrius. He

¹ Droysen has some judicious remarks on the conduct of Demetrius and Antigonus on this occasion. He observes, apparently with good reason, that Demetrius flung away his advantages, that he might have crushed Cassander and Lysimachus, and have enabled his father to meet Seleucus with an irresistibly superior force. The superiority of Demetrius however was owing it must be remembered, to the 25,000 men furnished by Greece. When therefore in a preceding page (179) Droysen represents the states of Greece as having lost almost all political importance, and observes that if the Macedonian chiefs still concerned themselves about what the Greeks said, it was merely their ancient renown and their intellectual culture that 'from time to time gave these little states the chimerical importance of powers, while in fact they were of no weight, except as staples of the civilisation which was to be carried over into Asia, as military posts in the struggle of parties, as objects of pity and magnanimity, on which it might be reputable for the possessors of power now and then to bestow the political aims of freedom'—this remark must be strictly confined to the individual states, and is only true to the extent, that no one state was of itself any longer politically important. But though in this sense the remark is true, it is one of those half-truths, which are more likely to mislead than to benefit the reader,—especially when expressed in such ambiguous language, which might easily tempt him to apply it to the whole of Greece. "What the Greeks said," so far as it indicated the side on which they would throw their weight, was still a matter of the greatest political importance. It was not for the sake of a name that the possession of Greece was so eagerly coveted by the Macedonian rulers, and became the object of such long and obstinate contests. We see that in return for the political aims of freedom the Greeks were able to furnish their benefactor with a force which, properly employed, would have made him master of Alexander's empire.

did not impose a garrison in the city, but burnt all the ships in the harbour, which were useless while the enemy commanded the sea. Teos and Colophon likewise yielded to him: but Erythræ and Clazomenæ received succours from Demetrius, which enabled them to repel his attacks, and having ravaged their territories, he moved against Sardis. Here Phoenix imitated the example of Docimus, and surrendered the town; but its impregnable citadel was commanded by Philippos, who remained faithful to Antigonus.

Antigonus was still at his new capital on the Orontes, in profound security, and had made great preparations to celebrate the completion of his work with magnificent games, when he received the unexpected tidings, that Lysimachus had crossed the Hellespont. He immediately broke up the festival, and dismissing the competitors and the artists he had collected with royal presents, hastened to the defence of his dominions. He moved by forced marches into Cilicia, and at Tarsus gave three months' pay in advance to his troops, and drew 3000 talents from the treasury at Quinda. He then crossed the Taurus, and entered Cappadocia. The approach of Lysimachus had excited a general revolt in the Upper Phrygia and Lycaonia, but the presence of Antigonus reduced both provinces to obedience: and Lysimachus determined to wait for the arrival of Seleucus, to take up a strongly fortified position, and remain on the defensive. Antigonus came up, and having vainly endeavoured to draw him into an engagement, began to intercept his supplies. Lysimachus was forced to decamp, and by a forced march of some fifty miles reached the fruitful plain of Dorylæum, on the banks of the Thimbres and the Sangarius, where he again intrenched himself. But he was pursued by Antigonus, who finding that he still declined a battle, proceeded to inclose his camp with lines of circumvallation. Lysimachus, failing in all his attempts to obstruct the progress of the enemy's works, and seeing himself threatened with famine, took

advantage of a stormy night, to withdraw unobserved, and crossed the mountains into Bithynia. Antigonus, when he discovered his escape, attempted to overtake him, by a different route, which traversed the plains north of the Sangarius. But it was now late in the autumn: heavy rains broke up the roads, and subjected his troops to great hardships and losses: so that he found himself obliged to abandon the pursuit, and to retire into winter-quarters, doubtless in some part of Phrygia. He had hoped to strike a decisive blow before the arrival of Seleucus, who was so far on his way from the East that he might be expected to appear on the theatre of war very early in the following spring. He had now reason to fear that his forces would be unequal to the approaching contest, and he therefore sent a message to Demetrius, directing him to come over to Asia, with all his forces, without delay. Lysimachus took up his winter-quarters in the plain of Salon, in the interior of Bithynia, which was famed for its rich pastures¹, and he entered into a connection with Heraclea, which enabled him to draw abundant supplies from the coast of the Euxine. Heraclea was at this time governed by Amastris, whom Craterus on his marriage with Phila had transferred to its tyrant Dionysius.² Her character, no less than her position, rendered her alliance extremely desirable for Lysimachus; and he solicited and obtained her hand.

Demetrius, as soon as he received his father's orders, which probably arrived not long after he had taken Phæræ, entered into negotiation with Cassander, and concluded a treaty, which however was not to be valid unless it should be ratified by Antigonus. His object was to prevent Cassander from profiting by his absence: and one of the articles provided that all Greek cities, as well in Europe as in Asia, should remain independent. Cassander, who only wished to be delivered as soon as possible from the presence of his formidable enemy, assented to his proposals: and Demetrius, when he had

¹ Strabo xii. p. 565.² Memnon ap. Phot. p. 224. a.

collected a sufficient number of transports, embarked with all his troops for Asia. He directed his course to Ephesus, and, having encamped near the walls, soon compelled the town to submit, and the garrison to evacuate the citadel, which, in spite of the recent treaty, he occupied with his own troops. He then marched toward the Hellespont, and recovered most of the places which had fallen into the hands of Lysimachus: and proceeding to the mouth of the Euxine, left 3000 men in a fortified camp, with a squadron of thirty galleys, to secure the passage, and immediately afterwards distributed the remainder of his army in winter quarters among the Hellespontine cities. Cassander no sooner saw the field clear, than he began to recover the places which he had lost in Thessaly: at the same time he sent his brother Pleistarchus, with 12,000 foot and 500 horse, to the aid of Lysimachus. Pleistarchus marched to the Bosphorus, but finding it guarded by the squadron left by Demetrius, he proceeded to Odesus, and collected transports to carry his troops over to Heraclea. But being unable to procure a sufficient number of vessels, he divided his army into three bodies, which embarked in succession, himself accompanying the last. The first only arrived in safety: the second was intercepted by the squadron of the Bosphorus: and the third was overtaken near the coast of Asia by a storm, in which the greater part were lost. The galley in which Pleistarchus himself sailed, was wrecked; and he narrowly escaped on a plank. After a short repose at Heraclea, he repaired to the winter-quarters of Lysimachus.

During these transactions Ptolemy had not been inactive; but though he had readily promised his aid to Cassander and Lysimachus, he showed little concern for their interests. He indeed made an expedition into Syria, when Antigonus had left it, but only that he might reduce it under his own dominion. He had made himself master of Cœlo-Syria, and was engaged in the siege of Sidon, when a report was spread, that

Lysimachus and Seleucus had been defeated by Antigonus and had retreated to Heraclea, and that Antigonus was on his march toward Syria. One might be inclined to suspect that Ptolemy himself had forged this news, for the sake of a pretext under which he might decently return to Egypt. The season was probably so far advanced that he could not hope to make himself master of Sidon that year, and he clearly wished to keep aloof from the great struggle which was about to take place, and to reserve himself with undiminished forces for the conqueror. He therefore pretended to be deceived by the false alarm, hastily concluded an armistice for four months with the Sidonians, and having left garrisons in the conquered cities, returned to his own kingdom.

The eyes of men were now bent most anxiously on the movements of Seleucus. During the interval which had elapsed since his return to Babylon, he had subjected to his rule all the provinces of Alexander's empire east of the Euphrates, and it seems had penetrated into India even beyond the limits which Alexander had reached. But this great expedition was destined to be known to us only from its results. Scarcely a single fact relating to it has been preserved from oblivion. We learn however that in India he was engaged in war with a powerful prince named Sandrocottus, who from an obscure condition had become the ruler of a mighty empire, but that he afterwards contracted an alliance with him, as the price of which he received 500 elephants. It is probable that he ceded all the conquests made either by Alexander or himself, east of the Indus, and even the territory lying between the upper Indus and the mountains to his new ally, whose friendship was likely at this period to be more useful to him than the possession of those remote provinces. He foresaw that on his return to the West he should be forced to stake all he had acquired in a struggle with Antigonus: and the embassy of Cassander and Lysimachus can have done no more than quicken his move-

ments. We do not know where it found him : but it was already winter, and perhaps the year 301, when he entered Cappadocia, where he halted to wait for the spring, having provided his troops with strong tents, to winter in the field. He came at the head of 20,000 foot, 12,000 horse, 480 elephants, and more than a hundred war-chariots.

Yet it appears that alone he would not have been able to withstand the united forces of Demetrius and Antigonus, and that it could not have been difficult for them to prevent his junction with Lysimachus, on which the issue of the next campaign would mainly depend. The loss of the remaining books of Diodorus leaves us wholly uninformed as to the movements of the belligerents before the summer, when we find Lysimachus and Seleucus together, and offering battle to Antigonus and Demetrius. If we might venture to refer a stratagem of Seleucus, reported by Polyænus¹, which has been supposed to belong to an expedition of Antigonus, of which we find no trace in history, to this period, we might conjecture that before Demetrius joined his father, Seleucus had gained some advantage over Antigonus, which, though of no moment in itself, opened a passage for Lysimachus to unite his forces with those of his ally. It was however near the little town of Ipsus in Phrygia, that the decisive battle took place. The combined forces of Seleucus and Lysimachus included 64,000 foot, and not less, it seems, than 12,500 horse, besides the elephants and the war-chariots. Those of the rival kings numbered 70,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and 75 elephants. Demetrius was accompanied by the young king of Epirus, who had come as a fugitive to his camp, having been driven from his dominions by a revolt which broke out — kindled possibly by the intrigues of Cassander — while, believing his authority firmly established, he was on a visit at the court of Glaucias, to be present at a marriage of one of the royal family.

Antigonus was now eighty years old. Yet the vigour both of his body and his mind were but little impaired. He had been wont to speak with contempt of the coalition formed against him : it was a flight of sparrows, which he would scatter with a single cast of a stone, and the sound of his voice. He disdained to resort to the arts of negotiation, by which he might perhaps have separated them with a still slighter effort, if he would have condescended to hold out the lure of moderate concessions to each. But he could not bear to part with the thought, which he had so long cherished, and once had so nearly realised, of a universal monarchy. Yet now, on the eve of the momentous conflict, he felt his haughty spirit weighed down by forebodings, which he betrayed by a marked change in his air and demeanour. Hitherto in the presence of an enemy, his loud voice, his high language, his ready jests, had been used to inspire his troops with his own never-failing confidence. Now he was observed to be thoughtful, grave, seldom breaking silence. He even presented Demetrius to the army as his successor : and for the first time in his life admitted him to secret consultations in his tent : an indication that he, who had never before disclosed his plans, until he gave his orders, now felt himself in want of advice. Demetrius too in the night before the battle had an inauspicious dream. Alexander had appeared to him, armed for combat ; had asked the watchword, and then declared that he was going over to the enemy. On the morning of the eventful day, Antigonus, as he stepped out of his tent to see his line formed, stumbled and fell prostrate. When he had recovered himself, he lifted his hands to heaven, and implored the gods to give him victory, or death before he was conscious of defeat.

The battle seems to have been decided chiefly through the impetuosity of Demetrius and the mass of the enemy's elephants. He had routed the cavalry opposed to him, which was headed by Antiochus, the son of Seleucus. While he was engaged in the pursuit, the ele-

phants moved forward, and interposed an impenetrable mass between him and the phalanx. Seleucus seized the opportunity to hover with the remainder of his horse on the flank which was left exposed, never coming to a charge, but repeating his threatening demonstrations, until he had thrown it into disorder. It would seem as if he must have had some secret intelligence, which led him to expect the result that ensued. One wing broke away from the rest, and came over to his side. This desertion spread terror and confusion among the ranks. Pyrrhus gave the first proofs of the impetuous valour which he afterwards displayed in so many happier fields, and for a time thought himself victorious: but the day was irrecoverably lost. He was hurried along in the general flight. The prayer of Antigonus seemed to have been heard. He still kept his ground after he had been deserted by all but a few of his officers. As the enemy came up, one of his attendants exclaimed, "It is against you, sir, they are making." "Why, who else," replied the old man, "should be the mark? But Demetrius will soon be here to the rescue." While he looked round him in vain for his son, a shower of darts fell, and many pierced him at once with mortal wounds. His followers fled, all but a Larissean, named Thorax, who remained by the corpse. It was interred by the victors with royal obsequies.

Demetrius made his escape from the field accompanied by Pyrrhus, with 5000 foot, and 40,000 horse, and directed his march with the utmost speed toward Ephesus. The Ephesians trembled, lest, at a time when he had such urgent need of money, he should be tempted by the treasures of their temple. But it seems that he did not feel himself yet driven to such an expedient, and was only anxious that the sacrilege should not be committed by his soldiers without benefit to himself; and on this account put them immediately on board the fleet, which lay in the harbour, and sailed away, leaving a garrison under the command of the

Ephesian Diodorus.¹ His first care was the discharge of a pious duty, which however happened to coincide with his interest. His mother Stratonice had been left by Antigonus at Tarsus: and there was also a treasure which might still be saved from the enemy's hands. He therefore made for Cilicia, took his mother and the treasure on board, and carried them over to Cyprus, where his wife Phila was residing.² He was of too sanguine a temper, and had too high an opinion of his own merit to be easily cast down by any reverse of fortune. He looked to Greece, as still his own, and as ground where he might maintain an independent position, until an opportunity should occur for new enterprises. He therefore bent his course to Athens; there he had left a part of his fleet, including a galley of thirteen banks of oars, the remains of his treasure, and his wife Deidamia: and its situation was the most opportune for any movements which his prospects might require. But before he reached the coast of Caria, he received intelligence that Diodorus had agreed, for a bribe of fifty talents, to betray Ephesus to Lysimachus. He therefore steered with a part of his fleet toward Ephesus, and leaving the rest at anchor behind the nearest headland, made for the mouth of the harbour with a single galley, in which a trusty officer, named Nicanor, appeared as commander, while he himself remained below. Nicanor invited Diodorus to a conference on the subject of the garrison, as if apprised of his design, and disposed to second it. Diodorus came to the ship's side in a boat; Demetrius then made his appearance, sank the boat, and took all the crew prisoners, and landing secured possession of the place.³ He now struck across the *Ægean* towards Attica: but before he reached it he was destined to a bitter disappointment. As he passed through the Cyclades, he was met by

¹ Probably the same person who is mentioned by *Polymenus*, vi. 49. Whether he was the officer whom Demetrius employed in the attack on *Siryon*, is doubtful.

² *Diodorus*, xxi. *Eclog* i. p. 489.

³ *Polymenus*, iv. 7. 4.

Athenian envoys, who begged him not to proceed toward Athens, since the people had decreed that none of the kings should be admitted within the city, and had escorted his wife Deidamia, with all the honours due to her high station, to Megara. This treatment, we are informed, wounded Demetrius more deeply than any of his late disasters : he had borne them with serenity and cheerfulness : but he was almost stunned by this unexpected blow, and could scarcely recover composure enough to send an answer suited to his altered circumstances, which did not permit him to resent it, gently complaining of their conduct, and requesting that they would restore his ships. This request was granted ; and he proceeded to the Isthmus, where he found that the event of the battle had produced as unfavourable an effect on the state of his affairs in Peloponnesus, as it had at Athens.

All that can surprise us in the transaction is the degree to which he must have been blinded by inordinate vanity, when he expected a different reception from the Athenians. It would seem as if he had forgotten everything that had occurred since the time when he first presented himself as the liberator of Athens and of Greece : or as Plutarch suggests, that he remembered only the honours he had received, and not the manner in which he had requited them. If the Athenians had deserved to be treated as the vilest of his slaves, if they had offered their necks, before he trampled on them, if the servility which disgraced them was properly to be attributed to the sentiments of the whole people, and not to the arts of a few of his own parasites, how could he believe that a people so utterly degraded should be capable of such generous constancy, as to adhere to him in his fallen fortunes ? If they still retained so much virtue, and if the old Athenian spirit was not altogether extinct, it was certainly not a friendly welcome, but rather the language of indignation, scorn, and loathing, which he would have expected, if he had ever viewed his own conduct

in its true light. The behaviour of the Athenians was in every respect wise and becoming, and might have been called noble, if it had been less prudent.

After the battle, it remained for the conquerors to divide the spoil. The dominions of Antigonus were actually in the hands of Seleucus and Lysimachus, and they alone had achieved the victory. It does not appear that they consulted either of their allies on the partition, though it seems that they obtained the assent of Cassander. They agreed to share all that Antigonus had possessed between themselves. It is not clear on what principle the line of demarcation was drawn, nor is it possible to trace it. But the greater part of Asia Minor was given to Lysimachus. The portion of Seleucus included not only the whole country between the coast of Syria and the Euphrates, but also, it seems, a part of Phrygia and of Cappadocia.¹ Cilicia was assigned to Cassander's brother Pleistarchus. With regard to Syria however a difficulty remained. The greater part of it had, as we have seen, been conquered by Ptolemy: Tyre and Sidon alone were still occupied by the garrisons of Antigonus. Ptolemy had at least as good a right as his ally to all that he possessed: though we do not find sufficient ground to believe, that Syria had been ceded to him by Seleucus, before the last campaign, as the price of his assistance, by formal treaty.² Seleucus however began to take possession of it, and when Ptolemy pressed his claims returned an answer, mild in sound, but threatening in its import, to the effect that for the present, out of regard to their friendship, he would take no farther steps, but at a future time would consider how he should deal with his friends, whose views of aggrandizement interfered

¹ Appian, Syr 55

² As Droysen would infer from the argument of the Egyptian ambassadors reported by Polybius (v 67), which does not require such an interpretation. It seems indeed hardly to be reconciled with the language of Seleucus in Diodorus (Man, ii p 43.): *δίναιοι εἶναι τοὺς τῇ παρατυχίᾳ κερταμένους αὐτοῦς ὑπαρχειν τῶν δευτέρων*. This sounds very much as if there had been no such previous treaty.

with his interests¹: and it appears that Ptolemy was induced to withdraw his opposition.

There were however also some native princes, who had taken advantage of the contests between the Macedonian chiefs, to establish their authority over extensive territories in the west of Asia. Ardoates was master of Armenia with the title of king; so independent that he not only gave shelter to Ariarathes, the son of the Cappadocian prince who was put to death by Perdiccas, but while the struggle between Antigonus and Seleucus was in suspense, enabled him to recover his hereditary dominions.² At an earlier period Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzanes, who traced his descent from the royal house of Persia, had lived for a time under the protection of Antigonus, as the companion of his son. It appears that he betrayed aspiring views, which excited his patron's jealousy, and it is said that a dream, the natural effect of such suspicions, determined Antigonus, who, as we see from the history of Seleucus, was not free from superstition, to despatch him. But he disclosed his purpose to Demetrius, who was generous enough to give timely warning to his friend.³ Mithridates made his escape to Paphlagonia, on the Pontic Cappadocia, and became the founder of the dynasty which defied and shook the power of Rome. He afterwards, it seems, submitted to Antigonus, and was permitted to possess some districts near the Propontis: and here the fate which he had avoided overtook him. When Lysimachus crossed over into Asia, Mithridates, as was to be expected, espoused his cause, and fell by the hands of assassins, employed either by Antigonus or Demetrius. His son succeeded to his dominions.⁴ Both

¹ So I understand the words which immediately follow those quoted from Diodorus in the preceding note *περὶ δὲ τῆς κοιλῆς Συρίας διὰ τὴν φίλιαν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος μηδὲν πολυπραγμονήσας* (so Droysen reads for *πολυπραγμονήσας*)—*βούλεται δὲ βουλευμένῳ πῶς χρῆσται ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων τοῖς βουλευμένοις πλινκιστῶν*. Droysen however interprets them not as a threat, but a friendly promise; and supposes that it was the intention of Seleucus to give Cyprus to Ptolemy as a compensation for Phœnicia.

² Diodorus, xxxi. Eclog. iii. p. 517 sq.

³ Plut. Demetr. 4.

⁴ Diodor. xx. lili,

Lysimachus and Seleucus were too much engaged with other affairs, to disturb any of these powerful neighbours.

So far as regards Asia, the battle of Ipsus must be considered as a disastrous event. Not because it transferred the power of Antigonos into different hands, nor because it would have been more desirable that he should have triumphed over Seleucus. But the new distribution of territory led to calamitous consequences, which might perhaps otherwise have been averted. If the empire of Seleucus had remained confined between the Indus and the Euphrates, it might have subsisted much longer, at least, as a barrier against the inroads of the barbarians, who at last obliterated all the traces of European civilisation left there by Alexander and his successors. But shortly after his victory, Seleucus founded his new capital on the Orontes, called, after his father, Antiochia, peopling it with the inhabitants of Antigonina.¹ It became the residence of his dynasty, and grew, while their vast empire dwindled into the Syrian monarchy.

For the prospects of Greece, on the other hand, the fall of Antigonos must clearly be accounted an advantage, so far as the effect was to dismember his territory, and to distribute it so that the most powerful of his successors was at the greatest distance. It was a gain that Macedonia was left an independent kingdom, within its ancient limits, and bounded on the north by a state of superior strength. It does not appear that any compact was made between Cassander and his allies as to the possession of Greece. It was probably understood, that he should keep whatever he might acquire there. It may be doubted, whether the forces of Greece, if they had been united and well directed, would not have been quite sufficient at this time to cope with those of Macedonia. Nor is it likely that any of Cassander's allies would have interfered to promote his

¹ Strabo, xvi. p. 355. Tauchn.

aggrandisement. But the only man who could have united the Greeks, as a free people, in resistance to Macedonia, was Demetrius. If he had been worthy of the opportunity which now offered itself, a new era might have opened for Greece. But he had forfeited the confidence of the nation: no Greek who loved his country could care much whether he or Cassander might prevail. All that was certain was that Greece must shortly become the scene of a fresh contest, in which her strength would be wasted, without a chance of reward or even the illusion of hope.

END OF THE SEVENTH VOLUME.

LONDON
A and G. A. SPOTTISWOODE,
New-street-Square